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Chapter 1 
 
Debates about the Role of Civil Society in Development  
 
1.1 Objectives and Themes 
This book centres on a Gramscian analysis of the changing position of civil 
society in Tanzania following the liberalization of the economy, which was 
accompanied by the move to multiparty liberal democracy during the 1990s. 
The research analyses, in particular, how these substantive shifts in the 
political economy of Tanzania have led to conflicts in the sphere of civil 
society where clear distinctions are made between which groups should, and 
which should not, play a meaningful role in national policy-making processes. 
How these changes are having mutually contrasting effects on the 
participation of two types of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), namely 
trade unions and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), in national 
policy-making processes is examined as fieldwork-based case studies. There is 
also an analysis of whether trade unions and NGOs have a sense of ownership 
of national policies, as a result of their modes of participation in policy-
making processes. This focus derives from the importance accorded to these 
concepts by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), which have largely 
driven the liberalization of the economy and the move to multiparty 
democracy in Tanzania.  
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To accomplish these aims an overarching research question was posited: 
How and why have trade unions been largely excluded from ‘civil 
society’ as it has been constituted practically and rhetorically in post-
liberalization Tanzania? 
 
This in turn necessitated examining four sub-questions: 
1. Are Tanzanian trade unions representatives of a labour aristocracy in the 
form of a decreasing number of wage labourers in the formal sector? 
2. What possibilities exist for trade unions to embrace 'social movement 
unionism’ by forming effective alliances with other associational groups 
in Tanzania? 
3. How and why have NGOs been able to dominate ‘civil society’ input to 
national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania? 
4 How have trade unions and NGOs been included in the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) process and with what outcomes? 
  
1.2 Civil society in Tanzania as a Case Study 
Tanzania has become an IFI show-case, portrayed as ‘one of the best 
performers in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2010b: 1). For the IMF (Nord 
et al 2009: 1), Tanzania has experienced a ‘remarkable turnaround’ 
characterized by ‘buoyant’ economic growth, ‘booming’ exports and poverty 
‘heading downwards.’  Tanzania was listed as one of the top ten reformers in 
the World Bank’s ‘Pro-Business List’ for 1996 (IFC, World Bank, 1996) and is 
currently ranked as the best country in Africa in terms of enforcing contracts 
(International Finance Corporation, World Bank, 2011). For the Tanzanian 
High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, (Kallaghe, 2010) Tanzania is a 
 12 
 
‘rising star’ in Africa and has a ‘robust economy.’ Moreover, the Mo Ibrahim 
Index of African Governance (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2010) rates Tanzania 
as the best governed country in East Africa and 12th out of 53 countries ranked 
Continent-wide. For the donor community, ‘Tanzania serves as evidence that 
ownership can be constructed through partnership between state and donors’ 
(Harrison, Mulley and Holtom 2009: 295). 1 
 
This depiction of Tanzania as a recent ‘success story’ in developmental terms 
has been problematized in this research through an analysis of changes in civil 
society. The activities of civil society organizations were circumscribed 
following the formal move to a one-party state four years after Tanzania 
gained independence from Britain in 1961. The state maintained firm control 
over civil society from this period until the adoption of the neo-liberal 
economic policies and multiparty liberal democracy during the 1990s. In the 
post-liberalization period civil society has become an arena of struggle in 
which different types of associational groups have contested the newly 
available policy spaces. However, only a relatively small number of NGOs 
have managed to play an active role in national policy-making processes, to a 
large extent championed and financed by external donors. While the donors 
argue that their support and funding is important in constituting and cementing 
a vibrant and varied civil society (Mercer, 1999), this view sits uneasily with 
their failure in practice to assist and include other types of associational 
groups, such as trade unions. The hegemony of neo-liberal policies in 
Tanzania, driven by the IFIs, has been consolidated with the active consent, in 
                                                           
1
  Key development indicators are listed in Figure 1.1 at the end of the chapter. Below this, a map showing the 
large geographical area of Tanzania, which is important to the debate concerning the role of a wide number of 
civil society organizations in national policy processes, is provided in Figure 1.2 
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Gramscian terms, of most of the leading NGOs working in the country since 
the 1990s, which take part in national policy-making debates through forums 
created by the IFIs and the government, such as the PRSP process, thus 
conferring on them legitimacy (see chapter 4). In contrast, associational 
groups such as trade unions, which put forward counter-hegemonic 
perspectives, unwelcome to the state, such as the need for tighter regulations 
regarding the entry of foreign firms into the domestic economy, are 
subordinated and struggle to play any role in the formation of national policies 
(see chapter 5). Both the winning of active consent from civil society groups 
and the subordination (or elimination) of those providing counter-hegemonic 
perspectives are equally important in achieving hegemony (Gramsci, 2011b). 
These two strategies have been used by the state in post-liberalization 
Tanzania. For the purposes of this research, hegemony is regarded as being the 
rule within a culturally diverse society of one group, through the manipulation 
of the beliefs, values and perceptions of subaltern classes, so that its 
worldview is accepted as a universally valid ideology. The resulting status quo 
is perceived by all as benefitting the whole society, whilst in reality only the 
ruling group gain (Gramsci, 2011b).  
 
Trade unions face a narrow range of possibilities in confronting the hegemonic 
discourse of neo-liberalism. Revolutionary unionism, through concerted 
militant confrontations with neo-liberal hegemony, along with a fully worked-
out vision for alternative economic and political policies, is improbable in 
Tanzania, given the emasculation of the movement by the state for thirty years 
following independence from Britain in 1961. Another option for the labour 
movement is to embrace social movement unionism by going beyond the 
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workplace to form strategic alliances with other civil society organizations, 
thus creating a ‘historic bloc’ of oppositional groups in Gramscian terms, 
capable of forming counter-hegemonic discourses and promulgating them 
through institutions which determine the thinking and actions of individuals 
and groups within society (Gramsci, 2011b). This scenario has precedents in 
pre-colonial history (see chapter 3) but after becoming quasi-governmental 
organizations, as part of state-led development policies in post-independence 
Tanzania, trade unions have formed few meaningful relationships with other 
civil society organizations (see chapter 5). Thus, while a shift to social 
movement unionism has attractions for the labour movement its realization is 
problematic.  
 
1.3 The Changing Development Context for Civil Society in Tanzania 
following the rise of Neo-liberalism 
The change on the part of the Tanzanian government during the 1990s, 
manifested in its liberalization of the economy and adoption of multiparty 
liberal democracy after three decades of statist dirigisme, can best be 
understood through an examination of the rise to a hegemonic position of neo-
liberalism globally, driven by powerful development actors and institutions, 
notably the IFIs.  These institutions made the acceptance of neo-liberal 
policies, in return for provision of official development assistance and debt 
relief, difficult to avoid for an aid-dependent country such as Tanzania.2 These 
major policy shifts have led to civil society organizations facing a new set of 
circumstances involving an ideological and physical restructuring of their 
relationships with the state, private enterprise and supranational organizations. 
                                                           
2
 See chapter 3. 
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Neo-liberalism can be defined as a ‘theory of political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade 
(Harvey, 2009: 2). Neo-liberal policies rose to prominence in the early 1980s 
with the accession to political power of Thatcher (1979-1990) in Britain and 
Reagan (1980-1988) in the US and the increasing influence of Milton 
Friedman and the Chicago school of economists (Mirowski and Plehwe eds, 
2009, Friedman, 1968, Friedman and Heller, 1969), advocating monetarist 
economic policies. 
 
Neo-liberals mounted a concerted attack on pro-state positions throughout the 
1980s, based on a distrust of the public sector and an emphasis on the negative 
effects the state was having on the development process (Little, 1982). 
According to neo-liberals, the fundamental problem with the public sector – 
which maintained an iron grip on development policies for three decades in 
Tanzania following independence - is the lack of institutional incentives to 
ensure that self-interested bureaucrats behave in ways that enhance the public 
good (Hayek, 1988).  State control of the economy inevitably leads to rent 
seeking (Lal 1997, Kreuger 1974) and other forms of Directly Unproductive, 
Profit-seeking (DUP) behaviour (Bhagwati 1982). Bates (2005: 8) sums up 
this position in the context of Africa with the argument that ‘states distort 
incentives out of regard for their own needs and those of powerful interests in 
their own societies.’ Even where corruption is not a major problem, neo-
liberals argue that public sector officials cannot know enough to predict 
markets and ‘pick winners’ (UNCTAD, 2007) and that informational 
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asymmetry inevitably results since ‘the totality of resources that one could 
employ in such a plan is simply not knowable to anybody, and therefore can 
hardly be centrally controlled’ (Bauer, 1988: 85). 
 
Neo-liberals argue that policy-making should be in the hands of independent 
institutions, such as central banks, staffed by well-trained technocrats 
(Easterly, 2002). The IFIs employ such technocrats and argue that they are 
thus able to put forward universally appropriate policies, signatories to which 
gain the confidence of domestic and foreign investors. In this way the IFIs 
assist in closing the ‘expertise gap’ in developing countries. In sum, the neo-
liberal position is that, ‘independent domestic and international policy-making 
institutions ensure that governments pursue economic policies that promote 
long term economic development [and] prosperity’ (Chang and Grabel 2004: 
48).  
 
For neo-liberals, the market mechanism is posited as aligning self-interest 
with the social good (Myint, 1987). Thus, the optimal role of the state should 
be limited only to the provision of essential public goods – law and order, 
defence, education and possibly health; ‘beyond that, economic activities are 
best left to private agents’ (Lal, 1997: 225). These attacks on arguments in 
favour of a leading role for the state as an agent of development during the 
1980s, led to Williamson (2000) devising a list of specific strategies in 1989 
(the Washington Consensus) to overcome problems caused by the previous 
decade of  ‘de-development’ in Latin America, which has become a neo-
liberal template. 
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Figure 1.1  The Washington Consensus: Key Policy Reforms 
(i) Fiscal discipline 
(ii) Redirection of public expenditure priorities to areas offering high 
economic returns and potentially better income distribution, such as 
primary health care, primary education and infrastructure 
(iii) Tax reform 
(iv) Liberalization of interest rates 
(v) Competitive exchange rates 
(vi) Liberalization of trade 
(vii) Liberalization of inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
(viii) Increased privatization 
(ix) Deregulation  (abolition of barriers such as quotas, tariffs and 
embargoes) 
(x) Protection of property rights 
Source: Williamson (2000) 
 
The Washington Consensus influenced the content of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs), which had been introduced in many developing 
countries from the early 1980s (Karcher, 2001). SAPs were introduced to 
remedy the perceived over-extension of the state in Africa and to stop private 
enterprise being crowded-out by the public sector. This was posited as creating 
the conditions for the (re)-establishment of ‘homo economicus’ (Bernstein, 
2004) in Africa; workers driven by profit maximization and able to achieve 
this within the institutional conditions of assured property rights and 
allocatively efficient markets. Inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and 
international trade were strongly encouraged, while wages were to be set by 
the market mechanism.   
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Around the same time as Williamson’s work was published, the World Bank 
(1989) brought out a report (Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable 
Growth) which cited the ‘crisis of governance’ as being a significant factor 
contributing to the hitherto disappointing results of SAPs. The report (1989: 5) 
emphasized that in Africa there was a need for ‘not just less government but 
better government – government that concentrates its efforts less on direct 
interventions and more on enabling others to be productive.’ This was a 
formative influence on the 1990s move to a focus on ‘good governance’ in 
developing countries, in the form of improved public sector management, the 
creation of robust legal frameworks, increased accountability of public 
servants and better transparency of public administration, which has come to 
be accepted by the IFIs as the political remedy for development problems 
(Minogue, 2002). The attempts to engender neo-liberal economic policies 
based on private-sector growth along with multiparty liberal democracy in 
developing countries has been termed the ‘New Policy Agenda’ of the major 
Western multilateral and bilateral donors and involve a substantive role for 
civil society in coalescing and advocating the views of citizens. 3  
 
However, by the second half of the 1990s, growth outcomes for countries that 
had adopted both aspects of the New Policy Agenda were generally poor. 
Poverty reduction had not happened to any great extent, if at all. Moreover, the 
liberalization of domestic finance and international capital flows had been 
partly responsible for global crises, such as Asia in 1997 (Basu, 2006, Chang, 
                                                           
3
 Although the details of the New Policy Agenda vary from donor agency to another a key role is assigned to 
NGOs in the democratization process. NGOs are an integral part of a vibrant civil society and the promotion 
of pluralism (Hulme and Edwards, 1996). See chapters 3 and 4 in particular for details of the growing 
influence of NGOs on development policies in post-liberalization Tanzania. 
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2005, Wade, 1998). Both market and institution failures had occurred in many 
of those that had applied Washington Consensus policies. This led to a shift to 
a Post-Washington Consensus in the form of wider policy prescriptions based 
on trying to remedy market and institution failure.  These changes have 
become the focus of a battle between orthodox policy makers (senior officials 
at the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO) and critics (Jomo and Fine eds, 
2006, Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus eds, 2001), who want the abandonment of 
the model on the basis that its policy prescriptions are fundamentally flawed. 
 
The World Bank, IMF and WTO want to build on what they consider to be the 
successes of ‘first-generation’ Washington Consensus policies and introduce 
‘second-generation’ reforms, centring on increasing the efficiency and 
durability of institutions in the development process in a bid to reduce poverty 
and inequality (Kuczynski and Williamson, 2003, Kanbur, 1999, Burki and 
Perry, 1998). This has led to the World Bank broadening the range of its 
activities from the economic to the political, social and cultural spheres and 
promoting a stronger regulatory role for the state when pursuing market-
oriented reforms. The stress is on a more accommodating ‘knowledge bank’ 
(Kapur, 2006, Cohen and Laporte, 2004) advocating national ownership of 
policies based on the vigorous participation of civil society organizations in 
their formulation (Pincus and Winters, 2002).  
 
The Post-Washington Consensus concentrates on four main aspects of the 
development process: addressing institution and market failure, promoting the 
information-theoretic paradigm, creating a new governance model and 
developing human and social capital. The latter two of these four elements 
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have been particularly important in providing new opportunities for civil 
society organizations to contest national policy-making processes. 
 
Regarding the first of these aspects, institution and market failure, the reaction 
to the lack of success of the original Washington Consensus led to the creation 
of an ‘augmented’ version based on broader and deeper institutional reform 
packages (Rodrik, 2006). 4 The policies resulting from these reforms are 
empirically at odds with the historical experiences of developed countries, 
since they reflect their contemporary institutional structures and processes 
rather than those that pertained during the early stages of development. 5 
Overall, the ‘augmented’ version of the Washington Consensus is based on a 
lengthy, vague and technical set of policy prescriptions, which do not 
accommodate the historical specificity of development processes in individual 
countries and fail to recognise ‘that institutional reform is deeply political’ 
(Khan, 2002: 36). 
 
Second, an information-theoretic ‘paradigm’ (Stiglitz, 2010, 2002, 2000, 
1999) has been devised, which concentrates on remedying problems caused by 
information asymmetries, whereby groups have varying access to market 
information and differing transaction costs across regions and countries.  The 
state has been ‘allowed back in’ to remedy these market imperfections.6 
Despite this enhanced role for the state, the information-theoretic paradigm 
                                                           
4
  Rodrik’s (2006) ‘augmented’ Washington Consensus comprises corporate governance; anti-corruption; 
flexible labor markets; WTO agreements; financial codes and standards; ‘prudent’ capital-account opening; 
independent central banks/inflation targeting; social safety nets; targeted poverty reduction.  
5
 See Chang (2002) and Rodrik (2004) for empirical examples. 
6
 Advocates of the Post-Washington Consensus stress the need for detailed micro-economic analyses of 
information to be made available to those participating in the market, which will allow generalisations to be 
made.       
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remains (like the original Washington Consensus) based on methodological 
individualism, where the focus of analysis is the rational behaviour of singular 
actors and the economy is posited as comprising no more than an aggregation 
of utility-maximising agents. There is no examination of how rules and 
institutions governing markets are created, and change, through contestations 
based on class or occupational interests involving levels of power, which vary 
according to the particular development paths of individual countries. In sum, 
the information-theoretic paradigm is reductionist and based on an ahistorical 
view of the roles of regulations and institutions governing markets. 7    
 
The third key aspect of the Post-Washington Consensus, the new governance 
model advocated by the IFIs, focuses on developing partnerships between 
agents of development. This should involve the participation of as wide a 
variety of civil society organizations in policy discussions as possible, so that 
governments can be held to account for the progress of national development 
plans and citizens will feel a sense of ownership and thus be committed to 
their implementation. However, the ways in which the key issues of 
participation and ownership are conceptualized and measured by the IFIs are 
suffused with problems, which are examined in detail in Section 1.4.  
 
The fourth distinctive aspect of the Post-Washington Consensus is its placing 
of greater emphasis on non-economic factors in development, particularly the 
roles of social and human capital, than was the case with the original 
Washington Consensus.  Using social capital in the locus of civil society 
organizations to build trust and reciprocal relations in developing countries 
                                                           
7
 See Hodgson (2007), Fine (2006, 2001) and Standing (2000). 
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has become a major part of the donors’ development strategies from the 
middle of the 1990s, evidenced by the fact that the World Bank has developed 
an extensive website dedicated to the concept. 8  
 
Strong social capital is regarded as fostering development but few policy 
prescriptions are provided in the Post-Washington Consensus literature as to 
how it can be inculcated. Phrases such as, ‘missing link’ (Schuurman, 2003, 
Grootaert, 1998) and ‘social glue’ (Narayan, 1999) are used to characterize 
social capital and to illustrate how the concept provides a complement to the 
economic policy prescriptions of the Post-Washington Consensus. Stress is put 
on the way building social capital through the work of civil society 
organizations can play a role in changing societies from ‘low-trust’ to ‘high-
trust’ (Fukuyama, 1996). The definitions and views preferred by the World 
Bank on social capital, come from Coleman (1988) and Putnam (2003, 2000, 
1993a, 1993b) and are rooted in a liberal theoretical framework. Coleman 
(1988) defines social capital as any social arrangement that allows individuals 
more readily to achieve their goals. In this conception social capital is 
potentially inherent in all social structures and should not be regarded as a 
dependent variable. Putnam’s (2003, 2000, 1993a, 1993b) work during the 
latter half of the 1990s has stimulated much research on how institutionalized 
forms of civil society can have an impact on increasing social capital, leading 
to greater trust and connectedness in societies, as well as the development of 
universal norms and networks. Since Putnam’s focus is largely on societal 
consensus, which can be achieved through the development of universal 
norms, his work lacks a systematic analysis of sources of conflict between 
                                                           
8
 See the World Bank - http://worldbank.org/poverty/scapital. 
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classes, groups and individuals, which are imbued with varying levels of 
power. The flaw in this ‘pluralist heaven’ (Schattschneider, 1960) is the failure 
to address the issue that civil society often represents the interests of powerful 
classes and/or high income groups, which have the ability to set up 
organizations with considerable institutional and financial capacity. In 
contrast, the needs of poor and marginalized groups are downplayed or 
ignored because they are framed and articulated in loose and informal 
associational forms, which lack financial capacity and do not attract interest or 
funding from major donors.  
 
The work of Bourdieu (1990), which stresses the way social capital leads to a 
reproduction of the dominance of an elite class, is cited rarely by the World 
Bank. Bourdieu (1990) regards social capital as non-economic processes of 
stratification by which classes demarcate themselves and reproduce and 
consolidate advantage. It is an important way by which culture and education 
are formed and become the preserve of a dominant class. This class and 
context-based analysis – which has parallels with the Gramscian perspective 
on civil society (examined in the following chapter) – has been disregarded in 
much of the literature on social capital and civil society. Bourdieu (1986) 
makes the point that levels of social capital are inextricably linked to the 
distribution of resource ownership, wealth, income and power in any society. 
These substantive factors are largely ignored in the arguments of Putnam, 
Coleman and other writers using a liberal theoretical framework, which the 
World Bank endorses. From such a perspective, civil society is portrayed as a 
level playing field where a diverse range of associational groups compete 
freely to put forward the views of citizens. 
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A related problem, with many analyses of civil society organizations as 
vehicles for promoting social capital couched within a liberal framework, is 
the lack of a rigorous examination of what can, and what cannot, be classified 
as a ‘civil society organization.’ (See, for example, the failure to provide such 
an analysis in the work of Burawoy, 1996, Evans, 1996a, 1996b, Heller, 1996, 
Lam, 1996, Ostrom, 1996). This issue is examined in depth in the following 
chapter as it is important in regard to which associational groups are able – 
and which are unable – to insert themselves into national policy-making 
processes in post-liberalization Tanzania and why this should be the case.  
This ‘rediscovery’ (Mamdani, 1996) by the IFIs and bilateral donor agencies 
of civil society organizations as vehicles to increase social capital and thus, 
build trust is based on a narrow view of the range of associational life in 
developing countries. The IFIs argument that social capital is a valid and 
important concept, because it addresses the ‘neglected’ role of civil society, 
does not stand up to scrutiny. In fact, the literature on civil society is 
voluminous and covers the key arguments centred on social capital in a 
thoroughgoing way (see, for example, Fine, 2010, Howell and Lind, eds 2010, 
Armstrong et al, eds 2010, Cheema and Popovski, eds, 2010, Anheier, Glasius 
and Kaldor, eds, 2009, McKeon, 2009, OSSREA, 2009, Jobert and Kohler-
Koch, eds, 2008, Edwards, 2004, Van Rooy, 2004, Chandhoke, 2003, Smillie, 
2001 and the arguments in chapter 2 for details).  
 
The Post-Washington Consensus stresses education as a means for 
development, focusing on ‘an uncritical faith in the notion of human capital’ 
(Rose, 2006: 162). Increasing human capital is justified by the World Bank in 
terms of its ability to raise the productivity of the poor (Rose, 2006, 2003, 
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Becker, 1975). Rose (2003) argues that the emphasis on human capital as part 
of the Post-Washington Consensus is leading to the marketization and 
privatization of education, and to a World Bank and WTO-driven global 
education industry. Analyses based on calculating ‘Rates of Return to 
Education’ (RORE) are used to justify investment. 
  
The emphasis on RORE has been criticized technically for using flawed data 
(Bennell, 1996) and conceptually for failing to examine adequately the moral 
and social impacts of education and not recognizing that education systems 
are the outcome of historically developed socio-economic practices that are 
particular to a country (Fine and Rose, 2001). The World Bank (2010c) claims 
that their approach has broadened in recent years. However, even in 2010, a 
major World Bank publication (Banerji et al. 2010: 1) outlines an interlinked 
conceptual framework for education, aimed at fostering economic growth, 
which focuses on ‘developing the technical, cognitive and behavioural skills 
conducive to high productivity [author’s emphasis] in the work environment.’ 
Thus, the Post-Washington Consensus perspective on education remains 
rooted in human capital theory, justified in terms of a ‘Rates of Return to 
Education’ framework of analysis.  
  
Overall, the Post-Washington Consensus preserves much of the core elements 
of the Washington Consensus; a stress on getting the fundamentals of 
macroeconomic policies ‘right’, a concern with the stabilization of economies 
and the pre-eminence of the private sector in the development process. It 
remains economic-reductionist in that it fails to examine the foundations upon 
which groups gain economic, political and social power, and how they 
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maintain it. The core policies of the Post-Washington Consensus encompass 
the World Bank’s stress on the value of liberal democracy, good governance, 
education, high levels of social capital and civil society participation in policy 
debates leading to national ownership as key aspects of development 
processes. These policies have become largely add-ons to the original policies 
of the Washington Consensus. However, they do involve an enhanced role for 
civil society. Key policies in this respect are the building of human and social 
capital (which draw significantly on an expanded role for civil society in 
development processes) and the good governance agenda, which focuses on 
bringing about greater levels of accountability and transparency in the political 
sphere. Incentives should be provided to act in the public good by minimizing 
information asymmetries in capitalist markets and increasing participation in, 
and ownership of, national policies, through the institutionalized means of 
civil society organizations. 
 
1.4  Civil Society and the Stress on Participation and Ownership 
Participation and ownership have become central to the donor discourse in 
post-liberalization Tanzania. How they are conceptualized and operationalized 
with regard to civil society organizations thus merits analysis. Summarized as 
the ‘buzzword of the 1990s’ (Cornwall and Pratt 2003: 1), 9 participation is 
‘the process by which stakeholders influence and share control over priority 
setting, policy-making, resource allocations, and/or program 
implementations’, according to the World Bank (2004b: 237). This definition 
links participation to the ‘good governance’ agenda in development with its 
emphasis on shared responsibility for project creation, implementation and 
                                                           
9
  See also Leal (2007). 
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evaluation between donors and participants with civil society expected to play 
a significant role.   
 
Fundamentally, participatory approaches are concerned with power and 
control over resources and life chances, whereby those with less power 
struggle to gain more control over their lives (Nelson and Wright, 1995). The 
concept has become imbued with various ideologies and meanings. Thus, any 
definition of participation should only be a base from which to explore the 
meanings attached to it in particular contexts, such as NGO and trade union 
participation in national policy-making processes in post-liberalization 
Tanzania, and how these are contested and deployed, leading to gains for some 
and losses for others.   
 
Types and levels of participation in the development process vary markedly, 
from low-intensity forms, where the target group is provided with information 
about projects and programmes, to participation as self-mobilization on the 
part of the intended beneficiaries. A middle ground is commonly occupied, 
centred on participation-as-consultation, where intended beneficiaries have the 
opportunity to express their views to donors and other stakeholders, without 
guarantees or mechanisms to ensure that their perceived needs will be 
addressed substantively (Pretty, 1995). 
 
The focus of participatory approaches has shifted since the 1980s when Robert 
Chambers (2008, 2007, 2005, 1999, 1997) was influential in getting actors and 
institutions to put the views of the poor to the forefront and to take a bottom-
up approach to development processes. During the 1980s, ‘first-generation’ 
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participatory approaches were mainstreamed mostly at the microeconomic 
level during the planning and implementation stages of development projects. 
  
The creation of the Learning Group on Participation (LGP) at the World Bank 
in 1990 provided a fillip to advocates of participatory perspectives.  The group 
produced three influential reports and published the Participation Sourcebook 
in 1995. The LGP’s 1994 report (World Bank, 1994) called for a new focus, 
whereby stakeholders in development projects and processes would be 
identified systematically and divided into two groups; primary (intended 
beneficiaries) and secondary, including a substantive role for civil society 
organizations, which could show they had technical expertise and links to the 
primary stakeholders. With this increasing acceptance by mainstream 
development organizations, the use of participatory perspectives enlarged and 
spread from a few sectors and countries, with NGOs becoming champions of 
the approach. 
 
As a result of this expanded vision for participation, ‘second generation’ 
concerns developed, based on the institutionalization of the concept, as the 
approach spread to development planning, policy research, monitoring and 
evaluation. Overall, the ‘participation in projects’ emphasis of the 1980s was 
challenged during the 1990s by a more radical concept of participatory 
development. For Chambers (1997) ‘they’ participate in ‘our’ projects 
encapsulates the former position while ‘we’ participate in ‘their’ projects sums 
up the more radical alternative.   
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From 2000 onwards, ‘third generation’ issues have come to prominence, 
focusing on governance, ethics and power. The emphasis has changed to how 
to bring participatory approaches into the areas of governance and rights. The 
development of the ‘good governance’ agenda and the stress on the 
developmental benefits of an active civil society have led to a deeper analysis 
of participatory approaches both in theory and practice, including the 
emergence of a thoroughgoing critique of the concept (Cooke and Kothari, eds 
2002, Mosse, 2002). Participatory development has been questioned in two 
main ways. One critique centres on technical limitations concerning the 
formulation, application and analysis of participatory approaches (Anello, 
2003, Anwar, 2003, Clemente, 2003, Malik, 2003, Swantz, 2003). A more 
radical attack focuses on theoretical, political and conceptual weaknesses and 
raises the possibility that participatory approaches per se may be the problem 
(Hickey and Mohan, 2005a and 2005b, Cooke and Kothari eds, 2002, Mosse, 
2002).  
 
Concerning the former, there is clearly a need for improvement in the 
application of participatory development approaches. As Drinkwater (2003: 
62) puts it, while the ‘rhetoric of participatory practice abounds, laudatory 
practice is a great deal thinner.’ Participatory approaches have been denigrated 
for being blind to context and thus, mechanistic in their application (Datta, 
2003, Mohan, 2002). 10  Regarding the latter, they have been criticized for 
becoming a ‘tyranny’ (Cooke and Kothari, 2002), leading to the exclusion of 
                                                           
10
 Cornwall and Pratt (2003) outline the problem of ‘facipulating’ – the facilitating and manipulating by 
development professionals of the direction or conclusion of the analysis - after a ‘token’ (Mohan, 2002) 
participatory process has been utilized.  
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other development strategies which may be legitimate and effective. In 
addition, they have been decried for adopting the neo-liberal discourse of 
individualism and consequently underplaying structural constraints that make 
groups unequal, which can work against the interests of the poor and 
marginalized when applied to development projects (Hildyard et al, 2002, 
Kohl, 2002). Thus, participatory approaches allow target groups to be 
involved in development processes only within a system where they are 
systematically disadvantaged, which inevitably maintains their subjugation 
(Hickey and Mohan, 2005a).  
 
Hickey and Mohan, (2005a, 2005b) make the point that it is not enough to 
regard institutionalizing participation as expanding political democracy to 
include more people and places in shaping policy processes and institutions. 
There is also a need for participatory democracy in the economic sphere, 
which should lead to a fight for structural reforms. For participatory processes 
to have a significant impact, they should focus on bringing about long-term 
social, economic and institutional change. Participatory approaches need to 
systematically address power relations, which constrain access to resources 
and opportunities. How these power relations involving the major external 
donors, the state and civil society have been manifested in post-liberalization 
Tanzania, leading to the marginalization of trade unions and the dominance of 
a small group of NGOs, is analysed in chapters four, five and six.  
 
Along with participation, the IFIs stress that national ownership is the key to 
the success of national policies in developing countries (IMF, 2010, IDA and 
IMF, 2002). Fundamentally, ownership is based on the belief that local 
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institutions must be run by locals, since if patterns of behaviour have altered 
only in response to a carrot or a stick, slippage will happen once the carrot or 
stick is removed (Thomas, 2004). The emphasis on ownership reflects a 
concern amongst IFI staff that policies, such as SAPs, failed, in no small 
measure because there was a lack of true national ownership of them on the 
part of recipient countries.  
 
The rise to prominence of the concept of ownership may be traced back to a 
major IFI policy document by Johnson and Wasty in 1993, 11 which 
emphasized the importance of ownership to the credibility of reform 
programmes, stating that there is a symbiotic relationship between the level of 
success of a programme outcome and the level of borrower ownership. 12 They 
posit ownership as a four-dimensional independent variable and outline four 
levels for each dimension, creating the possibility of sixteen different ratings 
for reform operations.  The four criteria are (i) locus of initiative, (ii) level of 
intellectual conviction among key policy makers, (iii) expression of political 
will by top leadership and (iv) efforts toward consensus-building among 
various constituencies. Applying this classification scheme to eighty-one 
World Bank operations, Johnson and Wasty found a significant degree of 
positive correlation between programme success and levels of borrower 
ownership. 13 However, following the publication of their work, ownership 
was ignored in donor literature until the end of the 1990s when it was adopted 
                                                           
11
 See chapter 6 for a discussion of Johnson and Wasty’s work on ownership in the context of the Tanzanian 
PRSP process.  
12
 Johnson and Wasty (1993: 1) themselves trace the origin of the concept to the late 1980s when, in the first 
World Bank Report on Adjustment Lending, it was stated that ‘progress has been stronger where governments 
have “owned” the program and hence were committed to carrying it through.’  
13
 Subsequent attempts to draw up criteria with which to assess levels of ownership, notably Killick (1997) 
and the World Bank (2004a) have drawn on Johnson and Wasty’s classification scheme.    
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by the IFIs as a key part of their New Policy Agenda and has since been 
portrayed largely as a ‘magic bullet’ to solve development problems.  
Critics of ownership can be broadly divided into reformers, who are largely 
supportive of the concept and concentrate on improving its technical 
limitations (World Bank 2004a, IMF, 2004, 2001, Drazen and Isard 2004, 
Drazen, 2002, Killick 2004, 1998, 1997, Booth, 2003a, 2003b) and radicals, 
who are critical, sometimes to the point of being dismissive (Pender, 2007, 
Carvalho 2001, WDM, 2001, Abugre 2000), on the grounds that the concept 
involves ‘playing with words whose meaning is too vague for rigorous 
analysis’ (Weeks et al., 2003: 1). 
 
Radicals make the point that there is a need to address a fundamental 
contradiction concerning the way ownership is conceptualized and 
operationalized in national policy-making processes. Ownership is chosen as a 
concept by external donors, which they claim is necessary if effective anti-
poverty strategies are to be put in place. However, the concept has been 
introduced by the donors as a priori containing merits in terms of leading to 
the creation of effective national policies and the recipient countries have no 
chance to reject it as unsuitable for their particular political and socio-
economic environment. They are not allowed to argue that ownership itself 
(which can only be achieved if civil society organizations play a significant 
role in national policy-making processes) is a concept being imposed on them 
by external actors, which they reject as being inappropriate in a context-
specific environment. Ownership can thus be regarded as a ‘super-
conditionality’ (Weeks et al, 2002). 14 
                                                           
14
  See chapter 6 for an examination of how ownership is measured in the context of the Tanzanian PRSP. 
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1.5 Structure of the Book 
In order to achieve a Gramscian analysis of the reasons for the exclusion of 
trade unions from the reconfiguration of civil society in post-liberalization 
Tanzania and to highlight in contrast the leading role played by NGOs, it is 
necessary to analyse the theorization of civil society, the changing nature of 
development policies in Tanzania since the onset of colonialism, the historical 
role of trade unions and of NGOs and the way both groups have taken part in 
the PRSP process.   
  
To this end, in chapter two the theorization of civil society is analysed, 
focusing on why liberal perspectives have taken precedence and how this 
dominance influences the way in which certain civil society organizations are 
included in national policy-making processes while others are marginalized or 
excluded. The key argument of the chapter is that a Gramscian perspective has 
been wrongly neglected, since it has greater explanatory power concerning the 
ways in which associational life is integrated into national policy-making 
processes in post-liberalization Tanzania than the prevailing liberal 
conception. A critical appropriation of a Gramscian theory of civil society is 
then used in the three fieldwork-based chapters (four, five and six) to provide 
an understanding of the roles of trade unions and NGOs in national policy-
making processes.  
 
In chapter three the history of development policies in Tanzania is examined. 
An overview is given of developments in the political economy of Tanzania, 
starting with the period of German colonization, in order to bring out how this 
has substantively shaped the ways in which civil society organizations take 
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part in national policy-making processes at present.  The reasons for Tanzania 
moving from the left-wing populism of the Nyerere regime after independence 
in 1961 to accepting the main precepts of the IFI-driven liberalization policies 
from the latter half of the 1980s are outlined. It is argued that in order to 
maintain high levels of aid, the Tanzanian government has ceded a large 
measure of economic and political control to the IFIs. This in turn influences 
the way the government attempts to determine which civil society 
organizations participate in national policy-making processes, as well as 
which groups are excluded.  
 
Chapter four is based on an analysis of the NGO sector in Tanzania. An 
assessment of the development of associational life in Tanzania under different 
periods (classified in terms of political economy) is undertaken, which shows 
the diverse nature of civil society in the country. The core arguments centre on 
why and how a small number of well-resourced, urban-based NGOs, staffed 
by highly-qualified individuals, have come to dominate civil society 
participation in national policy-making processes. The arguments draw 
substantively on fieldwork interviews, participant observation and document 
analysis, focusing on two main areas: the priorities of NGOs in discourses and 
their relationships with other important development actors. 
 
The main arguments in chapter four are linked to the assessments in chapter 
five of the role of trade unions in post-liberalization Tanzania. The analysis in 
this chapter focuses on how and why trade unions have been marginalized as 
civil society organizations in contrast to the dominant position of NGOs. An 
overview of the theorization of trade unions is set out. This is followed by an 
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outline of the labour aristocracy debate, which provides the basis for an 
examination of whether trade unions in Tanzania can be regarded as 
representing only a small number of relatively privileged wage labourers 
within the formal sector of the economy. Key aspects of the history of the 
labour movement in Tanzania are examined. These elements are linked to the 
fieldwork section, the findings from which reveal two substantive problems 
for trade unions; structural difficulties caused by weak capacity and lack of an 
ideological vision on the part of the leaders to drive the movement forward. As 
with NGOs, the fieldwork analysis of trade unions centres on the issues of 
their priorities in discourses and relationships with other key actors.  
 
Chapter six takes the PRSP process as a case study, which provides a window 
on the broader processes concerning the participation of civil society 
organizations as development actors in post-liberalization Tanzania. Drawing 
on fieldwork findings, the analysis focuses in detail on the processes and 
ideologies through which a group of elite, urban NGOs, which dominate civil 
society participation in post-liberalization national policy-making processes, 
have been able to occupy strategic nodes within the PRSP matrix, while trade 
unions have been marginalized.  
 
In chapter seven conclusions are drawn from the analysis in the preceding 
sections, focusing on the point that the contrasting positions of trade unions 
and NGOs in post-liberalization national policy-making processes in Tanzania 
has been shaped by the development of the country into one which embraces a 
plethora of donor-led programmes employing similar terms as objectives and 
justifications, as well as de-politicised policies which are articulated through 
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technicist procedures, such as Logical Framework Analysis (LFA). A small 
group of NGOs, well-funded by foreign donors have the resources and the 
staff familiar with such procedures and policies to engage in national policy-
making processes on these terms. Trade unions, however, lack knowledge of 
them, as well as resources, and tend to discuss development issues in overtly 
political terms, which leads to them being marginalized or excluded.  
Conceptually, the ways in which trade unions and NGOs are integrated into 
the process can be explained more fully by using Gramscian perspectives on 
civil society than by employing the dominant liberal conception, favoured by 
the donors. The latter is based on the view that the various strands of civil 
society are taking part in post-liberalization national policy-making processes 
on an equal footing. The Gramscian perspective reveals that the civil society 
sphere is a ’public room’ where ideological hegemony is contested and very 
different levels of power and influence on the part of associational groups are 
both sourced and realized. A minority of civil society groups have contested 
hegemonic discourses, rather than accepting them as being apolitical and in 
the best interests of all, as is portrayed by the donors. However, these counter-
hegemonic discourses are not currently leading to significant challenges to the 
current economic and political orthodoxy or to substantive grassroots 
campaigns. 
 
1.6 Summary 
The central planks of post-liberalization policy processes in Tanzania - greater 
participation on the part of the wider population within the institutionalized 
setting of civil society organizations in forming national policies, leading to 
their ownership – have clearly emerged from the change of ideological 
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emphasis within the IFIs and the major bilateral donors.  The state-civil 
society-policy matrix is mutually constituted (Gramsci, 2011b). With the 
adoption of multi-party liberal democracy and neo-liberal economic policies 
on the part of the Tanzanian state during the 1990s, changes in its policy 
orientation at national level have impacted substantively on the position of 
civil society. The role of civil society organizations in post-liberalization 
national policy-making processes in Tanzania is therefore of importance. Fine, 
(2006, 2001), Harriss, (2006), Van Waeyenberge (2006) and Standing (2000), 
are among analysts who point out that taken overall the Post-Washington 
Consensus underplays notions of class, power, conflict and development as a 
contradictory process involving major social and economic transformation. 
However, new policy spaces have been opened up through the focus on the 
four aspects of the development process outlined in this chapter, which mark 
out the Post-Washington Consensus. These changes have given oppositional 
civil society organizations opportunities to contest the hegemony of neo-
liberalism and their own marginalization. Civil society in Tanzania is, in the 
post-liberalization era, a sphere of confrontation concerning which groups 
should (and which should not) be classed as ‘civil society organizations’ and 
included in national policy-making processes by the government, as well as 
supported by external donors. Civil society organizations with sufficient 
technical and institutional capacity, allied to a concerted ideological vision, 
have the opportunity to participate in national policy-making processes in 
ways that may force governments to confront substantive issues, such as 
protection of local economies from foreign competition, arguing that failure to 
do so will result in a lack of national ownership, since these are issues which 
citizens have evinced as being of vital importance to their lives. An analysis of 
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how successfully trade unions and NGOs are able to insert themselves and 
their visions into the new policy spaces provides a way to examine the limits 
of the IFIs’ Post-Washington Consensus rhetoric, espousing openness to 
economic and political heterodoxy if a sufficient level of participation by civil 
society leading to ownership of national policies, has been demonstrated. The 
way in which the theorization of civil society in the post-liberalization period 
has become dominated by a liberal framework and conception, driven by the 
IFIs, is analysed in chapter two. The point that the liberal conception posits an 
erroneous view of civil society as a sphere where in a multi-party liberal 
democracy, a plurality of associational groups compete consensually and 
equally to represent the views of citizens, is highlighted. Trade unions and 
NGOs in post-liberalization Tanzania do not participate in national policy-
making processes on an equal basis and a Gramscian perspective, emphasizing 
how hegemony is continually resisted, modified and challenged (as well as 
accepted) by different civil society organizations, despite pervasive structural 
inequalities in the sector, is shown to have greater explanatory power than the 
liberal perspective. 
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Figure 1.2 Tanzania: Basic Indicators 
Demography 
Land Area – 883,749 sq. km. 
Population – 41, 892, 895 
Population growth rate – 2.03%  
Urban population – 25% 
Urban growth – 4.2% (annual rate of change 2005 – 2010) 
Total Fertility Rate – 4.31 
  
Economy 
GDP - $57.89 billion 
GDP per capita (PPP) - $1,400 
GDP growth rate – 4.9% (2009 figure) 
Agriculture as a share of GDP – 26.6% 
Industry as a share of GDP – 22.6% 
Services – 50.8% 
Inflation rate – 11.6% 
 
Education 
Literacy rate (total population) – 69.4% 
Literacy rate (females) – 62.2% 
Literacy rate (males) – 77.5% 
Primary level enrolment rate – 99.3% 
Population with at least secondary education – 6.0% 
Tertiary level enrolment rate – 1.5%  
Public expenditure on education as a share of GDP – 2.2% 
 
Health 
Life Expectancy at birth (total population) – 52.49 
Life Expectancy at birth (females) – 54.03 
Life Expectancy at birth (males) – 50.99 
Infant Mortality Rate – 67 (per 100,000 live births) 
Under 5 Mortality Rate  - 104 (per 100,000 live births) 
Public expenditure on health as a share of GDP – 3.7%  
Sources: URT (2010d), CIA (2010), UNICEF (2010), UNDP (2010) 
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Figure 1.3 Tanzania: Political Map 
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Chapter 2 
 
Theoretical Approaches to Civil Society 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter an analysis is made of theoretical approaches to civil society, 
contrasting the liberal view, influenced by the work of Alexis de Tocqueville, 
which dominates the thinking of the main donors driving the New Policy 
Agenda, with counter hegemonic views, focusing in particular on the 
arguments of Gramsci. The following section outlines the rise to prominence 
of the civil society sector as a driver of development, which became a 
significant part of the New Policy Agenda during the 1990s, bearing in mind 
Khilnani’s (2003: 17) point that the ‘rediscoveries of the idea of civil society 
obscure its historical depth.’ The prevailing liberal view of the role of civil 
society is then discussed, highlighting important weaknesses. Counter 
hegemonic views are subsequently examined, centring on the Gramscian 
perspective, which has a considerable amount of explanatory power 
concerning the position of civil society organizations in post-liberalization 
Tanzania. An evaluation is then made of why NGOs in particular have risen to 
power as civil society actors in development processes. The conclusion 
outlines both the partial reading and misreading of de Tocqueville’s work by 
donors involved in promoting the New Policy Agenda, as well as its 
weaknesses, and summarizes the strengths of a Gramscian approach to 
understanding the position of the civil society sector in post-liberalization 
Tanzania. 
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2.2 The Rise to Prominence of Civil Society in the Development 
Discourse 
The main driving force behind the New Policy Agenda, the World Bank 
(2010a), defines civil society: 
 
‘the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit 
organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the 
interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, 
cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic 
considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore 
refer to a wide array of organizations (NGOs), labour unions, 
indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based 
organizations, professional associations and foundations.’ 
 
The World Bank uses the term ‘civic engagement’ rather than ‘civil society,’ in 
order to include the actions of informal associations as well as the activities 
and roles of formally-constituted civil society organizations. 
 
A huge body of work has appeared during the 1990s on civil society and its 
relationship to development but, as Howell and Pearce (2002: 17) point out, it 
‘has not always helped to clarify why civil society should be considered 
essential to development processes in the South.’15 Edwards (2004: vi) 
concurs in stating that civil society has been ‘used to justify radically different 
ideological agendas, supported by deeply ambiguous evidence, and suffused 
                                                           
15
  There are vigorous debates regarding the conceptualization of civil society within the African context (See, 
inter alia, Armstrong et al, eds, 2010, OSSREA, 2009, Pinkney, 2009, Carmody, 2007, Lund, 2006, Chan, 
2002, Baylies and Power, 2001, Hearn, 2001, Chabal and Daloz, 1999, Oloka-Onyango and Baryo, 1997).  
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with many questionable assumptions.’ This assessment resonates with Allen’s 
(1997: 329) view of the concept in the African context as ‘diffuse, hard to 
define, empirically imprecise and ideologically laden.’ 
 
There are several reasons for the rise of arguments in favour of civil society as 
a vehicle for development. First, the perceived failure of previous 
development models – state-led development up to the end of the 1970s and 
market-led progress during the 1980s - stimulated an interest in civil society as 
the base of an alternative. Second, global political events in the 1990s, notably 
the demise of communism in Eastern Europe and the move towards liberal 
democracy in Africa and Latin America, focused attention on civil society as a 
counterweight to an overbearing state and as a means to put pressure on 
undemocratic governments. Third, the ‘rolling back of the state’ under the 
sway of neo-liberal economic ideas, led to the view that civil society 
organizations were necessary in developing countries to fill the ensuing 
democratic deficit by providing services in the social development arena 
(Lewis, 2002c). 
 
2.3 Key Civil Society Strands 
The concept of a ‘sphere of action’ is commonly used to delineate the arena in 
which civil society operates. To illustrate this, overlapping circles of the same 
size, representing state, market and civil society are often drawn up indicating 
similar levels of power, which is usually misleading. In most cases, the state 
and the market (particularly since the rise of neo-liberalism) have considerably 
more power than civil society and therefore the overlapping circles should be 
sized to reflect this (Van Rooy, 2004, Chandhoke, 2003, Smillie, 2001). 
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Edwards (2004), goes beyond the ‘sphere of action’ conception in outlining 
three separate but mutually supportive strands in the literature regarding the 
goals, visions and functions of civil society. First, a body of writing equates 
civil society with associational life, based around forming non-profit making 
organizations and stressing the importance of voluntary action. Second, an 
element focuses on civil society in normative terms, as promoting the ‘good 
society’, with an emphasis on creating shared values, strategies and joint 
action to bring about desirable outcomes, such as poverty reduction.  A third 
thread in the literature centres on civil society in the public sphere, promoting 
access to, and independence for, structures of communication and ways to 
extend public deliberation. Edwards (ibid) emphasizes the importance of the 
division between those who see civil society as an independent variable and 
thus stress the need to build it directly, as is the case with the donors driving 
the New Policy Agenda, and those who see it as a by-product of other forces 
and try to manipulate them to build the best overall civil society. 
 
2.4 The Prevailing Paradigm: the Liberal Conception of the Role of 
Civil Society in Development Processes 
Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), the French observer of US democracy, 
described the associational world in which people decide their wants and 
needs and ask for them through associations. De Tocqueville’s ideas have been 
revived by important advocates of the Post-Washington Consensus and have 
been influential in the debate on donor ideas regarding ways in which mass 
participation should be institutionalised within post-liberalization Tanzania. 
For the major donors, civil society is vital in fostering their key development 
ideas. The UNDP (2010), for example, states that ‘engagement with civil 
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society is critical to national ownership, accountability, good governance, 
decentralization, democratization of development co-operation and the 
quantity and relevance of official development programmes.’ This 
‘prescriptive universalism’ (Lewis, 2002a) regarding civil society as a vehicle 
for development has received support from analysts focusing on Africa. 
Ndegwa (1996) and Harbeson (1994), for instance, argue that civil society in 
Africa is beneficial to development and should be strengthened as a matter of 
priority. 
 
For de Tocqueville (1845a, 1845b), associations are schools of democracy 
where open-minded attitudes and behaviour are learned and exercised to 
protect the rights of individuals. This resonates with the arguments put 
forward in the seventeenth century by John Locke on civil society (Locke, 
1986, Dunn, 2003, Wiarda, 2003, Hardt and Negri, 2000). Associations should 
be constructed voluntarily at local, regional and national levels. Participation 
in such associations will lead to the inculcation of important civic virtues, 
such as tolerance and honesty, which will assist people in being able to put the 
interests of the group above that of the individual. The building of these civic 
virtues moderates public opinion and increases levels of trust and confidence 
in society.   The resulting vibrancy of a many layered civil society becomes 
important in restricting over-weaning power on the part of the state or any 
other particular group. 
 
De Tocquevillian ideas have been promoted by the World Bank, which 
provides many sources citing his arguments relating to civil society, on its 
website. See, for example, Comstock-Gay and Goldman (2008), Chase and 
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Woolcock (2005), McNeil (2002), Brown and Uslaner (2002), Parkison 
(2001), Satola (1997) and Foley and Edwards (1996). A number of these 
(McNeil, 2002 and Foley and Edwards, 1996, for example) emphasize the 
importance of de Tocqueville’s views on civil society to current development 
processes by starting with a direct quote from his work.  Moreover, when 
advocating a leading role for civil society in development, senior World Bank 
figures have stressed the importance of de Tocqueville’s ideas. Former 
President, Paul Wolfowitz, cites de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America as 
one of the first books written about a developing country and ‘I still think … 
one of the best.’ (Wolfowitz, 2006: 5). In outlining how de Tocqueville valued 
civil society and the impressive nature of associational life in America, which 
strengthened the development process, Wolfowitz goes as far as 
conceptualizing civil society as the ‘building block’ of US democracy 
(Wolfowitz, 2005). 
 
A reading of de Tocqueville’s arguments concerning civil society reveals two 
central points about the way they are being used by organizations involved in 
trying to engender participation and ownership as part of the New Policy 
Agenda. First, the interpretation of de Tocqueville’s ideas is based on a partial 
reading of his work, which misses important elements of the main arguments. 
Second, there is a lack of engagement with the fact that the ideas put forward 
by de Tocqueville relate to the very different circumstances pertaining to 
associational life in nineteenth century America compared to those which exist 
in contemporary Africa. 
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With regard to the former point, de Tocqueville (1845b: 106) was impressed 
by the way ‘Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions 
constantly form associations’ and admired ‘the extreme skill with which the 
inhabitants of the United States succeed in proposing a common object for the 
exertions of a great many men and in inducing them voluntarily to pursue it’ 
(ibid). For de Tocqueville, when people are allowed to meet freely for all 
purposes they regard associations as a universal and the sole means to achieve 
goals. Consequently, the ‘art of association … becomes … the mother of 
action, studies and applied by all’ (de Tocqueville 1845b: 117). However, he 
also recognized the temporal and spatial specificity of the nature of 
associational life in the United States, pointing out that the right to association 
is deeply ingrained as it ‘has always existed in America’, so that ‘the exercise 
of this privilege is now incorporated with the manners and customs of the 
people’ (de Tocqueville 1845b: 194).  This argument implies the need to 
examine the particular historical processes that have shaped the development 
of associational life on a case by case basis. Moreover, de Tocqueville drew a 
distinction between associational life in Europe and America, which resonates 
with current debates about the nature of civil society in Africa. In Europe 
associations were always to be ‘tried in conflict’ (de Tocqueville 1845a: 196), 
used to ‘march against the enemy’ (ibid) and their object ‘is not to convince 
but to fight’ (de Tocqueville 1845a: 197). Contrastingly, since in America ‘the 
differences of opinion are mere differences of hue, the right of association 
may remain unrestrained without evil consequences’ (ibid). The conception of 
civil society as put forward by the donors driving the New Policy Agenda 
corresponds with the American model, as set out by de Tocqueville, while the 
‘European tradition’ of civil society as an arena for conflict and contestation 
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between civil society organizations themselves and between civil society 
organizations and the state over policy, is neglected.  
 
De Tocqueville (1845b: 112) argued that civic associations ‘will advance in 
number as men become more equal.’ This claim raises a contradiction with 
regard to the economic policies donors are propounding and their view of the 
nature of associational life. Since the gap between rich and poor in Tanzania is 
at present wide under donor driven, neo-liberal policies, then, according to a 
de Tocquevillian analysis, associational life will not grow. Development 
indicators produced by the World Bank (World Bank, 2009b) show that the 
highest earning 20% of the people in Tanzania have a 42.3% share of total 
income or consumption. The equivalent figure for the highest 10% of income 
earners is 27.0%, which is large compared to 6.6% in Ethiopia, 13.6% in 
Kenya, 14.1% in Ghana and 16.6% in Uganda (World Bank, 2009b). 
 
These figures are problematic for the donors, particularly given Tanzania’s 
heavy reliance on foreign aid (see chapter 3). According to de Tocqueville, 
growing equality in society is needed for associational life to develop. In 
Tanzania the substantial share of total national income held by the highest 
10% and 20% of earners (World Bank, 2009b), as well as the multi-ethnic 
composition of the population 16 make it unlikely that differences of opinion 
between individuals and groups will be merely ‘of hue’. There is, thus, at best 
a failure to engage with important aspects of de Tocqueville’s ideas 
concerning civil society on the part of the main donors promoting the New 
                                                           
16
 Tanzania has 120 mega-ethnic groups, excluding minority groups from Asia and Europe, according to 
government figures - http://www.tanzania.go.tz/culture.html#Habitation 
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Policy Agenda and, at worst, an ideological selectiveness on their part in order 
to provide support for a liberal theoretical framework.  
 
In addition, the IFIs stress the need for complete freedom of association in 
recipient countries. However, de Tocqueville did ‘not think that a nation is 
always at liberty to invest its citizens with an absolute right of association … 
and I doubt whether, in any country or in any age, it is wise to set no limits to 
freedom of association.’ (de Tocqueville 1845b: 119).  For de Tocqueville, at 
times the right of association has to be ‘confined within narrow limits’ (ibid). 
De Tocqueville never ‘tried to draw exactly the boundaries between political 
and social control … and the area in which the individual should be free to act 
of his own volition’ (Lively, 1961: 10-11). Moreover, he recognized the need 
for free association and action to be shaped according to the particular needs 
of societies and admitted that the precise application of association and action 
‘must vary with circumstances’ (Lively, 1961: 11).  
 
Donors have drawn heavily on de Tocqueville’s views in stressing the 
importance of mass participation by citizens, coordinated through civil society 
organizations, in post-liberalization national policy-making processes. This 
perspective is premised on the view that only where there is a democratic state 
in which participation by citizens in political life is valued, will civil society 
develop and be supportive of democracy. In short, a democratic state is 
required to create a democratic civil society, which in turn is necessary to 
sustain the state in that form (Walzer, 2003).  ‘This virtuous circle is at the 
heart of the democratic case for civil society on the neo-Tocquevillian model’ 
(Goodhart, 2005: 7).   
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The way this form of associational life is being engendered by donor influence 
on post-liberalization national policy-making processes prioritizes the role of 
NGOs and marginalizes many other manifestations of civil society in 
Tanzania.17 It also fails to adequately account for the way civil society acts as 
a ’public room’ where ideological hegemony is contested, which is a central 
theme of the neglected perspectives of Gramsci (2011a, 2011b, 1994, 1977).  
 
2.5 Countervailing Views to the Liberal Conception of the Role of Civil 
Society in Development Processes: the Gramscian Perspective 
 In the nineteenth century Hegel made a pivotal contribution to the debate on 
civil society, conceptualizing the sphere as being distinct from the state and 
the family. For Hegel, civil society is not a natural condition of freedom but a 
historically produced sphere of life, arising from a multi-dimensional process. 
Civil society is posited as a contradictory combination of forces, involving 
confrontation between classes and groups themselves as well as continuous 
conflict between groups and classes and the state (Hegel, 2003).  Civil society 
movements cannot be idealised but demand individual empirical examination 
as they contain discrepant possibilities.  
 
Hegel idealised the (Prussian) state, positing it as the embodiment of universal 
interest and arguing that through strong law-governed rule the particular 
interests of civil society organizations are regulated in the interests of all the 
good of the whole society.  ‘In contrast with the spheres of … the family and 
civil society, the state [is] … an external necessity and their higher authority; 
                                                           
17  See chapter 4 for a comparison of the roles of NGOs with other types of associational life and chapter 5 
concerning the work of trade unions. 
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its nature is such that their laws and interests are subordinate to it and 
dependent on it’ (Hegel, 2003: 95). While de Tocqueville (1845a, 1845b) saw 
order emerging from unfettered individualism in the economic and political 
arenas and free competition between civil society groups, Hegel felt that the 
wants of individuals and civil society groups in such a system would 
inevitably be unequally fulfilled because of vast existing inequalities. 
 
Hegel argued that the development of a capitalist mode of production leads to 
the atomization of individual commercial interests and deepening inequality. 
People increasingly leave the family (which has provided them with moral 
cohesion) early to work in the capitalist system, where they meet a large 
number of individuals who are pursuing diverse interests. Civil society in such 
a system is both the problem, since it is the institutional embodiment of 
particular interest groups, and also the solution, as it fosters social integration. 
With strong state oversight based on laws and bureaucratic controls, 
universality ‘can be developed through civil society, despite the atomizing 
potential of the commercial self-interest that shapes it’ (Howell and Pearce, 
2002: 23).  
 
Marx challenged Hegel’s idealization of the state (Marx, 1970b), arguing that: 
 
‘contradictions within civil society are reproduced within the state, at 
the same time the state reinforces certain interests in civil society and 
undermines others. Civil society is not just external to the state, rather 
various and even contradictory groups in civil society differentially 
penetrate the state’ (Mamdani, 1992:17).  
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The state does not confront civil society externally but is an arena of struggle 
for forces whose springboard is civil society. 
 
For Marx, as with Hegel, civil society is a historically contingent and not a 
universal concept. Within a capitalist mode of production, civil society is 
bourgeois society.  Pre-capitalist forms of civil society, such as guilds and 
estates, had a political spirit, which the onset of capitalism broke down, 
leaving individuals to participate in civil society based on self-interest rather 
than social or political functions. In a capitalist system individuals treat others 
as a means to an end based on the dominance of market forces (Marx, 1971). 
Civil society thus becomes an expression of the separation of individuals from 
themselves, from others and from their communities. It is ‘the chief source of 
human alienation’ (Femia, 2001: 136). 
 
Marx rejected claims for the integrative power of the state and argued that 
unequal and self-interested relationships permeate all its aspects under 
capitalism, a system that also led to ‘the dissolution of civil society into 
independent individuals whose relations are regulated by law’ (Marx, 1971: 
29). Moreover, ‘egoistic man is the passive, given result of the dissolution of 
society’ (Marx, 1971: 30).  In sum, under a capitalist system, civil society is 
inextricably bound up with commercial and industrial life where the market 
economy reduces people to self-centred acquisitors, who relate to each other 
in contractual and instrumental terms. This leads to the unavoidable 
atomization of civil society, which must, along with political society, therefore 
be dissolved. 
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Gramsci goes beyond the classical Marxist conception of civil society, arguing 
that exploitative capitalist relations are ‘underpinned by a complex of moral 
injunctions that make these relations seem right and proper to all parties in the 
exchange’ (Femia, 2001:139).  People define their interests in terms of their 
own ideas and values, which imbues them with meaning. These might be 
false, class-biased and may mystify and cloud relations but we can ‘never 
detach ourselves from some moral perspective or other’ (ibid). This view 
forms the basis of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (how a set of ideas put 
forward by a ruling class become entrenched) and explanation as to why 
capitalism survives even when the objective conditions for a transition to 
communism are prevalent.18 The concept is based on an analysis of how 
specific modalities and apparatuses of power work on subjects with particular 
social identities and material interests. The focus is on the nature of power in 
modern capitalist social formations where mass politics have developed (Sum, 
2003). 
 
Gramsci moves away from an institutionalist, juridico-political and state-
centric account of the exercise of power to examine discourse and discursive 
formations and the articulation of power and knowledge.19 He focuses on how 
hegemony is created through a multi-faceted dialectical relationship between 
consent and coercion. Moreover, Gramsci deepened the debate on civil society 
by analysing the embedding and embodying of power in everyday routines 
and the role in this of specific institutions and apparatuses. For Gramsci 
(2011b), it is important for subaltern classes to engage in a war of position in 
                                                           
18
  See chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion of Gramsci’s use of the concept of hegemony. 
19
  See Gramsci (2001a) for a discussion of the juridical power of the state. 
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the civil society sphere by challenging the intellectual and moral leadership of 
the ruling class, which creates its hegemony. Gramsci envisaged the war of 
position as a process by which subaltern classes would continually confront 
the norms and values of the ruling class and exercise their own moral and 
intellectual leadership. In this way the consented coercion through which the 
ruling class maintains power can be stripped away and its values and norms 
exposed as bolstering a system in which only the minority holding power 
benefit, rather than representing universality or common sense (Gramsci, 
2011b). These important facets of uses of power are not examined within a 
liberal perspective.  Thus, it is only by employing a Gramscian perspective 
that a nuanced understanding can be achieved of how certain NGOs have used 
everyday routines embodying power to embed dominance of civil society 
input to national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania, 
while trade unions engage in routines which do not embody and embed power 
and are thus marginalized.  
 
For Gramsci, in line with Marx, the base of society is made up of the 
prevailing mode of production and it has a dialectical relationship with the 
superstructure, although the latter is ultimately an expression of the former. 
However, while Marx (1970a) delineated the superstructure as comprising key 
societal arrangements, which cement its organisation in the spheres of politics, 
law, religion, morality, ideology and traditions, Gramsci focused on a key 
division within the concept.  For Gramsci, the superstructure exists at two 
levels; civil society, which is ‘the ensemble of organisms commonly called 
“private”’ (Gramsci, 1994: 12) and political society or the state.  A balance 
occurs between direct domination by the state through juridical government 
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and civil society, where there is the ‘hegemony of a social group over the 
entire national society, exercised through the so-called private organizations, 
such as the Church, the unions, the schools’ (Gramsci, 1994: 67) . Civil 
society also comprises political parties, the press, publishers and voluntary 
associations and disseminates the ideology of the dominant class, ensuring its 
‘cultural hegemony’ (Gramsci, 2011b: 20), so that subordinate classes consent 
to their own subordination. It is in the ‘private realm that ruling values seem 
most natural and therefore unchangeable’ (Jones, 2006: 32). The coercive 
power of the state is used to enforce discipline when spontaneous consent 
based on hegemony fails. The multifarious combination of dictatorship with 
hegemony comprises the ‘integral state,’ formally defined by Gramsci (1978: 
263) as ‘political society + civil society, in other words, hegemony protected 
by the armour of coercion.’  
 
Gramsci (1977: 235) argued that in modern societies, civil society had become 
a complex structure and is resistant to economic shocks, such as depressions. 
The power of civil society organizations can be significant and lead to 
associational groups gradually taking over so many societal functions that 
there is a ‘withering of the state’. In this view, the state becomes a watchdog in 
a ‘regulated society’, while still at times acting as a coercive organization 
when facing particular challenges to its authority. As the growth of civil 
society continues the state gradually reduces its authoritarian and coercive 
interventions.  
 
For Gramsci, hegemony in relation to civil society is a vital area of study. 
Gramsci emphasised the potentially oppositional role of civil society as a 
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‘public room’ separate from the state and market where hegemony is 
contested. Civil society contains numerous organizations and ideologies, 
which both challenge and uphold the existing order. The cultural hegemony of 
the ruling classes and societal consensus is, thus, formed within civil society. 
The Gramscian perspective, therefore, accommodates the probability that 
some civil society groups will challenge hegemony within the existing 
structure of the political process and others will disengage and work 
underground to produce anti-hegemonic discourses.  Moreover, a Gramscian 
perspective accommodates the conflictual nature of relationships between civil 
society organizations, which is not the case with the dominant liberal view. 
For Gramsci, ‘there are other forms of oppression in civil society which are 
different from the exploitation of labour by capital. There are local, regional, 
racial, bureaucratic and other forms of domination in which a certain power is 
exercised and is given a material form in organisations and institutions of one 
kind or another’ Simon (1982: 73). 
 
For the donors involved in post-liberalization national policy-making 
processes, this is a largely undesired version of civil society, since they wish to 
maintain the perceived dominance of Western economic and cultural 
institutions and modus operandi. They do not want to embrace a Gramscian 
view of civil society - based on a struggle for power, influence and resources – 
but instead put forward a consensual perspective (pace de Tocqueville) where 
a variety of associational groups debate and advocate policies and 
programmes in an amicable and tolerant way. Gramsci posits a dichotomy 
between institutions and ideology within the realm of the superstructure, 
arguing that subordinated classes should prioritise institutional organization 
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over ideology in the struggle for hegemony. Crucially, to achieve hegemony a 
civil society group must ‘present its own aims as realizing the universal aims 
of the community’ (Laclau, 2000: 50). 
 
In accordance with orthodox Marxist views, Gramsci (2011b) contends that a 
universalistic class must emerge from civil society and not from a separate 
sphere above, as Hegel (2003) argued. However, Gramsci diverges from 
orthodox Marxism in arguing that ‘the only universality that society can 
achieve is a hegemonic universality – a universality contaminated by 
particularity’ (Laclau, 2000: 51). In contrast, orthodox Marxists argue that 
universality will occur through the subordinated class becoming fully aware of 
its exploitation and taking revolutionary action. Gramsci therefore shows that 
civil society is of great importance since ‘universal emancipation is achieved 
only through transient identification with the aims of a particular social sector 
… requiring political mediation and relations of representation’ (ibid). For 
Laclau (2000) the rise of global neo-liberalism - predicated on a minimal role 
for the state and the increasing power of the IFIs and other supranational 
organizations – means that decision-making processes must be examined in 
terms which go beyond focusing on designations such as class or ethnicity. 
Gramsci’s notion of hegemony is thus useful since it stresses the importance 
of examining the formal determination of spaces in which groups and 
collective wills compete.  
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2.6 The Rise of NGOs as Key Civil Society Actors in Development 
Processes 
Despite the diversity of associational life recognized by the World Bank (see 
section 2.2) it is evident that NGOs are regarded by the donors and national 
governments as the most important civil society actors taking part in post-
liberalization national policy-making processes. There was a huge rise in the 
number, size and level of activity of development-based NGOs during the 
1980s and the 1990s and their role has become increasingly important in 
developing countries. 20 This is indeed the case in the context of Africa, where 
associational life is rich and varied, but the IFIs and other major bilateral 
donors concentrate funding and capacity building on formally constituted 
NGOs. This narrow donor driven vision of civil society is a continuation of a 
trend starting with the ascendancy of neo-liberalism, leading to the 
‘emergence of NGOs floating above … primary associations and GROs.  
These spoke the language of the donors and tapped into their resource base’ 
(Nugent 2004: 384). 21 
 
Desai (2002: 495) defines NGOs as ‘autonomous, non-membership, relatively 
permanent or institutionalized, non-profit … intermediary organizations, 
staffed by professionals or the educated elite, which work with grassroots 
                                                           
20
  See, for example, Sundar, 2010, Pinkney, 2009, Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlin, 2008 eds, Lata, 2007, 
Rugendyke ed. 2007, Eade and Ligteringen eds, 2006, Edwards, 2006, 2004, Gupta, 2006 Ramphele, 2006, 
Bebbington, 2005, Van Rooy, 2004, Desai, 2002, Eade ed), 2002, Mercer, 2002a, Pearce, 2002, Shigetomi 
ed., 2002, Lewis, 2001, Lewis ed., 1999, Hulme and Edwards eds, 1997. 
21
 African states have also been involved in the formation of NGOs and in stimulating the activities of 
existing organizations. For example, Thomas (1987) outlines how increasing activity on the part of the 
‘Harambee (‘all pull together’) movement’ in Kenya has provided a useful way of mobilizing local resources 
for the benefit of communities through events to generate funds and raise awareness of self-help strategies. 
Encouraged by Kenyatta after independence, Harambee was regarded as a way of bringing communities 
closer through working together on development projects. The government provides start-up funds for these 
activities (See also Widner, 1992). 
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organizations in a supportive capacity.’ However, as NGOs have risen in 
number and importance, definitions have become increasingly blurred and 
caught up in analytical, normative and political notions of development. There 
are attempts to define NGOs according to their origins, 22 functions, 23 
ownership, 24 approach 25 and scale of operations. 26  There are also definitions 
of NGOs based on exclusion as much as inclusion.  Fowler (1997), for 
example, has provided acronyms for the many types of organizations that are 
registered as NGOs but operate in a variety of self-interested ways.   
 
Setting boundaries when defining NGOs is problematic. There are debates, for 
example, as to whether business-sponsored research organizations should be 
classed as NGOs. In analytical terms they may merit such a definition, but 
from a normative perspective - which equates these organizations with acting 
in benign ways to bring about progress in society - defining them as NGOs 
can be contested. Some writers (Stewart, 1997, Blair, 1997, Uphoff, 1996) 
regard NGOs as being essentially market-driven organizations, which do not 
comprise a ‘third sector’ that can be located as a separate entity from the state 
and the market. A further complicating factor concerns the ‘growing tendency 
for people to move back and forth between NGOs, government and … 
business’ (Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlin, 2008: 6). Thus, there is a problem 
                                                           
22  First to fourth generation NGOs have been identified by Korten (1990), for example. 
23
  A division is often made between advocacy-based NGOs and service-delivery NGOs, though this has lost 
much of its meaning as many NGOs engage in both types of work. See Goodhand (2006) and the discussion 
below in this chapter.  
24
  See Lauer (2008) and Fowler (1997) on issues of ownership relating to NGOs. 
25
  Petras and Veltmeyer (2001), for example, categorize the majority of NGOs as a neo-comprador group, 
which accepts the main precepts of neo-liberalism. A minority of NGOs take a different approach in 
confronting neo-liberalism and imperialism 
26 NGO operations vary from small grassroots-based projects to the large-scale international work of Big 
International NGOs (BINGOs), such as Oxfam.  
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with identifying what are, and what are not, NGOs in a tight and analytically 
rigorous way.  
 
Hilhorst (2003: 7) attempts to overcome this problem by conceiving of the 
term ‘NGO’ as a ‘claim-bearing label.’ NGOs claim to be ‘doing good for the 
development of others’ and Hilhorst (2003) argues that through ‘everyday 
politics’ such organizations struggle to achieve legitimacy for this assertion. 
An analysis of NGO attempts to attain legitimacy encompasses the self-
referrals of organizations, which definitions imposing boundaries cut across. 
This is a useful conceptualization in the context of this research, since in 
interviews with officials from NGOs themselves and with trade unionists the 
question of the legitimacy of NGOs was a recurrent theme.    
 
There are several important reasons for the increase in the importance of 
NGOs in development processes. First, during the 1980s - when neo-liberals 
were promoting the work of de Tocqueville - many development practitioners, 
driven to a large extent by disenchantment with the inability of the state to 
address issues of poverty and inequality, were putting their case for NGOs to 
be the leading civil society actors, and to play a primary role in alternative, 
bottom-up, participatory approaches to development (see chapter 1). A notable 
example, at the end of the decade, was Edwards (1989), who, in ‘The 
Irrelevance of Development Studies’ stated that participatory approaches to 
development must be adopted. These should be put into practice by NGOs, 
since they have greater command of the necessary skills and attitudes 
necessary to do so than states and international organizations. For Edwards 
(1989: 132), NGOs are ‘better at listening and learning than either government 
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or multilateral agencies.’ Therefore development-based NGOs grew in 
significance from the 1980s, partly on the back of the perception promulgated 
by practitioners that they demonstrate flexibility, openness to innovation and 
the ability to reach the poor through work at the grassroots level and by 
extension that they have the capability to lead an alternative vision of 
development to both the prevailing neo-liberal paradigm and state-led models.  
 
Wider political and economic forces also played a role in bringing about the 
current importance of NGOs in development. With the demise of many 
authoritarian regimes in Europe at the end of the 1980s, NGOs came to be 
seen as a vehicle to stimulate self-reliance among citizens in the newly 
emerging liberal democracies, thereby weaning them away from the nanny-
state (Jenei and Kuti, 2008, Osborne et al, 2005, Toepler and Salamon, 2003). 
In this way NGOs became part of the New Aid Agenda (Fowler, 2002: 509) 
driven by the IFIs and leading Western bilateral donors, which used aid as a 
way to influence moves in recipient countries towards the creation of liberal 
democratic political institutions and an economic system driven by free 
market ideologies. 27  
 
Linked to this, a burgeoning interest across the world during the 1980s in 
‘civil society’ also played a role.  NGOs became a significant part of this 
‘associational revolution’ where people began forming private, non- profit and 
voluntary organizations to pursue ‘objectives formerly unattended or left to 
the state’ (Salamon, 1994: 109). This signified, in developing countries, an 
                                                           
27  The New Aid Agenda, as set out by Fowler, can be regarded as an integral part of the wider New Policy 
Agenda outlined and discussed in chapter 1. 
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escape from the enforced immaturity of statism and a chance for individuals to 
reclaim responsibility for their lives (Salamon, 1994).  Thus, a combination of 
interest in, and support for, the work of NGOs in the development sector by 
practitioners, multilateral and bilateral donors and global citizenry led to them 
gaining in power and influence over the twenty years prior to the inception of 
the New Policy Agenda.   
 
As NGOs became increasingly favoured by donors at the supranational level, 
to carry forward democratization, marketization and participation agendas 
during the 1990s, they were pressured to scale up their activities.  A debate 
ensued about ways in which NGOs could scale up, and how this strategy could 
increase their ability to influence the wider systems that produce and solidify 
poverty, rather than settling for creating ‘small islands of success’ (Hulme, 
2008: 338). 28 Uvin et al (2000: 1) make the point that in overall terms scaling 
up for NGOs is about ‘expanding impact’ rather than increasing size. Various 
arguments were made as to exactly why and how development-based NGOs 
should scale up during the 1990s (Uvin and Miller, 1994, Edwards and Hulme, 
1992a, Chambers, 1992b, Robinson, 1992, Wils, 1992).  First, while the 
variation in their capacity has been acknowledged (Pearce, 1997), a sizeable 
number of NGOs in developing countries were too small, underfunded, 
understaffed and localized to seriously address substantive problems, such as 
poverty.  As Townsend et al (2002: 534) point out, many NGOs in developing 
countries worked in an environment where they were ‘cut off from access to 
knowledge and funding.’ Thus, NGO actions often did not live up to their 
                                                           
28  The pressure on Tanzanian NGOs from external donors to scale up their activities – and how this has 
influenced their mode of participation in post-liberalization national policy-making processes - is discussed in 
chapter 4.    
 63 
 
rhetoric, particularly in the areas of community participation, cost-
effectiveness and reaching the poorest (Ubels et al eds, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, a significant number of NGOs were unable to effectively absorb 
the large amounts of money needed to deal with major development problems, 
as they lacked institutional capacity and skills in the areas of management and 
strategic planning (Clark, 1997).  In addition, many NGOs could not 
effectively address issues that had policy level causes because they did not 
have a working relationship with the state and lacked a nuanced understanding 
of broader economic, political and social structures (Hulme and Edwards, 
1997). A further problem was the low level of sustainability on the part of 
many NGOs in developing countries.  For Edwards and Hulme (1992a: 53) 
the impact of NGOs ‘is often transitory.’ In Africa, there has been a problem 
with projects and programmes not continuing after the operational NGO staff 
ran out of finance and departed because of a change in funding policy and/or 
personnel.  
 
 
In response to these weaknesses, many NGOs during the 1980s began 
cooperating more with multilateral and bilateral donors in providing services 
than had previously been the case. NGOs also employed the strategy of 
networking to scale up and attempts to ‘self spread’ local initiatives (Fowler, 
1997, Chambers, 1992b). Receiving more support from powerful donors led to 
operational scaling up, in the forms of expanding the size of projects, 
programmes, budgets and target constituencies. 
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The scaling up of the operations and impact of development-based NGOs 
gathered pace from the 1980s. Hulme and Edwards (1997) calculated that at 
the end of the1950s there were 1,000 NGOs working in developing countries 
and by the start of the 1990s this had risen to 29,000.  By 2004, $24 billion of 
aid to developing countries – equivalent to over 30% of all ODA - was 
channelled through NGOs (Riddell, 2007). Furthermore, the amount of 
income provided for development-based NGOs rose from approximately 1.5% 
of the total at the start of the 1970s to around 30% by the middle of the 1990s 
(World Bank, 2010a). According to the UNDP (2010) there are currently 
50,000 NGOs working in developing countries, which receive over $10 billion 
funding from the IFIs - as well as American, Japanese and European 
governmental agencies - and affect the lives of two hundred and fifty million 
people. Turning to Africa in particular, by 1996, 30% of all US aid was 
channelled through NGOs, as part of a policy enshrined in 1992 of moving aid 
away from control by ‘patrimonial’ states (Chege, 1999). Regarding the 
consequences of this enhanced role for NGOs in development processes since 
the 1980s, Hulme (2008: 338) argues that scaling up has been successful in 
terms of having an impact ‘on the systemic pressures that cause and reinforce 
poverty,’ while making the point that there remains a lot of competition 
between NGOs, leading to duplication of work and best practice not being 
shared.   
 
A significant factor in the scaling up of NGOs has been the increase in their 
advocacy work. While some opt entirely for one or the other, most NGOs have 
to choose how to balance service delivery and policy advocacy. As service 
delivery agents, NGOs provide welfare, technical, legal and financial services 
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to the poor or work with community organizations in basic service and 
infrastructure provision. Advocacy is concerned with seeking social change by 
influencing attitudes, policy and practice and lobbying directly for the policy 
changes (Fowler, 1997).  
 
The neo-liberal attack on statism at the end of the 1970s (see chapter 1), led to 
a rise in the number of NGOs in developing countries used by governments 
and donor agencies as service-delivery gap-fillers in order to support those 
excluded from – or marginalized within – the capitalist free market system 
(Hulme and Edwards, 1997, Robinson, 1997). NGOs working in this way 
have been categorised by Korten (1990) as ‘public service contractors’ and 
accused of being co-opted by the state and donor agencies into propping up a 
neo-liberal agenda (Pearce, 1997, Gary, 1996).29 The role of service deliverers 
in such an environment has proved problematic for NGOs. Their work 
sometimes lacks compatibility and co-ordination with that of national 
development plans led by the state and is based on the ‘luxury’ of selecting 
one or two issues to concentrate on and a narrow constituency with which to 
work (Clark, 1997: 51). Securing funding for their work also became an issue 
for NGOs (Edwards and Fowler, 2003), along with concerns about the long-
term impact of service provision on the sustainability of national systems in 
developing countries (Hulme and Edwards, 1997). Overdependence on 
external donors has led ‘perversely’ to a weakening of local NGOs in 
developing countries, since they do not develop an independent financial base 
(Riddell, 2007: 395). This led Robinson (1993) to argue that influential and 
well-funded NGOs often concentrate resources in regions and sectors that are 
                                                           
29  The case of Tanzania in this regard, is examined in chapter 4. 
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not the most important for national development, thereby contributing to the 
creation of a ‘patchwork quilt’ of services with some regions not serviced by 
NGOs and covered only by weak state provision. 
 
Bratton (1989) made the point at the end of the 1980s that NGOs contribution 
to development processes might be more important in the political rather than 
the economic sphere. This argument had some influence and led to an 
increasing interest in the role of NGOs as promoters of democratic 
development. Later research on Africa by Bratton and van de Walle (1998) 
contended that voluntary groups can be vehicles through which popular 
political demands may be organized and disseminated, leading to mass efforts 
to bring about bottom-up democracy. Support for this view also came from 
Silliman and Noble (1998: 306), who argued that ‘NGOs … enhance 
democracy by expanding the number and range of voices addressing 
government.’ Moreover, for Fisher (1998: 126), bottom-up democracy 
stimulated by NGO advocacy has been successful in enough cases to create a 
tipping point, leading to ‘top-down political change’ becoming possible. In 
overall terms, for adherents of this view, which developed during the 1990s - 
and now includes the main donors involved in driving the New Policy Agenda 
- NGOs are important players in transforming development processes and 
have a key role to play during and after democratic transitions.   
  
The work of NGOs has thus become inextricably linked to the key Post-
Washington Consensus concerns of liberal-democratic transition, increasing 
good governance and building social capital. Running advocacy campaigns 
requires technical and financial capacity, so many NGOs are unable to engage 
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in such activities, but there is ‘increasing advocacy and policy assertiveness of 
a few’ (Fowler, 2002: 512). The rise of long term and costly advocacy work, 
done mostly by large organizations, and the scaling up of development work 
on the part of many NGOs, has led to them seeking larger amounts of funding 
from, and forming closer relationships with, major multilateral and bilateral 
donors.  
 
While some NGOs are committed to pursuing alternatives to donor driven 
agendas in developing countries (Baan et al, 2008, Hilhorst, 2003) and to 
exploring self-financing strategies (Biker, 2008, Hudock, 2001, Davis and 
Etchant, 2000), most now rely on donors for funds and there has been an 
increase in the number of NGOs working as public service contractors 
(Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlin, 2008). The World Bank finances civil society 
organizations through various funding mechanisms, such as the Civil Society 
Fund and the Development Marketplace. The financing of NGOs centres on 
particular areas, such as HIV/AIDS, where almost 49,000 grassroots projects 
in Africa have been funded by the World Bank (World Bank, 2009b). At state 
level many of the major government departments responsible for overseas 
development channel a substantial amount of their funds for programmes 
through NGOs. As Fowler (2002: 509) states, the relationship between NGOs 
and donors has changed ‘from separation to convergence, and from mutual 
mistrust and antagonism to an asymmetric co-optive embrace.’ 
 
The World Bank is the primary financier of development projects with 
developing countries currently owing the institution about $47 billion (World 
Bank, 2010a).  As part of the move to the Post-Washington Consensus, the 
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World Bank shifted from a focus on infrastructure to a stress on projects 
creating human and social capital (see chapter 1) as well as poverty alleviation 
under the Presidency of James Wolfensohn from 1995 to 2005 (Kagia ed., 
2005, Mallaby, 2005, Wolfensohn, 2005). To roll out such projects, the World 
Bank increasingly financed civil society organizations. The World Bank 
(2010a) calculates that 10% of its central portfolio, totalling $2 billion, goes to 
government-operated community-driven projects.  Moreover, there was 
‘active CSO involvement’ in 82% of World Bank-run projects in 2006, up 
from 21% in 1990. 30 For critics, participation remains mostly low-intensity 
(see chapter 1) in the form of consultation, which ‘is often a ritual that lends 
legitimacy to the policy process without creating binding commitments’ 
(Nelson, 2002: 500). 31 
 
Overall, NGOs have become significant actors in development processes 
through the move from the Washington Consensus to Post-Washington 
Consensus policies. As a result their operations and impact have been scaled 
up, advocacy work linked to good governance has become an important part 
of their activities and relationships with major donors have grown closer.  As 
well as affecting the ways in which they work on the ground, these changes 
have also influenced theoretical debates regarding NGOs, which are examined 
in the next section. 
 
 
 
                                                           
30  The precise meaning of ‘active CSO involvement’ is not outlined by the World Bank. 
31
 The validity of such criticisms is analysed in regard to the cases of Tanzanian NGOs and trade unions is 
analysed in chapters 4 and 5 respectively. 
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2.7 Critiques of the Liberal Conception of the Role of NGOs 
As Post-Washington Consensus policies were implemented towards the latter 
half of the 1990s a more critical literature on NGOs developed. Clarke (1998: 
40) stresses the importance of theorizing the political impact of NGOs, since 
failure to do this had led to an ‘inadequate, explicitly normative interpretation 
of NGO ideology.’ It had also encouraged a tendency to take NGOs’ advocacy 
as self-evidently positive. 
 
Auto-critiques (Hearn, 2007) of the roles of  NGOs broadened during the 
latter half of the 1990s from long-standing analysts of civil society, such as 
Edwards and Fowler eds, (2002), Edwards and Hulme eds (1996, 1992) and 
Fowler (2000, 1997), focused on increasing legitimacy, capacity, 
accountability and sustainability within the dominant paradigm. Fowler (1997: 
xii) made the point that people working for development NGOs ‘seldom have 
the time to reflect on their actions’ and thus it is not easy to get a ‘fix’ on the 
way NGOs perform. Subsequently there needs to be an emphasis on ‘creating 
virtuous spirals for sustainability’ (Fowler, 2000: 186) driven by NGO leaders.  
 
Edwards (2004: 103-104), has been particularly critical of the role of the IFIs 
and bilateral donors, arguing that much civil society building since the 
collapse of communism in 1989 has been a ‘crude attempt to manipulate 
associational life in line with Western, and specifically North American 
liberal-democratic templates.’ This has involved pre-selecting organizations 
that donors think are most important and ignoring domestic expressions of 
citizen action that do not conform to Western expectations, such as radical 
social movements, informal village/clan-based organizations or pre-political 
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formations.  Mistrust and rivalry have evolved as fledgling civil society 
organizations compete for foreign aid. In overall terms, during the 1980s and 
the 1990s there was ‘neglect [by NGOs] of analysing and challenging those 
who would gain control of both discourse and practice in development’ 
(Hulme, 2008: 340). 
 
Along with these critiques from within, a radical attack on the role of 
development-based NGOs has developed since the latter half of the 1990s, 
with Petras and Veltmeyer (2001) prominent in putting forward counter-
hegemonic theories. They contend that NGOs are a neo-comprador group, 
which - through supplying services on behalf of donor countries - are trading 
in domestic poverty in return for individual advancement. NGOs often have a 
negative influence on popular communities by directing energy to self-help 
projects more than social transformations. Moreover, when the majority of 
development-based NGOs discuss civil society they obscure the profound 
class divisions and struggles, as well as other forms of stratification, such as 
caste, that polarise contemporary society. 32 In the context of Africa, Maina 
(1998) argues that analysts fail to account for the fact that a lot of civil society 
organizations themselves are actually divided along lines of class and 
ethnicity.  
Tandon (1996) categorises NGOs as ‘missionaries’ of the neo-liberal era, a 
theme developed by Shivji (2007: vii), who argues that NGOs are not a third 
sector or independent of the state but are embedded in the neo-liberal project 
in Africa. For Shivji (2007) this is because most of the NGOs which are 
                                                           
32  See also Petras (2003) for this view. 
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currently influential in Africa were founded in the neo-liberal era and are 
staffed by careerist, urban-based elites who are motivated by material gain. 
These organizations overwhelmingly receive their funding from Western 
donor agencies, to which they are upwardly accountable, at the expense of 
downward accountability to the poor and marginalized. Moreover, the mission 
statements of these NGOs are ‘vague, amorphous and meaningless’ (Shivji, 
2007: 32). 33  
Hearn (2007: 1106-1107) has also put forward the case for taking up counter-
hegemonic perspectives, arguing that research on African civil society 
organizations should draw on a Gramscian perspective, given that civil society 
organizations in developing countries are dependent on external resources and 
patronage and in return popularize the development policy of donors.  This 
necessitates a close examination of the fluid relationship between the state and 
civil society in the struggle for hegemony.  
 
Making valid generalisations concerning the nature of the relationship 
between states and development-NGOs in Africa is difficult. Links diverge 
from country to country and inevitably change over time. Moreover, NGO 
connections with separate segments of the same state – politicians, civil 
servants of line ministries and the military - tend to vary. Finally these 
relationships can differ markedly across regions and localities of the same 
country (Hilhorst, 2003). However, the rise of a new group of well funded 
NGOs in Africa during the 1990s 34 has led to accusations from governments 
that they are usurping state sovereignty and fomenting unwarranted dissent 
                                                           
33
  See chapter 4 for an analysis of the validity of these criticisms with regard to NGOs in Tanzania. 
34
 See chapter 4 for an analysis of how this happened in Tanzania. 
 72 
 
among citizens (Pinkney, 2009, Fowler, 2002).  In a number of African 
countries, governments have been critical of the NGO sector during the neo-
liberal era. Governments have, inter alia, accused NGO officials of forming 
only to benefit themselves in Tanzania (Michael, 2004), being corrupt in 
Kenya (Chege, 1999), subverting national policies in South Africa (Chege, 
1999) and of unwarranted meddling in domestic issues in Ethiopia 
(Norwegian Council for Africa, 2009). 35 
 
African governments are also aware of the significant amount of finance 
NGOs attract from Western donors, which can be used to provide services in 
‘partnership’ with the state (Clark, 2002). Government authority has come 
under pressure in a number of African countries as a result of the donor driven 
agenda - which includes a substantive role for civil society organizations - and 
they therefore have to be strategic in regard to allowing NGOs to expand their 
activities (Manji and O’Coill, 2002). Some governments have also tapped into 
the donor finance available for NGOs through indirectly controlling and/or 
using state employees to form and run NGOs, such as in the case of the 
District Development Trusts (DDT) in Tanzania (Mchomvu et at, 1998, Qorro, 
1991). 36  
 
As a result of the factors outlined above, African governments have tended to 
deal with NGOs through carrot-and-stick strategies. These include granting or 
withholding privileges, such as being able to import equipment duty free 
(Michael, 2004).  Governments also usually insist on the formal registration of 
                                                           
35  See also on this point the cases of confrontational relations between the state and two development-based 
NGOs in Tanzania - Hakielimu and the Youth Partnership Countrywide -, which are examined in detail in 
chapter 4.  
36
  See chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the District Development Trusts (DDTs). 
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NGOs and Codes of Conduct, both of which have become issues of contention 
in the Tanzanian context (Lawyers Environmental Action Team, 2010, Policy 
Forum, 2008b). These two forms of regulation are good examples of the way 
the state delineates the formal spaces in which civil society operates in post-
liberalization Tanzania, which Gramsci (2011b) emphasized as vital to an 
understanding of how hegemony is created and maintained. 37  
 
Apart from dealing with potentially conflictual relationships with the state, the 
rising NGO sector in Africa faces other obstacles. The scaling-up of their 
activities and influence has led to accusations that many NGOs have become 
bureaucratic and top-heavy. In addition, NGO fundraising has been criticized 
for using paternalistic images and presenting ill-conceived views of reasons 
for problems in Africa.  For De Waal (1997), international humanitarian 
groups contribute to difficulties rather than providing solutions, by wrongly 
focusing on technical, rather than political, issues and over-focusing on certain 
areas.  De Waal’s argument in this regard resonates in Tanzania, where 
officials from the Foundation for Civil Society (FCS) - a large grant providing 
body - reported during fieldwork interviews that NGOs flood them with 
applications for grants to work on HIV/AIDS projects. According to 
interviewees, this is because they have heard on the ‘development grapevine’ 
that it is easy to get funding for work in this area.  Applications for grants to 
work on other important areas - such as malaria prevention and treatment - are 
lacking. 38 
 
                                                           
37
  See chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the registration of NGOs and the NGO Code of Conduct in post-
liberalization Tanzania. 
38
 See chapter 4 for a fuller examination of the work of the FCS. 
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The concentration of the Western donors on fostering forms of civil society in 
Africa with which they are familiar intensified from the mid-1980s, while 
other important civil society associations have been marginalized.  Civil 
society organizations focusing on women, traders, tribes, clans, credit 
provision, cooperative activities, death arrangements, culture and sports, for 
example, have been neglected or ignored by donors (Gibbon, 2001a). The 
examples of burial societies and sports clubs can be used to show how the 
complexities of associational life in Africa are underplayed and undervalued 
through donor insistence on concentrating funding and capacity-building 
initiatives on formally constituted NGOs.  
 
REBA (2007: 1) points out that, burial societies ‘have become a central part of 
the social fabric in many African countries.’ However, they feature little in the 
literature of the donors concerning civil society. Dercon et al (2008), Mapetla 
et al (2007), Schneider (2008) and Matobo (1998) are amongst other writers 
who have carried out work on the importance of the activities of burial 
societies in Africa, showing how these often extend considerably beyond 
arrangements to cater for the deaths of members and their families to 
encompass wider aspects of social and economic development. 
Moreover, there has been a considerable amount of recent research on the 
importance of sports clubs in Africa, which provide support and services for 
citizens extending beyond their ostensible remit. Armstrong and Giulianotti 
(2004) outline how colonial regimes in Africa used sport as a way of instilling 
‘discipline’ in subject peoples, often as part of ‘muscular Christianity.’ Sports 
clubs formed during the colonial period have often developed complex and 
powerful leverage over many areas of life and continue to provide support and 
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a sense of identity for many people.  For example, Pannenborg, (2008) - in a 
study of football clubs in Cameroon – shows how ethnic groups use football 
as a stepping stone to gain political and economic power. 39   
 
Lund (2006) also brings out the influence of traditional civil society 
associations in Africa, which at times compete with the state to exercise public 
authority. The ways in which such institutions act highlights the intricacies 
involved in understanding the concepts of legitimacy, belonging, citizenship 
and territory.  While government institutions are important in setting out and 
enforcing rules and regulations, the concept of the state is also used to depict 
‘what we are not’ by some civil society organizations. In parts of Africa state 
authority is vigorously challenged by civil society organizations, which at 
times have shared tactical interests. However, common interests between such 
groups fluctuate in a constant cycle of reproduction and transformation. 
Demarcating analytical lines between state and civil society obscures the fluid 
nature of relationships between the two. Public authority is exercised by 
bodies that come and go and such ‘institutions  
operate in the twilight between state and society, between public and private’ 
(Lund, 2006: 686). 
 
To be effective, institutions must convey meaning to acts of authority through 
practices that inculcate the idea that their authority is legitimate. In Tanzania, 
loosely formed community associations repair roads and provide security by 
                                                           
39  Studies by Hawkey, (2010), Korr and Close (2010), Wanderi (2009), Ricci, (2008), Manzo (2007), Ndee 
(2007), Alegi (2004) and Fjeld (2000) have also demonstrated the substantial influence of sports clubs on 
many aspects of civic life in Africa. 
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patrolling areas regarded as dangerous. They ask for voluntary contributions 
from citizens in the street and whether such demands are successful depends 
on their force, the perception on the part of the citizens as to the worth of the 
services provided and their economic status. For example, in some parts of 
Dar es Salaam the work of such ‘twilight institutions’ is well regarded and 
compared favourably to that of the state.  
 
When undertaking fieldwork in Dar es Salaam in 2008 I was often stopped in 
my local area by a group of men who asked for money, on the basis that they 
were repairing the roads and cutting back bushes to reduce the number of 
attacks by people using foliage as cover. On asking local Tanzanians if the 
group was targeting me as I was perceived as a wealthy foreigner, they said 
that this was not the case and that they contributed to this ‘local tax,’ as the 
group ‘did a good job’ and was better respected in the area than state 
authorities. In sum, this group was considered to be legitimate by the local 
population and was an effective ‘twilight organization’ (Lund, 2006).  
 
As well as these loosely formed civil society organizations, home associations 
play a substantive role in some areas of civic life in Tanzania. These 
associations – often formed by members of the domestic diaspora - take a 
variety of forms and often contribute to the building of schools in rural home 
areas. Home association development activities can be consistent with national 
political policies and leaders are sometimes MPs, using these groups as a 
vehicle for growth in their local constituencies. However, home associations 
also present a ‘potential threat to the government’s claim to legitimacy’ 
(Jennings and Mercer, 2011: 16) through their critiques of state policies, which 
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can be implicit or as direct, in some cases, as the formulation of alternative 
economic development strategy documents.  The activities of twilight 
organizations and home associations - and the complexities of their 
relationships with both the state and citizens - are ignored by the donors 
through their concentration on funding and nurturing a small group of 
formally constituted NGOs. 
 
For, Mbembe (2001) it is vital to examine efforts to establish new forms of 
legitimate order and to restructure forms of authority by differing groups. 
While some of these exertions are circumscribed by the state and others have 
no lasting impact, there are those that succeed and become self-sustaining 
through skilful strategies. Using this conception, it is possible to see how 
challenges can emerge to seemingly solid state structures and to gain insights 
into ways in which social and political life is governed because it does not 
make binding assumptions about the state and civil society. The ‘prevalence 
and persistence of twilight institutional forms … should encourage us to re-
investigate the institution and the idea we call state’ (Lund, 2006:  701).   
 
The arguments set out above regarding the particularities of associational life 
in different African settings provide support for Mamdani’s (1996) argument 
that a historically formed understanding of the role of civil society 
organizations is important. Mamdani makes the important point that civil 
society was used as a significant organizing principle under colonialism, 
which should thus be used as an analytical starting point for studies of the 
concept. The current relationship between the state and civil society 
organizations in Tanzania can only be fully apprehended through an analysis 
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of the way ideologies, strategies and interrelationships have developed from 
the colonial era onwards. This is why the analyses of NGOs and trade unions 
(in chapters 4 and 5, respectively) focus on how the perspectives and actions 
of these two associational groups have been affected by the development of 
different political and economic formations in Tanzania. 
 
2.8 Summary 
This chapter has identified several key issues relating to the rise to prominence 
of civil society as a concept in development processes as part of the New 
Policy Agenda and the reasons why NGOs have become the associational 
form most favoured by donors involved in driving post-liberalization national 
policy-making processes. 
 
First, weaknesses in the de Tocquevillian perspective on civil society – which 
is favoured by the IFIs - have been highlighted.   Moreover, it has been shown 
that donor views concerning the way civil society organizations participate in 
post-liberalization national policy-making processes - and its consequences - 
can be challenged by an analysis of arguments made by de Tocqueville 
(1845a, 1845b) himself, the weaknesses in his views notwithstanding. De 
Tocqueville argued that civil society should be developed organically and 
become rooted in a society in order to become effective. However, the World 
Bank and bilateral donors have focused narrowly on fostering NGOs as 
participants in post-liberalization national policy-making processes, neglecting 
other organic associational forms, which have roots in African societies.  
Thus, the way civil society is conceptualized, theorized and fostered by the 
donors has led to a restricted base of participation by associational groups in 
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post-liberalization national policy-making processes in Africa, which has 
contributed to weak ownership. 
 
Second, according to de Tocqueville (1845a, 1845b) the number of CSOs in a 
society expands with growing equality and associational life is likely to be 
limited and based around conflict if inequality is enhanced. World Bank 
(2009b) statistics show that income inequality is growing in Tanzania, 
therefore according to the de Tocquevillian view, it is doubtful that 
associational life will expand endogenously in these circumstances. Moreover, 
as a result of this inequality, existing civil society organizations are likely to 
take part in confrontational activities, rather than harmonious debates with 
organs of the state, encouraging tolerance, openness and moderate opinion, as 
envisaged by the donors.  
 
Third, Gramscian arguments concerning the roles and activities of civil society 
organizations – which are neglected by the donors - have greater explanatory 
power than liberal views. The strength of Gramsci’s notion of hegemony is the 
way it focuses on the formal determination of the spaces in which civil society 
groups compete, such as the way the state regulates the registration and 
conduct of NGOs in post-liberalization Tanzania (discussed in section 2.7), 
rather than pre-conceived determinants of attitude, interests and behaviour. 
Civil society is of importance as the public room where hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic views are put forward by civil society organizations, 
which all identify with the aims of a particular social sector.  Framing the 
participation of Tanzanian civil society organizations in post-liberalization 
national policy-making processes within a Gramscian approach to civil society 
 80 
 
- concentrating on how the political space in which they operate is formally 
determined - allows a more nuanced analysis to emerge than is the case when 
using the dominant liberal theorization as a model. How the prevailing 
political spaces, in which civil society and the state contest hegemony, have 
been shaped by major shifts in the political economy of Tanzania is examined 
in the following chapter. This is instrumental to a more subtle understanding 
of why civil society is at present a very uneven playing field where NGOs 
have greater capacity to insert themselves into national policy-making 
processes than trade unions.   
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Chapter 3 
 
The History of Development Policies in Tanzania 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter highlights changes in relationships between the core elements of 
what Gramsci characterized as the integral state (civil society, state institutions 
and ideology) in Tanzania, from the period of German colonialism to the 
present. This is done in order to illustrate how changes in the nature of the 
state crucially affected the perceptions, positions and power of trade unions. 
The focus is largely on the construction of the neo-liberal power bloc. 
However, in order to explain its precise form in Tanzania, it is first necessary 
to review briefly the historical contours of the state. Key changes in the 
political economy of Tanzania in the post-liberalization period, which have led 
to the marginalization of trade unions, are assessed.40 In the economic sphere, 
these shifts have revolved around the stress on attracting inward Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), accompanied by the growing informalization of the 
labour force. In the realm of politics, the transition has taken the form of the 
adoption of a confusing array of national policy instruments, all driven by the 
main Post-Washington Consensus issues of achieving good governance 
through partnership between agents of development, accompanied by mass 
participation in policy-making debates, in order to bring about national 
ownership of them.  
 
 
 
                                                           
40
  A detailed historically-grounded analysis of trade unions in Tanzania is provided in chapter 5. 
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3.2 German Colonialism 
After Chancellor Bismarck changed his attitude from indifference to pro-
Colonialism in 1884, Germany played a leading role in the ‘Scramble for 
Africa’ at the Berlin Conference (1884/1885), whence control over ‘German 
East Africa’ was claimed as a protectorate.  This was ‘a simple assertion of her 
new position among the world powers’ (Oliver and Atmore, 1994: 106) and 
thus, as Koponen (1995: 169) puts it, colonial conquest was ‘in essence a 
political action.’ 
 
Mainland Tanganyika was shared between German and British chartered 
companies. German rule has been divided into two broad periods by Iliffe 
(1969); from its inception to 1906, where progress was slow through the 
hostility of native tribes, lack of funds and poor administration, and second the 
‘age of improvement’ from 1907 until the outbreak of the First World War. 
Iliffe's division is based on the major reorganization of the colony, which 
occurred after the Maji Maji rebellion of 1905. This started at Kilwa and 
spread through the south of the country, becoming ‘the most widespread 
resistance to colonial rule in Africa’ (Coulson, 1985: 31). 
  
The colony used three modes of economic development: trade based on native 
crops, European plantations for crops needing technical equipment, such as 
sisal, and farming and ranching by permanent white settlers. With the 
European community being the most forceful and articulate, concessions made 
by the ruling administration favoured the second and third approaches.  
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Economic relations between German East Africa and British East Africa were 
generally good. 41   
 
The onset of the First World War in 1914 signalled the end of German rule. 
The short period of German control over Tanganyika meant that development 
processes initiated during this time had not matured enough to make them 
‘identifiable and transparent to historical analysis. Most progressed unevenly 
and were far from completed when German rule was interrupted’ (Koponen, 
1995: 557). Infrastructure was built (notably roads and railways) during this 
period and coffee, cotton and sisal industries became significant export 
sectors, primarily to the benefit of European plantation owners, traders and a 
small group of state officials. 
 
Iliffe (1969) points out that the fundamental quandary of German colonialism 
in Tanganyika, after 1906, was based on a clash between the growing power of 
settlers, bringing them closer to the machinery of territorial government and 
the new skills acquired by some Africans during the ‘age of improvement’ 
which gave them the means to assert control over their own societies more 
effectively than had previously been the case. This group sought advantage 
through new modes of behaviour, whereby resistance was replaced by ‘a 
widespread desire to utilise Western techniques in order to transform African 
societies’ (Iliffe, 1969: 8). For the colonizers, how to accommodate the 
aspirations of this group was problematic. The Maji Maji rebellion showed 
                                                           
41
  A German administrator at the time argued that, ‘with regard to tropical products, Germany was the 
teacher of England, while on the question of agriculture and stock-raising Germany can learn much from her 
English neighbours’ (Brode, 1977:  26). 
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that a serious challenge to colonial rule in Tanganyika was possible. The 
rebellion had been based on a number of different tribal groups, which did not 
have a similar vision or over-arching sense of unity (Giblin and Morison, 
2010), drawing on their particular forms of organization to resist the 
colonizers. While based, overall, on the political marginalization of tribes in 
the south of Tanganyika and anger at the exploitation of local labour within an 
extractive colonial economy (Koponen, 1995), the rebellion had particular 
local triggers. 
 
3.3 British Colonialism up to the end of the Second World War 
 In succeeding Germany as the colonial power in Tanganyika, on 1 February  
1920, 42 the British were aware, through the Maji Maji rebellion, that the 
integral state needed to rely on ideological hegemony as far as possible, since 
coercion was a drain on state resources and the morale of its officers. Thus, 
under the forty-one year period of British administration, there was a slow and 
uneven shift in state ideology, in order to allow Africans to pursue their 
aspirations through the institutionalized means of civil society. A fluid struggle 
for ideological hegemony ensued, as state and civil society both endeavoured 
to frame and control the forms and activities of associational groups in the 
country.     
  
As the plantations and sisal estates were in a state of disrepair, peasant 
production became the mainstay of the economy with official policy being 
premised on non-industrialization. 43 The ruling administration had to maintain 
                                                           
42
  Britain took control of the ‘Tanganyika Territory’ on a League of Nations Mandate. 
43
  This policy was continued under the leadership of Nyerere after independence (see section 3.5. below). 
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a good relationship with the settlers. Although the Governor did not want them 
to have political power, settlers were given support, whilst, rhetorically, a 
policy of ‘primarily African development’ (Iliffe, 1989: 262) was maintained. 
The British introduced a system of Indirect Rule in 1925, based on running the 
country through local chiefs, who had their own courts and were allowed to 
keep some of the taxes they collected. 44 Acquiescence to British requirements 
on the part of the chiefs was required, as a way of maintaining the ideological 
hegemony of the colonial state, with the result that those adopting too 
independent a line were replaced. Since many chiefs had been killed or 
banished by the Germans, the British often created ‘chiefs,’ who were young, 
educated and easy to influence. 
 
As it became apparent during the 1920s that rule via the chiefs was unlikely to 
be successful (Coulson, 1985), some colonial administrators argued that civil 
society should be used to form an institutionalized alliance with the educated 
African class as an alternative. The co-operative societies were suggested as 
an appropriate vehicle for this concord, since they operated on a basis close to 
that of the main principles of Indirect Rule; the teaching of personal 
responsibility and initiative. Although it was another thirty years before the 
idea was taken seriously the co-operative societies at independence in 1961 
had grown to be a powerful part of civil society in Tanzania, which engaged in 
a war of position with the colonial state, particularly around the issue of 
whether Africans could successfully set up and run commercial enterprises 
within a market economy independently. 
                                                           
44  Iliffe (1989) and Rodney (1980) argue that the imposition of indirect rule in Tanganyika led to tribalism. 
For a contrasting view see Willis (1993). 
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Some co-operatives were inaugurated and run by Africans from the early years 
of British control. The first of these, the Kilimanjaro Native Planters’ 
Association (KNPA), was formed in 1925. However, the colonial 
administration was wary of such associations providing a challenge to state 
hegemony. Consequently government control of these societies was set up 
through a registrar, who had the power to liquidate any which did not obey the 
rules. 45 The development of the KNPA, thus, shows the importance to the 
state of using legislation to win the war of position in Tanganyika, which 
continues to the present. By 1927 the KNPA had become a marketing co-
operative. This was significant, as crop marketing was the Tanganyikan 
peasant society’s main connection with the larger polity and market.  Thus, the 
marketing system formed an important framework for political organization, 
which distinguished peasant from tribal societies and is a reason why ‘cash-
crop agriculture was so important to Tanganyika’s political history’ (Iliffe, 
1989: 277). The KNPA quickly became a political body led by coffee farmers, 
whose interests clashed with those of the administrators, settlers and tribal 
chiefs. Under settler pressure, the government discouraged native coffee 
production and encouraged the cultivation of food crops instead. The collapse 
of coffee prices in 1929, corruption scandals and replacement of fees by a levy 
(which was difficult to collect) led to the demise of the KNPA. The 
government replaced it with the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union 
(KNCU), which was seen as a ‘state institution’ by natives and thus distrusted. 
It was closely controlled by the registrar of societies and deliberately 
decentralised and depoliticised through the influence of central government.  
                                                           
45  Furthermore, the registrar could decide on the size of societies and employed a team of inspectors and 
auditors to check on the way they were being run.  
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It was not until 1952 when the Victoria Federation of Co-operative Unions 
(VFCU), which became the largest co-operative society in Africa (Maghimbi, 
1990), had its application for registration accepted that the government 
allowed freer formation of co-operative societies. 46  The co-operatives grew 
during the 1950s and through this expansion, the ‘alliance between the 
educated and the colonial state was legitimized’ (Coulson, 1985: 99).47  While 
the state regulated the co-operative societies closely they also provided 
assistance in various ways, notably price regulation, guaranteed markets and 
subsidised credit (Gibbon, 2001b). The co-operatives can thus be regarded as 
reliant on the state. However, they were active in the independence struggle, 
through promoting the expansion of cash cropping in rural areas, thereby 
raising confidence by showing that Africans could do business successfully. 
This challenged the ideology of the state that Africans were unable to 
participate independently within a market economy.48 On the basis of their 
positive role in the independence struggle and their substantial economic 
impact, officials from co-operative societies expected to play a significant and 
autonomous role in post-colonial Tanzania.49 Instead, the state increasingly 
controlled their activities, since (as with trade unions) it was not prepared to 
tolerate a competing power axis, which was entrenched in key sectors of the 
economy. Using the argument that co-operative societies were run by 
exploitative middle-men, they were proscribed in 1976 and replaced with 
                                                           
4646
  The VFCU was very successful in supplying peasants with inputs for the cotton industry and even started 
its own industrialization process (Maghimbi, 1990).  
47
  There were 188 co-operatives in 1952 with 153,000 members. By 1957 this had risen to 474 co-operatives 
with 305,000 members. Two years later, 617 co-operatives had been registered, which marketed all the cotton 
in Tanganyika and increasing amounts of coffee, paddy and cashews.  
48
 Shivji (2006) outlines how co-operative societies operated successfully in the Kagera and Kilimanjaro 
regions during the 1950s. 
49
  By 1968 the Tanzanian co-operative movement was the largest in Africa and third biggest in the world 
measured by market share of agricultural exports (Maghimbi, 2010). 
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‘ujamaa organizations,’ reducing the forms of associational life in Tanzania 
able to play an independent role (Shivji, 2006).   
 
The onset of the Second World War led to an enhancement of civil society 
activity in Africa by providing a boost to the nationalist and labour 
movements, as the numbers of workers joining the labour market to provide 
materials for the Allies increased (Shillington, 1995). In Tanganyika, 86,740 
Africans were enlisted in the armed forces, all of whom were conscripts, from 
1940 onwards. Conscription was also used to provide labour on plantations, 
particularly the sisal estates. As the war continued, ‘discontent with shortages, 
inflation and regimentation grew’ (Iliffe, 1989: 372). Furthermore, fighting 
alongside the British led to the ‘mystique of the coloniser’ (Guibernau, 1996) 
lessening and feelings of inferiority amongst the colonised consequently 
decreasing, as they became more conscious of the system of consented 
coercion (Gramsci, 2011b) by which their subjugation was maintained. 
 
3.4 The Independence Struggle after the Second World War 
Several factors further stimulated African nationalism and the rise of civil 
society organizations after the Second World War. Key elements of 
associational life in Tanganyika provided challenges in the public room of 
civil society during the 1950s to the state’s hegemonic status, as a rising class 
of educated Africans became increasingly resentful at the way colonial rule 
was holding them back. First, attempts by the ruling administration to create 
white settlements - along with evictions of Africans from their land - led to 
resistance. The number of white settlers rose from 10,648 to 20,958, in the 
decade after 1948 (Iliffe, 1989). The fluid nature of the contestation of 
 89 
 
ideological hegemony between the core elements of the integral state, outlined 
by Gramsci (see chapter 2), can be seen by the way evictions galvanised 
opposition to colonial rule, organized by African political associations and 
trade unions. Second, agricultural policies were applied in a way which 
favoured white settlers, leading to a rise in nationalist consciousness and 
opposition from the labour movement. The disastrous groundnut scheme - 
started in 1946 and cancelled in 1951 after £49 million had been spent on it – 
is an example. Rizzo (2006) outlines how the scheme led to a struggle 
between its managers and state officials for control of the labour market. The 
scheme caused widespread environmental destruction and led to the 
‘extinction of existing land rights’, as farmers became ‘tenants of the state’ 
(Woodhouse and Chimhowu, 2005; 186). Third, as part of their effort to win 
the war of position, the colonial state refused to allow Africans to join higher 
civil service levels. This exclusion from the upper levels of the state 
machinery led to unrest, as Africans were aware that, as Gramsci (2011b) 
argued, control of institutions (both in the state and civil society spheres) was 
vital to the achievement of ideological hegemony. Fourthly, the colonial state 
attempted to preserve its ideological hegemony by introducing a new system 
of governance in 1957, whereby the largely African-controlled District 
Councils had to report to white-dominated Provincial Councils. This was 
contested by Africans, who saw it ‘as an attempt to preserve white rule’ 
(Coulson, 1985: 13).  
 
With regard to the labour movement, Africans were galvanised by the way 
trade unions demonstrated that they could bring important parts of the 
economy to a halt after the war. The war itself had led to an improvement in 
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the legal position of trade unions, as administrations in British colonies were 
ordered from London to regulate labour relations. The British government 
passed the Development and Welfare Act in 1940, regulating the provision of 
economic assistance to colonies, which stated that ‘no territory might receive 
aid under its provisions unless it had in force legislation protecting the rights 
of trade unions’ (Ikiara, 1988: 2).  
 
Buoyed by this legislation the few existing trade unions became more 
predisposed to take organized strike action than was the case before the war. A 
general strike took place in 1947 50 and three years later a dock strike in Dar es 
Salaam 51 caused concern amongst the ruling administration, as it illustrated 
the ability of labour to organize effectively. Despite forcibly disbanding the 
Dock Workers Union after the strike (Iliffe, 1975), the action helped to make 
the colonial administration aware of the inevitability of building alliances with 
educated Africans through the institutionalized means of indigenous civil 
society organizations in order to maintain ideological hegemony. The Trade 
Union Ordinance of 1951 formalized the position of labour organizations in 
the country (Bienefeld, 1979). In 1953 52 the government accepted the 
application for registration by the African Commercial Employees Association 
(ACEA), which stimulated the formation and development of other labour 
organizations in the country (Coulson, 1985). As Gramsci (2011a, 2011b) 
argued, compromises and alliances are needed on the part of civil society 
organizations in building counter-hegemonic discourses. Thus, the state 
                                                           
50
  See chapter 5. 
51  See chapter 5 for details of the course of the Dock Strike and its aftermath. 
52
   This was one year after the registration of the VFCU had opened the way for a large growth in the co-
operative movement. 
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attempt to build an alliance of sorts (under its own control as far as possible) 
with trade unions by allowing greater freedom of registration during the 1950s 
ultimately was counter-productive.  Contrary to its intentions, it led to the 
trade unions building institutional capacity, as membership rose, and to the 
formation of a an increasingly effective counter-hegemonic alliance with the 
nationalist political movement. 
 
Contemporaneously to this growth of the co-operative movement and trade 
unions, civil society in the political sphere received a fillip from a group of 
nationalists, who radicalized the Tanganyikan African Association (TAA). The 
TAA was founded in Dar es Salaam in 1929 as the ‘African Association’ and 
was open to Africans of any status and religion in an attempt to avoid tribalism 
and parochialism. At its 1946 annual conference, the association produced the 
‘first coherent demand that the colonial territory of Tanganyika should become 
an independent nation state’ (Iliffe, 1989: 453). In 1948 it was renamed the 
Tanganyika African Association. Julius Nyerere became the association’s 
President in 1953 and successfully led a campaign to turn it into a political 
party. The TAA formally became the Tanganyikan African National Union 
(TANU) on 7 July 1954. It was officially recognized as the first political party 
in Tanganyika three months later. Under the leadership of Nyerere, TANU 
engaged in a war of position with the state, challenging the hegemony of 
British rule. Nyerere (1976: 29) fought to end colonial ‘interference with 
African customs’ and to instil a sense of pride in them on the part of 
Tanzanians. Tanzanian associational groups, such as dance societies, credit 
associations and clan-based groups were encouraged and supported (see 
chapter 2).     
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The British were aware that they were losing ground in the war of position as 
a result of these actions by TANU, and responded with obstructive legislation 
(Hubbard, 2011). The control of key superstructure institutions, notably the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary, remained a substantive weapon 
with regard to maintaining the ideological hegemony of the colonial state. In 
1954 the Societies Ordinance was put into place, which required all public 
organizations to be registered and to supply the registrar with a list of 
members and a copy of the constitution. The creation of the Office of the 
Registrar has left a lasting legacy, since it led to tight top-down state control of 
NGOs. The Code of Conduct for NGOs drawn up after 2000 remains a source 
of conflict between the state and associational groups, which regard it as 
overly restrictive (see chapter 4). Furthermore, a similar governing body for 
trade unions was founded, which has continued to exercise similar powers 
through to the present (see chapter 5). In 1955 an amendment to the Penal 
Code made it an offence ‘to print, publish … or make any statement likely to 
raise discontent amongst any inhabitants of the Territory’ (Pratt, 1978: 37). 
This substantively restricted the content of TANU pronouncements and 
publications. 
 
The British also founded a rival political party to TANU in February 1956, 
based on white settlers and chiefs sympathetic to colonial rule; the United 
Tanganyika Party (UTP). In Gramscian terms, this was an attempt to maintain 
the institutional power of the ruling bloc, from which the ideology of the 
colonial state could be disseminated and hegemony consequently maintained. 
Franchise was then set on the basis of completion of secondary education and 
an income of 3,000 shillings per year. When Tanganyika’s first elections were 
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held in 1958, the UTP believed the restricted franchise made it certain that 
they would win. However, TANU had enrolled 200,000 members by this time, 
making it ‘a major political force’ (Pratt, 1978: 35). Nyerere organized votes 
for European and Asian candidates who were sympathetic to the aims of the 
organization. As a result, TANU sympathisers won all but one of the seats 
contested and the UTP collapsed soon after (Nugent, 2004).  
 
The challenge to TANU from the UTP was a major reason for TANU 
increasing its links with the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL) - which 
had been founded in October 1955. 53 The TANU leadership was well aware 
that to win the war of position, alliances and compromises had to be made 
with as many organizations promulgating counter-hegemonic perspectives as 
possible, thus forming a durable historic bloc (Gramsci, 2011b and see chapter 
1). Thus, the two organizations were also drawn closer together by TANU’s 
commitment to help the labour movement improve the terms and conditions of 
workers after independence in return for union support in the anti-colonial 
struggle. In this subsequently broken promise lies the bitterness of many 
Tanzanian trade unionists to this day.  
 
By the end of the 1950s, most senior trade union officials were also members 
of TANU. While TANU and the trade union movement were united in pursuit 
of uhuru (freedom) there was a difference in the way the concept was 
perceived; for TANU uhuru meant self-determination and the freedom to 
develop the interests of the people of Tanganyika as a whole, whereas the 
trade unions envisaged the concept in narrower terms, centred on the 
                                                           
53  See chapter 5. 
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Africanization of the economy, higher salaries and an end to discrimination in 
workplaces (Matiko, 1968). Thus, while there was an alliance between the 
trade union movement and TANU, both maintained their own agendas. 
 
In December 1959 the British conceded that a majority of ministers needed to 
be elected as members of parliament and a general election was held in August 
1960. TANU won a landslide victory, taking 70 out of the 71 seats which were 
contested. Nyerere became chief minister and pressed for independence by the 
end of 1961, which met with agreement from the British. Thus, the victory of 
the nationalists had been ‘driven primarily by civil society groups’ (Matlosa, 
2004: 79), yet they were quickly suppressed and/or subsumed within the 
organs of the ruling party after independence.  
 
3.5  Independence: From the One Party State to Liberalization of the 
Economy  
Tanganyika formally became independent on 9 December 1961. Following a 
coup d’état, Zanzibar merged with the Tanganyikan mainland to form the 
United Republic of Tanzania on 26 April 1964. In the first half of the 1960s 
Tanzania formally adopted socialist policies (Nyerere, 1967) in its attempts to 
forge a nation out of territory, citizens out of subjects and a people from a 
heterogeneous population (Jennings, 2007). However, the country was heavily 
dependent on external financing in pursuing its development goals. By 1965 
foreign aid made up 44% of the national budget, which left the state 
vulnerable to policy influence from external donors.   
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The ‘Republican constitution’ was put into place in 1962 to replace the 
existing ‘Westminster model’ (Shivji, 1986). In the same year all land was 
nationalized under the Rent Restriction Act (1962) and a tribunal was created 
to set ‘fair’ rents (Bukuku, 1993). An interim constitution was drawn up in 
1964, following the union between the Tanganyikan mainland and Zanzibar. 
One year later a new ‘One-Party State’ constitution formalized the rule of 
TANU over the Union and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) in Zanzibar. Nyerere 
argued that the newly independent country could not afford the luxury of 
competing political parties playing power games, which would be at the 
expense of putting into practice a concerted plan for national development 
(Dowden, 2009). The same rationale was used for the suppression of 
independent civil society organizations, including trade unions. 54 Nyerere 
(1976) used the discourse of national liberation to argue that all interest 
groups, classes and efforts needed to be subordinated to the struggle to 
overcome the iniquitous legacies of colonial repression. When trade unions 
pressed for substantive improvements in the terms and conditions of members 
soon after independence, they were accused of being selfish representatives of 
a labour aristocracy and suppressed to the point where they became quasi-
governmental organizations (see chapter 5 for a detailed analysis). 
 
Tanzania’s development was to be led by a ‘state-for-all’ (Havnevik, 2010a), 
which would engender a broad societal concord concerning the direction of 
major nation-building policies. Thus, unlike Gramsci (2011b), Nyerere 
believed that the state could achieve hegemonic universality (see chapter 2) 
and, therefore, direct the development of all economic, political and social 
                                                           
54
 This point is examined in detail in chapters 4 and 5. 
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groups, through consensus-based policies. He was, however, also committed 
to inculcating a participatory culture, whereby Tanzanian citizens, particularly 
the peasantry, could articulate their needs and wants, to which the state would 
be responsive. This commitment inevitably led to tension over how far the 
state was prepared to forgo its developmentalist role and allow a pluralist 
political system, including advocacy and provision of services by civil society.      
 
Nyerere was well aware of the fact that relying on external donors for finance 
meant it was impossible for Tanzania to formulate autonomous domestic or 
foreign policies. He argued that dependence on external donors weakened and 
distorted national development efforts, particularly since it ‘comes much later 
than one expected and not always in the form it is wanted’ (Nyerere, 1976: 
319). The reliance on foreign finance provided an impetus for the setting out 
of the Arusha Declaration on 5 February 1967, which fundamentally changed 
the direction of Tanzania’s development polices. The Arusha Declaration 
repudiated capitalism and stated that collective ownership of means of 
production was necessary for the successful development of Tanzania.  
 
The declaration led to the nationalization of firms in key economic sectors and 
entailed the state taking majority shareholdings in subsidiaries of 
multinational firms, as well as most of the sisal plantations. However, there 
was no emphasis on the need for central control of the economy or 
industrialization. Nyerere (1967) prioritized the development of kilimo 
(agriculture), focusing on improving the lives of smallholder peasants. Yet, 
Nyerere rejected class struggle as the basis of African socialism and instead 
regarded its foundation as being ‘the extended family system’ (Ibhawoh and 
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Dibua, 2003: 62). The slavish following of any doctrine was rejected, with 
Nyerere  (1968: 1) arguing that in a ‘socialist society it is the socialist state of 
mind, and not the rigid adherence to a standard political pattern, which is 
needed to ensure that the people care for each other’s welfare.’  
 
Rist (2005) identifies five major principles within the Arusha Declaration. 
First, self-reliance is stressed, which entails de-linking (following Baran and 
Sweezy, 1966, Amin, 1990) from the international capitalist economy in order 
to attain the freedom to put in place autonomous domestic and foreign 
policies. Second, autarky is rejected and delinking in this context can be 
regarded as close to Amin's (1990: 62) definition of the concept as the pursuit 
of ‘rational criteria for economic options founded on a law of value on a 
national basis with popular relevance, independent of such criteria of 
economic rationality as flow from the dominance of the capitalist law of value 
operating on a world scale.’ Third, money is rejected as a driving force in 
development. The need for a psycho-political change is set out whereby 
individuals develop the self-confidence to relate to the economy in ways not 
based around the need to make money. Fourth, measures should be taken to 
stop exploitation of one group of the population by another and to promote 
conditions of social equality. Finally, the replication of all foreign economic 
and political models must be avoided. African values and traditions should 
form the basis of aspirations and organization. 
 
Tanzania had two main advantages with regard to getting such a radical 
national development plan accepted by the people. First, the country was 
relatively homogeneous socially; 80% lived in rural areas and none of the one 
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hundred and twenty ethnic groups had dominance. Moreover, Swahili was a 
common language of communication (Roy-Campbell, 1999). Second, Nyerere 
commanded respect from all sectors of the population. Gramsci (2011b) 
argued that leaders who do not enjoy the confidence of regional and local 
institutions, and who do not labour rigorously to make their policies accessible 
to non-intellectuals, are likely to have them ignored or sabotaged. This was far 
from the case with Nyerere, who worked hard to ensure that his views could 
be understood by peasants and the urban working class. Known as ‘mwalimu’ 
(teacher), Nyerere was a ‘persistently innovative thinker’ (Davidson, 1987: 
330) and Tanzanians never doubted that he was ‘a leader of unquestionable 
integrity, who, whatever his policy errors, was profoundly committed to their 
welfare’ (Pratt, 1999: 138). 
 
The concept of ujamaa was used by Nyerere as the basis of his plan to satisfy 
the basic needs and aspirations of the peasantry. Ujamaa is often translated 
into English as ‘collectivization of production.’ However, Bryceson (2010: 73) 
points out that the concept has a wider meaning, symbolizing ‘the national 
collective, unity of purpose, and cherished way of life.’ In this sense, Nyerere 
used ‘ujamaa’ fundamentally to build hegemonic universality for his vision of 
Tanzania’s development trajectory. Villagization began in autumn 1967. 
Nyerere at first tried to get peasants to form ‘ujamaa villages’ through free 
will. However, with only two million people – out of a total population of 16.9 
million - adopting the scheme by 1973, Nyerere turned to the coercive 
functions of the integral state in the form of ‘Operation Planned Villages,’ 
which speeded up the process. In 1975, the initiative encompassed nine 
million people and by 1977 13 million people were residing in 7,684 ujamaa 
 99 
 
villages. That meant 70% of Tanzanians had moved into these villages in three 
years. As well as his own charismatic authority over the organs of state, 
Nyerere was able to draw on the influential support of important 
superstructure institutions, notably the controlling bodies of the protestant and 
catholic churches, in pursuing ujamaa (Ludwig, 1999, Jennings, 2008b).  
 
Flawed state economic policies were clearly a major reason for the lack of 
success of ujamaa (Sender and Smith, 1986). A contradiction that militated 
against the success of the initiative was the focus on African traditions as its 
bedrock at the same time as peasants were being taken away from their 
ancestral lands and exhorted to employ unknown and untried modern 
agricultural practices (Rist, 2005). For example, peasants developed a 
‘parasitic’ relationship to the newly introduced machinery (Hyden, 1980). 
They would use machines but abandoned them as soon as problems occurred, 
through lack of training in maintenance. Thus, ujamaa led to the alienation of 
peasants ‘from their cultural and social realities’ (Ibhawoh and Dibua, 2003: 
61). Moreover, Nyerere did not foresee that ujamaa would not appeal to rural 
leaders since it ‘blocked their own social ascent and personal enrichment’ 
(Rist, 2005: 133). Consequently, rural elites started to appropriate the ujamaa 
villages in pursuit of their own interests or ‘undermined collective work’ 
(Davidson, 1987: 332). 
 
Ujamaa as a ‘populist’ initiative (Campbell and Stein, 1991, Sender and 
Smith, 1986) remains a controversial vision of development. For Ibhawoh and 
Dibua (2003: 78), there is a need to go beyond ideologically driven ‘binary 
frameworks’ of either romanticizing the initiative or regarding it solely as an 
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economic disaster. Ujamaa should be examined as a development strategy, 
seeking social equity and distributive justice based on self-reliance. In this 
regard, Jennings (2003: 184) points out that Tanzanian self-help groups during 
the 1960s engaged in ‘a massive movement of community action … operating 
increasingly outside the direct control of the state and implementing schemes 
largely defined by the community.’ These important aspects of ujamaa, 
showing that ideological hegemony is always contested and modified, have 
been obscured by the emphasis on its economic dimensions. However, 
Nyerere admitted that the Arusha Declaration and ujamaa did not lead to 
Tanzania becoming self-reliant or socialist. For example, in Iringa in the early 
1970s, 9% of farmers owned 53% of the land and 96% of all capital 
equipment (Davidson, 1987). 55 
 
A further issue that arose through the policies of ujamaa remains pertinent in 
contemporary Tanzania. The policies were kept going by a number of Western 
development agencies, which were keen to see the success of Tanzania’s non-
capitalist path. Thus, Tanzania received 60% of its budget from foreign aid to 
support ujamaa policies. 56 Moreover, through the 1970s, over 70% of the 
education budget was funded by external donors (Campbell, 1991). This 
created a system in Tanzania of foreign ‘domination through giving’ (Rist, 
2005: 134).  
 
Overall, ujamaa policies failed because it proved impossible to reconcile the 
tension between ‘an overt ideology stressing popular participation and a more 
                                                           
55  Moreover, Due (1980; 99) found maize yields to be low and input costs high in Iringa from 1973 to 1976, 
‘resulting in average net returns per village which were highly negative.’ 
56
 See also chapter 4 for an analysis of how NGOs, such as Oxfam, aided the imposition of ujamaa policies. 
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covert reality of strong, highly centralized bureaucratic control’ (Townsend, 
1998: 266). Nyerere’s government moved decisively during the 1970s to 
control development processes and popular participation was reduced to 
fulfilling legal requirements, rather than a matter of ‘pride, community spirit 
or local custom’ (Jennings, 2007: 92). Civil society was, from this period, 
given little formal policy space within which it could challenge the state’s 
hegemony (see chapters 4 and 5 for details, regarding NGOs and trade unions, 
respectively). 
 
In 1977 TANU joined with the Afro-Shirazi Party in Zanzibar to form Chama 
Cha Mapinduzi (CCM - ‘the Party of the Revolution.’ CCM was quickly 
proclaimed the only legal political party. Tanzania faced substantive economic 
problems during the latter part of the 1970s through inflation and a decline in 
export crops.  Per capita GDP growth rates averaged 0.2% between 1976 and 
1978 and this declined to -2.5% from 1979 to 1984 (Ndulu, 1987). Corruption 
on the part of state officials was also a problem at this time through ‘an over-
regulated economy, with scarcities in officially allocated commodities and a 
rapid erosion in the real value of official salaries’ (Wangwe and Van Arkadie, 
2000: 86). In addition, rising oil prices and war with Uganda contributed to 
the failure of Nyerere’s vision for Tanzania. Overall, ‘rural producers, urban 
workers, and upper income earners were all worse off at the end of the 1970s 
than they had been at the beginning’ (Coulson, 1985: 199).   
 
With the increasing dominance of a neo-liberal policy environment at the IFIs 
from the end of the 1970s and ‘economic decline’ (Gonza, 2008: 8) apparent 
in Tanzania, the government gave way to external and internal pressures to 
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soften statist policies and to allow the private sector to play a greater role as an 
agent of development.  Tanzania launched its own ‘National Economic 
Survival Plan’ (NESP), which failed to have a positive impact on the 
economy. Consequently, bilateral donors made their continued support 
conditional on an agreement being reached with the IMF (Harrison, 2001). 
The increasing pressure on Tanzania to accept IMF policies in return for 
assistance was an influence on Nyerere’s decision to step down as President, 
to be replaced by Ali Hassan Mwinyi in 1985.  However, Nyerere remained as 
chair of the party and argued against accepting the Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) proposed by the IFIs.  In contrast, Mwinyi was in favour of 
accepting the SAP, leading to a ‘crisis of ideological hegemony in Tanzania’ 
(Campbell and Stein, 1991: 3).  
 
3.6 The Post-liberalization Period 
The Tanzanian government formally agreed to the imposition of a SAP in 
1986, leading to levels of aid – which had subsided due to Nyerere’s resistance 
to neo-liberal reforms - being raised.  The signing of the SAP marks the 
official turn in Tanzania towards accepting economic solutions ‘from without’ 
(Rusimbi, 2003).  Three years later an enhanced SAP (ESAP) was signed, 
signalling the deepening of neo-liberal reforms and the abandonment of 
economic naturalism in return for external funds (Harrison, 2001). Tanzania 
also faced donor demands to adopt the second main plank of the New Policy 
agenda, liberal multi-party democracy (Vener, 1996). In response to this 
pressure, the Political Parties Act, 1992 was brought into force, which allowed 
for the registration of multiple political parties (Olaleye, 2006). While on the 
surface, this indicates the rapidity with which the economic and political 
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policies promulgated by external donors became hegemonic in Tanzania 
following the end of the Nyerere regime, in reality the pace of change was 
slow and uneven during the 1990s, quickening noticeably from 2000. For 
trade unions, both the economic and political aspects of this New Policy 
Agenda have led to their marginalization as the neo-liberal power bloc in 
Tanzania, comprising external donors, the state and ‘new (largely foreign) 
investors.’ have excluded them from the realm of civil society as far as 
possible. 
 
Regarding political aspects, although there were no direct correlations 
between fluctuations in aid disbursements and moves towards multi-party 
democracy, the perception of such a link on the part of the Tanzanian 
leadership was significant in influencing the political transition to multi-
partyism which occurred in 1992. The very existence of donor policy stating 
that aid transfers were contingent on recipient moves towards democratization 
was enough to stimulate political reform without concrete actions (Vener, 
2000). However, implementation of a number of the agreed neo-liberal 
reforms developed slowly during the early 1990s and the timetable for reform 
set by political power-holders became so convoluted that a ‘blocked transition’ 
(Bratton and Van de Walle, 1998) occurred. Consequently, in 1994, donors 
suspended aid to Tanzania, citing corruption and tax collection failure as the 
primary reasons (Bigsten et al, 2001), which exacerbated the financial turmoil 
that had sparked the political crisis (Holtom, 2005). The state and labour at 
this time had similar interests, since only with a forceful and independent 
government and well organized workers’ associations were there likely to be 
effective resistance to the action of the IFIs (Chambua, 1997). However, 
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mutual distrust stopped them from working together to provide a united policy 
front in response to the donors’ actions. The state gave precedence to 
improving its relationship with the donor community, with the interests of 
labour in Tanzania a much lesser concern. 57 This was hardly surprising as an 
outcome, since over the previous three decades aid dependence had become 
‘part and parcel of the national economic culture’ (Rugumamu, 1997: 10). 
 
From 1970 to 1980 the real value of ODA to Tanzania had quintupled 58 
making the country ‘one of the largest aid recipients’ (Svendsen, 1986: 70). 
Subsequently, net ODA as the ratio of GDP rose from 13.5% during the period 
1981-1985 to 34.7% for the period 1986-1990 (Agrawal et al 1993). Thus, 
Nyerere’s efforts to break Tanzania’s reliance on external financing, through 
the Arusha Declaration and ujamaa policies, had clearly failed. Acceptance of 
IFI-driven adjustment policies led to the external debt burden, which had been 
substantive from independence (see section 3.4), increasing even further. The 
World Bank (2009b) provides figures showing ODA as a percentage of GNI in 
Tanzania starting from 1988. The figures from 1988 to 1995 - when the 
influential Helleiner Report (Helleiner et al, 1995) on aid to Tanzania was 
published – show the high level of aid dependency (see table 3.1). For Mshana 
(2003: 113), such figures reflect a key macro-level problem that ‘Tanzania 
depends too much on foreign aid and foreign ideas instead of relying on local 
ideas and resources.’ 
 
 
                                                           
57
  The economic and political crises in 1994 led to the first strike organized at national level by the Trade 
Union Congress of Tanzania in the post-liberalization period, which is discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
58
  It was between $50 and 60 million in 1970 and reached $670 million by 1980 (Svendsen, 1986). 
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Table 3.1 ODA as a Percentage of GNI in Tanzania 
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
ODA 
as % 
of 
GNI 
20.5 21.4 28.6 22.5 30.2 23.1 22.0 16.9 
Source: World Bank (2009b) 
 
The Helleiner Report (Helleiner et al, 1995) argued that lack of serious 
attention to reforms in Tanzania was caused by weak government ownership 
of the process. Being aware that economic reforms have always been heavily 
influenced by political considerations in Tanzania (Jennings, 2001), donors 
promoted change by promising increased aid in return for reform, supporting 
reformers through the provision of training courses and dominating economic 
analyses of the crisis, which they couched within a neo-liberal framework  
(Holtom, 2005). This control of formal policy space did much to make the 
neo-liberal discourse hegemonic in post-liberalization Tanzania. The Helleiner 
Report pointed in particular to the link between the high transaction costs of 
aid and low government ownership. With so many donors employing different 
missions, procedures and practices, the Tanzanian government was spending a 
lot of time and money on preparing reports and holding meetings. 
Consequently, Helleiner et al (1995: 19) emphasized the need for aid from 
individual donors to be ‘harmonized along the lines of common policies and 
strategies.’ A Consultative Group (CG) of ‘high-level … experts’ (UNDO, 
2003: 292) was formed in 1997 to oversee the implementation of sixteen steps 
for action set out in the Helleiner Report to improve the performance of aid.  
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Benjamin Mkapa came into office as president in November 1995 – after 
CCM had won a resounding election victory in the first multi-party elections 
held in Tanzania for over 30 years - and prioritized restoring amicable 
relationships with external donors. Consequently, an agreement between the 
government and the donor community concerning aid modalities was reached 
in January 1997. The guiding principle was set as ‘ownership and leadership 
by Tanzania in policy and development cooperation’ (Wangwe, 2002: vii). On 
the donor side, the call for harmonization of aid policies was then enshrined in 
the 1998 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) overview support for 
Tanzania, which became the core of new modalities of aid and the means by 
which multi-lateralization was to be achieved. 
 
The move to a multi-party system in Tanzania legitimized CCM rule at 
national level, at least until the aftermath of the 2010 national elections. In 
2005, Mkapa’s successor as the leader of CCM, Jakaya Kikwete, garnered 
80.3% of the vote when victorious in the presidential elections. This figure 
declined to 62.8% when Kikwete won again in the 2010 elections. However, 
as a party, CCM captured only marginally fewer seats (258 out of 343 in total) 
in winning the 2010 national parliamentary elections than they did in 2005 
(264 out of 324) (URT, 2010, NEC, 2011). Nevertheless, challenges to CCM’s 
hegemony have arisen in particular regions from opposition parties are 
emerging. The largest opposition party, Chama Cha Demokrasia na 
Maendeleo (CHADEMA), has much support in the Mwanza and Arusha areas 
and deaths occurred following demonstrations organized by the party, to 
protest against the rising cost of living, in January 2011 (Africa Research 
Bulletin, 2011). The legitimacy of CCM rule could increasingly be challenged, 
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particularly if the high inflation rates of the past few years 59 are maintained 
while most of the rising GDP since 2000 continues to be appropriated by 
foreign investors and a minority of Tanzanians, who have good connections to 
the ruling party (Cooksey and Kelsall, 2011). Little trickle-down of wealth 60 
generated by increasing exports in the post-liberalization to the vast majority 
of the population has occurred. 61 However, CCM has always mobilized 
successfully to restore unity when its hegemony has been challenged in the 
past (Havnevik, 2010b) and the party has far greater organizational power than 
any other, making radical political change, driven by civil society, unlikely in 
the short to medium term.   
 
The state itself claims to be ‘developmental’ (Leftwich, 2008) in the post-
liberalization period (URT, 2009c), which entails navigating the progress of 
the country towards the achievement of goals set in national policy 
instruments (see below for an overview of these instruments). However, the 
state should also ‘acknowledge and promote the private sector as a key 
(author’s emphasis) partner in national development (URT, 2009c: 181). The 
state’s views in this regard tally closely with the main policy prescriptions of 
the Post-Washington Consensus. In reality, MPs at local constituency level 
tend to form patrimonial relationships with constituents and have to spend 
money and/or get them control of projects to ensure their compliance (Gould 
and Ojanen, 2005). 62  A ‘transnational policy technocracy’ (Gould and 
                                                           
59
  Inflation rates have been 10.1% (2008), 7.4% (2009) and 7.7% (2010). Source: World Bank – Tanzania 
Country Data Profile. 
60
  See chapter 2 for figures on income distribution in Tanzania. 
61
  See below for a discussion of economic developments in post-liberalization Tanzania. 
62
  See chapter 4 for an overview of how MPs use District Development Trusts (DDTs) as one important way 
to foster patrimonial relationships with constituents. 
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Ojanen, 2005) sets out policy guidelines that lead to implementation in the 
regions with a high level of oversight from local MPs. This encourages rent-
seeking behaviour on the part of MPs, despite a donor-inspired anti-corruption 
drive in the country (Cooksey, 2011a, Cooksey, 2010, Fjeldstad, 2003, 
Harrison, 2001).  Therefore, a power bloc of supranational organizations and 
the state create and uphold neo-liberal hegemony. Moreover, continuity with 
previous periods of political economy is maintained, as political power 
remains based on personal relationships and social networks to a great extent. 
Such relationships can involve corruption in the form of pay-offs by CCM at 
the centre to various factions within the ruling party in order to ensure their 
support. 63 The strong independent institutional capacity of CCM at regional 
level across the country and the fact that patron-client networks have similar 
levels of bargaining power has helped to ‘maintain political stability by 
lowering the costs of factional transfers’ (Khan and Gray 2006: 50). 64 Kelsall 
and Cooksey (2011) argue that this decentralized nature of rent seeking within 
CCM, whereby particular cadres act independently, is unsustainable and will 
damage collective interests in the long-term. In overall terms, corruption in 
Tanzania, which continues ‘to characterize central and local government,’ is a 
major impediment to the success of all development policies (Cooksey, 2010: 
189) and the post-liberalization period has witnessed ‘systemic waste and 
looting’ (Cooksey, 2011a: 82) by the state.    
Despite the pervasive nature of corruption in the country, the labour 
movement has done little work on the phenomenon. Their own institutional 
                                                           
63
  Large-scale corruption has been associated with state officials involved in the privatization of mining, 
electricity and water enterprises in Tanzania since 2005.    
64
  See also Gray and Khan (2010) on this issue. 
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structures and procedures, at federation and individual trade union levels, lack 
transparency (see chapter 5) and senior officials have been suspended and/or 
dismissed over corruption allegations in the last five years. The lack of 
attention paid to economic and political corruption by the labour movement 
since liberalization was raised by many trade unionists during fieldwork 
interviews and is a contributory factor to the lack of legitimacy of trade unions 
in the eyes of many of its own officials, rank-and-file members and staff 
working for NGOs (see chapters 5 for details).  
 
To drive development, CCM has overseen the adoption of ‘home-grown’ 
policy documents and programmes in the post-liberalization period, premised 
on mass citizen participation, from which it was argued that higher levels of 
national ownership would emerge than has been the case in the past. This, 
sometimes confusingly, has resulted in the drawing up of several linked 
national policy instruments. In 1995, the government appointed ‘a group of 
experts to formulate a policy document’ which would serve as a ‘guide for the 
development effort’ (Mallya, 2000: 1). This resulted in the Tanzania 
Development Vision (TDV) 2025, which became operational from 1999 and is 
necessary because (URT, 1999: 1): 
 
the people of Tanzania, led by their government, recognized the 
need to prepare a New National Development Vision, which will 
guide economic and social development efforts up to the year 2025. 
The objective…is to awaken, co-ordinate and direct the people’s 
efforts, minds and our national resources towards those core sectors 
that will enable us to attain our development goals. 
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Essentially, TDV 2025 lays out the overall development framework and long-
term social and development goals. In addition, the National Poverty 
Eradication Strategy (NPES) came into operation in 1997, aiming to provide 
‘guidance to all stakeholders in identifying, formulating, implementing and 
evaluating their poverty’ (URT, 1997: 1).  A third national policy instrument - 
the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS) (URT, 2000b: 1) - was set out in 2000. 
This is ‘a Government initiative aimed at restoring local ownership and 
leadership, as well as promoting partnership in designing and executing 
development programmes. It is also about good governance, transparency, 
accountability and capacity building and effectiveness of aid.’ In overall terms, 
TAS (which became the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST) in 
2006) is the operational framework within which the government manages all 
the major donor resources it receives. All of these initiatives put a stress on the 
mantras of the Post-Washington Consensus - partnership, good governance, 
participation and ownership. They also prioritize the setting and meeting 
quantifiable targets, necessitating a high degree of proficiency amongst staff 
involved in the areas of monitoring and evaluation. Such skills are, for the 
most part, lacking among trade unionists, which is a further reason for their 
marginalization in post-liberalization period. 65   
 
Alongside the formulation of a number of national development policy 
instruments, a policy of decentralization has been adopted by the government, 
which entails fostering efficiency and entrepreneurship at the local level 
(Pallotti, 2008). Decentralization has been championed by the World Bank, in 
particular, which has adopted the policy in its own operations. To this end, the 
                                                           
65
  See chapter 5 for further details. 
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Tanzania country director was transferred from Washington DC to Dar es 
Salaam at the end of the 1990s. The country director is a person known to be 
‘open to new ideas.’ 66 Since then the World Bank has engaged in ‘a big push 
to be more transparent than it used to be’ and has ‘tried to provide a window 
on its world for the Tanzanian people.’ 67 
 
One of the main objectives of the country director has been to open up the 
World Bank in Tanzania to discussion and criticism through finding ‘new 
ways of communicating with civil society organizations and the media’ 
(Interview with World Bank official). An important way of doing this has been 
through working more closely with, and learning from, bilateral donors. To 
this end, an official from the Danish International Development Agency 
(DANIDA) has been seconded to work at the Dar es Salaam Country Office. 
DANIDA seconds a number of staff members to country offices where the 
Danish Embassy believes ‘the World Bank is progressive and receptive to new 
ideas.’ 68 For DANIDA, the aim is to have ‘more Danish influence on World 
Bank policies, through the side door.’ 69 DANIDA also perceives the 
secondment of its officials to the World Bank to be useful because often the 
Bank is unable to think like a bilateral donor.  Thus, these placements are 
beneficial, as they allow seconded DANIDA staff put forward ideas that the 
World Bank would not otherwise contemplate.70 The DANIDA initiative 
exemplifies the World Bank’s harmonious view of state change in Tanzania, 
                                                           
66  Source: interview with World Bank official, 7 October, 2005 
67
  Source: interview with World Bank official, 7 October, 2005  
68
  Source: interview with DANIDA official, 15 October, 2005 
69
  Source: interview with DANIDA official, 15 October, 2005 
70
  One of the main initiatives set up by the World Bank in Tanzania as a result of DANIDA influence – the 
‘Coffee Morning Discussions’ – is examined in chapter 4. 
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based on inculcating ideological hegemony through a convergence of interests 
between development agencies and the desire to promote a complementary 
relationship between an accountable and transparent state, which encourages 
the active participation of its citizens in forming national development plans, 
and a market economy.  
 
In regard to maintaining neo-liberal hegemony, the state also needs to pay 
substantial attention to its relationships with bilateral donors. Bilateral donors 
are major providers of aid, to a large extent because they concur with the IFIs 
in regarding the country as a ‘model performer,’ willing to implement Post-
Washington Consensus policies with some vigour. 71 In 2008, Tanzania 
received $2, 331, 000 billion in ODA, of which $1, 375, 290 billion (59%) 
was from bilateral donors. Regarding members of the DAC, in 2008 Tanzania 
was the primary recipient of aid from Norway ($121 million), Sweden ($117 
million), Denmark ($105 million) and Finland ($40 million). The country was 
also one of the top ten recipients of ODA from the Japanese ($396 million), 
the British ($243 million), the Dutch ($122 million) and the Irish ($59 
million), as well as receiving $207 million from the USA (OECD, 2010a, 
2010b).   
 
Bilateral donors have also been influential in creating alternative national 
development plans for Tanzania since 2000. These include the Tanzania Mini-
Tiger Plan 2020 (Japan Development Institute, 2010) backed by Japan, South 
Korea’s ‘Initiative for Africa’s Development’ started in 2006, which cites 
Tanzania as being ‘one of the core development partners of Korea’s 
                                                           
71  See chapter 1 for an analysis of why the IFIs regard Tanzania as a ‘model performer.’ 
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international cooperation’ (Koo, 2008: x) and Mpango wa Kurasimisha 
Rasilimali na Biashara za Wanyonge Tanzania (MKURABITA)  - ‘the 
Programme To Formalise the Property and Business of the Poor in Tanzania’ 
(URT, 2007e)  – which draws on the ideas of Hernando de Soto (De Soto, 
2001) and receives a substantive amount of support from Norwegian aid 
(Sundet, 2008). When these initiatives are added to that of the PRSP, the 
NPES, Vision 2025 and the TAS, there are seven major national level policy 
instruments in operation in Tanzania (see Table 3.2 below). This puts the 
government under a substantial amount of ‘ownership stress.’ 
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Table 3.2 Tanzanian National Policy Instruments 
Policy Instrument Time Horizon/Partners Main objectives 
MKUKUTA III 2010-2015/IFIs and major 
Western bilateral donors 
Reducing income poverty, 
sustaining macroeconomic 
stability, developing the 
private, export and sectors. 
Enhancing human capabilities 
in health, education and social 
well-being. Reducing 
vulnerabilities. Protecting the 
environment. Symbiotic 
relationship with Vision 2025 
and the NPES. 
Tanzania Vision 2025 1999-2025/Tanzanian 
government-run 
Long term national 
development vision based on 
attaining 1. High quality 
livelihoods 2. Peace, stability 
and national unity 3. Good 
governance 4. A well-educated 
society 5. A competitive 
economy capable of producing 
sustainable growth and shared 
benefits. 
National Poverty Eradication 
Strategy 
1997-2025/Tanzanian 
government-run  
Long term national strategy 
for poverty elimination. 
Guiding framework for co-
ordinating and supervising 
policies to reduce absolute 
poverty. Linked to Vision 
2025.  
Tanzania Assistance Strategy 
(TAS) - became Joint 
Assistance Strategy for 
Tanzania (JAST) 
TAS: 1997-2005 
JAST: 2006-
ongoing/Tanzanian 
government-run 
Operational framework for 
managing donor resources, 
including aid modality. 
MKURABITA 2004-ongoing in 4 phases/ Strategy for opening up the 
formal market economy to 
those excluded from it, Focus 
on formalisation of property 
land rights and businesses.   
Tanzania Mini-Tiger Plan 2020 2005-2020/Japan  Strategy for fostering 
competitiveness in global 
markets and promoting exports 
through creation on Special 
Economic Zones. Linked to 
MKUKUTA. 
Korea Initiative for African 
Development (KIAD): 
Tanzania  
2006-ongoing/South Korea Strategy based on capacity 
building – focusing on 
agriculture, fisheries, health 
and communications. 
Sharing experiences of Korea’s 
development model 
Source: McQuinn (2011) 
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Overall, the willingness of the Tanzanian government to embrace robustly the 
main political precepts of the New Policy Agenda, as part of a liberal positive-
sum approach to state change (pace De Tocqueville, 1845a, 1845b), is a key 
reason for its post-liberalization ‘success’ according to IFIs. 72 However, for 
trade unions, these major political changes have been largely detrimental. 
Analysis of the national policy instruments reveals that trade unions are not 
included in the post-liberalization configuration of ‘civil society’ in Tanzania. 
The role of labour organizations is not accommodated in any of the seven 
national policy instruments summarized above, with the exception of the 
second PRSP document. Trade unions were not included at all as civil society 
representatives in the first PRSP (1999-2004). Following a concerted 
campaign by the national federation (the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania), 
trade unions did play a peripheral role in PRSP II, although fieldwork findings 
show that trade unionists regard themselves as outsiders in the PRSP process 
and unable to bring about debates on key issues concerning labour (see 
chapter 6). The fact that these national policy instruments include analyses of 
key labour-related issues, such as employment creation, formalizing 
businesses and increasing competitiveness in export sectors, yet fail to even 
mention a role for trade unions, shows the extent to which the labour 
movement has been excluded from civil society, as it has been constituted 
practically and rhetorically, in the post-liberalization period.   
 
Turning to the economic elements of the New Policy Agenda, the SAP was 
introduced in three phases. The first of these centred on trade liberalization. 
                                                           
72
 See also chapter 1 for an overview of why the IFIs consider Tanzania to be a post-liberalization success 
story. 
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During the second phase the focus moved to the deregulation of Foreign 
Direct Investment, while the third period of adjustment primarily addressed 
parastatal and civil service reform (Pallotti, 2008).  Structural adjustment led 
to annual GDP growth from 1986 to 1994 of 4% on average and a small 
improvement in agricultural production during the second half of the 1980s. 73 
However, increases in the levels of exports were not substantive. Fluctuating 
prices for commodities on the world market affected Tanzanian farmers. For 
example, between 1983 and 1988 the price of tea obtained by farmers in Iringa 
fell on world markets by 3% (TADREG, 1994). Moreover, the Balance of 
Payments deteriorated and there was an economic slowdown after 1994 
because of the closure or running down of parastatals prior to sale or 
liquidation, an increase in credit costs and failure to compete with foreign 
imports, as protection was removed. Overall, the modest economic gains of 
the 1980s were followed by decline during the 1990s (Chambua, 1997). From 
2000 onwards, as inward FDI increased, GDP growth has averaged more then 
5 per cent per year. The figure was 6.5 per cent for 2010, although this needs 
to be set against an inflation rate of 8.9 per cent for the same year (Global 
Finance, 2011). 74 Despite this high inflation rate, the World Bank (2010e: 1) 
praises Tanzania for its sound ‘macroeconomic policies, market oriented 
reforms and debt relief [which] have provided a conducive environment for 
Tanzania’s steady economic growth.’    
 
However, the fact that much of Tanzania’s GDP growth since 2000 has been 
based on inward FDI is problematic for the labour movement, since new 
                                                           
73
  The accuracy of these figures is open to question. Jerven (2010: 286) points out that data showing 
economic growth rates for Tanzania ‘have large statistical errors for the late 1980s.’  
74
  The World Bank figure is 7.7%.  
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investors are perceived by trade unionists as overwhelmingly anti-trade 
union.75 According to Ngowi (2002), between 1985 and 2001 there were a 
total of 854 officially approved FDI projects in Tanzania and from 1986-1991 
inward FDI averaged only $2 million per year in value. Nevertheless, mainly 
through the increasing amount of privatization of SOEs and changes in 
investment laws during the 1990s, Tanzania became the seventh largest 
destination for inward FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa by the end of the decade. In 
1997, the National Investment Act was passed, providing concessionary terms 
for foreign investors, notably in the area of tax rates. By 1999, inward FDI had 
increased to $17 million and by 2004 the figure had reached $249 million, 
making Tanzania one of ‘Africa’s best performing countries in terms of … 
attracting foreign direct investment’ (MIGA, 2007: 6). 
 
Gibbon (1999: 17) outlines how large-scale FDI in Tanzania since the second 
half of the 1980s has occurred mostly in the ‘classic colonial/neo-colonial 
sector of exportable raw materials.’ Regarding ownership, the Africanization 
of the Tanzanian economy that began after independence with the creation of 
nationalized enterprises is being reversed. For Gibbon (1999: 17), ‘the 
colonial/neo-colonial pattern is again reasserting itself’ with former corporate 
owners featuring prominently as investors.  One of the first foreign 
acquisitions after liberalization of trade and investment occurred was the 
takeover by Lonhro of the Mifundi Tea Plantations, which it lost in 1978 
through nationalization. The World Bank (MIGA, 2007) takes a different view, 
arguing that inward FDI is diversified, since it encompasses mining (39 per 
cent), manufacturing (22 per cent), tourism (13 per cent) and agriculture (7 per 
                                                           
75
  See chapter 5. 
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cent). This is a questionable analysis, given that foreign investment in mining 
alone equals the percentage of the only other three sectors cited when added 
together.   
 
Gold mining, run by large Foreign Mining Companies (FMC), has been vital 
to Tanzania’s rising GDP figures since 2000. Exports of gold increased in 
value from $121 million in 2000 to $1,076 million in 2009 (Cooksey, 2011b). 
The narrowness of Tanzania’s export base, contrary to the claim of the World 
Bank (MIGA, 2007), cited above, is shown by the fact that in 2009, gold 
represented the value of more than one third (34.75%) of total exports (Bank 
of Tanzania, 2011). 
 
The FMCs have received a generally less than welcoming reception from the 
Tanzanian public, linked to the discourse of economic nationalism 
promulgated during the Nyerere era, which still resonates with many people in 
the country. 76 Nyerere was not prepared to let FMCs dominate mining in the 
country with the result that under his regime ‘Tanzania’s mining wealth 
remained buried securely for the future’ (Bryceson, 2010: 72). The arguments 
for and against the FMCs, in terms of their ability to substantially aid the 
development process are complex (see Cooksey, 2011b). Industrial relations in 
the gold mining industry are fractious and, in interviews, officials from the 
Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union (TAMICO) provided details 
of numerous breaches of labour laws by the FMCs. They argued that the state 
had been reluctant to deal with such matters and clearly sided with capital (in 
the form of the FMC owners) against labour (in the form of Tanzanian miners) 
in all mining disputes, because of the large amount gold mining contributes to 
                                                           
76
  See Shivji (2006) for the argument against FMCs in Tanzania. 
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the country’s GDP (see chapter 5 for a detailed analysis). The powerlessness 
of TAMICO in the face of hostility from major foreign investors, along with 
the state, exemplifies the marginalization of trade unions in the post-
liberalization era in Tanzania, where the interests of capital are prioritized 
above those of labour.  
 
For the labour movement, a major issue concerning privatization of 
enterprises leading to a rise in inward FDI, is the large numbers of workers 
being dismissed, leading to a fall in membership and consequently influence.77  
In addition, the labour-force has been negatively affected by the removal of 
state subsidies as part of neo-liberal policy prescriptions, which has 
contributed to the rising prices of accommodation, fuel and social services. 
With regard to the latter, between 1977 and 1991, government expenditure on 
health declined from 7.2% of total government spending to 4.9% (Rusimbi, 
2003). Moreover, privatization has negatively affected institutionalized forms 
of employee participation, notably the Worker’s Committees, which had 
existed in Tanzania since 1952, with the aim of involving labour in decisions 
concerning the management of enterprises (Chambua, 1997). 78 Since they 
lack a legal basis in the newly created private sector, foreign and/or domestic 
managers are not obliged to continue with such committees (Chambua, 1997, 
Galarraga and Gogue, 1997). Trade unions have therefore lost an important 
channel of communication with management in many enterprises since 
liberalization and the neo-liberal power bloc has one less significant form of 
challenge to its ideological hegemony.  
 
                                                           
77
  See chapter 5 for details of the changes in trade union membership patterns in the post-liberalization era.  
78
  See chapter 5 for further details of the role of Worker’s Committees in Tanzania. 
 120 
 
A further significant consequence of the imposition of neo-liberal policies in 
Tanzania has been the increasing informalization of the economy (Wuyts, 
2001).  It is estimated that 34% of households in Tanzania are engaged in 
informal sector activities and this figure rises to 55% of households in Dar es 
Salaam (Becker, 2004). Trade liberalization has led to a large rise in foreign 
imports entering the country in the commodities sector, including ‘massive 
importation of beer and clothes’ (Ngowi, 2002: 9). This has reduced 
competition as local firms lack the skills and capacity to compete with 
imported goods and have to downsize or close. 79 Consequently, there has 
been a decrease in the formal wage labour sector, including stagnation in the 
production of traditional export crops, such as coffee, tea, cashew nuts, cotton 
and tobacco. In response, households have come to depend more on ‘multiple, 
diversified and spatially extended livelihood strategies, where wages are in 
part subsidised through other forms of economic security’ (Wuyts, 2001: 435). 
 
The informal sector is dynamic and some of its activities have led to the 
formation of civil society organizations, such as co-operatives and savings 
societies, which allow actors to organize their financial assets (Seppala, 2008) 
and increase their knowledge of markets (Muller, 2005). However, despite its 
diverse forms (War on Want, 2006), a common feature of the informal 
economy is that it provides little job security for workers, who are not 
protected by labour legislation, have no contracts of employment and are 
subject to intimidation and extortion from officials of the state, such as police 
officers. Even in sectors, such as public transport, where a state monopoly led 
                                                           
79  See chapter 5 for further details and figures regarding retrenchment of workers in Tanzania following the 
onset of the structural adjustment period. 
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to consistent shortages of buses prior to liberalization of the economy, 
privatization has not led to unambiguous improvements for workers or 
consumers. Exploitative labour relations have characterized the privatized 
daladala (mini-bus) sector, in the form of long working days and little security 
of employment being imposed on a mass of casual workers (Rizzo, 2002). 
Moreover, many daladalas remain extremely crowded and poorly maintained. 
The privatization of the water industry has also been problematic in Tanzania 
(ICSID, 2008).  Privatization led to erratic provision and high charges for 
water, culminating in an acrimonious dispute between the government and the 
new foreign investors in the sector (Rice, 2008, 2007). As a result, the number 
of informal vendors has risen considerably and regulation of this type of 
provision is non-existent (Bayliss, forthcoming). 
 
However, the trade union movement has done little, beyond the level of 
rhetoric, to engage with workers in the informal sector. A few unions (TUICO, 
COTWU(T) and CHODAWU, for example) have supported the informal 
sector, mostly by assisting in setting up associations. However, the national 
federation of trade unions (TUCTA) has formulated no overall strategy to 
engage with the informal sector and in overall terms union work in this area 
lacks coordination, planning and financial backing (Fischer, 2011). When it is 
considered that around one third of Tanzanian households - and more than a 
half of those in Dar es Salaam – engage in informal economic activities, the 
failure of trade unions to provide this sector of the labour force with any 
substantive representation has been a significant factor contributing to their 
marginalization in the post-liberalization period. 80 
                                                           
80
  This issue is covered in detail in chapter 5. 
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Overall, the post-liberalization period has seen a measure of macro-economic 
stability emerge in Tanzania from the viewpoint of the IFIs and the state, 
which together uphold neo-liberal hegemony. Inward FDI, particularly in the 
mining sector, has been the main driver of increased GDP growth rates since 
2000. However, trickle down to the mass of the population is not occurring, to 
a large degree because the main growth sector – mining – have provided 
relatively few employment opportunities and lack linkages to the rest of the 
economy (see chapter 2). The trade union movement has been unable to exert 
any substantive influence on the government, external donors or new investors 
to improve the terms and conditions of the work-force in the formal sector. 
Moreover, it has failed to engage with, and organize, the increasing numbers 
of Tanzanian workers in the informal sector.     
 
3.7 Summary 
Colonial economic policies (German and British) created an export-led 
economy in Tanzania, which benefitted a minority of largely foreign 
producers, traders and state officials. It left the country dependent on external 
finance: from the colonial centre to develop politically and from foreign 
investors and buyers to progress economically. In post-colonial Tanzania, a 
concerted attempt, under the left-wing populist regime of Julius Nyerere, to 
break the political and economic dependence of the country on external 
agents, failed. By the end of the 1960s the government took control of 
development processes, tacitly acknowledging that they ‘could not be both 
state directed and popularly initiated’ (Jennings, 2003: 185). Only the rhetoric 
of self-reliance continued within development plans. After Nyerere stepped 
down in 1985, the Tanzanian government has, largely through donor pressure, 
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adopted neo-liberal economic policies, along with a move to multi-party 
liberal democracy. The implementation of these policies gathered pace from 
the 2000s to the extent that Tanzania has become one of the ‘developmental 
stars’ of Africa in the view of the IFIs, whereby key actors from the ruling 
administration have internalized the main precepts of the New Policy Agenda 
and little donor oversight is needed to ensure the hegemony of neo-liberalism. 
However, a ‘developmental state’ in Tanzania is lacking. The ruling party, 
CCM, is engaged in systemic rent- seeking at national and regional levels and 
patronage politics is the norm. For trade unions, the major shifts in the 
political economy of Tanzania in the post-liberalization period have led to 
their marginalization. The state prioritizes the interests of capital over labour, 
based on two main premises. First, Tanzania continues to rely substantively on 
external financing, much of which comes from the IFIs, which promulgate 
neo-liberal economic policies. Second, the rise in GDP during the 2000s is 
largely due to inward FDI, concentrated on a small number of economic 
sectors, the most important of which is mining. The privatization of SOEs 
during the 1990s also led to the entry of new domestic entrepreneurs as well as 
foreign ‘new investors.’ Neither of these groups welcomes a substantive role 
for organized labour in the economy and both have engaged in aggressive and 
obstructive tactics in dealing with trade unions. For these reasons, neo-liberal 
policies have become hegemonic in Tanzania over the past twenty years. 
Hegemony is, however, always contested (Gramsci, 2011b) and the ways in 
which trade unions and NGOs in the post-liberalization period have contested 
the new policy spaces that have opened up, forms a major part of the 
following three fieldwork-based chapters. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The NGO Sector in Tanzania 
 
4.1 Overview of the Development of NGOs in Tanzania 
In this chapter, central issues regarding the conceptualization and theorization 
of civil society, which were examined in chapter 2, are framed within the 
historical development of NGOs in Tanzania, starting from the period of 
British colonialism. This is followed by a discussion of fieldwork findings. 81 
The historical grounding of the development of NGOs shows that their room 
for manoeuvre as part of civil society was limited in the war of position under 
colonial rule and during control by the one-party state after independence. 
Throughout these periods, the key aspects of the integral state - ideological 
hegemony supported by coercion (Gramsci, 1978) - were used to close down 
spaces where policies and ideologies could be contested by civil society. The 
state maintained tight control of key superstructure institutions, notably the 
judiciary, the legislature, the executive, the military and the church, thereby 
dominating the war of position in civil society with potential or actual 
opponents. As a result, NGOs had few opportunities to formulate and 
promulgate counter-hegemonic discourses. In the post-liberalization period, 
civil society has been reconfigured, with a small group of large, urban-based 
NGOs rising to power, largely through the funding and patronage of 
multilateral and bilateral donors, which pressured the state to relinquish its 
dominant position as an agent of development in favour of a prominent role 
for market forces. As the market-led model was unable to meet the social and 
                                                           
81
  The fieldwork findings are based primarily on interviews with officials from NGOs that have taken part in 
national policy-making processes in the post-liberalization period, as well as participant observation and 
document analysis.  
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economic needs of the population, NGOs became both service-providers to fill 
in the gaps and standard bearers of the newly configured civil society, which 
donors were keen to make a key part of the socio-political landscape in post-
liberalization Tanzania. The state was reluctant to allow NGOs a significant 
role in providing services and in national policy-making processes, but had 
little choice but to acquiesce, given their indebtedness to the donors and the 
need to fill in shortfalls in the provision of social services to the mass of 
citizens. Other forms of civil society in Tanzania that have legitimacy with 
citizens have been marginalized, whilst the donors have instead championed a 
small number of elite urban-based NGOs, staffed by well-educated 
professionals with whom they share the dominant development discourse. 
This group, therefore, has some leverage vis-à-vis the state, regarding input to 
national-policy making processes. However, the state has used legal-
bureaucratic means in the form of legislation, codes of conduct and the 
creation of an oversight body, to circumscribe the remit of NGOs in post-
liberalization Tanzania. These means have served to ensure that the work of 
NGOs is largely apolitical and confined to the social sphere. The state claims 
these legal-bureaucratic measures embody the national interest, represented 
more widely by neo-liberal policies in the economic sector linked to multi-
party liberal democracy and an apolitical civil society, which shares the 
concerns of the state in forming policies and programmes. In short, these 
policies and programmes are portrayed by the state as ‘common sense’ 
(Gramsci, 2011b). In the context of this neo-liberal hegemony, a small number 
of NGOs have formed counter-hegemonic discourses. However, in doing so, 
these organizations face the powerful accusation that they are acting against 
the national interest and common sense.  In addition, these counter-hegemonic 
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discourses are not based on a concerted strategy or vision and fail to involve 
sizeable grassroots campaigns. Thus, they do not constitute a substantive 
challenge to the hegemony of the state at present.  
 
4.2 Tanzanian NGOs during the period of British Colonialism 
The formation and activities of NGOs were tightly constrained by the colonial 
authorities in Tanzania. Kiondo (1992) records the founding of nineteen NGOs 
under colonial rule and revises this down to just eleven in a later piece of work 
(Kiondo, 1993). The few active NGOs were mostly national chapters of 
existing British associations, providing social services, such as the Tanzania 
Society for the Blind. The other main type of NGO operating in Tanzania at 
this time was based on bourgeois economic interests, notably the Tanganyikan 
Farmers Association (TFA), a membership requirement of which was 
ownership of at least five acres of developed land or a number of livestock. 
Race and ethnicity were fault lines for NGO membership during this period. 
The TFA and other influential NGOs, such as the Dar es Salaam Round Table, 
were dominated by Asians. The majority of Africans lacked the economic 
means to join such organizations and instead developed associations based on 
adapting to life in urban areas, notably burial societies, loans associations, 
faith-based organizations and groups centred on regions of the country (Tripp, 
1992). 
 
The independence struggle stimulated increasing activity in the civil society 
sector, which engaged in a concerted struggle for ideological hegemony with 
the state, based on the Tanzanian African National Union (TANU) in the 
 127 
 
political arena, 82 the cooperative movement in the agricultural sector 83 and a 
growing labour movement, organized by the Tanganyikan Federation of 
Labour (TFL). 84  NGOs were not active during this period, although some 
Parents’ Associations and Youth Leagues took part in associational life from 
the 1940s onwards (Kiondo, 1993). However, Gibbon (2001: 822) shows how 
other elements of civil society did pose a threat to state hegemony. 
Chieftaincies in northern Tanzania during the colonial era contained a 
kaleidoscope of associational life, including lineages, clans, age-sets, credit 
groups (upatu), sports clubs, dance societies, faith-based organizations and 
courts of elders. Above this, at tribal level, were some large rural-based civil 
society associations, notably cooperative unions and tribal unions, along with 
more informal ‘non-compliance movements.’ All of these groups contested 
state hegemony to some degree. The anti-colonial activities of non-compliance 
movements were directed mainly against land use regulations, taxes, 
alienation of land and the racial composition of local councils.  Tribal unions 
took part in actions contesting the regulations opposed by the non-compliance 
movements but also were concerned with wider issues of ‘development’, such 
as educational provision. The struggles of the large non-compliance 
movements did have links to similar protests by more locally-based peasant 
groups and with the work of some TANU branches. 
 
 
 
                                                           
82
  See chapter 3 for an overview of the development of TANU. 
83
  See chapter 3 for an overview of the development of Co-operative Societies. 
84
  See chapter 5 for an overview of the development of the TFL. 
 
 128 
 
4.3 Tanzanian NGOs from Independence to the New Policy Agenda 
Following independence in 1961, the Tanzanian state rapidly became a 
hegemon, through firmly imposed policies (see chapter 3), supported by the 
international donor community and influential foreign NGOs, which led to a 
situation where independent associational life was limited during the 1960s 
and the 1970s. From 1961 to 1978 only seventeen new NGOs were registered, 
through the Societies Act, in the country (Kiondo, 1993). The use of the 1954 
Societies Act to register NGOs remained a vital legal-bureaucratic means of 
state control over which elements of civil society could exist and in what form 
after independence. 85 The fact that registration of any NGO could be refused 
because it was ‘in the opinion of the registrar, undesirable’ (URT, 1954) and 
that an existing organization could be de-registered if its actions were 
prejudicial to ‘good government’ (URT, 1954), gave the state substantive 
power and control over civil society. With the dissolution of the TFL in 1964, 
state control became pervasive and associational life ‘at the national level was 
effectively crippled’ (Tripp, 2000: 197). This control of civil society by the 
one party state from 1965 was instrumental in narrowing and overseeing who 
could participate in the political life of Tanzania, and how. For Shivji (1991: 
85), the ‘destruction of autonomous organized expression of the differences in 
civil society is the first profound effect of the monopoly of politics by the 
state-party.’ Tanzania became a closed society ‘where the members of the 
public are spectators and rumour-mongers rather than actors and 
commentators’ (Shivji, 1991: 86). The Arusha Declaration of 1967 (see 
chapter 3) led to state structures gradually replacing the major voluntary 
associations operating in the rural areas, notably the co-operative societies, 
                                                           
85
  See chapter 3 for a discussion of the lasting significance of the Societies Act. 
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which were banned in 1976. Within a further year, remaining civil society 
organizations of substance, such as the Dar es Salaam Student Association 
(DUSO), were brought under state control.  Worsening economic conditions 
during the 1970s (see chapter 3) were a major influence on the state’s decision 
to further tighten its control over development activities. This led to a 
‘removal of space for independent activity’ (Jennings, 2007:  92-93). Thus, 
while the charismatic leadership of Nyerere was important in maintaining the 
authority of the ruling party (as it rolled out its developmental vision for 
Tanzania) in the forms of the Arusha Declaration and ujamaa (see chapter 3), 
the coercive element of the integral state was also used effectively and rapidly 
after independence to limit the autonomy of civil society. 
 
Although service provision in areas like health and education was uneven 
during this period, a high level of foreign donor funding and support for 
government policies were significant in upholding the hegemony of the state. 
The IFIs and leading bilateral donors were at this time keen to support what 
they perceived as ‘progressive non-communist development models’ (Kiondo, 
1993: 166). Tanzania received the highest level of official development 
assistance in Africa from 1977 to 1979, the majority being in grant form, 
which made it easy for the government to leverage. 86 In addition, the 
ideologies of foreign NGOs during the ujamaa period limited the ability of 
civil society to operate autonomously. Jennings (2008a, 2001) shows how 
Oxfam supported the ujamaa programme on ideological grounds, and 
operations such as the Chunya Integrated Development Project, were created 
overtly to assist in its implementation. In doing so, Oxfam, as well as other 
                                                           
86
  See chapter 3 for an overview of, and figures for, ODA to Tanzania. 
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foreign NGOs, became ‘surrogates of the state’ and ‘part of a process that 
withdrew power and representation from the grass roots’ (Jennings, 2001: 
131).  Thus, assistance from external donors and foreign civil society 
organizations was useful to the state in winning the war of position in 
Tanzanian civil society. 
 
However, with the adoption of neo-liberalism on the part of the IFIs from the 
end of the 1970s, Tanzania’s statist policies came under pressure, given the 
large dependence of the government on external financing.  The government’s 
acceptance of a SAP in 1986 (see chapter 3) changed the dynamic between the 
state and civil society in Tanzania. Under the SAP, externally driven neo-
liberal policies replaced statism and the ideology of ujamaa was rolled back. 
This resulted in NGOs gaining space in which to provide a challenge to state 
hegemony, should they so wish.  As the democratic deficit, brought about by 
the newly-imposed market-driven model, became apparent during the 1980s, 
NGOs increasingly filled in the gaps by providing social services. NGOs were 
seen by the major donors as more efficient, less bureaucratic and less corrupt 
than the state sector. This led to increasing numbers of NGOs entering the 
development arena in Tanzania, with forty-one registered between 1980 and 
1990 (Kiondo, 1992). The doubling of the social service sector NGOs 
registering during the 1980s in comparison to the 1970s reflected the 
‘tremendous erosion of government capacity in social service provision’ 
(Kiondo, 1993: 171).   
 
The failure of state dirigisme to provide adequate social services was a 
significant factor leading to the creation of a special category of NGO, District 
 131 
 
Development Trusts (DDTs), from the late 1970s, which were granted powers 
by the official District Councils and permitted to raise revenues through local 
taxes and crops. DDTs mainly provided services in the areas of education, 
health and infrastructure (Mchomvu et al, 1998).  Foreign NGOs and donor 
agencies helped fund the activities of DDTs, which were often set up by 
political and business elites in urban areas.  Many DDTs had national political 
figures as patrons, who could leverage funding and state resources and in 
return guarantee loyalty to the government and increase their support from 
constituents. Thus, the government approved of these organizations and more 
than two hundred came into existence (Nugent, 2004). For Qorro (1991), 
DDTs represented not just the need for NGOs to fill in the democratic deficit 
but also enabled the people running them to be registered and approved by the 
state when they could not legally be placed within the ambit of official 
government bodies, such as the District Councils. In this way DDTs started to 
run many secondary schools from the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1990 the 
number of state secondary schools rose from eighty-three to one hundred and 
thirty-five, whereas secondary schools run by non-state actors rose 
significantly faster; from seventy-one to one hundred and ninety-five (Lugalla, 
1993). In this way, state hegemony was bolstered in the face of the increasing 
power of donor-driven neo-liberal policies in Tanzania, which included an 
enlarged role for an ‘independent’ civil society sector. The state felt threatened 
by this expansion of civil society and reacted with various strategies as part of 
the war of position, including co-option of civil society. In the case of the 
DDTs, it was successful. 
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The challenge to state hegemony from the enlarging NGO sector during the 
1980s has led to attempts at classification of different types of NGOs 
operating in the country. Shivji (1991) identifies four categories of NGOs 
according to their socio-political alignment that emerged during this period; 
government-organized NGOs (GONGOs), foreign NGOs (FONGOs), local 
NGOs (LONGOs) - the majority of which were foreign funded (FFUNGOs) - 
and People’s Organizations (POs). The rise of GONGOs is related to the 
recognition of the government that NGOs were attracting a substantial amount 
of foreign funding. This stimulated efforts on the part of the Tanzanian 
government to maintain hegemony by coordinating, monitoring and 
evaluating the work of NGOs, in order to obtain access to donor financing, 
establish patron-client relationships with intended beneficiaries of the work of 
NGOs and provide a local power base for individual politicians, who could 
claim credit for successful work by the NGO with their constituents (Kiondo, 
1993).  Prominent GONGOs were quasi-governmental mass organizations, 
such as the Women’s Movement (Umoja wa Wanawake), which had been co-
opted by the ruling party as part of the move to an all-encompassing statism 
after independence. FONGOs are mostly Tanzanian branches of Big 
International NGOs (BINGOs) and function to channel external donor 
financing into the operation of local initiatives or support for the existing work 
of indigenous NGOs. LONGOs are closely related to FONGOs in comprising 
local NGOs, formed and funded largely or wholly through international donor 
financing. FONGOs and LONGOs have in common a socio-political 
alignment to BINGOs. People’s Organizations (POs) are often grassroots 
groups, which are self-financing or use international funding only as a 
supplement to their own fund-raising strategies. Some POs have confronted 
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government policies and stood up for the interests of those being oppressed, 
such as the Tanzania Environmental Society (TESO), which fought against 
government confiscation of public land in Arusha.  Government antagonism 
towards POs, which challenged state hegemony by criticizing their policies, 
was ameliorated during the 1980s by the need to have as many development 
agents as possible supplementing the increasingly beleaguered state provision. 
Thus, with regard to the war of position, the state gave strategic ground to 
civil society, by allowing some NGO criticism of its policies, through a need 
to ensure that external donors would continue to fund non-state actors, which 
would engage in service delivery where gaps existed in public sector 
provision. 
 
Overall, the number and the activities of NGOs increased markedly in 
Tanzania from the 1970s, as the IFI-influenced move to neo-liberal policies 
led to the rolling back of state activities. While the government was forced to 
acquiesce to the ideology of neo-liberalism, largely through its financial 
dependence on external donors (see chapter 3), it used the coercive aspect of 
the integral state in an effort to uphold its hegemony in the face of actual and 
potential opposition from civil society. This centred on the continued use of 
the Societies Act, which the state had used effectively to circumscribe the 
activities of NGOs since its enactment in 1954. As well as allowing the 
registrar to refuse applications for registration and to de-register existing 
organizations, the act also required all NGOs to supply the registrar with a list 
of officers and members, as well as a copy of the constitution. This allowed 
the state to monitor individuals and organizations working in ‘sensitive’ 
sectors carefully. ‘Sensitive’ sectors included all advocacy work, human rights 
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and organizations working in areas where CCM had dedicated wings of the 
party; notably gender and youth. Therefore, while the state’s position as the 
dominant agent of development was threatened by the increase in NGO 
activity from the 1970s up to liberalization in the mid-1980s, it employed 
legal-bureaucratic means plus co-option of important elements of civil society, 
as in the case of the DDTs, as effective weapons in the war of position. 
 
4.4 NGOs in Post-liberalization Tanzania 
Tanzanian government statistics (URT, 1995) show that while only twenty-
five NGOs were registered in the country between 1986 and 1990, the figure 
increased to six hundred and four registrations between 1990 and 1995. 
Influential NGOs became concentrated in urban areas and in the main were 
‘established by educated elites who have the knowledge and contacts to start 
an NGO successfully’ Mercer (1999: 249). The state, in keeping with 
historical tradition, reacted to this challenge to its hegemony by using 
legislation as a weapon in the war of position, therefore, obstructing through 
legal-bureaucratic means the ‘gradual shift of power and prestige away from 
the bureaucracy to the civil society’ (Mwapachu, 1998: xviii). 
 
Research on NGO growth, activities and ideologies from 1990 to the present 
reveals several key aspects. First, the donor-driven nature of NGO work is 
apparent, with upward accountability to funders, through reliance on external 
finance, being more important than downward accountability to intended 
beneficiaries. Second, the new NGO sector is not organic in the sense of 
associations being created in response to the perceived needs of Tanzanian 
citizens (Pender, 2005, Shivji, 2004). NGOs were scaled up in Tanzania from 
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the 1990s, largely through the patronage of external donors, which provided 
most of the funding for this expansion. Third, the majority of the most 
influential NGOs in Tanzania are urban based and run by well educated, 
middle class professionals. Fourth, NGOs tend not to have grand visions of 
how Tanzanian society should be configured in economic, political and social 
terms. There is a concentration instead on day-to-day activities (Mushi, 
forthcoming, Shivji, 2004).  
 
The influence of donors and the difficulties involved in forming and 
maintaining effective NGOs outside urban areas are illustrated by the 
struggles to create organizations representing the concerns of pastoralists in 
Tanzania. The prioritization of donor interests above those of the pastoralists 
themselves and the need for good connections with state actors in order for 
NGOs to operate effectively is shown by the studies of Plastow (2005), Igoe 
(2003) and Cameron (2001).  
 
Cameron (2001) outlines how the Pastoralist Indigenous Non-Governmental 
Organization (PINGOs) Forum, founded in 1994 became over-laden with 
structures, driven by donor priorities, and was captured by a particular faction, 
leading to the withdrawal of external funding in 1999.  Igoe (2003: 881) 
demonstrates that external aid from the international donors ‘actually 
undermined the formation of civil society in pastoralist communities.’ Too 
much time was spent on activities involving upward accountability to donors.  
Despite the rhetoric of ‘partnership’ and ‘local ownership’ of programmes, the 
old top down relationship between northern donors and local NGOs remains 
largely unchanged. For Plastow (2005: 1), substantive change is only likely to 
 136 
 
be achieved if a range of powerful actors can be brought on board to lobby for 
the interests of pastoralists, allies found within the government and empirical 
evidence to support arguments is produced. This scenario requires time, 
money and a variety of technical skills on the part of pastoralist groups, which 
are currently lacking. 
 
Furthermore, Mercer (2002b: 124), drawing on a study of village-based 
women’s groups on Mount Kilimanjaro, points to the romanticizing of the 
concepts of participation and the empowerment of local communities in much 
Western development literature and the failure to take account of the way 
‘local social, cultural, political and economic conditions influence people’s 
agendas and motivations for getting involved.’ Women’s groups were used to 
consolidate the interests of certain individuals and to attain status rather than 
through a desire for empowerment. This exemplifies the need for historically-
grounded studies of civil society, which take into account the way power has 
been created and maintained by particular groups of people in communities. 
The attempts by donors to map development concepts (in this case, a 
participatory approach) onto projects and programmes without knowledge of 
how the local political economy has been shaped historically is a major reason 
for their failure. 
 
A more positive view of the influence of Tanzanian civil society in the post-
liberalization period can be gained from the way that land and sexual 
harassment policies were changed as a result of concerted efforts by NGOs. 
Consequently, the enactment of the Sexual Offences Special Provisions Act 
(1998) and the Land Act (1999) ‘are the most significant achievement of the 
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activities of civil organizations’ (Mallya, 2001: 27). Nevertheless, the 
relationship between the NGO sector and the government during the 1990s 
can be characterized as a series of ‘peformative rituals’ (Mercer, 2003), which 
legitimized continued economic liberalization policies and the discourse of 
good governance, based on partnership and participatory development. For 
Kelsall (2002: 598), this period saw the ‘building of an ersatz, air-conditioned 
civil society’ in Tanzania by donors keen to fund NGOs, following structural 
adjustment and the move to multi-party politics. Little challenge to state 
hegemony emerged from this newly created sector. 
 
The onset of the PRSP process (see chapter 6) in October 1999 led to changes 
in the composition, power dynamics and trajectories of the NGO sector in 
Tanzania, with FFUNGOs and FONGOs coming to the fore and, through 
donor influence, a new umbrella group, the Policy Forum, created, in order to 
coordinate NGO work.  Donor influence has also led to advocacy work 
becoming more prominent than had previously been the case (Gould and 
Ojanen, 2005, Pender, 2005) and an attempt to modernize and professionalize 
a group of influential urban-based NGOs, through capacity building and the 
use of Information Communication Technologies (ICTs). The state’s response 
to these challenges to its hegemony from civil society has again been to use 
legislation and regulation of the policy space available to the NGO sector.  
First, a formal policy with regard to NGO work in the country was created. 
Second, in 2002, new legislation covering the work of NGOs - the Non-
Governmental Organizations Act (No. 24) (URT, 2002b) - was enacted. Third, 
a coordination body – the National Council for NGOs (NACONGO) (URT, 
20101) – was set up.  These three new fronts in the war of position show how 
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the government has fought to maintain its hegemony in the post-liberalization 
period through using the coercive legal-bureaucratic elements of the integral 
state. 
 
Upholding its position as a hegemon in post-liberalization Tanzania is 
complicated for the state by the increasing influence of transnational actors, 
particularly the IFIs. The IFIs (and to a lesser extent, bilateral donors) drive 
the ideology and policy directions of both the state and civil society. 
Multilateral and bilateral donors have provided substantive funding and 
support for NGOs in Tanzania since liberalization. For example, Mercer 
(2005, 2004) outlines how donors have funded and promoted ICTs in Tanzania 
since 2000 as a way of strengthening civil society by attempting to broaden 
participation in development debates, disseminate information to a wide 
audience and foster alliances. While this has stimulated some networking 
among well-resourced NGOs, only a small number of FONGOS and 
FFUNGOS have access to ICT amenities, and the Internet is far from being an 
inclusive development tool. These findings can be supported by the fact that 
only six per cent of the population has access to electricity (African Rural 
Energy Enterprise Development (AREED), 2010). Thus, any potential 
challenge to state hegemony from NGOs using modern communication 
technologies is extremely narrowly-based. ICTs are used for exchanges of 
information between this small group of elite NGOs, such as notices 
concerning the schedules of the ‘Breakfast Meetings’ between NGOs (see 
chapter 4). They are also used to upload national policy instrument documents 
for comment and discussion, such as the PRSP. Policy Forum, 2010, has for 
example, the third phase PRSP document (2010-2015) on its website (URT, 
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2010b). However, ICTs are not used to instigate grassroots campaigns and, 
since ninety four per cent of people in the country have no access to electricity 
they are anything but a vehicle with which to engage the mass of the 
Tanzanian population. The improvement of ICTs at the small number of elite 
urban-based NGOs can, thus, be seen as the provision of another trapping, 
along with air-conditioning and land cruisers. It has not been useful, however, 
in formulating and sustaining counter-hegemonic discourses.   
 
Moreover, Gould and Ojanen (2005) show how a donor-driven emphasis on 
advocacy work by NGOs emerged at the end of the 1990s with the 
establishment of dedicated positions in major organizations that had hitherto 
concentrated on service delivery. This was a significant shift, since, at the start 
of the new millennium, few Tanzanian NGOs had developed the capacity to 
engage in ‘policy analysis and advocacy’ in ways that applied ‘any real 
pressure on the government’ (Evans and Ngalewa, 2003: 251). DFID 
commissioned research on civil society in Tanzania in 2000 (Alloo, 2000, 
Dangor and Nadison, 2000), which highlighted the importance of advocacy 
work. However, donor efforts to fund and support advocacy work, as a way of 
inculcating a stronger challenge from civil society to state hegemony in post-
liberalization Tanzania has been problematic. The main obstacle to the 
development of advocacy work among Tanzanian NGOs is the prevailing 
belief on the part of state institutions and civil society organizations 
themselves that it is ‘political,’ whereas ‘true’ civil society activities should be 
apolitical. 87 This viewpoint, influenced by years of state hegemony during 
colonialism and the post-independence period of one-party rule, is limiting, 
                                                           
87
  See section 4.5 for details relating to this point from the fieldwork interviews with NGO officials. 
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given that by its very nature advocacy involves recommending or supporting a 
particular cause or policy, making it necessarily political. The state’s use of 
legal-bureaucratic means since 2000 to capture the terms and conditions by 
which NGOs operate (in the form of the creation of an NGO policy, an NGO 
Act of Parliament and NACONGO as a coordinating body) has allowed the 
state to take itself out of the equation regarding political and ideological 
discourses. The state claims that these legal-bureaucratic measures are not 
based on a political ideology but simply represent the best practice in terms of 
framing the form civil society should take and the parameters of its activities 
in the post-liberalization era. Thus, the measures are based on common sense 
(Gramsci, 2011b) and to contest them is not to engage in political debate but 
to go against the national interest. Given the power of the state’s perspective in 
this regard, it is not surprising that few counter-hegemonic discourses have 
been created through advocacy work on the part of Tanzanian NGOs in the 
post-liberalization period.  
 
NACONGO set up an ‘NGO Code of Conduct’ (TANGO, 2010, Hakikazi 
Catalyst, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d) also called ‘NGO Code of Ethics’ (Policy 
Forum, 2008b), the main aim of which is ‘to establish core values and 
principles that shall guide the conduct and operations of all NGOs working in 
Tanzania’ (Policy Forum, 2008b: 1). The code focuses on the technical aspects 
of NGO work - governance, accountability, financial transparency, human 
resources, communication and information sharing - and the relationship 
between NGOs and other stakeholders. NACONGO is working on developing 
rewards for NGOs which comply with the code and sanctions for 
organizations breaking it, primarily to pre-empt state enforcement, which 
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would imply ‘weak ownership’ on the part of NGOs (Policy Forum, 2008b: 2). 
Ensuring compliance with the code in this way indicates that NACONGO has 
internalized the donor-driven liberal view of the role of civil society 
organizations in Tanzania, which is based on achieving consensus through 
amicable debates between a variety of associational groups and the state. The 
point made by writers such as Cramer (2002) 88 that ‘ownership’ is likely to 
involve conflicting positions and actions among both civil society and state 
organizations (which would mean having to fundamentally rethink the liberal-
consensus model) is not taken into consideration.  
 
4.5        NGOs in Tanzania: Key Fieldwork Findings 
The ‘privatization of the notion of public interest’ (Kamet, 2002: 156) 89 under 
neo-liberalism, leading to the concentration of power and resources, is evident 
in the way NGOs participate in the Tanzanian PRSP, the national policy 
instrument introduced in 1999 and since strongly supported ideologically and 
financially by the IFIs. 90  In post-liberalization Tanzania, the state has been 
forced by donor pressure to allow the public interest to be debated and 
determined in the private sphere by citizens operating through the 
institutionalized means of civil society organizations. The state, in response, 
has applied common sense legal-bureaucratic measures to regulate civil 
society, which it claims are technical common-sense measures, representing 
the national interest. According to this donor-driven perspective, the views of 
Tanzanian citizens are, pace deTocqueville, formulated through free and fair 
debate, involving mass participation. In reality, ‘civil society,’ as a designated 
                                                           
88
  See chapter 1. 
89
  See also Kamat (2004) on this point. 
90
  See chapter 6 for a detailed analysis of civil society participation in the PRSP process. 
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sector taking part in PRSP process, is dominated by just a small number of 
influential NGOs. A core group of thirteen NGOs are involved as members of 
the macro working group. The process by which NGOs became part of the 
macro working group is not transparent but it is clear that all members are 
from the elite, urban-based NGOs, staffed by well-educated professionals. 
This group also comprises representatives from the Ministry of Finance, 
sectoral ministries, the donor community, research institutes, the President’s 
Office, Regional Administration and Local Government (PORALG) and the 
Local Government Reform Programme (Alonso and Utz, 2004). There are 
also sub-groups of NGOs which work on particular areas of development: 
Agriculture; Rural Development and Water; Governance; Education; Health; 
HIV/AIDS; Roads and Regions/Other Groups. Nine NGOs from the macro 
working group, along with four non-members, were selected for interview, as 
a purposive sample. Regarding the four non-members of the macro working 
group, Tanzania Education Network (TEN/MET) was chosen, as it is an 
influential umbrella organization (see discussion below in this section). 
Second, Oxfam Tanzania was selected, as it played an active role in 
supporting the Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development (TCDD) as a 
coordinator of NGO input to the first PRSP (1999-2004). 91 PACT Tanzania 
was interviewed, as it is a well resourced and influential NGO, financed 
primarily by USAID. Finally, Youth Partnership Countryside (YPC) was 
selected, as the organization had been involved in a serious dispute with the 
government in the recent past, under its previous name, leading to it being 
deregistered. The key findings are summarized under two themes; NGO 
Priorities in Discourses and Key NGO Relationships. 
                                                           
91
  Source: Interview with former Oxfam Country Director, 10 November, 2005 
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The annual budgets of a number of the Macro Group of NGOs are 
considerable, providing them with a capacity far beyond that of trade unions 
and other forms of associational life in Tanzania. The budgets of the two most 
influential think tanks in the country (REPOA and ESRF) are substantive at 
$251,656 and $342,624 respectively. The size of these budgets can be judged 
from a comparison with total state revenues in 2009, which were $4.3 billion. 
Most of this funding comes from external donor agencies, which are named as 
financial supporters in the accounts sections of annual reports, although the 
specific amounts of donations are, in the main, not recorded. Thus, the donors 
are expending a substantive amount of finance on just a few NGOs, as a major 
part of their effort to build a ‘new’ civil society in their own image. The heavy 
reliance on external funding has been used by the state as evidence that the 
‘new’ NGOs, which dominate civil society in the post-liberalization period, 
are pawns of, and mouthpieces for, the major international donor agencies, 
rather than organizations which have developed organically to respond to 
perceived needs of Tanzanian citizens.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 144 
 
Table 4.1  Budget Analysis of NGOs Interviewed 
 
Name of NGO Budget (in US dollars) 
Policy Forum 598,928 (2008) 
TGNP Not supplied – Grant of 197,872 
provided by Norwegian Embassy 
(2007) 
TEN/MET 250 (2008) 
TACOSODE Not supplied 
ESRF 251, 656 (2010) 
REPOA 342, 624 (2009) 
LHRC Not supplied 
Oxfam Tanzania 1,141 (2008) 
Hakielimu 2,498 (2009) 
SCF Tanzania 13,264 in ‘Restricted Funds’ category 
11,561 in grant from the CEF (2008) 
ActionAid Tanzania 4,413 (2005) 
PACT Tanzania 12,350 (2008) 
YPC Not supplied 
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     Table 4.2  Website Analysis of NGOs that are part of the Macro Working Group 
 
NGO Mission 
Statement 
Statement 
of 
Vision/Core 
Values 
Annual 
Reports 
Published 
Main 
Donors 
Stated 
Advocacy 
Emphasis 
Major 
Content in 
Kiswahili 
Legal and 
Human Rights 
Centre (LHRC) 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
HakiElimu Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Tanzania Social 
and Economic 
Trust 
(TASOET) 92 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Hakikazi 
Catalyst 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Tanzania 
Agriculture 
Development 
Research Group 
(TADREG) 93 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tanzania 
Gender 
Networking 
Programme 
(TGNP) 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Care 
International 
Yes  Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Tanzania 
Association of 
NGOs 
(TANGO) 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Save the 
Children Fund 
(SCF) 
Yes  Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Tanzania  
Council for 
Social 
Development 
(TACOSODE) 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
ActionAid Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Research on 
Poverty 
Alleviation 
(REPOA) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Economic and 
Social Research 
Foundation 
(ESRF) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                                                           
92
  TASOET has no website. 
93
  TADREG has no website. 
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The contrast between the resources of NGOs and Tanzanian trade unions 94 is 
striking. All the NGOs interviewed have websites, which are regularly 
maintained and updated. This can be contrasted with the fact that only the 
largest individual trade union – the Tanzania Teacher’s Union (TTU) - has a 
website, and even this barely functions.  Moreover, all the NGOs interviewed 
produce their own publications, ranging from academic textbooks to reports 
and newsletters. With regard to trade unions, only two out of twenty one 
produce regular publications.  
 
NGO Priorities in Discourses 
The issues highlighted as priorities for NGOs focus first on legitimacy and 
then on capacity. The legitimacy of development-based NGOs as 
representatives of poor and marginalized groups has been much debated 
(Steffek et al, 2010, Baan et al, 2008, Riddell, 2007, Jordan and Van Tuijl, 
2003, Hilhorst, 2003, Pearce, 2002, Hudock, 2001, Hashemi and Hassan, 
1999, Clark, 1997).  For Steffek et al (2010: 105) the legitimacy of any CSO is 
based on putting the ‘participation of, and accountability to, its members, 
supporters and beneficiaries centre stage.’ More specifically, legitimacy 
should be evaluated according to levels of participation, inclusion, 
responsiveness, transparency and independence. However, Steffek et al (2010) 
do not set out any ways to measure these five dimensions of legitimacy. None 
of the other analyses of legitimacy cited above provide a means of measuring 
the concept. Legitimacy in the context of the fieldwork findings section 
centres on how NGO officials themselves, in qualitative terms, view the 
                                                           
94
  See appendix 5.2 for a summary of trade union resources. 
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participation of, and accountability to, intended beneficiaries. It also addresses 
the issue of how legitimate, as representatives of the poor and marginalized in 
Tanzania, NGO officials perceive themselves to be in the eyes of officials 
from other branches of civil society and the state, as well as the wider public.    
 
Legitimacy Issues 
There is considerable variance amongst NGOs as to how far their focus should 
be on building upward legitimacy, with the government and the donors, and to 
what extent their stress should be on creating downward legitimacy with the 
intended beneficiaries.  The latter emphasis is closely related to a point raised 
by a number of interviewees; the need to build a positive profile not just with 
intended beneficiaries but also the general public in Tanzania. This is 
inextricably linked to the perception of Tanzanian NGO officials that civil 
society is a ‘new sector’. Civil society is regarded by the vast majority of 
NGO officials interviewed as starting with the new policy agenda. Most 
interviewees specifically stated that the civil society sector in Tanzania is only 
ten – fifteen years old. It was notable that interviewees did not recognize the 
current configuration of civil society as having any continuities with its form 
during the colonial era or under the post-independence one-party state. This 
was shown by the way interviewees did not state that civil society 
organizations are different in their current forms and ideologies to those 
existing in the past, but instead put forward the unequivocal view that civil 
society is a ‘new sector in Tanzania.’ 
 
Such views must be seen in the light of the fact that all but one of the thirteen 
NGOs interviewed had been formed after 1990 and are part of the donors’ 
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desire to create an associational life, based on the free and fair exchange of 
ideas. The ideas put forward by NGOs will consequently make a significant 
contribution to the formation of policies based on the mass participation of the 
citizens and consequently a perception of ownership of national policy 
instruments.  Almost all the interviewees felt that their organizations had no 
profile whatsoever with members of the public. Where they were recognized, 
this was largely in a negative way; as well-paid careerists, operating primarily 
in order to tap into foreign donor and government finance or simply as corrupt 
organizations, which solicit funds for their own use. ‘Careerist’ was used by a 
number of interviewees, from both NGOs and trade unions (see chapter 5), to 
describe the way they believe NGO staff are perceived by the public in 
Tanzania. The phrase ‘briefcase NGOs’ was used a number of times during 
interviews, when respondents were asked about the way their organizations 
are regarded by the public. The term has become known in Tanzania through 
media popularization. In response to negative perceptions of their work 
several leading NGOs had designed a billboard campaign in Dar es Salaam 
with the aim of fostering more positive views on the part of citizens. The 
billboards featured pictures showing different aspects of the work of NGOs 
which all had the same heading ‘NGOs are Good’ printed in Swahili and 
English. No monitoring and evaluation of the campaign or follow-up work 
was set up and interviewees felt that it was difficult to accurately gauge any 
affects of the campaign. 
 
For almost every interviewee, the power of external donors to influence the 
Tanzanian NGO movement in the post-liberalization period is summed up by 
the leading role they played in the creation of Policy Forum as an apex 
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organization, despite the fact that two NGO umbrella groups already existed. 
One of them, TACOSODE, was set up in 1965 as a joint government-civil 
society initiative. TACOSODE’s main functions are to foster cooperation 
between NGOs and the government, represent NGOs at national level, to link 
NGOs at local, national and regional levels and to act as a clearing house for 
donors.  The organization has three hundred members and facilitates the 
provision of funds from international donors to grassroots organizations.  As 
well as TACOSODE, the donors could have chosen to build the capacity of the 
Tanzanian Association of NGOs (TANGO), ‘the largest and oldest NGO 
umbrella organization in Tanzania,’ according to an official interviewed, as a 
lead umbrella organization for the sector. TANGO was formed in 1988 and 
now has seven hundred members. 95 Some NGOs are members by proxy; as 
they belong to networks that have joined TANGO.  Thus, according to an 
interviewee from TANGO, every NGO in Tanzania is linked to the 
organization in some way. TANGO runs three main programmes; policy 
advocacy, capacity building and information dissemination, which are all 
interrelated.  
 
None of the interviewees could give a certain answer as to why external 
donors (principally Care International) had moved to set up the Policy Forum, 
when TACOSODE and TANGO already existed. It was suggested by several 
interviewees that TACOSODE was based on service delivery and the BINGOs 
wanted an umbrella group centred on advocacy work. However, if this were 
the case, then TANGO would have been a suitable choice, as it works 
                                                           
95
  Since TACOSODE used to be a quasi-governmental organization, it is not considered by interviewees to 
be an older NGO umbrella group than TANGO.  This is an example of why the civil society sector in 
Tanzania is considered to be ‘new’ by officials from NGOs interviewed. 
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exclusively on advocacy issues. Given the prior existence of these two 
experienced NGO umbrella organizations, the decision of the donors to 
expend a lot of energy and finance on creating another umbrella association, 
points to the desire to create a ‘new’ Tanzanian civil society in their own 
image.  For interviewees the creation, through the influence of external 
donors, of Policy Forum as its preferred apex organization has led to 
confusing and contradictory structures and relationships in the NGO sector, 
which weakens its legitimacy. The founding of Policy Forum illustrates the 
point that, while civil society is able to counter state hegemony more 
vigorously than in any previous period of Tanzanian history, the form of this 
contestation is shaped substantively by external donors, driving their 
(mis)interpretation of a de Tocquevillian view of civil society (see chapter 2), 
and not by the perceived needs of Tanzanian citizens. It also highlights the fact 
that the war of position in Tanzania for hegemony, involves not just the state 
and civil society, but also important actors at the transnational level. These 
actors are primarily the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and 
bilateral donors, which are framing a neo-liberal economic order and multi-
party liberal democracy, along with a corresponding re-organization of civil 
society in line with their interpretation of de- Tocquevillian ideas. These 
donor-propelled shifts in the political economy of Tanzania are being repeated 
across the developing world as part of a move to make neo-liberalism 
hegemonic globally (Cox, 1983). 
 
Along with the attempts of external donors to influence the composition and 
modus operandi of the NGO sector, the government’s use of legal-bureaucratic 
means move to maintain hegemony was cited by every interviewee as being of 
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concern.  NACONGO, created and empowered by an Act of Parliament to 
coordinate and provide policy guidelines for the role of NGOs in Tanzania, 
was seen in an overwhelmingly negative light by interviewees; ‘it is not 
working,’ as one put it, summing up the general view. Many interviewees 
argued that the role of NACONGO clashes with that of the Policy Forum and 
the foundation of the former is an attempt by the government to undermine the 
influence of the latter. The formation of NACONGO is also clearly seen as a 
threat to other umbrella NGO organizations.  For example, officials at 
TACOSODE were worried that they could be banned in the future, as the state 
might rule that only one NGO coordinating body should be allowed. 
Structured power dynamics play a significant role in making NACONGO an 
influential organization; several interviewees argued that their organizations 
prefer to cooperate with Policy Forum in principle but regard having 
connections with NACONGO as a useful conduit to obtain information on 
what is happening with regard to NGOs within the ambit of the state. Thus, 
they maintain cordial relations with NACONGO, as doing so may provide 
them with access to information useful in contesting the war of position. 
 
This perceived clash between the work of NACONGO and the Policy Forum 
illustrates the weakness of the de Tocquevillian vision of civil society being 
promulgated by the donors in post-liberalization Tanzania. Rather than seeing 
an open and tolerant debate involving NACONGO and Policy Forum, aimed 
at fostering a constructive relationship between the key elements of the 
integral state, respondents regarded the two organizations as representing 
opposite sides in the war of position involving the state and civil society. 
NACONGO is regarded overwhelmingly as representing the interests of the 
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state in restricting the power of NGOs to work autonomously. NGO officials 
interviewed pointed out that they had not been asked to take part in the 
formation of NACONGO. Thus, they regarded the organization as being an 
unwarranted external imposition on their work, which had been created in an 
undemocratic way. In addition, all the interviewees felt uneasy about relations 
with NACONGO, as they believed it had overseen the creation of an overly 
restrictive NGO Act in 2002. This view was unanimous among interviewees, 
despite the fact that pressure from NGOs forced key amendments to the 2002 
NGO Act, notably having the need for annual registration deleted, which was 
inhibiting the founding and growth of associations. For the interviewees, 
NACONGO is there to ensure an unwarranted degree of oversight of their 
work and to make sure their activities remain largely apolitical. Their views, 
in this regard, show that the donors de Tocquevillian vision of state-civil 
society relations, based on openness, tolerance and trust, is far from reality in 
post-liberalization Tanzania. In fact, the polarized way in which interviewees 
perceived the positions of, and relationship between, NACONGO and the 
Policy Forum shows that a war of position is being fought. The majority of 
interviewees cited the history of coercive control by the Registrar of Societies 
over NGOs (see chapter 3 and section 4.4 in this chapter) and the Registrar of 
Trade Unions over labour organizations (see chapter 5) as a significant cause 
of their misgivings about the position of NACONGO. Thus, most interviewees 
contended that the state was fighting to maintain hegemony in post-
liberalization Tanzania in the face of rising civil society power, by using 
coercive legal-bureaucratic elements of the integral state in the form of an 
NGO policy, new legislation concerning NGOs and, above all the creation of 
NACONGO, as a supervisory body. 
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 A further issue raised by interviewees concerning legitimacy was how far the 
minority of well funded and powerful NGOs are able to represent effectively 
the views of small NGOs outside urban centres. Part of the remit of the Policy 
Forum is the gathering and presenting the views of grassroots organizations 
nationwide.  When interviewed, a Policy Forum official outlined how hard it 
was for them to represent the views of grassroots organizations. The large 
geographical size of Tanzania (see figure and map at the end of chapter 1) 
makes it impossible for Policy Forum staff to visit many NGOs. Other forms 
of contact are also difficult, as the vast majority of small NGOs outside urban 
centres have no websites and do not use email regularly, if at all. The Policy 
Forum also reported difficulties in making telephone contact with such 
organizations. There is thus a problem with the argument that an umbrella 
organization is able to put forward the views of members effectively, so that a 
wide range of opinions from civil society groups in Tanzania are represented 
in national policy-making processes. This donor-driven perspective fails to 
take into account how demographic factors and the lack of communications 
infrastructure in the country hinder civil society participation in national 
policy-making processes. 
 
A final major concern, regarding legitimacy, for NGO officials when 
interviewed was the use of the growing amount of data on poverty reduction. 
One interviewee summed up the general perspective in stating that ‘the 
information is geared to donors and written in a way only they can 
understand.’ The data was presented in ways that are intelligible to the 
intended beneficiaries, according to all respondents.  The technical approach 
to poverty reduction, which is fundamental to all national policy instruments 
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in post-liberalization Tanzania (see chapter 3), thus, hinders the understanding 
of issues on the part of the most marginalized and vulnerable groups in the 
country. By extension, it stops them from participating in an informed way. 
This lack of capacity on the part of intended beneficiaries, leads to their 
inability to participate meaningfully in national policy-making processes, 
which, therefore, lack legitimacy, according to almost every NGO official 
interviewed. Furthermore, interviews revealed that NGO officials regard the 
donors and the government as having little interest in making the conceptual 
framework and the data used in national policy-making processes intelligible 
to the most vulnerable groups in Tanzania. Instead they were regarded as 
having mainly technical concerns, centred around the effective collection, 
storage and presentation of data on poverty alleviation. Interviewees also 
argued that the state refused to discuss neo-liberal macroeconomic 
fundamentals with NGOs. Thus, even for the minority of individuals who 
could understand the technicalities relating to data collection and presentation, 
there was little room for meaningful debate around statistics on different 
aspects of poverty in Tanzania. Overall, interviewees were concerned that 
intended beneficiaries had little chance of participating meaningfully in 
national policy-making processes. Thus, the interviews revealed that mass 
participation on the part of Tanzanian citizens, and by extension ownership of 
national policy-making processes, were largely absent. 96 
 
Capacity Issues 
Although an overall vision and strategy on the part of NGOs had not been 
formed, poverty alleviation was identified as the central issue concerning their 
                                                           
96
  See chapter 6 for an analysis of the concept of ownership in the context of the Tanzanian PRSP process. 
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work by the majority of NGO officials interviewed, in line with the donor 
discourse. Work in this area often focused on awareness-raising campaigns, 
which take place under various names, (Civic Education in the case of the 
Policy Forum and YPC and Civic Awareness with regard to PACT, for 
example). However, a small minority of organizations, notably TGNP and 
Hakielimu, have attempted to formulate a more fundamental challenge to the 
donor-driven focus on poverty alleviation.   
 
The lack of both financial and technical capacity, hampering the finding of 
effective ways to reduce poverty, were significant themes running through the 
interviews. Funding was a concern for many NGOs, with lack of financial 
capacity regarded as a major impediment to meaningful participation in 
national policy-making processes. Moreover, the need for NGOs to get access 
to relevant information and data that would inform their arguments was also 
regarded as important.  Thus, both financial and technical capacity building 
for NGOs were significant issues for interviewees and the perceived lack of 
detailed attention to these issues on the part of donors was also raised as a 
matter of concern. For example, when interviewed, a TGNP official outlined 
how she had been approached by a representative from one of the donors 
involved in national policy-making processes who wanted to provide help in 
‘capacity building.’ The TGNP official replied by asking the representative to 
give an assessment of TGNP’s current ‘capacity.’ When the representative was 
unable to do so, the TGNP official asked why they wanted to do ‘capacity 
building’ work when they did not know the current capacity of TGNP, to 
which the answer was silence. 
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Despite the confrontations with the state in post-liberalization Tanzania 
experienced by Hakielimu and YPC, some NGOs saw their role in de 
Tocquevillian terms, as an equal partnership with the donors and the state. 
Respondents from these organizations rejected the argument that they were 
likely to be aggressively confronted or co-opted by the state, if they 
challenged its hegemony. These NGOs were principally from the small 
number close to the government and the donors.  Interviewees from these 
well-resourced organizations discussed national policy-making processes 
primarily in terms of how to gather and assess data efficiently. They also 
argued that it is important for NGOs to work as partners of the government on 
all aspects of national policy-making processes. Therefore, a minority of 
NGOs in post-liberalization Tanzania have accepted the premise that state can 
accommodate the views of civil society and encompass a universal form of 
hegemony, which represents the national interest. The views of interviewees 
from these organizations were not shared by all NGOs officials. However, the 
majority of respondents have internalized the donor discourse in post-
liberalization Tanzania, in regarding their role vis-à-vis the state as that of 
watchdog combined with partner. They saw no contradictions between these 
two positions. This perspective can be juxtaposed with the criticisms of 
NACONGO, the NGO Act of 2002 and the new NGO Policy by the majority 
of the interviewees, which showed contradictory tendencies in the views of 
respondents. That is, while these legal-bureaucratic measures were seen as an 
attempt to capture the terms and conditions by which civil society participates 
in national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania, 
interviewees, nevertheless, believed that ‘partnership’ with the state was 
possible. Such a view is clearly beneficial to the state in maintaining 
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hegemony in post-liberalization Tanzania. 
 
Thus, there is an uncritical assumption on the part of officials interviewed that 
NGOs can, pace de Tocqueville, be both watchdogs and partners in the 
creation of national policy instruments. Resolving the conflicts that inevitably 
arise from the co-existence of these two roles in the war of position is not 
debated in any thoroughgoing way among NGOs. This was a reason for the 
frustration of an interviewee from TANGO, who had not been able to 
engender such a discussion among NGOs taking part in national-policy 
making processes. 97 Most interviewees argued that the ‘new’ NGO sector 
‘needs time’ to build up its constituencies and to set out a clear vision and 
strategy, while admitting that their organizations had not made substantial 
progress in either of these areas. However, a minority of NGOs have 
attempted to develop counter-hegemonic discourses. An example in this 
regard is the ‘Open Sheraton’ meetings run weekly by the Tanzania Gender 
Networking Programme (TGNP). 
 
NGO Counter-hegemonic Discourses 
 
Case Study One – The ‘Open Sheraton’ Meetings 
The ‘Open Sheraton’ Meetings are organized by TGNP and held weekly 
throughout the year in the open air outside the office of the organization in 
Mabibo, a working class area of Dar es Salaam.  The term ‘Open Sheraton’ is 
a mocking reference to the fact that the donors and many FONGOs in 
Tanzania always hold conferences and other meetings in five star hotels. The 
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 See the Key NGO Relationships section. 
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meetings are held to identify the issues that most affect the lives of members 
of the public and from there to generate activism to bring about changes.  
Through these meetings TGNP have tried to involve poor and marginalized 
individuals and groups in national policy-making processes by awareness-
raising and trying to give them a voice. It is important to TGNP how much 
national policy-making processes allow space for the voices of the people and 
how the stated needs of the people are met by the ‘owners’ of the process.  
 
The meetings are based on the principle of inclusivity. Facilities and support 
are available for the disabled. Moreover, as the meetings are held in Swahili, 
the facilitator always asks at the start if anyone present is not fluent in the 
language. If that is the case, translators are assigned to such people and they 
are encouraged to contribute. Meetings last for several hours and attendance is 
on average two to three hundred.  People are invited to the meetings by fly 
posting and word of mouth. This contrasts with the format of online 
invitations used by donors and FONGOs, which exclude the many people who 
are technologically disconnected (see section 5.4).  The sensitivity of state-
civil society relations can be judged by the dispute over the provision of 
refreshments at these meetings. One free soda per person is given out at each 
meeting, which has led to criticism from the government that participants are 
being induced to attend. The meetings have been running for ten years and 
TGNP has published the results of some of the themes (see, for example, 
Mbilinyi et al (eds), 2003). People have also taken ideas raised at the meetings 
and put them into theatre and other performances.   
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Concerning the organization, chairs are arranged in banks on three sides with 
the fourth left for the facilitator, who stands next to a whiteboard. The 
facilitator engages with people as they arrive, asking questions and starting 
small discussions. A presenter, who has been invited by TGNP to give a talk 
on a topic, works with the facilitator. The meetings have drawn criticism from 
the government for fomenting dissent amongst people. World Bank officials in 
Dar es Salaam have been invited to attend but declined on the grounds that 
Mabibo is not a safe area. Topics on economic, political and social themes are 
debated at meetings, such as participating in the democratic process, making 
politicians accountable to their constituents, the role of the media in society, 
housing issues, the provision of water and other utilities and problems with 
transport.  
 
With a view to avoiding compartmentalized thinking, topics discussed at 
meetings are linked; participating in the political process and the role of the 
media, for example. A stress is put on the use of the philosophy of praxis, 
whereby reflection and debate on issues are followed up by actions, which in 
turn leads to further consideration of the outcomes, which can heighten 
people’s consciousness of their social position within the sphere of civil 
society (Gramsci, 2011b).  Volunteers try out the strategies (how best to make 
candidates respond effectively to questions from the public at campaign 
meetings, for example) and report back on whether they worked. Following 
reflections on activism, tasks are set out on the whiteboard for particular 
individuals to undertake during the week. The fact that the government has 
challenged their legitimacy on the grounds that one free drink is provided to 
participants per meeting gives an indication that some degree of success has 
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been achieved in engendering counter-hegemonic discourses. These meetings 
have led to grassroots campaigns relating to, inter alia, accountability of 
public servants to citizens, education provision, infrastructure improvements, 
gender issues and the role of the media. However, despite the effective use of 
praxis to refine objectives and actions, such campaigns have not generated a 
coherent and cohesive challenge to state hegemony. Numbers involved in the 
grassroots campaigns are small and consequently the counter-hegemonic 
discourses generated through the Open Sheraton meetings provide little 
systematic challenge to state power. 
 
Key NGO Relationships 
It is clear from the interviewees that the most important relationship for NGOs 
is with the government, as it has the power to circumscribe, and even 
eliminate, their work, followed by the donors, as they provide funding and 
support. Relationships with other NGOs, civil society organizations and 
intended beneficiaries were considered of lesser importance by the 
interviewees. Overall, the focus of Tanzanian NGOs involved in national 
policy-making processes is on upward accountability to the government and 
the donors. 
 
National policy-making processes are regarded by all interviewees as top-
down and driven by donors and the government. The current development 
discourse buzzwords of ‘partnership’, ‘ownership’ and ‘participation’ were 
regarded as being confined largely to rhetoric by all the interviewees. 
However, it was also recognized that the stress on these concepts had opened 
up new possibilities in the war of position between civil society and the state. 
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Interviewees overwhelmingly believed that new policy spaces for NGOs had 
been created through the donor-driven stress on participation, ownership and 
partnership. Nevertheless, NGOs had not considered how to contest these new 
spaces in any detailed and strategic way, with two exceptions.  
 
First, an interviewee at TANGO outlined how his organization was forming a 
new strategy as a result of NGO participation in national policy-making 
processes, based explicitly on narrowing its focus to an analysis of two ‘key 
questions’: 
 
1. What type of space is the government allowing NGOs? 
2. How is the government encouraging NGOs to move into that space?  
 
The interviewee had a high level of formal education and was well aware of 
conceptual issues concerning the role of NGOs as agents of development, as 
well as the practical problems involved in forming effective working 
relationships with the state and donor agencies. He was particularly concerned 
about the lack of strategic planning capacity and overall vision of the NGO 
sector in the light of an agenda on the part of donor agencies to make NGOs 
the standard bearers of a Tanzanian civil society based on a consensual, 
pluralist perspective. Second, an interviewee at Hakielimu outlined how the 
organization had analysed strategically ways of contesting the new policy 
space created by participation in national policy-making processes. He felt 
that civil society was contesting issues on terms dictated by the donors and 
needed to find innovative ways of challenging state hegemony in post-
liberalization Tanzania. This required new ways of thinking and needed to be 
based on thoroughgoing independent research, which the NGO was 
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prioritizing. As with the respondent at TANGO, the interviewee at Hakielimu 
had an understanding of overarching conceptual debates regarding the role of 
NGOs as agents of development and was acutely aware of the problems 
involved in forming effective working relationships with the state in Tanzania, 
as Hakielimu was at that time engaged in a serious dispute with the 
government. 98  These two interviewees were committed to the cause of NGOs 
and well-read in the areas of development theory and practice. Their high 
levels of commitment and knowledge of development issues were clearly 
significant factors in stimulating a move to formulate overall strategies 
regarding the contestation of policy space. However, neither had been able to 
engender a concerted counter-hegemonic vision at the institutional level and 
both felt that this was hard to accomplish, since their organizations 
concentrated primarily on operational practicalities. For this reason, as well as 
the history of subjugation of civil society by the state in Tanzania, both 
interviewees doubted the ability of Tanzanian NGOs to provide substantive 
counter-hegemonic discourses in the short to medium term. 
 
NGO - State Relations in Tanzania 
The current relationship between NGOs and the state is substantively 
influenced by the history of the war of position between the state and 
opposing political forces, waged though civil society in Tanzania (see chapter 
3). This has resulted in the government taking a top-down attitude to NGOs in 
the post-liberalization period, rather than regarding them as ‘partners’, in line 
with the donors’ de-Tocquevillian vision of state-civil society relations in 
Tanzania. This can be seen most clearly in the way the state confronts NGOs 
                                                           
98
  See case study two: The Clash between Hakielimu and the State. 
 163 
 
which are critical of its policies. For almost every interviewee these conflicts 
were incontrovertible proof that the government is not prepared to tolerate 
substantive criticisms of its policies and thus no ‘partnership’ relationship 
between NGOs and the state exists, despite donor-driven efforts to create this 
through national policy-making processes.  
 
The dispute between the government and leading education-sector NGO, 
Hakielimu was raised by every interviewee as a matter of concern. 99  Many 
interviewees also put forward the fact that other NGOs apart from Hakielimu 
have clashed with the government, notably Youth Partnership Countrywide 
(YPC) (which is also examined as a case study), the Lawyers’ Environmental 
Action Team (LEAT) and the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC).  As a 
result, a number of NGOs in the post-liberalization period have formed 
defensive survival strategies in the war of position with the state. These 
include widening the constituency and/or support base, bringing on board 
powerful people, who the government may be reluctant to confront, such as 
high-ranking members of the clergy, and using the media, particularly non-
Tanzanian outlets, to ‘shout very loudly’ if they are threatened. Moreover, a 
few NGOs had addressed these issues by engaging in publicity campaigns and 
increasing the number of regions in which they were active in order to widen 
their constituencies and support bases. The Legal and Human Rights Centre 
(LHRC), for example, has increased its work in remote rural areas and 
provides free clinics for poor and marginalized groups, advising them on their 
legal and human rights, as well as assisting them with particular cases.  
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Furthermore, the LHRC has drawn up a list of important and influential 
people it aims to recruit in honorary and/or senior advisory roles if the attitude 
of the government towards civil society organizations becomes more hostile. 
Those on the list include senior figures from the clergy and District 
Commissioners. All the figures on the list have good offices with some senior 
government officials and could, therefore, use patronage to defend LHRC 
against attacks and/or restrictions on its work.  Thus, the LHRC is combining 
top-down and bottom-up approaches in its war of position with the state.  
Many interviewees were, however, concerned about using the media, pointing 
to cases in the post-liberalization period where newspapers had been closed 
down temporarily by the government after publishing material deemed 
‘inappropriate’ and to a journalist who was jailed for one year after writing an 
article about hunger in the Songea region, which annoyed government 
officials. A number of interviewees also felt that using foreign media to 
highlight their causes was risky, as it left them open to charges of being 
unpatriotic and forming alliances with donors and other outsiders in the 
pursuit of money and status.  Indeed, these charges were levelled at Hakielimu 
in its clash with the Tanzanian government.  
 
Overall, the interviews revealed that the strategies used by Tanzanian NGOs in 
their war of position with the state are defensive and used primarily to ensure 
the survival of organizations at an individual level. This overriding concern 
with the level of the individual organization means that there is little chance of 
a historic bloc of disparate forms of civil society forming in Tanzania in the 
short term, which could gain the consent of significant strata of the population 
and systematically challenge neo-liberal hegemony. 
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Case Study Two - The Clash between Hakielimu and the State 
The government threatened to de-register Hakielimu following its criticism in 
2005 of the Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP). Under section 17 
of the Societies Ordinance (URT, 1954), an organization must cease all 
activities immediately upon receiving notice from the Registrar that its 
registration has been cancelled. Hakielimu is well-financed, mainly by 
Western donors. Through its strong funding base the organization is able to 
employ highly-qualified staff, who are able to do independent research and 
produce publications with high production values (See, for example 
Hakielimu, 2005b). It is also able to run a well-equipped office and has 
modern motor vehicles at its disposal. In short, it has the trappings, which, as 
outlined in the chapter 3, are seen by critics of the ‘new’ NGOs in Africa as 
the main reason people want to work in the sector. 
The state used various arguments against Hakielimu in its war of position. It 
claimed that Hakielimu’s analysis of PEDP (Hakielimu, 2005b) was biased; 
overstating criticisms of education policy and underplaying its successes. It 
also argued that Hakielimu was dominated by an individual and therefore an 
undemocratic ‘one-man show.’  It further contended that Hakielimu acted 
primarily in the interests of its Western funders, that it aimed mainly for self-
publicity, since its television advertisements featured schoolchildren wearing 
Hakielimu t-shirts and shouting ‘Hakielimu’, and that it misrepresented 
problems in schools by showing a spelling mistake on a blackboard on the 
front cover of one of its publications that is not typical of Tanzanian primary 
schoolchildren in general but one that occurs largely amongst pupils in a part 
of the country where the dialect makes it hard for them to distinguish ‘r’ from 
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’l’.  100 According to a minister, the government ban was for ‘disparaging the 
image and ridiculing the education ministry, education officers and teachers’ 
(Yunus, 2005). Another government officer involved stated that the ban was 
because Hakielimu focused on shortcomings in the education sector and 
ignored recorded achievements (Lipili, 2005). Hakielimu counter-argued that 
it had been largely positive about PEDP in its literature and had been 
constructive in identifying certain areas where improvements could be made. 
Hakielimu also claimed to have self-censored its report in an attempt to avoid 
being overly critical of the government. The debate was prominent in the 
media, occupying the front page of many national newspapers for some time 
and strong views on both sides were expressed in letters and articles in the 
inside pages. The focus of the debate ranged from the legalistic (whether the 
law used to ban Hakielimu from working in educational institutions actually 
remains in existence) to a wider analysis of the appropriate roles for the state 
and NGOs. 
 
Discourse analysis of the PEDP Report (Hakielimu, 2005b) shows the 
sensitive nature of state-civil society relations in Tanzania.  The report is based 
largely on an examination of government documents relating to the status of 
PEDP, which has four main components; enrolment expansion, quality 
improvement, capacity building and strengthening institutional arrangements. 
The report starts by highlighting general issues common to social science 
research in most circumstances, such as ‘inconsistency of data’ (Hakielimu, 
2005b: 2). In the report’s specific ‘conclusions’ section, the first paragraph of 
seven lines summarizes the successes, citing six particular aspects that are ‘all 
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clear achievements of PEDP’ (Hakielimu, 2005b: 18). The following two 
paragraphs, comprising ten full lines in total, set out the need for more 
classrooms, more teachers and more textbooks, as well as stressing that the 
quality of education should be improved. Concerning proposed ways forward, 
it is stated that ‘distressingly, many issues raised and recommendations made 
in the [government] reviews appear to be neglected’ (Hakielimu, 2005b: 18). 
The report concludes by outlining seven action points, which need to be 
prioritized if PEDP is to fully achieve its goals.  
 
Polarization occurred in the conflict with, on the one hand, the President 
supporting the Minister of Education’s attacks on Hakielimu, whilst on the 
other, most of the leading NGO sector and the main Western donors coming 
together to defend the organization.  That civil society participation in national 
policy-making processes is donor-driven can be seen from the discussion 
amongst multilateral and bilateral donors as to what line to take in the dispute. 
Some of the donors favoured writing to the government in support of 
Hakielimu but this was rejected on the grounds that it would be likely to 
produce a backlash against the organization and the wider NGO community. 
The Acting World Bank Country Director was ‘dismayed by the ban’ and 
argued that what ‘has happened should not be happening at all in this country 
right now, where democracy and accountability is taking root’ (Lipili, 2005).  
 
Despite such support for Hakielimu, the government sent a circular to every 
educational institution in the country telling them not to have any dealings 
with the NGO and to take down any materials from them displayed on their 
walls. Experienced figures from the Tanzanian NGO sector interviewed as part 
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of this research were worried about the possible outcome, both for Hakielimu 
and for the future of NGOs in general in the country. They pointed out that the 
government’s dispute with Hakielimu was not the first such occurrence during 
the post-liberalization period. Baraza La Wanawake (BAWATA)/National 
Women’s Council was de-registered in 1997, after the government accused the 
organization of operating as a political party. The dispute centred on 
government claims that BAWATA was being ‘too political’ and challenging 
the work done by its own women’s wing. The government’s action against 
BAWATA sent ‘a message to all NGOs that they potentially can be 
deregistered at any time if they do not support the government positions’ 
(Nahala, 1997: 4).  
 
Case Study Three - The Clash between the National Youth Council and  
      the State 
Another NGO, which was deregistered by the government, now operates 
under the name of Youth Partnership Countrywide (YPC), formerly the 
National Youth Council (NYC).  The NYC was threatened with closure by the 
government several times, on the grounds that its activities were ‘too political’ 
(pace the Baraza La Wanawake case) and challenged the work done by the 
ruling party’s own youth wing.  This is an example of the state’s move to de-
politicize civil society in post-liberalization Tanzania in order to negate 
challenges to its hegemony. The state presents legislation and policies, as well 
as the work of NACONGO, as being effective technical measures, which 
represent the common interests of all citizens. Contestation of this legislation 
and these policies by groups such as BAWATA and the NYC are then attacked 
as going against the national interest. The activities of the NYC led to 
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confrontations with the police at their conferences in Zanzibar and Dar es 
Salaam, leading to both being brought to a premature end.  The breaking up of 
the Zanzibar conference in 2001 by the police was particularly sensitive, since 
there was an international presence. The dispute between the government and 
the NYC came to a head at the 2002 NYC Annual Conference in Mwanza on 
the ‘Role of Youth in Democracy Building’, which was attended by around 
1,000 people.  The government considered the agenda of the Conference to be 
‘threatening’ and afterwards deregistered the NYC for ‘failing to submit 
proper accounts.’ The deep level of concern on the part of the government 
about counter-hegemonic discourses from civil society can be seen through 
events surrounding the Mwanza Conference. Five members of the NYC’s 
organising committee had booked a bus to take themselves and other delegates 
from Dar es Salaam to Mwanza but, on going to catch the vehicle, were told 
that it was no longer available. Moreover, food ordered for the conference was 
not delivered and management at the University of Mwanza, where 
conference delegates were staying, refused to let delegates cook their own 
food in the canteen. It later transpired that the food supplier had been told not 
to support the conference delegates by providing them with food.  
 
The fact that the state is able to use catchall phrases to describe the work of 
NGOs such as the National Youth Council (as well as Baraka la Wanawake) as 
‘too political’ and ‘threatening,’ without providing further detailed evidence, 
shows how sensitive it is to perceived challenges to its hegemony in post-
liberalization Tanzania. These cases demonstrate that the idea of partnership 
between the state and NGOs (driven by the de Tocquevillian notion of civil 
society on the part of donors) has no basis in reality and is part of an attempt 
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to map idealized Western ideologies, practices and structures onto Tanzania 
with no attempt to understand and accommodate previous periods of political 
economy in the country. 
 
NGO -World Bank Relations in Tanzania 
Many of the larger NGOs in Tanzania are critical of the World Bank, which is 
aware of this, and has made it a priority to build better relations with civil 
society in the post-liberalization period. 101 To this end, the World Bank ran a 
series of meetings on key aspects of its work in Tanzania, aimed at ‘opening a 
development dialogue with the press and CSOs.’ The meetings (named Coffee 
Morning Discussions) were held at the World Bank’s Dar es Salaam office. 
The venue was chosen partly as a way of familiarizing Tanzanian citizens with 
the building and thus breaking down perceptions that the organization is 
faceless and remote. For the Country Director, it is important that Tanzanians 
recognize that ‘the World Bank is not one individual, one entity or one voice.’ 
102
  
 
Case Study Four – NGOs and the World Bank’s Coffee Morning  
  Discussions 
The Communications Team at the World Bank decided on the theme for the 
Coffee Morning Discussions, although the state had some input. The topics for 
the initial series, reflecting ‘priority concerns’ for Tanzania, were economic 
growth, the marine environment, education and rural development linked to 
the Tanzania Social Action Fund. 
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  Source: Presentation by World Bank Country Director, 21 September, 2005. 
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The session on education provides an example of how the meetings are 
structured and the way participation takes place. The education session was 
run by a World Bank education specialist, whose presentation centred on 
which levels and types of education should form the focus of policy, how 
education can help to alleviate poverty and how it can be used to increase 
female empowerment and well-being. In terms of achieving the World Bank’s 
objective of breaking down barriers with civil society, the meeting failed 
completely. First, notice of the meeting was sent out electronically, so many 
small organizations, without computers, received no invitation. Second, the 
meeting was held at 9.00 in the morning on a weekday, which meant that 
many of the staff at small CSOs would not have been able to afford to take 
time off to attend even if they had known about it and were interested in the 
issues being discussed. Most of those attending were from large and well-
funded NGOs based in Dar es Salaam and a lively debate ensued. However, it 
was a discussion in English between representatives of the self-referential and 
self-perpetuating development community. The narrow civil society base in 
attendance was illustrated by a point made from the floor, expressing disquiet 
concerning the fact that representatives of the Tanzania Teacher’s Union 
(TTU), the largest trade union in the country, had not been invited to a 
meeting on education. World Bank officials could not provide reasons why the 
TTU had not been invited, providing another indication that trade unions have 
been excluded from civil society in post-liberalization Tanzania. 
 
The essence of the presentation was (in line with the World Bank’s stress on 
human capital theory, outlined in chapter 1) that major changes are needed in 
the education sector in Tanzania. First, greater provision of technical and 
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vocational education is required, as ‘there are currently too many philosophy 
and history graduates.’ Second, too much of the education budget is spent on 
funding Masters and PhD students, whose subjects are ‘out of line with 
Tanzania’s education needs.’ This led to a discussant asking whether the World 
Bank wanted Tanzania to have less people with Masters and PhDs in order to 
ensure that the country has to continue to rely on expensive Western 
consultants to tell us how to run our education policies. The reply was silence. 
Another discussant then asked whether the World Bank wants Tanzania to 
have less philosophy and history graduates so people from Western countries 
‘can explain our past to us and provide us with frameworks for thinking about 
and organizing our society.’ The reply was again silence. 
 
The presentation on the role of rural development, focusing on women, was 
different in format and tone. It took place on Rural Women’s Day in Tanzania 
(15 October) and was combined with an overview of the Tanzania Social 
Action Fund (TASAF), which meant the structure was unwieldy and the focus 
unclear. TASAF is a part of the donor-driven agenda for development in 
Tanzania and a controversial initiative. The Fund has $120 million available, 
which is provided jointly by the World Bank and the government, to disburse 
on social projects.  The majority of attendees were again officials from well 
resourced NGOs based in Dar es Salaam. However, twelve representatives 
from rural women’s groups were also present to showcase their produce. The 
PowerPoint presentation was made in English and translated into Swahili, as 
the representatives of rural women’s groups had little command of the former 
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language. 103  In contrast to the presentation on education, questions and 
debate did not flow naturally from the floor. The disjointed nature of the 
presentation and its tortuous progress (as there had to be continual stoppages 
for translations) dampened enthusiasm. Moreover, the representatives from 
rural women’s groups were ill at ease in the environs of the World Bank 
meeting room, and stood uncomfortably around the back walls with their fruit, 
vegetables, textiles and chickens in cages. A discussant questioned the value 
of the meeting, on the grounds that the poor only have labour as an asset and 
are thus too busy to attend. The presenter replied by stating that TASAF does 
provide jobs for the ‘very poor’ by creating public works projects and offering 
employment on these schemes at wages, which are 10-20% below the 
(unspecified) market rate. This attracts only the most impoverished people, as 
others are not willing to work for such a low wage.  Thus, according to the 
presenter, it is the poorest that benefit from TASAF. 
 
Whatever the wider aims of the meeting, the representatives of the rural 
women’s groups were objectified. They were treated as ‘objects’ who had been 
identified by development professionals as ‘poor’ people worthy of assistance, 
rather than ‘subjects’ who have nuanced understanding of their positions, 
which they can explain in their own time and way. None of the representatives 
from the rural women’s groups addressed the meeting. The overriding concern 
of the meeting was to set out the benefits of the TASAF and link it to the 
virtues of wider aspects of the neo-liberal and good governance agendas in the 
country; individual enterprise, partnership and participation. The 
                                                           
103
  See Blommaert (2005) for a discussion of the status of Swahili and English in Tanzania in relation to 
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representatives from rural women’s groups had been brought to the meeting to 
provide tangible evidence that the ‘poor’ benefit from TASAF. However, their 
agency was subsumed within the structural requirements of the World Bank, 
concerning the format and agenda of the meeting, as well as the mode of 
participation. None of the women attending were able to make points about 
the scheme or any other aspect of their lives. 
 
The extent to which the World Bank is concerned with controlling 
development processes in Tanzania is shown by the fact that the External 
Affairs Department (EAD) in Washington DC monitors the ‘Coffee Morning 
Discussions.’ All feedback on the meetings is tracked by a team at the 
Tanzania Country Office, which then informs the EAD.  Any negative 
coverage of the coffee mornings results in the World Bank calling those 
responsible for a ‘discussion.’ From these contacts the World Bank often finds 
the negative coverage was a result of the issues ‘not being understood 
properly’ by the media in question. 104 This view gives the lie to the stated aim 
of the donors to accept wider debates on development issues, including policy 
heterodoxy, as part of the move to a Post-Washington ‘Consensus’.  
 
4.6 Summary 
The rise to prominence of NGOs is linked to macroeconomic and political 
processes in Tanzania going back to the 1980s when donors pressured the 
country to roll back the state and bring in a market driven model. The ensuing 
democratic deficit in the 1990s led to NGOs being fostered by major donors as 
service-providing gap fillers and evidence of the existence of a vibrant 
                                                           
104
  Source: Interview with World Bank official, 7 October, 2005 
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associational life, as part of the new policy agenda. It also led to donors 
influencing the Tanzanian government to include NGOs in national policy-
making processes as the vanguard of civil society.  The donors prioritize the 
participation of NGOs in national policy-making processes, as they fit in with 
their own understandings of, and visions for, civil society. Important elements 
of associational life have been left out of national policy-making processes. 
Tanzanian associational groups which have histories of participation in the 
sphere of civil society, such as trade unions, burial societies, sports clubs, 
credit associations, tribal and clan-based organizations, have been 
marginalized. The adoption of a Gramscian perspective provides insights into 
the importance of civil society in Tanzania as a public room where counter-
hegemonic views are being put forward by a small number of NGOs, such as 
TGNP. Through the use of a Gramscian perspective in the case of Tanzania it 
is possible to gain insights into how NGOs are applying ideologies and 
strategies, which both uphold and confront the prevailing order. Thus, 
hegemony is being formed in a fluid way as part of a continuous war of 
position involving the state and both supportive and oppositional civil society 
groups. Current counter-hegemonic discourses within the NGO sector could 
gain momentum and provide a greater challenge to the dominant neo-liberal 
discourse than is currently the case and new ideologies and strategies may 
emerge. These possibilities can be encompassed within a Gramscian 
framework, but not the liberal de Tocquevillian view (rooted in a narrow and 
consensual vision of the relationship between state and civil society) whereby 
a win-win scenario is the pre-determined outcome of participation in debates 
on national policies. However, at present counter-hegemonic discourses from 
NGOs are very limited, as organizations are constrained by the state’s use of 
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legal-bureaucratic means and concentrate on the practical provision of 
services, rather than focusing on wider strategies and visions for the sector.  
 
The small number of NGOs which play a leading part in national policy-
making processes have the power, through external donor support, to make the 
state engage with their arguments. However, the views of these organizations 
do not systematically question and counter state hegemony in post-
liberalization Tanzania for several reasons. First, macroeconomic policies are 
excluded from discussions taking place within the format of national policy 
instruments. As a result, NGO work tends to focus on the social sphere of 
development, notably health and education issues. Second, NGOs are fearful 
of the state’s reaction to criticism of its policies, particularly in the light of 
what happened to Baraza la Wanawake, Youth Partnership Countrywide and 
Hakielimu during disputes with the state. Their work, therefore, tends to be 
apolitical. Third, the majority of NGOs taking part in national policy-making 
processes reject the need to engage in a war of position with the state and 
instead frame their role within the conventional liberal discourse on civil 
society, based on free and open debate between NGOs and the state with 
policy outcomes reflecting a partnership between the core elements of the 
integral state. In contrast to NGOs, the labour movement has faced continual 
struggles to have any voice in national policy-making processes. Why trade 
unions, as membership organizations with a history of struggle against 
colonialism and, thus, roots in Tanzanian society, have been marginalized, and 
what this means for national policy-making processes, is examined in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
 Trade Unions in Tanzania 
 
5.1     Introduction 
In this chapter a detailed analytical and empirical examination is made of how 
Tanzanian trade unions have participated in national policy-making processes, 
from the 1930s to the present and the reasons for their relative marginalization 
in the post-liberalization period are evaluated. The assessment of the current 
situation of trade unions in Tanzania is based on fieldwork interviews carried 
out with senior officials in the Tanzanian trade union movement, as well as 
observation and document assessment. First, the theorization of trade unions is 
outlined, focusing on the point that it is unlikely, in the short or medium term, 
that the labour movement in Tanzania will adopt social movement unionism 
and thereby form a historic bloc with other civil society organizations in 
confronting neo-liberal hegemony in post-liberalization Tanzania. This is due 
to the lack of systematic contacts between trade unions and other elements of 
civil society, caused to a significant degree by suspicions on the part of the 
latter that the thinking of the labour movement remains rooted in the pre-
liberalization era, when it was subsumed within the ambit of the state. The 
labour aristocracy debate is then assessed, as it furnishes a framework for 
analysing the validity of arguments that the Tanzanian trade union movement 
is unlikely to form counter-hegemonic discourses because it acts for an elite 
minority of workers in the formal sector, and thus lacks legitimacy as a 
representative of the poor in national policy-making processes. Fieldwork 
findings reveal that in the case of Tanzania the aristocracy thesis is overly 
determinist and cannot account for the heterogeneity of the attitudes and 
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actions of trade unions in the post-liberalization period.   
 
Subsequently, the historical development of trade unionism in Tanzania is 
outlined. As with NGOs (see chapter 4), the main elements of the integral state 
- ideological hegemony supported by coercion - were used to limit spaces 
where policies and ideologies could be contested by trade unions during the 
colonial period and after independence. From 1961 until the early 1990s the 
state dominated the labour movement to the extent that it was virtually 
impossible for trade unions to develop counter-hegemonic discourses. Two 
main weapons were used by the state in this war of position; repressive legal-
bureaucratic measures and the discourse of national liberation, centred on the 
argument that the perceived needs of trade unions had to be subordinated to 
the overarching struggle to overcome the legacies of colonial repression. The 
state vigorously put forward the perspective that the national liberation 
struggle was of much greater importance than the sectional interests of trade 
unions. In the post-liberalization period, trade unions have regained the 
freedom of association that was taken away from them by the state soon after 
independence. However, the state’s exclusion of trade unions from national 
policy-making processes and its continued employment of coercive control by 
legal-bureaucratic measures has pushed the labour movement to the margins 
of civil society in the post-liberalization period. In response, unions have used 
strikes and other forms of industrial action as tactics in the war of position. 
Nevertheless, lack of capacity (financial, technical and institutional) and 
ideological vision on the part of the trade unions has led to the labour 
movement being unable to form a systematic and effective counter-hegemonic 
discourse to that of neo-liberalism, which is driven energetically by key 
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integral state actors in alliance with external donors.  
 
5.2  Theorizing Trade Unions 
Hyman (2001) identifies three main types of trade unionism. 105 First, business 
unionism, focused on trade unions largely accepting the existing relations of 
market power and embracing the discourse of ‘flexible’ working practices and 
‘partnership’ between capital and labour, leading to an emphasis on 
representing the interests of members mainly through collective bargaining. 
Second, revolutionary unionism, which stresses the representation of the 
working class through militant anti-capitalist opposition. Third, some trade 
unions have moved towards social movement unionism (Bezuidenhout, 2002), 
which is a strategy where ‘labour goes beyond the workplace … to form links 
with communities … while also working space through networking place to 
place within the same global corporation’ (Webster, Lambert and 
Bezuidenhout, 2008: 160).   For trade unions in Africa, adopting any of these 
three approaches clearly and consistently is problematic, since an interregnum 
exists in the labour movement marked by disorder, disorientation and 
dislocation, following the wave of economic liberalization which occurred 
across the continent from the late 1980s onwards (Von Holdt, 2003). This 
situation is reflected in contrasting views of the current state of, and 
possibilities for, trade unions. Thomas (1995a, 1995b), Lambert (2002) and 
Baskin (2000) are among those who tend towards pessimism regarding the 
ability of African labour organizations to bring about substantive change in 
industrial relations and the condition of the workers. However, the analyses of 
                                                           
105  Other analysts take a broader approach. Poole (1981) outlines five main schools of thought concerning the 
theorization of trade unions:  First, the ethical or moral school.  Second, the revolutionary approach. Third, 
the conservative position. Fourth, the economic Implications school. Fifth, the political perspective. 
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Kraus (2007a, 2007b), Kester (2007) and Kester and Sidibe (1997) take a 
more positive view in regard to these two key issues.  
 
Thomas (1995b) contends that despite the spread of privatization in Africa and 
consequent dismissals of public sector workers, trade union membership 
remains concentrated in the state sector. Moreover, there has been a decrease 
in earnings and an absence of job creation in Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) in Africa. These factors have ‘destroyed any possibility of the trade 
union movement’s acting as a stable institution in labour-market development 
and transformation’ (Thomas, 1995b: 239). Furthermore, Lambert (2002: 186) 
argues that labour organizations are characterized by organizational decline. 
While some individual unions and federations have attacked the negative 
effects of global neo-liberalism on workers, these efforts lack rigour and have 
not had any ‘significant impact or attract [ed] citizens into their ranks’. For 
Baskin (2000: 54), to be successful a labour movement requires ‘the capacity 
to service its members and promote their interests’ and a more centralized and 
structured collective bargaining environment than currently exists in Africa.  
 
In contrast, Kester (2007: 3) argues that trade unions in Africa are very 
important in campaigning for institutional democracy based on balancing 
ownership with other social concerns and are ‘ideally placed to contribute to 
the democratization of the economy.’  In addition, Kraus (2007a) points out 
that unions in many African countries played key roles in organizing protests 
and strikes during the 1980s and 1990s which were significant in 
overthrowing authoritarian regimes. Through such actions unions also created 
political space, which other CSOs could use to confront monolithic states. 
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These actions have continued in a number of countries as neoliberal policies 
exacerbate existing inequalities. Furthermore, trade unions are the largest 
organizations that represent the working class in Africa. Von Holdt (2003: 
304) argues that in South Africa there has been a move from ‘militant 
resistance of workers excluded both politically and in the workplace, to a new 
form of unionism characterized by participation and engagement with both the 
state and management.’ This has led to contradiction, ambiguity and 
uncertainty in forming strategies, which has weakened solidarity and cohesion 
in the movement. Contrasting pressures brought about by competitive 
globalization and the ongoing attempts at political and economic change by 
Western donors have led to erratic responses by unions, covering ‘quiescence, 
defensive strategies, wildcat militancy, and attempts at proactive engagement 
with reconstruction’ (Von Holdt, 2003: 306). 
  
For Jose (2002: 1), trade unions worldwide have constantly adapted in the face 
of globalization over the past three decades, combining strategies for changing 
labour into non-competing social groups. Trade unions thus ‘occupy a unique 
position as purveyors of social cohesion in all societies’. However, union 
enlargement has been slowed by the upsurge in individual company-unions, 
which ‘represent highly skilled workers effectively but insulate them from a 
sense of collective identity or solidarity amongst workers’ (Jose, 2002: 6). 
Unions have been forced to adapt to the political ramifications of globalization 
by addressing the needs of constituents who they have not traditionally 
represented systematically. The most important of these groups are the 
increasing numbers of casualized labour, women and youth. Globalization is 
forcing trade unions increasingly to compete to represent these (as well as 
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their traditional) constituents, which necessitates changing their modus 
operandi and structures. As this research shows, NGOs have become service-
providing competitors to trade unions in Tanzania. 106 Trade unions also face 
the problem that their traditional platforms for representation increasingly do 
not match the structures of the new investors in developing countries. These 
are often multi-national companies, which prefer to deal only with national or 
international union bodies and ignore the branch and district levels (Kester, 
2007).  
 
The arguments of writers such as Van Holdt (2003) that new forms of 
unionism are emerging in Africa, characterized by constructive engagement 
with the state and management as ‘partners,’ raise important issues. One of 
these is whether trade unions adopting such a position have become 
representatives of a labour aristocracy in the form of a small group of 
relatively well paid formal sector workers who have survived the mass 
dismissals precipitated by SAPs, while the majority of the workforce are poor, 
landless rural labourers or engaged in precarious informal sector activities. 
 
5.3 The Labour Aristocracy Debate 
The term ‘labour aristocracy’ has been interpreted in various ways during 
different time periods. Its origins have been traced by Lapides (1987) to usage 
by William Thompson in 1827 of the term ‘aristocracy of trades,’ based on 
exclusivity. His views influenced Marx and Engels, who employed the phrase 
in writings from 1850 onwards. In 1885, Engels (1999: 321) described a sector 
of the English proletariat as having greatly improved their position since 1848, 
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  See the fieldwork findings section below for details. 
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being on very good terms with their employers and comprising an ‘aristocracy 
among the working class’, who had attained a relatively comfortable position 
that they regarded as permanent. 107 Lenin (1996) developed the theory of the 
labour aristocracy, attributing the emergence of an elite group of workers in 
imperialist countries to the ‘super-profits’ made through exploiting colonies. 
These profits allowed employers to buy off labour leaders with high levels of 
earnings and job security, thus gaining their support for capital and ensuring 
that labour would follow a reformist path. Working class opportunism and the 
labour aristocracy were particularly marked in Great Britain, since the country 
achieved a dominant position in the world market for decades, before being 
challenged by rival powers. For Lenin (ibid: 110) the effects of this monopoly 
were such that a ‘section of the British proletariat becomes bourgeois … [and 
a] section of the proletariat permits itself to be led by men sold to, or at least 
paid by, the bourgeoisie.’ Later versions of the labour aristocracy thesis 
(Elbaum and Seltzer, 2004, for example) focus on the monopolist exploitation 
by multi-national companies in certain economic sectors that allows them to 
make huge profits, some of which are used to provide a small group of 
privileged workers with secure jobs based on high levels of earnings and 
benefits. These workers constitute an aristocracy of labour and their existence 
is dependent on the super-exploitation of workers in competitive sectors of the 
advanced capitalist economies. Designating which criteria should be used to 
ascertain membership of the labour aristocracy is complicated. Hobsbawn 
(1976) outlines six pertinent factors, the most significant of which is the level 
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  In a different interpretation of the origins of the concept, Peace (1975) argues that the colonial authorities 
were the first to use and discuss ‘the labour aristocracy,’ based on a concern that early wage earners in the 
colonies could use their position to force up their earnings by collective actions.  
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of earnings of a worker. 108 Post (2006) also emphasizes the importance of the 
level of earnings in the labour aristocracy thesis, which he summarizes as 
based on the view that well paid workers are more conformist and politically 
conservative than those receiving low levels of remuneration. 
 
A problem in forming a convincing labour aristocracy thesis lies in the tension 
between structure and agency. The labour aristocracy are identified as a high 
stratum of the working class, which can be partly delineated structurally by 
the terms and conditions of their work, centred on their receipt of relatively 
large wages and benefits. However, they are also partly located by their 
attitudes and their reputation with other social classes as ‘respectable’ and 
‘trustworthy’ people. Thus, their ‘structural class position is imbued with 
certain behavioural patterns’ (Parpart, 1982: 1).  These two key elements 
involved in determining which groups can be classed as a labour aristocracy 
inevitably co-exist and interrelate in complex and fluid ways, making 
objective definition difficult. Katz (1976), for example, outlines how white 
miners in South Africa at the turn of the twentieth century can be classed as a 
labour aristocracy partly because of the high wages they earned but also due to 
the fact that they refused to do menial work, were unsympathetic to, and 
discriminated against, unskilled workers, and had ‘notions of gentility which 
were reflected in their lifestyle’ (Katz, 1976: 8). 109  
 
                                                           
108
  The five other factors identified by Hobsbawn (1976) are; first, the regularity of wages paid as well as 
levels of social security. Second, the terms and conditions of employment, including the amount of respect 
afforded the worker by superiors. Third, the way the worker interacts with the social levels both above and 
below. Fourth, the worker’s overall standard of living. Fifth, the prospects for advancement of the worker and 
his/her offspring. 
109
  This example also indicates that race can be a factor in labour aristocracy debates. 
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In Africa the labour aristocracy thesis has been put forward to explain the lack 
of revolutionary consciousness on the part of workers by radical left-wing 
analysts in the main but also by liberals, such as Berg and Butler (1964), who 
argue that economic and political power structures in Africa have been 
centralized by states since independence and are weighted overwhelmingly 
towards capital, making revolutionary action on the part of the working class 
difficult.  The radical perspective draws on Fanon (2001), who regarded 
African wage labourers as lacking the will to take up revolutionary paths, 
though he did recognize the power of trade unions in urban centres to mount 
effective direct actions. 110 Overall, the waged labour force in Africa after 
independence from colonial rule has become ‘the most favoured section of the 
population, and represent the most comfortably off section of the people’ 
(Fanon, 2001: 97).  
 
Arrighi and Saul (1973) produced an influential analysis from the radical 
perspective, premised on their identification of a small class, created under 
colonialism, which stabilized after independence, developing specialized skills 
and relatively strong bargaining power. ‘These workers enjoy incomes three or 
more times higher than those of unskilled labourers and together with the 
elites and sub-elites in bureaucratic employment in the civil service and 
expatriate concerns, constitute what we call the labour aristocracy of tropical 
Africa’ (Arrighi and Saul, 1973: 149). 
 
The labour aristocracy thesis in the African context has been subjected to 
criticism from a number of sources. Jeffries (1975: 275) argues that in Ghana 
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   See section 5.4 for examples of such actions by trade unions in Tanzania during the colonial period. 
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a number of the marginalized urban masses looked to the unionized working 
class as ‘their spokesmen rather than as a purely self-interested labour 
aristocracy.’ Parpart (1982: 16) contends that ‘the labor aristocracy thesis has 
little predictive value for understanding the behaviour of the upper stratum on 
the [Zambian] copperbelt.’ Miners vary their behaviour and tactics according 
to what they perceive to be the best ways to gain advantages in the struggle 
with capital. Peace (1975), argues that the Arrighi-Saul thesis fails to account 
for the way in which incremental earnings to workers in African urban centres 
actively promote closer economic and political ties between the labour force 
and non-wage earners.  For Peace (ibid), wage earners in Nigeria express 
generalized grievances as a consequence of perceived social injustice and have 
not developed sectional interests. Moreover, the Arrighi-Saul model needs to 
pay more attention to both the scale and the methods of exploitation of the 
labour aristocrats used by capitalists in the urban areas. For Peace, the level of 
surplus extraction in Nigeria is so great in these areas that it promotes a 
common identity between wage labourers and the marginalized rural majority, 
rather than distance.  
 
Saul (1975: 308) accepts the thrust of Peace’s points and argues that the 
African working class must not be prematurely labelled and concentration 
must occur on ‘the processes which are at work in specific African settings. 
This means identifying, analytically, the objective conditions under which a 
more conservative or a more radical stance towards the neo-colonial situation 
is likely to be adopted by the working class.' Consequently, it is important to 
study the particular historical development of the trade union movement in 
order to adequately assess the explanatory power of the labour aristocracy 
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thesis in the context of Tanzania. The legitimacy (based on their claims to 
represent labour) and the capacity (to set out ideologies and to organize 
actions) of the Tanzanian trade union movement have been shaped by a long 
process of development under different periods of political economy.  
 
5.4  The Trade Union Movement in Tanzania from the Origins to 
Independence 
Trade unions started to organize in Tanzania in 1931 as a result of unrest 
among African workers reacting to alienation from traditional cultural 
practices, low wages and poor living conditions. 111 Unions were legally 
recognized by the Trade Union Ordinance of 1932, which enshrined the 
principle of freedom of association. The need for effective labour 
organizations to represent workers during the 1930s and 1940s is illustrated by 
Cooper (1996: 326), who points out that ‘wages in East Africa generally made 
it impossible for workers to separate themselves from the rural economy.’ 
Wage labourers needed the hidden subsidy from subsistence in order to be 
able to survive. 
 
Much of the labour unrest in Tanzania in the 1940s and the early 1950s 
centred on the dock industry. A serious dock strike took place in Dar es 
Salaam in 1943 with the state deploying troops. 112 This led to one hundred 
and forty two arrests but also to the setting up of a tribunal, which raised the 
wages of full-time dockers (Coulson, 1985). Further strikes over terms and 
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  Hundreds of workers died in 1930, for example, in the Lupa goldfields, as a result of scurvy (Rodney, 
1972). 
112
  There were precedents. For example, dockers went on strike in Tanga in 1937 over poor terms and 
conditions of employment. 
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conditions towards the end of the 1940s met with a hard-line state response, 
since leaders would not bow to the demands made of them and dockers 
occupied an important strategic position in an export-oriented economy 
(Barker et al 1986: 47).   By 1947, the dock industry was unionized with a 
working class leadership, which initiated a general strike in September 1947. 
While the strike broke down after just over a fortnight in Dar es Salaam it 
continued to spread throughout the country. This led to the formation of a 
labour tribunal, which introduced a pay increase of between forty and fifty per 
cent.  Moreover, channels of communication were set up between 
representative organs of capital and labour primarily to ensure that ‘grievances 
could be dealt with before they reached explosive levels’ (Bienefeld, 1979: 
557). However, another dock strike occurred in 1950, during which the use of 
casual labour precipitated rioting, leading to the deaths of at least two 
people.113  
 
This violence and a more general fear of expanded trade union activity in 
Tanzania led to a shift on the part of the state in its war of position. Legal-
bureaucratic measures (cf. NGOs, examined in chapter 4) were enhanced to 
control the formation of, and the work of, existing trade unions. The Dockers 
Union was first to feel the effects of this change, when it was dissolved by a 
High Court order in 1950 for not conducting itself responsibly. For Iliffe 
(1975: 69) this not only ended the Dockers Union but also ‘a whole period of 
labour history in Tanzania.’ One year later the Trade Union Ordinance was 
enacted, which formalized and regulated the position of labour organizations 
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  The state even used the feared Motorised Unit (MU) of the military ‘against striking workers … during 
the 1950 dockworkers strike’ (Shivji, 1990: 19). 
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in the country. The Ordinance required all trade unions to register with the 
state, thereby facilitating greater knowledge of, and control over, their officials 
and work. However, as is the case in post-liberalization Tanzania, the state was 
influenced by transnational actors, in its struggle with oppositional civil 
society forces. The British government based in London was the most 
influential of these actors. It passed the Development and Welfare Act in 1940, 
requiring all colonies to enact laws enshrining the rights of trade unions, as a 
condition of the provision of economic aid (see chapter 3). The state, 
therefore, had to be seen to be acting in accordance with this directive. Thus, 
while the Trade Union Ordinance was primarily a way for the state to control 
the formation and the remit of labour associations, such organizations were 
able to use the legislation to gain formal status in the civil society sphere. 
Thus, the registration of the African Commercial Employees Association 
(ACEA) in 1953 (see also chapter 3) provided a springboard for the 
foundation of a number of other trade unions.  
 
Challenges to state hegemony were also influenced by transnational actors. A 
visit to Tanganyika by Tom Mboya, the Head of the Kenyan Federation of 
Labour, in 1955, constituted an impetus to the formation of the Tanganyikan 
Federation of Labour (TFL) on 7 October of the same year, at a Dar es Salaam 
conference. Julius Nyerere, the President of TANU, addressed the conference 
and a full time General Secretary, Mr Kawawa was elected. The TFL was 
charged with two main tasks; to organize and place workers in relevant 
affiliate unions and to amalgamate all small craft unions that shared a 
similarity of purpose into larger industrial unions (Kitine, 1976).  The TFL’s 
work during the latter half of the 1950s was largely economistic in nature. 
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However, the organization’s attempts to improve terms and conditions of 
employment met with little success, since power resided with the state and 
capital. One of the main ways in which the state maintained hegemony in the 
face of challenges from the TFL was the direct transference of key features of 
the British model of trade unionism to Tanganyika. This led to the British 
national structure, rules for leaders and the rank-and-file members and 
bargaining methods being imposed on the federation via the Tanganyika 
Department of Labour (Friedland, 1969), which were difficult for trade union 
officials to understand. While these structural measures ensured that senior 
trade union officials struggled to operate effectively on behalf of labour, 
individual actions by workers provided a significant challenge to the interests 
of capital and the state in certain sectors of the economy.  For example, on the 
economically important sisal plantations, ‘absenteeism, strikes, property 
destruction and the organised evasion of taxes’ (Bolton, 1978: 176) showed 
that workers were conscious of being exploited by management. The state 
responded with further legal-bureaucratic measures. For example, it refused to 
let the Tanganyikan Sisal Plantation Workers Union (TSPWU) form on a 
national basis, restricting it to the status of a provincial organization, which 
was inaugurated in March 1956. By April 1958 the union had only three 
representatives on the Central Joint Council, a statutory body covering the 
sisal industry, while twenty-four members were employer controlled (Bolton, 
1978). 
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5.5  National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA)   
The advent of independence on 9 December 1961 led to almost total defeat for 
trade unions in their war of position with the state. 114  TFL leaders pressed the 
state for greater autonomy, which was rejected, leading to a series of strikes 
during 1962. The state reacted by passing a law requiring all trade unions to 
affiliate to the TFL if they wanted to retain legal status, thus facilitating close 
supervision. It also passed legislation making strikes almost impossible 
without the permission of the Ministry of Labour (Mwakyembe, 1986, Shivji, 
1986). The Preventative Detention Act of 1962 also presaged the emasculation 
of the trade union movement. This act allowed unlimited detention at the 
President’s discretion of anyone acting in a manner prejudicial to state 
security. The fact that the first person to be detained under the act was the then 
President of the TFL, Victor Mkello, showed that ‘the government was 
looking for an opportunity to snuff out the trade union movement’ (Kapinga, 
1986: 89). The final incident that led to the state dissolving the TFL was a 
mutiny by soldiers demanding the Africanization of the Officers Corps.  The 
TFL issued a statement in support of improved pay and conditions for the 
rebels, which infuriated the state, and ensured that ‘its fate was sealed’ 
(Rupiya, Lwehabura and Le Roux, 2006: 77). Trade unionists were accused by 
the state of being involved in an attempted coup and over two hundred of them 
subsequently arrested. As well as legal-bureaucratic means in the forms of 
detention and new legislation, the state used dispersal tactics to dissipate the 
power of the trade unions. Some ‘difficult’ trade union leaders were given 
diplomatic posts abroad. Thus, the effective use of a combination of coercive 
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  Ananaba (1979) points out that this was the case in many African countries following independence from 
colonial rule. 
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aspects of the integral state ‘marked the end of trade union autonomy’ in 
Tanzania (Kitindi, 1999: 56).  The formation by the state of the National 
Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA) to replace the TFL occurred in 
February 1964. The state tightly controlled NUTA and prevented the 
organization acting in ways inimical to its interests. Collective Bargaining 
Agreements (CBAs) could only be struck between the government and NUTA, 
and individual trade unions could not even exist as separate legal entities 
outside NUTA. These measures made it almost impossible for trade unions to 
challenge state hegemony. 
 
Rank-and-file union members did little in the face of the emasculation of the 
movement after independence. This was due to a lack of contact between the 
grassroots union membership and the leadership. For Bienefeld (1972: 24), no 
‘better illustration of the isolation of the trade union leadership from their 
members can be found than the bald fact that the arrest of the bulk of the trade 
union leadership brought no response.’ Effective opposition to state control 
and the interests of capital had often been based on the actions of workers at 
individual places of employment. There is continuity between the nature of 
these actions and ones that are occurring in contemporary Tanzania. In 2011, 
the ITUC (2011: 2) reported that ‘workers tend to stage illegal wildcat strikes 
and walkouts.’ Most disputes centred on the particular nature of the work and 
workers’ responses to their situations. Thus, as Iliffe (1975: 119) points out, to 
view the actions of Tanzanian trade unions ‘solely “from the top” is to miss 
the dynamic that powers the movement.’ Bolton (1978: 199) argues that by the 
1950s sisal workers acted in solidarity with one another on particular 
plantations but, despite union efforts to quicken a sense of consciousness in 
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workers, they were not, at the time when NUTA was inaugurated, ‘ready to act 
as a united labour force in opposition to the employer class’ and ‘not yet 
committed to national class action.’ Thus, trade union leaders in Tanzania 
during the 1960s lost the war of position with the state not only through the 
latter’s use of repressive legal-bureaucratic measures, but also because they 
failed to form the basis for a historic bloc of oppositional groups by building a 
close relationship with their own rank-and-file members. They had few 
contacts with the rank-and-file trade unionists and were not responsive to 
members’ needs. In Gramscian terms, trade union leaders were a ‘caste’ of 
reformist bureaucrats, who did not have the interests of the workers at heart 
(Gramsci, 1919). These two issues remain salient with regard to the current 
situation of the labour movement (see below in this section and the fieldwork 
findings section, for details). 
 
The state also used the discourse of national liberation effectively in 
maintaining hegemony in the face of challenges from trade unions after 
independence. TANU operated an effective divide and rule policy in resisting 
trade union pay claims, which stifled the 'revolution of rising expectations' 
(Tumbo, 1969: 30), on the part of workers. They did this by invoking the need 
for self-sacrifice on the part of all civil society organizations, including trade 
unions, in order to achieve true national liberation from the repressive legacies 
of colonialism. It was stressed by the ruling party that the majority of 
employees in the country were poor agricultural workers, who had no 
comparable voice to trade unions to stand up for their interests. For example, 
at the Second Annual Conference of NUTA in 1967, Nyerere argued that 
unionized workers were improving their terms and conditions of employment 
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at the expense of impoverished farmers, which was insupportable (Nyerere, 
1976, Matiko, 1968). Thus, whenever trade unions made substantial claims on 
behalf of their members, the argument that they were egotistical 
representatives of a labour aristocracy was used against them as a powerful 
weapon by the state as part of its war of position. 
 
In practice, NUTA did not represent workers’ interests. The leaders were not 
chosen by the workers and the structures and objectives of the organization 
were defined by the legislature. At plant level NUTA provided for the 
existence of Workers Committees but these were often close to management 
and commanded little respect from the shop floor. Critics (as is the case in 
contemporary Tanzania) accused the state of making deals with foreign capital 
on terms favourable to the investors and their own officials and argued that 
NUTA’s primary roles were to 'discipline and control workers... [and to] serve 
the interests of the ruling class' (Rwechungura, 1976: 51).  NUTA was forced 
continually to confront the paradox of the government’s efforts to ‘serve both 
the interests of its population and those of foreign capital’ (Bienefeld, 1977: 
33). Thus, under NUTA, the state used trade unions to discipline the working 
class and in return granted leaders at the centre tangible benefits in the form of 
regular salaries, reasonably well-equipped offices and status. Consequently, 
working class opposition to state hegemony was neutered by tactics that led to 
the labour movement conceding a large amount of ground in the war of 
position.  
 
Nevertheless, the publication by the state of Mwongozo (TANU Guidelines) in 
1971 led to a period where workers were able to exercise a degree of power 
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vis-à-vis management. Mwongozo contained clauses stipulating the need to 
eradicate corruption and waste and stated that party officials and managers 
should set good examples to others through their lifestyles. Clause 15 of 
Mwongozo stated that ‘there must be a deliberate effort to build equality 
between the leaders and those they lead’ (Davidson, 1987: 332). These were 
used by workers to instigate actions against the abuse of the trappings of 
management power, which again resonates with contemporary events in 
Tanzania, where there is anger about the way wealth is paraded and power 
used by managers working for ‘new [often foreign] investors’ in the country 
(see chapter 3). Between the publication of Mwongozo in February 1971 and 
September 1973, Davidson (1987) records thirty one strikes occurring, which 
‘strained relations between management and workers in enterprises’ (Mihyo, 
1979: 270). Of these actions, the dispute at the Mount Carmel rubber plant 
from 1972 to 1973 (Tarimo, 1977, Mihyo, 1975) was decisive in making the 
government move against Mwongozo’s adoption as a ‘workers charter.’ 115 
This was because the Tanganyika Development Finance Company (TDFL) 
was an investor in the Mount Carmel factory and British, German and Dutch 
development corporations were TDFL shareholders. Thus, a clash with the 
TDFL meant opposing powerful capitalist countries, which the state was not 
prepared to risk.  
 
In the months following the end of the Mount Carmel dispute, therefore, the 
Tanzanian state moved to take control of factories away from workers. This 
                                                           
115
  Other significant industrial actions during this period included strikes at the Sungura Textiles plant in 
1972, (Chachage and Chachage, 2005, Mihyo, 1975), the British American Tobacco factory in 1973 (Musoke, 
1978) and the Kioo Soft Drinks Company from 1974 to 1975 (Msuku, 1976), which all centred on worker 
anger at management extravagance and misuse of resources. 
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showed clearly the limits to the participatory culture in Tanzania, to which 
Nyerere (1976) was committed. He wanted the people to articulate their needs 
through channels to which the state had to respond. However, Nyerere also 
recognized that raising economic productivity was paramount and the 
introduction of Mwongozo had led to a situation where this was put at risk. 
Nyerere (1976: 315) had made it clear that both the workers and NUTA must 
not ‘allow industrial disputes of any kind to jeopardize production.’ Thus, in 
the aftermath of the Mount Carmel conflict, official permission from TANU 
was made necessary before any industrial dispute could take place and 
workers’ representatives deemed ‘militant’ were sacked and in some cases 
imprisoned (Bienefeld, 1979). It became evident that workers ‘would not 
control their factories and they would have little or no power over the 
Tanzanian state’ (Coulson, 1985: 289). As Davidson (1987) argues, the 
attempt through Mwongozo to build a party of mass participation against the 
power of state bureaucrats was a fraught process, illustrating the difficulty of 
bringing about systemic change within and against an established neo-colonial 
culture and structure. 
 
5.6 Jumuiya ya Wafanyakazi wa Tanzania (JUWATA) 
As a result of the formal merger between the ruling parties on the Tanzanian 
mainland and Zanzibar (Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and the Afro Shirazi 
Party (ASP) respectively) in 1977, the state decided to form a new trade union 
federation to represent the whole republic. To this end they disestablished 
NUTA and created Jumuiya ya Wafanyakazi wa Tanzania (JUWATA) in 1979. 
Nyerere oversaw the appointment of trade union leaders and was able to 
exclude and therefore silence potential dissenters to state policies. Under 
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JUWATA trade unions were subject to even greater state control than had been 
the case with NUTA. JUWATA was forced to operate under CCM's 
constitution, whereas NUTA had at least worked under its own. The General 
Secretary of JUWATA was also the Minister of Labour and a labyrinthine 
system of regulations made strikes impossible.  In these ways, the state gave 
the labour movement no room to manoeuvre in the war of position and trade 
unions lacked any opportunity to form a counter-hegemonic discourse.  
JUWATA, like NUTA, was placed in the untenable position of trying to defend 
the interests of both the state and labour. An example of the contradictory 
nature of JUWATA’s position occurred from 1979 to 1980 when the union 
brokered an annual bonus of TZS 6,720 to the Bank of Tanzania workers, 
which the government subsequently reduced to TZS 2,500 for ‘economic and 
unavoidable reasons’ (Duma 1990: 186). In the ensuing dispute JUWATA 
supported the workers claims for the original amount at branch level but at the 
same time argued in favour of the government’s reduction at its Head Office. 
The government position inevitably prevailed. 
 
5.7 Trade Unions in Post-liberalization Tanzania 
The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) period 116 from the mid-1980s 
was difficult for the labour movement in Tanzania, since the IFIs were ‘openly 
hostile to trade union organizations’ (Chambua, 1997: 309). Trade union 
membership was concentrated in the state sector, where, by the time the third 
phase of the SAP had taken effect during the second half of the 1990s, 
dismissals had been substantive. Between 1993 and 1997 the public sector 
payroll was cut by twenty seven per cent from 355,000 to 260,000 (World 
                                                           
116
  See chapter 3 for an overview of the period of SAPs in Tanzania. 
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Bank, 2000). Mistrust between the state and representatives of labour 
remained during the SAP period with the state worried by the prospect of a 
strong and independent union movement that could form a sustainable 
counter-hegemonic discourse in response to the policies being promulgated. 
Trade unions were by-passed in discussions on policy formation and SAPs 
were constructed and put into practice in a way that excluded the ‘vast 
majority of the population (the urban poor, public servants and rural dwellers) 
from decision-making processes’ (Rusimbi, 2003: 102).  
 
Interviews conducted as part of this research show that state acceptance of 
structural adjustment in Tanzania provided trade unions, almost inadvertently, 
with a counter-hegemonic discourse, since they became regarded by members 
and the wider citizenry as guardians of welfarism. Therefore, while unions 
provided opposition to SAPs partly to protect their own corporate interests in 
SOEs, they also voiced popular anxiety about the future of social services. For 
example, in interviews, leaders of the larger trade unions stressed how they 
had argued that sectors such as water, health and education, should never be 
privatized, as they were concerned with public goods, equitable access to 
which must be seen as a human right for all Tanzanians. 117 This struck a chord 
with the Tanzanian public, who, ironically, had heard similar arguments for 
years from state officials and Nyerere himself. However, although the 
Tanzanian labour movement did mount protests against the negative effects of 
structural adjustment on workers, it failed to address three vital issues. First, it 
did not systematically put forward alternative policies to SAPs. Second, it 
failed to develop detailed analyses of the relationship between multiparty 
                                                           
117
  The old guard leaders of TUGHE and TALGWU expressed this view with particular conviction. 
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liberal democracy and economic development in the country. Third, it was 
slow to adopt a participatory approach towards rank-and-file union members. 
These failures stemmed fundamentally from lack of capacity and vision on the 
part of the labour movement and meant that a chance to form a counter-
hegemonic discourse, which had the potential to carry with it the mood of the 
public, was lost. 
 
At the 1991 JUWATA Annual Congress, workers called for more freedom for 
trade union activities and separation from the state. This pressure influenced 
the creation of the Tanzanian Trade Union Act of 1991, which contained a 
provision allowing trade unions to be formed individually and separately from 
the structures of the federation, leading to the creation of the Organization of 
Tanzanian Trade Unions (OTTU) in 1992. All members of JUWATA 
automatically became members of OTTU and newly formed trade unions were 
required to affiliate to OTTU. 118  OTTU was, however, allowed to have its 
own constitution and was free from direct political control by the government. 
This meant that more policy space opened up than had existed previously in 
the post-independence period and trade unionists were able to work towards 
the creation of 'free' trade unions, which could choose whether to affiliate to 
OTTU. From 1992 until 1995 ten sector-based trade unions drew up 
constitutions, held their own elections and were formally registered. However, 
the state’s use of legal-bureaucratic methods as a weapon in the war of 
position remained significant; both the struggle to be recognized as a trade 
                                                           
118
 This contravened the right to Freedom of Association set out in United Nations Conventions and caused 
friction between the government and the Western donors, as it was not in line with the New Policy Agenda. 
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union and the registration process were made cumbersome. 119 Despite these 
measures OTTU organized a short-lived general strike in 1994. While the 
federation made a solid case for the need to improve the terms of conditions of 
employment for the majority of workers, the economic crisis in Tanzania at 
the time meant that there were no funds available to finance the demands 
without printing more money. 120  This was the first major action at a national 
level organized by the trade union movement since One Party rule was 
established in 1965. At its 1995 Congress OTTU changed its name to the 
Tanzania Federation of Free Trade Unions (TFTU). However, the TFTU had 
an unclear status because under the provisions of the OTTU Act, OTTU was 
the only lawfully recognized Trade Union Federation (Kitindi, 1999, 
Mukandala, 1999).   
 
Tanzania’s adoption of multi-party liberal democracy led to national elections 
being held in 1995. This development indicated a significant shift in the war 
of position, driven to a large extent by transnational actors trying to inculcate 
Post-Washington Consensus (PWC) policies in Tanzania. The PWC stresses 
the need to pay more attention to the sequencing of reforms than the original 
Washington Consensus (see chapter 1) and emphasizes the need to build 
durable and effective institutions before wider reforms, such as privatization, 
can be put in place (Stiglitz, 2010, Stiglitz, 2002, Burki and Perry, 1998). 
However, in the case of Tanzania, the donors required the state to act in haste 
to bring in legislation based on the PWC reforms. Donor agencies pressed, in 
particular, for freedom of association to be allowed in Tanzania, as a key plank 
                                                           
119
  For example, the Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU) was formed on 1 November 1993 only after a long 
struggle, culminating in strikes by teachers (Michael, 2001). 
120
  Source: Interview with Professor Samuel Chambua, 2006. 
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of the wider move towards embracing liberal democracy. As a result, the state 
came under pressure to rescind the OTTU Act, but had little time to conduct 
research on a replacement. Thus, the promulgation in 1998 of new trade union 
legislation was rushed.  While the reforms, in general, and the new law, in 
particular, led to the state losing some ground to the labour movement in the 
war of position, the results were confusing and contradictory, with two trade 
union federations operating, both of which had an unclear legal status. 
 
The Trade Union Act 1998 (URT, 1998) came into force on 1 July 2000, 
replacing the 1991 OTTU Act, and formally recognized freedom of 
association on the part of trade unions. 121 Thus, it signified a formal split 
between the labour movement and the state (Chambua, 2002a) and marked a 
new phase of trade unionism in Tanzania. 122 The 1998 act was incorporated 
into the Labour and Industrial Relations Act (2004) and defined unions in 
Tanzania as ‘any combination, either temporary or permanent, of 20 or more 
employees … the principle purposes of which is the regulation of the relations 
between employers and employees’ (URT, 1998: 4).  This piece of legislation 
marked an important shift in the labour movement’s war of position with the 
state. Under its terms, workers were allowed, for the first time in more than 
thirty-five years in Tanzania, to organize trade unions that had their own 
constitutions, rules and elections. However, other aspects of the legislation 
showed that the state was able to continue its history of using legal-
bureaucratic measures to maintain hegemony in Tanzania. For example, the 
law requires trade unions to register with the Office of the Registrar of Trade 
                                                           
121
  Both the OTTU and the TFTU were de-registered as federations as part of the Trade Union Act 1998. 
122
  See table 5.1for a summary of all the phases of trade unionism in Tanzania. 
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Unions (ORTU), which is part of the Ministry of Labour, within one month of 
formation, in order to acquire legal status.  The ORTU has been criticized for 
possessing excessive powers (ICFTU, 2011), particularly concerning its 
freedom to register (and de-register) trade unions (see the fieldwork findings 
section below for details). The powers of the Registrar of the ORTU are wide-
ranging and not dissimilar to those possessed by the Registrar of Societies, 
who oversaw the registration and operations of NGOs from 1954 until 
changes in legislation during the post-liberalization period (see chapter 4). 
As well as altering the relationship between the labour movement and the 
state, the law also led to a substantial change for trade unions in terms of their 
relations with transnational actors. Individual trade unions and federations 
gained the right under the 1998 act to affiliate with, or be a member of, any 
consultative body registered inside or outside Tanzania.  In the pre-
liberalization period, the state used legal-bureaucratic measures to prevent 
trade unions from affiliating with influential organizations based outside 
Tanzania, such as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU) or the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), both of which 
had resources available to assist labour movements in developing countries. 
Here, the state used the discourse of national liberation 123 effectively as a 
tactic against the trade unions in the war of position. It achieved this by 
arguing that reliance on outside financial support would leave unions in a 
dependent position, leading to pressure on them to implement policies and 
actions which could jeopardize the national liberation struggle, which was of 
paramount importance (Musoke 1978).  
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  See also section 5.1 for an analysis of this discourse. 
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However, although the labour movement gained the freedom under the 1998 
Trade Union Act to access foreign funding and support for their work in the 
post-liberalization era, little has been forthcoming in practice, with the notable 
exception of assistance from the Danish International Development Agency 
(DANIDA). 124 Since 2000, DANIDA has given technical and financial 
support with the aim of making TUCTA a ‘fully functioning organization.’ 125 
DANIDA works with all the trade unions affiliated to TUCTA as part of its 
overall remit to improve the labour market in Tanzania through its Business 
Sector Programme Support (BSPS) (DANIDA, 2002). Starting in 2000, Phase 
1 (BSPS I) of DANIDA’s work focused on revision of the labour laws and 
lasted three years. During Phase 2 (BSPS II), work on reforming the main 
central organizations of TUCTA took centre stage for a five year period. From 
1 July 2008, DANIDA moved to the third phase (BSPS III) of its work, 
focusing on the technical capacity-building of unions in the regions. By the 
completion of BSPS III, ‘the trade unions of Tanzania mainland affiliated with 
TUCTA will be able to provide effective services to their members in 
Collective Bargaining Agreements and dispute settlement and effectively 
advocate the interests of the members in bi- and tripartite and international 
forums’ (Hansen, 2008b: 3). BPS III also aims to bring about greater social 
dialogue involving representatives of labour, capital and the state and to 
develop corporate social responsibility. BPS III is, therefore, premised on the 
business unionism approach to labour movements. In overall terms, assistance 
aims to build up physical and communications infrastructure of the trade 
                                                           
124
  Support from transnational organizations for particular projects involving Tanzanian trade unions has 
come from LO-TCO (Sweden), LO-Norway, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, The Canadian Labour Federation and 
ICFTU-AFRO, LO/FTF Council (Denmark), the Danish Union of Teachers and the Danish General Workers 
Union.  
125
   Source: Interview with DANIDA official, 2008. 
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union movement along with more efficient service delivery than currently 
exists. These objectives are not proving easy to accomplish, with 
achievements from the end of one DANIDA planning-retreat in 2008 (focused 
on increasing the effectiveness of inter-departmental cooperation at TUCTA’s 
head office) to the start of another, summarized by an official as ‘minimal’ 
(Hansen, 2008a; 1). According to DANIDA officials interviewed as part of 
this research, trade union departments at the federation head office lack the 
technical capacity and vision to cooperate effectively in driving the movement 
forward. There is little cohesion between departments, which do not keep each 
other systematically informed of their projects, programmes or policies. This 
fundamental lack of co-ordination among trade union departments at the 
federation’s head office is a significant reason for the failure of the labour 
movement to form a counter-hegemonic discourse in the post-liberalization 
period. 
 
Table 5.1 Phases of Trade Unionism in Tanzania  
Period Dates Freedom of Association – 
Individual Trade Unions 
Freedom of Association – Trade 
Union Federations 
Pre-independence (from 
TU Ordinance 1932) 
1932-
1961 
Yes Yes – Tanganyikan Federation of 
Labour (TFL) 
Early period of 
independence (TU 
Amendment Act, 1962) 
1962-
1964 
Yes No – only United Federation allowed 
by state 
National Union of 
Tanganyikan Workers 
(NUTA) Act, 1964 
1964-
1979 
No – unions could not exist as 
separate legal entities outside 
NUTA 
No – only NUTA (state - controlled) 
allowed 
Jumuiya ya 
Wafanyakazi wa 
Tanzania (JUWATA) 
Act, 1979  
1979-
1991 
No – unions could not exist as 
separate legal entities outside 
JUWATA 
No – only JUWATA (state-controlled) 
allowed 
Organization of 
Tanzanian Trade Unions 
Act (OTTU), 1991 
1991-
1998 
Yes – provision in 
1991Tanzanian Trade Union 
Act (No.20) allowed unions to 
be formed outside OTTU  
No/Yes – Only OTTU allowed 1991-
1995. At 1995 union elections, new 
federation created – Tanzanian 
Federation of Free Trade Unions 
(TFTU). This had no legal recognition 
Trade Unions Act, 1998 1998-
Present 
Yes Yes – Trade Union Congress of 
Tanzania (TUCTA) 
Source: McQuinn (2011) 
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All trade unions were dissolved following the enactment of the 1998 Trade 
Union law, and had to re-apply for membership of the new federation – the 
Trade Union Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA). The old trade unions 
successfully applied to join TUCTA and the ‘old guard’ leaders mostly 
remained in place. 126 However, some freshly created unions emerged with 
‘new guard’ leaders.  127 A number of these unions attempted to form a 
separate federation, which they proposed to name the Tanzania Federation of 
Labour, after the organization that existed prior to independence. This attempt 
to form an alternative power centre to TUCTA continues to the present and is 
the source of rancour and division within the movement (see the examination 
of the proposed May Day strike in 2010 below in this section). 
 
The TUCTA headquarters in Dar es Salaam contains the offices of its main 
departments and eight out of its fourteen affiliate unions. TUCTA also has a 
college at Mbeya, which runs courses on labour-related issues but lacks the 
financial and technical capacity to operate it effectively (Chambua, 2002b). In 
overall terms, TUCTA has the task of reorganizing and leading the trade union 
movement in the post-liberalization era. This primarily involves the re-setting 
of relationships with the state and representatives of capital to form a tripartite 
arrangement in which the interests of labour are addressed. It also necessitates 
finding ways to serve the needs of workers in dealings with the influential 
external donors operating in Tanzania and the foreign new investors who are 
particularly important in the mining sector of the economy (see chapter 3). 
                                                           
126
 ‘Old guard’ refers to union leader who held positions of power in the movement prior to the substantive 
changes that occurred with the advent of liberalization at the end of the 1980s. 
127
  ‘New guard’ refers to both to senior union officials at TUCTA and leaders of individual trade unions 
appointed after the changes that occurred in the labour movement caused by the advent liberalization at the 
end of the 1980s. 
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TUCTA is headed by a General Secretary, supported by a Deputy General 
Secretary, who is responsible for the day to day operations of the organization 
and cooperation between departments. The work of the General Secretary is 
more externally oriented. The organization has four main departments – 
Economics and Research, Education, Gender and Youth Issues and 
Occupational Health and Safety, Environment and HIV/AIDS. Of the twenty-
one trade unions in Tanzania registered by the Office of the Registrar (as at 
April 2011), fourteen are affiliated to TUCTA.  TUCTA has been offered a 
free website by the ICFTU and has a domain space, but lacks the finance to set 
up and maintain the site. It does not produce a regular journal or newsletter. 
Heads of department have computers and email addresses, though 
communication has been hampered in recent years by regular power cuts.  
Currently, according to officials at TUCTA Head Office, one third of workers 
in the formal sector are unionized and the total trade union membership is 
around 800,000. 128 However, the membership figures obtained from those 
interviews (provided from membership lists which are submitted to the Office 
of the Registrar of Trade Unions and from the documents and personal 
knowledge of senior union officials) show a total trade union membership of 
352,458, which is 447,542 less than the TUCTA estimate. 129 According to the 
latest Integrated Labour Force Survey (URT, 2007a) the total labour force in 
Tanzania is 20.6 million, of which 15,759,000 (76.5%) are involved in 
agriculture and 4,841,000 (23.5%) in industry or services. This means that 
from the figures obtained as part of this research, 1.71% of the total workforce 
                                                           
128
  See also TUCTA (2004b) for trade union membership profiles and figures. 
129
 The findings for this research on total trade union membership are closer to the number of 407,000 
provided in 2003 by the World Bank (World Bank, 2003c) than they are to TUCTA figures.  
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is unionized. Breaking the figures down further provides deeper insights into 
the density of trade union membership. Of the 76.5% (17,759,000) who 
comprise the agricultural sector, 67.2% (11,934,048) work on their own farms 
or shambas and thus have little incentive to join a trade union. Only 18.4% 
(3,267,656) of the agricultural sector are paid employees and, thus, have a 
substantial potential interest in joining a trade union. All twenty one unions in 
Tanzania draw members from the industry or services sectors, with the 
exception of the Tanzania Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union 
(TPAWU) and the very small Tanzania Agroforestry Workers Union (TAWU), 
which have a combined membership of 26,482.  Taking the combined figures 
for TPAWU and TAWU as representing unionized workers in agriculture in 
relation to the total number of wage labourers (3,267,656) in the sector, then 
8.7% are unionized. Subtracting the memberships of TPAWU and TAWU 
from the total number of trade unionists in the country, produces a figure of 
325,976 wage labourers in the nineteen unions covering the industrial and 
service sectors.  This equates to a union membership of 6.73% in the industrial 
and services sectors. Thus, findings from this research show that there is a 
significant percentage of unionized workers in both the formal industrial and 
service sectors and amongst wage labourers in the agricultural sphere. These 
findings (based on a total trade union membership of 352,458) are 
summarized in Table 5.2 below: 
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Table 5.2 Level of Unionization in the Tanzanian Labour Force 
 Number Percentage 
unionized 
No. of trade unions 
representing workers in these 
sectors 
Total labour force 20,600,000 1.71 21 
Total labour force 
in agricultural 
sector 
15,759,000 0.17 2 
Total wage 
labourers in 
agricultural sector 
3,267,656 8.7 2 
Total labour force 
in industry and 
services  
4,841000 6.73 19 
Sources: McQuinn, (2011), URT, (2007a) 
As Figure 5.1 shows, the trade union membership in Tanzania is concentrated, 
with 75.86% of the total belonging to just four unions – the Tanzania Teachers 
Union (TTU) - 157,000 (44.54% of the total); the Tanzania Local Government 
Workers Union (TALGWU) – 37,493 (10.64%), the Tanzania Union of 
Industrial and Commercial Workers (TUICO) – 37,022 (10.5%) and the 
Tanzania Union of Government and Health Employees (TUGHE) – 35,868 
(10.18%). This means that there are seventeen other unions, which make up 
only 24.14% of the total membership between them. Therefore, the outcome 
of the 1998 Trade Union Act has been, somewhat paradoxically, both the 
proliferation of trade unions and the concentration of membership. 
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Figure 5.1  Tanzanian Trade Unions – Membership Concentration 
  
Source: McQuinn (2011) 130 
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  See appendix 5.3 for details of the membership numbers of every trade union in Tanzania. 
 
Tanzania Teachers 
Union (TTU)  
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Tanzania Local 
Government 
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Tanzania Union of 
Government and 
Health Employees 
(TUGHE) 35,868
Other Trade Unions 
(x17) 85,075
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Of the four biggest unions, the TTU is by far the largest, partly through the 
stress placed on the importance of education, and hence the widespread 
building of schools and training of teachers, under the Nyerere regime from 
the 1960s onwards, when union membership was compulsory. The TTU has 
also increased its numbers as a result of the Post-Washington Consensus 
emphasis on human capital, 131 which has led to rises in funding for education 
from donors and, consequently, to the training of new teachers, who the TTU 
have recruited into the union with a considerable degree of success. The TTU 
has modern and well- equipped premises in Dar es Salaam. It has been 
involved in regular disputes with the state in the post-liberalization period, 
particularly over back payments of salaries and expenses owed to teachers. 
The second and fourth biggest unions, TALGWU and TUGHE, are made up of 
civil servants and frontline workers from the health sector. While their 
numbers declined as a consequence of the dismissals that followed the 
imposition of SAPs (see chapter 3), they retain larger memberships than most 
of the existing unions, have experienced leaderships and offices in the TUCTA 
Headquarters. They are, therefore, close to the national leadership of the 
labour movement. Consequently, the bulk of trade union membership in 
Tanzania is white collar, with the exception of the third biggest union, TUICO, 
which draws its members from the industrial and commercial sectors. TUICO 
has an active leadership and produces newsletters on important issues for 
members.    
Concerning the remaining seventeen organizations, TPAWU, which has the 
fifth largest membership of 26,461, is a dynamic organization. One of its 
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  See chapter 1 for a discussion of the importance of human capital as part of the Post-Washington 
Consensus and the work of Rose, (2006, 2003) and Fine and Rose (2001) on the topic. 
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officials contributes to international newsletters on health and safety concerns 
in the cut flower industry, which the state has targeted as an important sector 
to develop. Major problems for TPAWU officials are the dispersed nature of 
the membership, which makes it difficult to maintain clarity and cohesion in 
the union and the casualization of the workforce, which has occurred since 
liberalization. 132 Beneath TPAWU in size, come a group of five unions, which 
are medium-sized in the context of the Tanzanian labour movement, with 
memberships of between 5,000 and 15,000. Three of these unions, the 
Conservation, Hotels, Domestic and Allied Workers Union (CHODAWU), the 
Tanzanian Railway Workers Union (TRAWU) and the Tanzania Mines and 
Construction Workers Union (TAMICO), are involved in complex struggles to 
protect members’ interests in the face of assertive entry into the sectors in 
which they operate by largely foreign new investors in Tanzania. Officials 
from all three unions feel strongly that the state sides markedly with the 
interests of new investors and provides little practical help or support for their 
members or leaders. This is linked to a rising nationalist discourse in the trade 
union movement, stimulated by the refusal of the state to make transparent the 
details of contracts it has signed from the second half of the 1990s onwards 
with major foreign investors, particularly in the mining, tourism and transport 
sectors. Another member of this medium sized group, the Researchers, 
Academicians and Allied Workers Union (RAAWU) contains a large number 
of highly qualified members, many of whom are lecturers at universities 
 
The remaining eleven unions, making up more than half of the total number 
registered, are small, having less than 3,000 members each. From this group, 
                                                           
132
  See Fischer (2011) for figures.  
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some significant issues can be highlighted. The Tanzania Union of Private 
Security Employees (TUPSE) operates in a sector that is growing rapidly in 
the country and has attracted considerable foreign investment. Many members 
of TUPSE are engaged in guarding the new businesses in the country, mostly 
in the telecommunications, mining and tourism sectors. Officials expressed 
great concern at the aggressively anti-union stance of employers in this sector 
and at the lack of support from the state in dealing with issues arising from 
this attitude.  The Telecommunications Workers Union of Tanzania 
(TEWUTA) operates in a sector that is one of the ‘success stories’ of 
economic development in the country. However, the union has been involved 
in disputes with employers over privatization in the sector, as well as the terms 
and conditions under which members work. Officials from the Tanzania Pilots 
Union argued that investment in areas such as expanding training for pilots 
and routes flown was inadequate. They set these arguments in the context of 
much-publicized state plans to bring about growth in the tourism industry. For 
a TPU official, the fact that the organization had never been invited to discuss 
schemes for the expansion of the airlines in Tanzania, showed that the state is 
not serious about its own plans to develop the tourism industry and produces 
plans for the sector mainly because it is a favourite of the IFIs. 
 
Irrespective of the sizes of the twenty-one trade unions registered in Tanzania, 
they lack institutional and financial capacity, with the important exception of 
the TTU. Where almost all the NGOs taking part in national policy-making 
processes have functioning websites, to which content is regularly added, the 
TTU is the only union to have such a facility, although it contains little 
information and is not updated. Only three unions have a Research and 
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Economics Department and two, an Education/Training Department. Thus, 
unions lack the capacity to provide members systematically with relevant 
information and arguments concerning their interests, which could help in 
raising the consciousness needed to gain support for a counter-hegemonic 
discourse to neo-liberalism. Moreover, trade unions lack creativity in 
countering neo-liberal hegemony compared to other forms of associational 
life, such as NGOs. For example, Hakielimu (2005) produced a booklet 
entitled ‘Sera Poa… Lakini Utekelezaji?’ (‘Great Policies… but 
Implementation?’), featuring a satirical series of cartoons mocking the 
contradictions in development initiatives in the country and the disconnect 
between policy and practice. The cartoons (two of which are reproduced 
below in figures 5.2 and 5.3) drew much debate in the media and among the 
public, as well as trenchant criticism from the state. No trade unions have 
engaged in such imaginative ways to engender a counter-hegemonic 
discourse. 
 
Despite the labour movement’s lack of capacity and vision in the post-
liberalization era, both TUCTA and individual trade unions have organized 
strikes and other forms of industrial action, particularly from the latter half of 
the 2000s. However, the ‘excessive restrictions’ (ITUC, 2011: 1) embodied in 
the legal-bureaucratic measures created and enforced by the state make 
successful industrial action hard to achieve. While trade unions in the post-
liberalization period have regained freedom of association, laws, regulations 
and the powers of regulatory bodies continue to constrain their activities to a 
significant degree. As in previous periods of political economy, strikes are 
difficult to mount, as they are only permitted as a ‘last resort’ after a 
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mandatory thirty day mediation period has passed.  
 
A proposed indefinite general strike, organized by TUCTA, and scheduled to 
start on May Day 2010, was the biggest action taken in the post-liberalization 
era.  TUCTA called the strike to protest against the failure of the state to 
increase wages, including the minimum wage, and to reduce income tax rates. 
All the major TUCTA-affiliated unions, covering the private and public 
sectors, supported the planned action. In response, the state invoked 
stipulations contained in its legal-bureaucratic measures relating to labour 
issues, to claim the proposed action was illegal and threatened TUCTA 
officials with court action, if they did not cal off the action. In April 2010, 
senior state officials argued that the compulsory mediation process was 
ongoing and, thus, TUCTA had no legal right to call for a strike. This position 
was then articulated by President Kikwete in his monthly address to the nation 
and by officials from the Confederation of Tanzanian Industries (CTI) and the 
Association of Tanzanian Employers (ATE). The ATE argued that employers 
should sue striking workers in order to recover any losses incurred as a result 
of their actions. Various other state and quasi-state bodies then became 
involved, making the processes complex and time consuming. The decision as 
to whether the mandatory mediation period had closed, and the strike 
consequently legal, was then referred to the Labour Division of the High 
Court of Tanzania (LDHCT). The conclusion of the court would be based on 
whether the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration (CMA) (a body set up 
under section 12 of the 2004 labour law, and confusingly called an 
‘independent government institution’ by the state) considered that negotiations 
between TUCTA, representatives of capital and the state had been exhausted 
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and if the federation had followed the other legal steps necessary before a 
strike could be called. In addition, the Labour, Economic and Social Council 
(LESCO) (also formed under the 2004 labour law) and composed of 
representatives of the state, capital and labour, organized mediation meetings 
in the run up to the proposed strike day. The decision of the LDHCT was not 
needed in the end, as TUCTA called off the strike after Kikwete made a 
further speech forcefully reiterating the point that the action was illegal. The 
traditional May Day parade went ahead but in a form different to any before in 
two respects. First, TUCTA itself broke with precedent by not inviting the 
Head of State to speak at their parade. Second, Non TUCTA-affiliated unions, 
showed their intention to move power away from the national federation, by 
organizing their own celebrations for the first time.  
 
Analysing the action in overall terms, it is clear that the state’s use of legal-
bureaucratic measures gave it huge power. The labour movement was locked 
into complex and restrictive processes in trying to mount a strike. Added to 
this were attacks, widely reported in the media, on the labour movement’s 
actions from senior state officials and representatives of capital. Despite high 
levels of unemployment and widespread poverty (see chapter 3) which led to 
sympathy for union demands amongst much of the population, TUCTA was 
unable to seriously challenge state hegemony during the period of the 
proposed strike. With regard to trade union theory, TUCTA officials clearly 
did not want to pursue a revolutionary unionism path by exhorting workers to 
engage in militant anti-capitalist direct actions. They were ideologically at 
 216 
 
odds with such a position 133 and it would have produced a hostile response 
from the government, which would certainly have used the coercive aspects of 
the integral state to confront such actions. TUCTA also eschewed following a 
social movement unionism perspective, by forming alliances with other forms 
of associational life, in mounting the action. This revealed the lack of serious 
contacts trade unions have with other types of civil society organization in 
Tanzania (see below section 5.9 for further analysis of this point and figure 
5.3, summarizing reasons for mutual distrust between trade unions and 
NGOs). Instead they were forced into a default business unionism approach, 
based on technical arguments concerning both the terms and conditions of 
employment of rank-and-file members and the legal processes relating to 
industrial action. TUCTA officials admitted that it was hard for them to 
understand the new laws and regulations relating to labour that have been 
introduced in the post-liberalization period, which hampered the effectiveness 
of the industrial action. 134 Moreover, they found dealing with recently created 
bodies (LESCO and the CMA, in particular), time-consuming and difficult.  
 
The example of the aborted general strike in 2010 reveals two central points 
about the labour movement in Tanzania in the post-liberalization era. First, 
TUCTA officials lack a concerted vision, along with strategies, for the labour 
movement. Second, most trade unionists lack detailed understanding of the 
legal-bureaucratic framework relating to labour which has been imposed by 
the state since liberalization. They are, therefore, contesting the war of 
position from a weak knowledge base concerning the technical mechanisms of 
                                                           
133
  Source: Personal communication from trade union officials. 
134
  Source: Interviews with senior TUCTA officials. 
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control over labour, which currently pertain, and they have not developed a 
grounded counter-hegemonic discourse to neo-liberalism. Gramsci (2011b) (in 
arguing for labour organizations to take a revolutionary unionism approach) 
made the point that trade union officials tend to become focused on the 
technicalities concerning legal-bureaucratic issues, when involved in labour 
disputes. In doing so, they form similar overall perspectives to those of 
representatives of capital and the state, with the result that arguments centre on 
details within a mutually accepted discourse. This leads to the leadership of 
the mass of workers by authoritarian pressure from senior trade union 
officials, resulting in inertia within labour movements (Gramsci, 1919). Given 
the complexities involved in mounting industrial action in contemporary 
Tanzania, highlighted by the failure of the 2010 general strike, there is a case 
for arguing that the labour movement should adopt a social movement 
unionism approach if it wants to enhance its effectiveness. This would, for 
example, provide opportunities for union officials to form alliances with 
NGOs, such as the Legal and Human Rights Centres (LHRC) and the Lawyers 
Environmental Action Trust (LEAT). Both of these NGOs are active and can 
offer legal expertise on labour issues, thus, enabling both a broader form of 
opposition to the state and deeper knowledge for union officials of 
technicalities. This may be a more effective way for trade unions to take part 
in labour disputes than the current mode, which involves acting alone and 
contesting technicalities, which were framed by state bodies. However, 
following Kikwete’s victory in the 2010 presidential elections (see chapter 3), 
there has been a rapprochement between CCM and the labour movement and 
an adoption of the discourse of business unionism by TUCTA. Kikwete held a 
series of meetings with senior TUCTA officials, beginning in April 2011, 
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based around the slogan, ‘let bygones be bygones.’ Following the meetings, 
TUCTA leaders stated that they now regarded the government as one of their 
‘social partners’ with which they could work constructively, without, however, 
compromising the interests of workers. 135 This showed that TUCTA as an 
institution had internalized the discourse of business unionism, as it was 
unusual for the organization to make a formal statement at the highest level 
using the term ‘social partners’ to refer to the government. 
 
Another way in which the trade union movement could build alliances is 
through formal links with opposition political parties. In interviews, TUCTA 
officials revealed that this option has become a serious consideration, but is 
clearly problematic for several reasons. First, many interviewees (TUCTA 
officials at head office as well as leaders of TUCTA-affiliated and non 
TUCTA-affiliated unions) expressed disquiet about the labour movement 
linking itself formally to any political party, so soon after emerging from a 
period of control by CCM, which lasted more than thirty years. A number of 
interviewees argued that CCM would use this as a weapon in the war of 
position to accuse the trade union movement of partisanship. It was pointed 
out that when TUCTA proposed to formally name their preferred candidate for 
the 2010 presidential elections, this was exactly how they were criticized in 
response by state officials. The acting permanent secretary at the President’s 
Office, for example, argued that this action by TUCTA violated the code of 
conduct applying to civil servants. In addition, he stated that TUCTA should 
be protecting the interests of workers and that it was unethical for the 
organization to influence its members as to which political party and leader 
                                                           
135
  Source: Personal communication (April, 2011). 
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they should vote for. 136 Both the acting permanent secretary and later 
ministers then made the attack on TUCTA’s acting general secretary personal 
and called for him to leave the labour movement and join the presidential race 
if he was serious about becoming involved in politics. 137 Second, a number of 
old guard leaders have connections with CCM leaders, which go back to the 
pre-liberalization period. An element of patronage remains in these 
relationships and, consequently, these leaders resist a formal move to support 
opposition political parties. Third, it is not clear that any opposition political 
parties have policies concerning labour issues that are substantively different 
to those of CCM. Thus, the labour movement would not be allying themselves 
with a coherent counter-hegemonic discourse by forming an alliance with 
opposition parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
136
  Source: Interviews with TUCTA officials and This Day, 14 August, 2010. 
137
  Source: This Day, 15 August, 2010. 
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Figure 5.2  Hakielimu Cartoon: At the Health Centre 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Translation - Cartoon on left 
Teacher (with crutch) – ‘I have health insurance.’ 
The Receptionist replies – ‘That’s nothing to do with us. Pay 5,000 in cash or 
no service.’ 
Sign on front of the reception desk – ‘Money first.’ 
 
Cartoon on right 
Sign above the serving hatch ‘Medicine.’ 
Sign below the serving hatch ‘Give thanks for whatever you get.’ 
 
Person giving the medicine through the hatch – ‘Take these few, the rest you 
will have to buy somewhere else.’ 
Teacher ‘I have to walk seven kilometres just to get some Panadol.’ 
 
Caption pointing to the teacher’s trousers – ‘Empty pockets.’ 
Aside from small creature -  
‘If this is the situation, then how is having health insurance going to help us’? 
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Figure 5.3  Hakielimu Cartoon: At the School 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Translation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Teacher (on the table) – ‘When will this situation for teachers end? We are 
tired.’  
 
Announcement on radio (under the table) – ‘The government has just released 
one billion Tanzanian shillings for the refurbishment of Dar es Salaam bank 
…’  
 
Aside from small creature -  
‘Bah! It is better being under a mango tree than living in this situation.’ 
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5.8  Trade Unions in Tanzania: Key Fieldwork Findings 
The key findings are summarized under two main themes: Trade Union 
Priorities in Discourses and Key Trade Union Relationships. With regard to 
the former, the issues highlighted as priorities for trade unions are divided into 
three sub-categories: first, structuring, resources and mergers, second, 
economic issues and third, political issues. The points raised within these 
separate categories are interrelated and overlap in places. However, separation 
into sub-categories is useful in providing a clear structure for all the findings. 
 
 
Structuring, Resources and Mergers 
For senior TUCTA Officials the need for capacity building is the main priority 
of the labour movement. It was stated forcefully by the vast majority of 
interviewees that technical and financial capacity must be built if the trade 
union movement is to have an influence on economic, political and social 
policies affecting the lives of workers. Poor technological resources, 
particularly a lack of their own websites, seriously hamper communications 
between and within unions. Email contact is difficult due to low rates of 
computer ownership and power cuts. These structural problems are, for a 
considerable number of interviewees, compounded by issues of agency. 
Several of the new guard senior officials argued that many old guard union 
leaders look to the past and find it hard to keep up to date with emerging 
realities of importance to the labour movement, particularly the growing 
casualization of the labour force, gender issues, the ‘brain drain’ from  
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Tanzania 138 and the consequences of the high incidence of HIV/AIDS 
amongst workers and their dependents. For one such official, ‘trade unionists 
don’t read.’ They have papers and documents from conferences but these are 
just badges of status to be displayed in their offices. They do not engage 
substantively with important issues or keep up to date with new ideas. Overall, 
‘they want routine things.’ Several other officials at TUCTA-affiliated unions 
argued that the thinking and actions of the federation’s old guard leadership 
are rooted in the pre-liberalization period. One official outlined how collecting 
dues through the top-down check-off system introduced after independence, 
where two per cent of the wages of all union members are deducted at source, 
has led to a situation where union leaders do not know ‘the art, tactics, 
methods and techniques of organizing, persuading and soliciting for 
membership.’ For this official the check off system has led to the leadership 
lacking ‘the most crucial trade union asset - negotiating skills.’ Moreover, for 
a number of interviewees, the lack of skills in these areas on the part of union 
leaders is not being addressed. TUCTA has failed to establish a centralized 
collective bargaining centre/unit, which would train officials in the skills 
necessary to negotiate effectively and serve as a repository of knowledge and 
materials. Other interviewees pointed out that the TUCTA old guard fails to 
use experienced and well educated unionists from individual trade unions 
when negotiating CBAs through an ‘egocentric’ desire to hold on to the 
machinery of power. Old guard union leaders were also criticized by a 
considerable number of interviewees for lacking ‘creativity,’ ‘commitment’ 
                                                           
138
  Well qualified and experienced union members are emigrating from Tanzania and their abilities are thus 
lost to the movement. Exact numbers are hard to ascertain given the clandestine nature of some of this 
emigration. See Naud (2010) and UNCTAD (2007) for general overviews of the ‘brain drain’ from Africa and 
Lucas (2006) for an analysis that includes a discussion of issues concerning the brain drain from Tanzania. 
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and ‘tenacity’ in addressing key issues relating to the labour movement. These 
views reveal a clear frustration on the part of TUCTA officials appointed after 
1998 with the old guard amongst the leadership. 
 
Issues of structure and agency also combine to make the work of trade unions 
ineffective in the regions, according to most interviewees. Many respondents 
made the point that Tanzania is a large country with poor infrastructure and 
inadequate communications outside urban areas, making it hard to work in the 
regions. In addition, it was argued by a significant number of interviewees that 
trade union officials at branch level have few resources, are not effectively 
trained and cannot read documents relating to national policy-making 
processes well because their command of English is limited. They are in need 
of capacity-building initiatives run from trade union head offices, which are 
not forthcoming.  Many interviewees contended that a vicious circle has 
developed, characterized by a lack of commitment to branches outside Dar es 
Salam on the part of TUCTA which creates resentment about paying fees to an 
‘unresponsive centre’ on the part of regional union offices. This leads to 
apathy and inertia at regional offices, which in turn makes the federation at the 
centre reluctant to set up and fund initiatives outside Dar es Salaam. There has 
been a failure on the part of TUCTA to ‘institutionalize a spirit of teamwork 
between the centre and regions’ was the summary of a senior TUCTA-
affiliated trade union official. Overall there is a ‘dire lack of communication 
both vertical and horizontal’ was how one trade union official summarized 
issues concerning internal relationships within the trade union movement.  
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A difficulty relating to both capacity and legitimacy raised by a large number 
of interviewees is the inability of unions, through lack of finance and qualified 
personnel, to conduct thoroughgoing independent research into important 
areas, leading to their arguments being dismissed by the state and employers 
as not proven. Several interviewees pointed out that although the saying in 
Tanzania, ‘no research no right to speak’ is well known, 139 unions do hardly 
any analysis of labour issues or monitoring and evaluation of key trends 
relating to employment, which could be used to support their positions in 
debates with state officials, representatives of capital and other civil society 
organizations. Thus, both the leadership and the rank-and-file members of 
most unions have little detailed knowledge of issues, and consequently are 
only able to discuss them in very broad terms. The RAAWU membership has 
been identified by TUCTA officials at head office, as containing people who 
have the skills to do rigorous independent research, which could put the labour 
movement in a much stronger position to create a counter-hegemonic 
discourse to neo-liberalism than is currently the case.  However, due to lack of 
finance, effective planning and a concerted will, such research has not been 
undertaken. This is an example of the disconnect between the theory and the 
practice of trade unions in post-liberalization Tanzania, which is hindering the 
effectiveness of the labour movement. 
 
 
 
                                                           
139
  For example, the phrase was used by Anne Makinda in December 2010, during an interview she gave 
after becoming the Speaker of Parliament (East African, 2010) 
Available at - http://allafrica.com/stories/201012201456.html 
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Mergers 
Mergers between trade unions are seen as desirable by senior TUCTA 
officials, mainly because small trade unions do not provide adequate services 
to their members. The fact that more than half of Tanzanian trade unions have 
less than 3,000 members is a major reason for calls from TUCTA officials for 
mergers in order to create large organizations, capable of representing the 
interests of labour vis-à-vis capital and the state effectively. For one official, 
‘mergers are vital if trade unions are to become more efficient and to work in a 
more focused way and get their issues settled quicker and better than is 
currently the case.’ However, another new guard TUCTA official, argued that 
such views remain at the level of rhetoric and in practice the old guard leaders 
are ‘power-mongers’ who have made no concrete moves towards mergers. 
This research corroborated this claim in finding that no practical steps 
regarding mergers have been documented.  
 
A senior TUCTA outlined the argument against mergers, which is related to 
the fact that the work of Tanzanian trade unions was subsumed within a 
monolithic state system for more than thirty years after independence. 
Through the 1998 Trade Union Act, unions became independent again and are 
understandably ‘keen to guard this freedom.’ For this official, therefore, it is 
better to keep unions individually independent and to develop an overall 
solidarity movement which will provide strong mutual support for trade 
unions.  The majority, however, disagreed with this perspective, arguing that 
the small trade unions do not have the capability ‘to service their members or 
deliver anything to them.’  
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It was clear from the interviews with officials from TUCTA-affiliated trade 
unions that mergers were a divisive issue. For some (27%), mergers are 
necessary as they will make trade union work more effective and will stop 
small unions dividing the movement by fighting over recruitment of members. 
Disputes over demarcation of membership were cited as serious issues by a 
number of interviewees. Interviews revealed that there are tensions between 
TUGHE and TALGWU regarding which of the two unions employees of 
district health authorities should join. Moreover, both TAMICO and TUICO 
lay membership claims to workers in the cement and woodwork industries. A 
further example of such a dispute is the clash between the TTU and RAAWU 
over which union teachers in vocational education centres should join. These 
intra-union conflicts have demoralized members according to many 
interviewees and led to the perception on the part of the public that labour 
organizations are more interested in power and money than providing effective 
services for their members. Other points put forward by interviewees were that 
small trade unions should merge as they are not financially viable (30%) and 
have low visibility (20%). These views are typified by the claim of one 
official that there are ‘dead unions’ in Tanzania and mergers would lead to the 
dynamic officials in the movement emerging to head bigger, and thus more 
effective, unions. Moreover, an official at TUGHE argued that mergers are a 
good idea as having many individual trade unions plays into the hands of the 
employers who then use a divide and rule policy that ‘lessens solidarity in the 
trade union movement as a whole.’ 
 
In contrast, the mainly small unions formed as a result of the enshrining of 
freedom of association under the 1998 Trade Union Act, argued strongly 
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against mergers. For them, mergers would be undemocratic, as the rank-and-
file are against such a move. In addition, the new unions need time to 
consolidate their work and build activities and memberships. It was also stated 
that rather than mergers leading to dynamic officials coming to the forefront, 
in fact old guard leaders would use their networks of power and patronage to 
gain control of these large unions and run them in the same top-down 
unaccountable way as they did under the monolithic system.  
 
Debates over mergers were not solely based on whether unions were formed 
pre or post-1998. Two pre-1998 unions (TTU and RAAWU) are currently 
holding talks with a view to a merger. TTU officials are aware that they have 
to overcome the fears of RAAWU officials that ‘their members will be used to 
undertake research and to present papers where necessary but would not be 
included in the democratic structures and processes of the union.’  RAAWU 
officials were worried that the TTU officials would dominate the upper 
echelons of a merged union and concentrate on issues concerning primary and 
secondary education, at the expense of tertiary level concerns, which are the 
focus of their own membership. This example highlights the general worry on 
the part of TUCTA-affiliated trade unionists of whether smaller unions would 
have the interests of their members represented effectively in larger merged 
unions. 
 
For non TUCTA-affiliated trade unions the issue of mergers is a sensitive and 
complicated one, which divided opinion equally. The arguments in favour 
were based on the fact that mergers will lead to larger trade unions, which will 
thus have more power in dealing with employers and the government. 
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However, mergers were recognized as being impossible at present for non-
TUCTA affiliated unions, as they are not allowed to merge with TUCTA-
affiliated trade unions. The case against mergers was based on the argument 
that non-TUCTA affiliated unions had been created as breakaways from what 
members perceived to be poorly functioning larger unions and thus demanded 
a separate organization, which would be receptive to their concerns. Clearly 
fragmentation of the movement is a danger given the current structure and 
condition of trade unions.   
 
Economic Issues 
Privatization was cited as the root cause of trade union problems by almost all 
officials during interviews. One official summed up the general concern about 
privatization in stating that the ‘new private sector in Tanzania is mostly anti-
union and tries to negotiate with the individual. Because of poverty, workers 
are easily bought by employers.’ All the officials interviewed expressed 
disquiet at the aggressive attitudes of employers in the private sector towards 
employees and the failure of the government to address the matter. Senior 
TUCTA officials overwhelmingly argued that they should have a voice in all 
labour market issues since these contribute to poverty reduction and are 
troubled that this is not happening at present. They were particularly worried 
about the ‘unwarranted’ attention paid to privatization, while there is much 
less focus on employment creation, the quality of work, labour standards, 
child labour, wages policies and occupational health and safety. 
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The casualization of labour 140 as a result of trade liberalization leading to an 
increase in cheap manufactured imports and the harmful employment 
strategies of the new investors are other important topics of concern for the 
trade unions. It was pointed out, for example, that contracts in the hotel 
industry are short-term and must be renewed annually. This discourages 
workers from joining a trade union and leads to casualization of the 
workforce, which is a deliberate strategy aimed at achieving more profit 
through use of cheap labour. This practice has slashed the membership of the 
Conservation, Hotels, Domestic and Allied Workers Union (CHODAWU) and 
consequently weakened its power to operate effectively. Trade union officials 
also argued that the claims of donors that the government’s restructuring of the 
economy would lead to redeployment of workers who lost their jobs in SOEs 
are false. This is due to the capital intensive nature of the jobs created by the 
new investors in Tanzania, which has led to only a few workers being re-
employed after losing their jobs.   
 
For officials at individual TUCTA-affiliated trade unions the priorities 
outlined in interviews are closely interrelated – privatization (stressed by 80% 
of officials interviewed), the need for capacity-building (80%), high levels of 
unemployment (60%), lack of finance (47%) and inability to reach members 
in the regions (33%). A further priority in the discourse of trade unions is the 
vicious circle, which lowers capacity and legitimacy. Many officials made the 
point that privatization has led to unemployment, precipitating a fall in 
membership, which means less finance comes into the unions and leads to 
diminished capacity to operate effectively, thus lowering legitimacy of the 
                                                           
140
 See Wuyts (2001), discussed in chapter 3. 
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union in the eyes of members. For some TUCTA-affiliated trade unions the 
fall in membership has reached crisis proportions. For example, the Tanzanian 
Union of Journalists (TUJ) was described as ‘a dying union’ by its General 
Secretary and has less than two hundred members.  
 
For officials of non-TUCTA affiliated trade unions the major priorities were 
the same as those cited by officials at TUCTA and individual TUCTA 
affiliated unions – the need for both technical and financial capacity-building 
and the attitude of management in privatized industries. These problems were 
emphasised by the officials of all six of the non-TUCTA affiliated trade 
unionists interviewed. All non-TUCTA affiliated trade unions only draw 
members from the private sector, as state sector workers were placed in unions 
under government direction as part of the monolithic post-colonial trade union 
system and were automatically re-enrolled as members when these unions re-
registered as independent organizations after the 1998 Trade Union Act. 
Officials at non-affiliated unions regard private enterprises as under the 
control of anti-union management. Ship owners were cited as particularly 
exploitative employers, who act as a cartel to keep wages down and are 
aggressively anti-union; ‘Every day they try to kill us [the trade union]’ was 
the view of one official who had regular dealings with management in the 
shipping industry.  
 
Moreover, union officials struggled with the problem that workers in 
privatized enterprises ‘do not see the point of joining a trade union,’ to quote 
one interviewee. This is a central point concerning legitimacy. Many officials 
interviewed stated that employees in the private sector knew little about the 
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work of trade unions or regarded them as part of the state, because of the way 
they were organized under the one-party state, and thus were unconvinced 
about joining. A further factor militating against becoming a union member 
was fear on the part of employees in the private sector that they would be 
victimised or dismissed by employers.  
 
An important related point made by several officials interviewed is most trade 
unions continue to follow the check off system by taking 2% of members’ 
salaries in dues, which is ‘exorbitant’ for the majority, who are not well paid.   
The 2004 Employment and Labour Relations Act specifies that trade unions 
have the freedom to set union dues at any rates they wish, but, as one 
interviewee pointed out, ‘many, if not all unions, continue to take 2% of 
salaries, which is a major reason for non-members shying away from joining 
trade unions.’  
 
Political Issues 
The view that trade unionists are a labour aristocracy (Engels, 1999, Lenin, 
1996, Elbaum and Seltzer, 2004, Fanon, 2001, Arrighi and Saul, 1973, Saul, 
1975) and thus lack legitimacy in national policy-making processes as 
representatives of the poor, was refuted by many interviewees. TTU officials 
cited the study they had organized and funded with Hakielimu by Sumra 
(2004), which found that teachers had a low status largely because of the poor 
salaries paid to them. A teacher on Grade A at that time earned TZS 70,000 a 
month and for Sumra (2004: 33) even a 100% increase on this would ‘put the 
salary at only 150,000, which seems to be the bare minimum to live in at least 
a little comfort.’ Sumra (2004: 12) also found that teaching is increasingly 
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‘viewed as a last resort, when other options have failed’, which has lowered 
the status of teachers in their own eyes as well as those of Tanzanian citizens 
who are not part of the profession. Bearing in mind the arguments of Katz 
(1976) that a labour aristocracy is created from both structure (where good 
terms and conditions of employment are important) and agency (based on the 
perception of the labour group by others in society and by the group itself) 
then members of the TTU are anything but a labour aristocracy. Teaching is 
regarded by many Tanzanian citizens as a ‘last resort, low status and low-paid 
job’ (Towse et al, 2002: 637).  
 
Interviews also revealed that unions containing well educated and/or relatively 
highly paid members recognize commonalities with labour as a whole in 
Tanzania and have taken part in actions that are not solely based on the 
immediate concerns of members. The TTU, for example, played an active role 
in the fight to have school fees abolished at primary level and to make the 
state address the quality of education, rather than concentrating on increasing 
enrolments, numbers of teachers in training and the construction of school 
infrastructure. In addition, officials from the Tanzania Fishing Crew and Allied 
Workers Union (TAFICAWU) cited a government document on wage rates in 
the fishing industry for 2006 (URT, 2006) which imposed a salary increase 
from the original settlement between employers and TAFICAWU of 15%. The 
raised salaries ranged from TZS 59,064 per month (which was below the 
minimum wage at the time of TZS 62,000 per month) for a deck boy to TZS 
79,675 for a bosun. These salaries can be seen in the light of Suma’s argument 
two years earlier that TZS 70,000 per month as a salary for teachers hardly 
amounted to a living wage. 
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Moreover, TEWUTA, whose members are relatively well-paid workers in the 
telecommunications sector, have been active in anti-privatization campaigns 
and the struggle against the ‘anti-union’ stance of the new employers, who 
have responded by dividing telecommunications workers into separate 
categories of ‘unionizable’ and ‘non-unionizable’.  As Gramsci (1977) argued, 
such actions by civil society groups are important in increasing their 
organizational ability, which in turn raises consciousness levels and hence the 
possibility of forming and developing wider counter-hegemonic discourses. 
Dissenting ideologies and actions can emerge from groups of workers with 
relatively good terms and conditions of employment, depending on the 
particular political-economy conditions prevailing in a country. Thus, on the 
evidence of the interviews conducted with trade union officials, the labour 
aristocracy thesis is overly determinist in arguing that the more well paid the 
workers are, the less they will formulate and/or engage with counter-
hegemonic discourses.  
 
Unpublished trade union research cited by interviewees was also used to 
support criticisms of the labour aristocracy thesis. This reveals that one wage 
labourer in the formal sector in Tanzania supports between six and twenty 
family members, many of whom are self-employed rural poor. Moreover, a 
number of vulnerable, low income workers in the informal sector are either 
former union members, who lost their jobs as a result of privatization or 
relatives of current union members. Thus, as one TUCTA official put it, 
‘workers and peasants interests are closely interrelated.’ Even groups of 
workers that have obtained relatively good terms and conditions of 
employment, such as telecommunications workers, do not exhibit attitudes 
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and patterns of behaviour associated with the labour aristocracy and have not 
allied themselves with capital and/or the state to a great extent.   
 
Criticism of the labour aristocracy thesis on the grounds that it needs to pay 
more attention to both the scale and the methods of exploitation of the ‘labour 
aristocrats’ (Peace, 1975) resonates in the context of Tanzania. In the mines 
run by foreign new investors in Tanzania, where, although wages are relatively 
high 141 compared to workers in agricultural and manufacturing sectors, 
industrial relations have been largely confrontational.  TAMICO has been 
engaged in continual disputes on behalf of its members, contesting the policies 
and actions of foreign investors and the state, which the union claims, allies 
itself with the interests of management. Miners have varied their behaviour 
and tactics in the struggle with management. There are currently more than 
twenty cases before the Arbitration Commission concerning disputes between 
Barrick, the Canadian mining enterprise, which runs some of the largest mines 
in the country, and ex-employees. The level of surplus extraction in the mining 
sector is large, which has been a major cause of acrimonious labour relations, 
characterized by disputes over recognition of unions, strikes, dismissals and 
legal claims by workers against employers. 142  For example, a strike in 2007 
at the Bulyankulu Gold Mine run by Barrick, centred on the huge disparity in 
wages between Tanzanian and foreign workers. It was claimed in interviews 
that Tanzanian miners received a minimum wage of TZS 200,000 per month 
                                                           
141
  The national minimum wage in Tanzania is TZS104, 000 per month.  In 2007 Tanzanian mine workers 
received a minimum of TZS 200,000 per month (Source – TAMICO officials). The National Poverty Line 
(set in 2007) is TZS 13,998 per month (Policy Forum, 2008a). In 2007, 37.6% of all rural households were 
living below this line. 
142
  Source: Interviews with TAMICO and CHODAWU officials from 2005 – 2008. 
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while foreign workers earned TZS 24 million per month. 143  
 
Finally regarding the labour aristocracy debate, a number of trade union 
officials argued that there is a considerable presence among agricultural self-
producers and those working in the informal sector of former trade unionists, 
as well as family members of current trade unionists. This creates a sense of 
common identity among these groups.  Overall, the interviews with trade 
unionists conducted for this research confirm the validity of Post’s (2006) 
argument that the labour aristocracy thesis is not theoretically rigorous or 
supported by empirical evidence and that careful individual studies are 
needed, focusing on the objective relations pertaining between labour and 
capital, if meaningful analyses are to emerge.  
 
However, while not acting on behalf of a labour aristocracy, trade unions in 
Tanzania take part in national policy-making debates within the hegemonic 
discourse. This form of participation betokens a fundamental acceptance of the 
prevailing neo-liberal order. Thus, trade unions, which make a claim to be of, 
and for, the working class, can only be of, and for, it up to the point of a 
political challenge to the integral state.   The trade union movement has failed 
to provide such a challenge and, therefore, has to operate on terrain laid out by 
the integral state, particularly the ideological terrain. Unless the labour 
movement can formulate a concerted counter-hegemonic discourse it will 
continue to operate on the basis of economism, whereby debates focus 
narrowly on improving the terms and conditions of workers within an 
accepted hegemonic neo-liberal order.  
                                                           
143
  Source: Interviews with TAMICO officials, 5 September, 2008. 
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Key Trade Union Relationships 
Trade unions have traditionally operated in a tripartite system in Tanzania, 
where their key relationships are with the state and Employers Associations. 
However, the neo-liberal era has witnessed the rise of other major 
development agents, which affect the work of trade unions. The most 
significant of these are NGOs and new investors in the privatized economy. 
Relationships with these two groups have thus become increasingly important 
for trade unions, with the latter rivalling Employers Associations as major 
representatives of the interests of capital. The findings show juxtaposition 
between the attitudes of old guard trade union officials and those of the new 
guard towards new investors and NGOs. Recently appointed TUCTA officials 
were more ready to accept these groups as ‘social partners’ rather than the old 
guard, who categorize them as adversaries. 
 
Senior officials at TUCTA were understandably circumspect when discussing 
trade union relations with the state. For such officials, the state always sides 
with the interests of capital in general, not just the employers associations in 
the post-liberalization era. Capitalists work in tandem with the state to ‘force 
through laws which are favourable to businesses and are at the expense of 
workers’ was the way one TUCTA official put it. All the old guard TUCTA 
officials saw the state as wanting to control unions in the interests of capital 
rather than negotiate with them fairly. They cited the many years of union 
emasculation by the state after independence as a strong influence on this 
view. These officials all argue that the state had not changed its attitude to 
unions following 1998 and paid only lip service to their views, while allowing 
new investors to dictate the terms of their entry into the Tanzanian labour 
 238 
 
market. For old guard TUCTA officials, these state attitudes make the work of 
the Employers Association and new investors easy, as it knows the state sides 
with capital against labour in disputes. 
 
New guard TUCTA officials were less equivocal in their opinion of employers 
associations and employers in general. One such official stated that trade 
unions are learning to see employers as ‘social partners’ and to take part in 
‘social dialogue’, rather than regarding them as exploiters. This view has been 
put forward as the most constructive way for unions to envisage their 
relationship with representatives of capital at one of the annual courses run by 
the Office of the Registrar, showing that the state is actively promoting a 
business unionism approach in post-liberalization Tanzania. The fact that, at 
head office, some of the new guard officials interviewed have internalized the 
discourse of business unionism was revealed by their acceptance of the 
concept of the state and employers  as ‘social partners’ of workers. One 
interviewee stated that the trade union movement must not just engage, but 
also ‘proactively initiate meaningful dialogue with the state and employers as 
social partners.’ Thus, such leaders are operating within the hegemonic 
discourse, thereby strengthening the core elements of the integral state. By the 
same token the chances of a substantive challenge to state hegemony emerging 
from the rank-and-file are weakened, since they absorb only a hegemonic 
discourse from their union leaders rather than an ideological challenge to the 
discourse of neo-liberalism. 
 
The most commonly expressed view from officials at TUCTA-affiliated 
unions concerning trade union relations with the state was that the President 
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talks positively about the rights of workers 144 and about the role of trade 
unions, but these exhortations do not move beyond the rhetorical and there has 
been no discernible improvements in the position of labour since he came to 
power. As the interviews progressed, many officials tended to become more 
open and expressed the view that the state is too close to the new investors and 
has done little to assist workers.  
 
The relationship between development NGOs and trade unions in general has 
been characterized by a large measure of distrust (Leather, 2005, Spooner, 
2004). In the case of Tanzania, the interviews revealed that NGOs are 
regarded with a mixture of suspicion and envy by trade union officials, who 
perceive an increasing ‘NGOization’ of development work, which is cutting 
into areas where the labour movement has traditionally been active.  
 
The most commonly made point was that both donors and the state favour 
NGOs over trade unions. None of the interviewees made distinctions between 
types of NGOs.  Although Baraza La Wanawake, Hakielimu and the National 
Youth Council had all been deregistered (or threatened with deregistration) as 
NGOs by the state following disputes, 145 NGOs were invariably perceived as 
a homogenous group, which had harmonious relationships with the state and 
international donor agencies.  It was also argued by the vast majority of 
interviewees that NGOs are more fashionable and popular than trade unions, 
that NGOs duplicate the work of trade unions, that NGOs have better contacts 
than trade unions and that NGOs are upwardly accountable to donors, while 
                                                           
144
  For example, the President has made direct calls to employers to increase salaries in low paid sectors, such 
as textiles (The Citizen, 2006) but claimed that TUCTA’s demands concerning the raising of the minimum 
wage in 2010 were unrealistic and impossible to meet. 
145
  See chapter 6. 
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trade unions are downwardly accountable to members. With regard to NGO 
duplication of trade union work, an official argued that there is a danger that 
the situation in Tanzania might replicate that in Kenya, where NGOs have 
been encroaching on the work of labour organizations with no mandate but 
some success. NGOs have been quite successful in working to protect the 
rights of domestic servants, for example, while trade unions argue that they 
are more legitimate as representatives of this group. Another trade union 
official pointed out that Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP) has 
campaigned vigorously for the rights of women in the workplace, the Legal 
and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) has fought for basic employment rights for 
workers and the Savings and Credit Co-operative Organization (SACCOS) has 
addressed legal issues concerning children, the disabled and the elderly. Such 
activities have led to a loss of space for the labour movement, which trade 
unions are becoming increasingly aware of, as more NGOs obtain finance to 
run high profile programmes in the areas of child labour and HIV/AIDS, while 
funding proposals for such work from trade unions are rejected. 
 
TRAWU officials, for example, pointed out that they had specialist knowledge 
of how HIV/AIDS was spread along railway routes and was leading to a high 
incidence of the disease amongst their members. Despite making this clear in 
funding proposals to different donor groups their applications had been 
rejected. At the same time, NGOs with little specialist knowledge of key 
issues concerning HIV/AIDS in Tanzania had received funding from the same 
donors to run projects and programmes. However, one trade union official 
made the point that no trade union had set up its own internal unit to address 
issues relating to HIV/AIDS, despite considerable losses of trade union 
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members to the disease. This official argued that trade unions would stand 
more chance of both getting funds to address issues concerning HIV/AIDS 
amongst members and using them effectively if they started their own work in 
the area, rather than looking immediately for help from donors. This would 
also lead to union leaders getting more respect from rank-and-file members, 
who regard the many donor-funded projects and programmes in Tanzania as 
gravy trains for local budget holders, who run projects with negligible 
transparency and accountability. 
 
Another issue clouding the relationship between trade unions and NGOs 
outlined by TUCTA officials is state ring-fencing of funds for ‘civil society 
development’ and then giving it only to NGOs. Trade unions were told they 
were not eligible to apply for these funds. TUCTA officials pointed out that 
the refusal of funding prevented capacity building on the part of the labour 
movement and, thus, hindered their ability to challenge state hegemony. 
Through its control of funding mechanisms the state is able to manipulate civil 
society into a form it finds acceptable. In this way, legal-bureaucratic 
measures are employed to strengthen the integral state and to weaken 
opportunities for a counter-hegemonic discourse to be formulated by trade 
unions. Moreover, control over funding mechanisms in this way shows the 
close connections between the state, civil society and ideology. Through its 
power over finance, needed by associational groups to operate meaningfully in 
post-liberalization Tanzania, the state is able to reformulate which groups are 
included in civil society, and which excluded. The exclusion of trade unions 
by the state as an organization eligible to apply for funds from a tranche set up 
in the post-liberalization period with the specific aim of ‘developing’ civil 
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society reveals their marginalization within a hegemonic discourse driven by 
the ideology of neo-liberalism. 
 
TUCTA-affiliated trade unions do little work with NGOs. Only one trade 
union works regularly with NGOs. TPAWU works with NGOs in the UK, 
Holland and Germany on issues concerning pesticide control, the cut flower 
industry and Occupational Health and Safety. The Head of Research, Planning 
and Credit at TPAWU contributes to the sector publication (GOHNET) and 
argues that other trade unions should take this route and involve trained people 
in a wide variety of activities. CHODAWU had worked with a local NGO on a 
child labour project that was praised by officials as a ‘good partner.’ The 
problem with the project from the union point of view was its sustainability; a 
limited budget and time period for the project meant that the children who 
were taken from their places of work and reintegrated into the school system 
were not going to be supported until they had finished at primary level. The 
only way to make the project sustainable was to get more funding but 
applications were refused. Moreover, the TTU has done joint research with 
Hakielimu. 146 The work of TPAWU, CHODAWU and the TTU with NGOs is 
unusual. Most TUCTA-affiliated trade unions work occasionally with NGOs 
(53%) or never (33%). Many officials of TUCTA-affiliated trade unions were 
negative in their attitude to NGOs and did not show interest in learning how to 
raise funds by replicating their strategies, despite the fact that almost half of 
all the interviewees from the labour movement argued that ‘NGOs are better at 
raising funds than trade unions.’  
                                                           
146
  The two organizations collaborated to do research, leading to the publication of ‘The Living and Working 
Conditions of Teachers in Tanzania’ (Sumra, 2004).  
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Donors are regarded by TUCTA-affiliated trade union officials as preferring 
NGOs to trade unions. This point was made by officials at the TTU, who saw 
different sides of NGO work. The efforts of Hakielimu in highlighting 
education issues in the country were praised but it was also argued that NGOs 
lack popular accountability, in contrast to trade unions. Moreover, NGOs are 
seen as more aggressive than trade unions in their work and in pursuing 
relationships with other key agents of development, notably the state. An 
official from the General Secretary of TUICO captured the views of many 
trade unionists in asserting that ‘NGOs chase donors much more widely and 
aggressively than trade unions.’ Corruption in the NGO sector and the 
prevalence of ‘briefcase NGOs,’ in particular, was also an issue raised by a 
number of trade union officials, one of whom contended that many ‘NGOs do 
not work. The leaders get funds from donors … but they do not use them in 
the regions. They keep the funds for themselves.’  
 
Non TUCTA-affiliated trade unions have very few contacts with NGOs. 
Eighty three per cent of interviewees from non TUCTA-affiliated trade unions 
reported that their union had never worked with an NGO. Officials at one of 
the largest non-TUCTA affiliated trade unions argued that NGOs have no 
membership and are included in national debates through ‘making more noise’ 
than trade unions.  
 
A different view was put forward by one of the new guard TUCTA officials 
interviewed, who was concerned about the suspicion many trade unionists 
have about NGOs and argued that the unions must actively forge links with 
them to strengthen the overall work of the civil society sector in Tanzania. 
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Such connections are important for this official, as trade unions can use them 
to learn how NGOs act effectively in pursuance of their own interests when 
working with international donors and state officials, as well as using the 
media to their advantage and pursuing funding sources efficiently. A related 
argument was made by another official in an interview, who pointed out that 
trade unions wrongly have not forged links with, or learnt skills from, the 
influential professional associations in the country. 147  
 
NGOs are attractive potentially as partners for trade unions wishing to move 
to a social movement unionism strategy, through their financial capacity and 
closeness to the donors and the state. However, the findings from this research 
indicate that mutual suspicion between NGO and trade union officials makes 
close collaboration problematic. The main reasons for this mutual suspicion 
are summarized in Table 5.3 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
147
  Influential professional associations include notably the University of Dar es Salaam Staff Association 
(UDASA), the professional association of teachers, Kitaaluma cha Walimu Tanzania (CHAKIWATA) and 
the Tanzania Registered Nurses Association (TARENA).  
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   Table 5.3 Barriers to Effective NGO-Trade Union Collaboration in Tanzania 
Issue NGO Perception of Trade Unions Trade Union Perception of 
NGOs 
Accountability Narrow accountability base – to 
members only. Do not represent the 
rank-and-file effectively. Poor 
methods of communication with 
members. Top down ethos. 
No popular accountability, thus 
no democratic mandate. Not 
membership organizations. 
Impose themselves on 
constituencies Focus on 
upward accountability to 
donors. 
Transparency Do not make information and 
accounts readily available to 
members. 
Produce reports and accounts 
for donors but not for intended 
beneficiaries. 
Roots in 
Tanzanian 
Society 
Historically linked closely to the 
state. Have alienated the workers as 
a result. Still living in the past era 
of the One Party State. 
No roots in Tanzanian society, 
so do not understand their 
constituencies.  
Corruption Lack of transparency and top down 
way of operating make corruption 
likely and difficult to detect. 
Endemic corruption in NGO 
sector – many ‘briefcase’ 
NGOs. NGO and state sectors 
inextricably interlinked. Thus, 
rent seeking a major 
motivation for forming NGOs. 
Modus Operandi Reactive, bureaucratic, inflexible. Aggressive, insensitive, overly 
self-confident. 
Participation Unwilling to share ideas with other 
CSOs. 
Participate largely in work with 
donors and the state. 
Funding Limited, as it comes mainly from 
members. 
From international donors, so 
NGO orientation and 
accountability upward. 
   Source: McQuinn (2011) 
 
Trade unions feel frustrated that ‘new [mainly foreign] investors treat them 
and the workers with contempt. However, they are being exhorted by the 
donors and the state to adopt a business unionism approach, based on treating 
the new investors as social partners with whom they can engage in a mutually 
beneficial social dialogue, as part of embracing the new policy agenda. The 
role of new investors in Tanzania is perceived as threatening by the majority 
of both old guard and new guard TUCTA officials. The flouting of national 
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laws by new investors was a significant factor contributing to this view, whilst 
the provision of poor working conditions and loss of jobs through the capital 
intensive nature of work provided were also of major concern. For one senior 
official at TUCTA the Tanzanian state has ‘signalled to foreign investors that 
they could forgo the labour movement’. The state is aware that the mass 
dismissals of workers that followed the imposition of SAPs led to a rise in 
unemployment in Tanzania, culminating in more crime and social instability 
and, thus, threatened state credibility. Consequently, there is little political will 
to confront ‘new foreign investors’ which ignore labour legislation, such as 
minimum wage rates. A TUCTA official summed up this point by stating that 
labour ‘laws are relaxed and not enforced for fear of FDI being withdrawn by 
these new investors.’ 
 
Officials of TUCTA-affiliated trade unions have an overwhelmingly negative 
view of the role of new investors in Tanzania. Ironically, it is perceived by 
many interviewees that new investors create unemployment, through 
providing mostly capital intensive work and using foreign managers and 
technicians. It is also argued that new investors provide poor working 
conditions for employees, that their operations lack transparency and that they 
are anti-union. TAMICO had the most negative views of new investors in the 
mining sector, with Barrick being singled out as a particularly bad employer in 
its provision of working conditions and its attitude to trade unions. ‘Every 
time TAMICO gets into a position to form a CBA, Barrick terminates the 
agreement’ was how one TAMICO official summed up dealings with the 
company. Labour disputes are also common at other gold mines. On 19 May 
2011, just after Kikwete had spoken out against exploitation of mineworkers 
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in his May Day speech, two TAMICO leaders working at the Geita Gold Mine 
were suspended. TAMICO, and then TUCTA officials at head office, claimed 
the suspension was a result of their work in trying to recruit union members. 
They were supported in this claim by evidence from a report on conditions at 
the mine compiled by the Legal and Human Rights Centre.  
 
The situation at the Geita Gold Mine highlighted a significant wider issue for 
trade unions in post-liberalization Tanzania. First, it was an NGO that 
compiled the report on conditions at the mine. A major problem for trade 
unions is their own lack of detailed evidence-based research on new investors. 
On one hand, lack of transparency on the part of both state and the new 
investors is an issue. Though the different percentages of royalties received by 
the Tanzanian state for various types of minerals extracted by foreign investors 
are known, full details of the terms and conditions of contracts negotiated 
between the state and foreign enterprises are not put into the public domain or 
made accessible to trade union officials. On the other hand unions lack the 
financial and organizational ability at present to undertake research on the 
terms and conditions whereby new investors enter key sectors of the 
Tanzanian economy (notably, mining and tourism). Such research would be 
very useful as the basis of potential challenges to the state and the donor 
positions on the impacts of new investors on the labour force in Tanzania. 
Interviewees criticized the new investors in Tanzania on several key grounds; 
excessive subcontracting of work, which is leading to the casualization of the 
workforce, failing to honour negotiated CBAs and giving jobs to Tanzanian 
nationals on significantly worse terms and conditions of employment than 
those contained in contracts awarded to foreigners with equivalent skills and 
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qualifications. However, unions have done little, if any, recent specific 
research themselves on any of these key areas and thus have no quantifiable 
evidence to support their views. Moreover, the fact that TAMICO, and 
subsequently TUCTA, had to rely on a study by an NGO (LHRC) in putting 
their case over suspended members provided concrete evidence of how a 
concerted move to adopt a social movement unionism approach could make 
the work of trade unions more effective in the post-liberalization era. 
 
A nationalist discourse ran strongly through the interviews, grounded in 
opposition to perceived exploitation of Tanzanian labour and resources by new 
foreign investors in lucrative sectors of the economy, particularly mining. The 
wisdom of Nyerere’s (1976) argument that minerals should be left untouched 
until they could be used for the benefit of all Tanzanians, was constantly cited 
by interviewees. The rise of this discourse on the part of the labour movement 
is problematic for the donors, the state and representatives of capital. This 
research showed that the donors, the state and the new investors in Tanzania 
clearly want trade unions to embrace a business unionism approach, since this 
neutralises their ability to deploy nationalist vocabulary within a counter-
hegemonic political discourse. By deploying such a tactic trade unions 
threaten to transcend the state’s monopoly of the discourse of national 
liberation in Tanzania. The argument on the part of trade unions that they are 
the guardians of national assets and the interests of workers, while the state is 
prioritising the interests of foreign capitalists, who are appropriating national 
assets and exploiting Tanzanian labour, provides the basis of a substantive 
counter-hegemonic challenge to the prevailing orthodoxy.  
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Furthermore, this nationalist discourse clearly strikes a chord with the wider 
citizenry in Tanzania. In contrast, the endorsement of a business unionism 
approach would locate the labour movement in post-liberalization Tanzania 
firmly within the hegemonic neo-liberal discourse.  Thus, the adoption by the 
Tanzanian labour movement of a business unionism or a social movement 
unionism approach is a vital issue. 148 While some of the new guard officials at 
TUCTA head office and at individual trade unions used the discourse of 
business unionism in interviews (for example, by referring to the state and 
employers as ‘social partners’), a majority indicated that social movement 
unionism is the best direction for the labour movement. While interviewees 
did not use the term ‘social movement unionism’ explicitly during interviews, 
a considerable number stated that pursuing union strategies in conjunction 
with other civil society organizations should be an important part of the work 
of the Tanzanian labour movement. 
 
As part of tentative steps towards forming a social movement unionism 
strategy, trade unions are starting to ally themselves with marginalized groups 
in the economy, particularly workers in the informal sector, women and youth. 
All the senior officials at TUCTA stressed in interviews the importance of 
working with these three groups and TUCTA agreed from 2008 to elect a 
delegate from the Youth Wing onto the National Executive. The Gender and 
Youth Department was started at TUCTA in 1986 and gathered a great deal of 
baseline data on the position of women in the labour force. Using this data to 
highlight women’s issues was difficult during the late 1980s and the 1990s as 
                                                           
148
  This is not to exclude the possibility that the labour movement could adopt a revolutionary unionism 
approach at some stage in the future. However, during the interviews, such an approach was not considered 
either possible or desirable by any of the respondents. 
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TUCTA was male-dominated and, according to an official from the Gender 
and Youth Department, ‘men laughed when women’s issues were raised at 
union meetings.’ The same official outlined how the situation has improved 
from 2000 onwards and now all trade unions have an official gender policy 
and three unions (TTU, TPAWU and RAAWU) have a budget allocation for 
women’s issues. TUCTA has set a target with no time limit for 30% of the 
total trade union membership to be female.  
 
However, these moves cannot be seen as originating from trade unions. 
Instead they reflect donor-driven mainstreaming of gender and youth issues 
across civil society and the Tanzanian state.  Despite the top-down nature of 
the way these issues have been pushed up the agenda, adopting a Gramscian 
framework provides insights into the way trade unions could adopt them to 
form counter-hegemonic discourses. A central point of the Gramscian analysis 
(Gramsci, 2011b,1994, 1977) is that the struggle for hegemony is fluid, with 
both the state and civil society organizations (albeit from different positions of 
structural power) able to seize on changing processes or new initiatives and 
promulgate versions of them as realizing the aims of universal benefit for 
society. There is, from this perspective, the chance for gender or youth issues 
to become a focus for counter-hegemonic discourses. 
 
These measures on the part of trade unions towards embracing social 
movement unionism have important implications for their mode of 
participation in national policy-making processes. Social movement unionism 
is predicated on substantive collaboration between trade unions and other civil 
society organizations, which is not occurring in Tanzania at present. The 
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interviews reveal the opposite to be the case. That is, trade unionists in general 
regard other types of civil society organizations, particularly NGOs, with 
suspicion and do little collaborative work with them. Thus, there is a clear 
disconnect between the stated aim of moving towards social movement 
unionism and the current state of the relationship between trade unions and 
other civil society organizations in Tanzania.  
 
5.9     Summary 
This chapter highlighted significant theoretical, structural and ideological 
problems facing Tanzanian trade unions, which have negatively affected their 
participation in national policy-making processes, and led to the 
marginalization in post-liberalization Tanzania. Unless unions can draw on 
their experience under colonialism of social movement unionism (when they 
worked successfully with TANU and the co-operative movement) 149 they are 
unlikely to be able to effectively fight state and corporate reorganization of 
labour in the post-liberalization period. The research shows that unions are 
caught in a contradictory situation, where an increasing number of union 
officials are advocating the need for a move towards the adoption of social 
movement unionism, but at the same time are distrustful of having close 
relationships with other civil society organizations and lack a sense of 
common purpose with them. In addition, trade unions are viewed with 
suspicion by other civil society groups, due to their close association with the 
state in pre-liberalization Tanzania. Thus, the chances of trade unions being 
instrumental in the formation of a historic bloc of oppositional groups, which 
could provide a substantive challenge to the prevailing neo-liberal order are 
                                                           
149
  See chapter 3. 
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slight at present. While the fieldwork for this research revealed that trade 
unions do represent a relatively small percentage of the total labour force, it is 
difficult to sustain the labour aristocracy thesis in the case of Tanzania. The 
attitudes, behaviour and actions of unions show a heterogeneity that casts 
doubt on the validity of the labour aristocracy thesis. The research showed that 
it is important to examine the objective conditions that make a certain stance 
towards capital likely to be adopted by the workforce. The most important of 
the structural problems facing trade unions is insufficient capacity, which, in 
turn, leads to a lack of legitimacy. The majority of interviewees made the point 
that the shortage of financial capacity in the trade union movement is severely 
restricting the ability of officials to build technical and institutional capability. 
The IFIs and the state regard labour organizations as a disruptive presence in 
national policy-making processes and, consequently, attempt to erode their 
legitimacy. Furthermore, trade unionists are concerned that their legitimacy is 
being compromised by lack of downward accountability. That is, they have 
ineffective contact with the rank-and-file membership and are, thus, unable to 
represent their concerns effectively. 
 
In addition to the recognition of structural problems, there is a concern on the 
part of many trade unionists about the lack of a coherent ideology in the 
movement. While trade unions in the post-liberalization era have protested 
against the negative effects on workers of neo-liberal economic policies, a 
considerable number of officials argue that the movement needs to work out 
an ideology based on an overall vision of the role of the labour movement in 
Tanzanian society, rather than being reactive and taking predominantly 
piecemeal actions, as is currently the case. These findings reveal the strength 
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of the Gramscian perspective on the nature of civil society-state relations, 
wherein the struggle for hegemony is fluid and contingent on the visions, 
capacities and motivations of associational groups, such as trade unions. These 
key factors in turn shape possibilities for such groups to promulgate counter-
hegemonic views to those of the prevailing neo-liberal power bloc. Struggles 
organized by unions, even on a piecemeal basis, can be important in 
developing the consciousness, the resolve and the organizational ability 
necessary to formulate and then sustain a counter-hegemonic discourse. Thus, 
the abortive general strike organized by TUCTA in 2010, TAMICO-organized 
industrial action in the Bulyankulu Gold Mine, anti-privatization struggles, co-
ordinated by TEWUTA, in the telecommunications sector and conflict 
between the state and the TPU over strategies to develop the tourism sector 
show that a wider vision on the part of trade unions, regarding their role, is 
starting to emerge in Tanzania following the shocks to the labour movement 
resulting from the profound structural changes it has undergone in the neo-
liberal era. These actions could lead to trade unionists, and the wider citizenry, 
becoming more aware of alternatives to neo-liberal hegemony.   
 
Regarding theoretical debates, the fieldwork findings showed that the 
prevailing liberal conception of civil society (see chapter 2), predicated on a 
consensus model, whereby relations between associational groups and the 
state are regarded as harmonious, has little explanatory strength in Tanzania. 
The actions of trade unions in post-liberalization Tanzania highlighted the 
strengths of analysing civil society within a Gramscian framework, since it 
allows insights into how some trade union actions and ideologies are 
confronting the prevailing order. While trade unions lack an overall vision, 
 254 
 
and have not systematically set out a counter-hegemonic discourse to the 
dominant neo-liberal perspective driven by the donors and the core elements 
of the integral state, it is possible that new strategies and increasing 
organizational ability will emerge from their practical struggles and actions. 
An important aspect of the Gramscian view is that institutional organization is 
more important than ideology in the struggle for hegemony. 150 Therefore, the 
more actions are co-ordinated by individual trade unions and/or the national 
federation, the greater the possibility for the labour movement to develop and 
to effectively present the ‘particularity’ of its counter-hegemonic views as 
beneficial for Tanzanian society as a whole and the more its organizational 
ability will increase. However, power currently lies overwhelmingly with 
capital vis-à-vis labour in Tanzania and, therefore, the development of new 
strategies and actions by unions are thus of paramount importance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
150
  See chapter 2. 
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Chapter 6  
NGOs, Trade Unions and the PRSP Process in Tanzania 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the ways in which NGOs and trade unions have taken 
part in the Tanzanian Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process, from 
its inception in 1999 until the end of its second phase in 2010, in order to 
illustrate wider and deeper issues relating to the participation of civil society 
organizations in the post-liberalization era. An overview of PRSPs is provided 
to highlight the key role for civil society organizations, which is stressed by 
the donors driving the process. This is followed by a summary of supportive 
(World Bank, 2010d, for example) and critical (Harrison, 2010a, for example) 
perspectives on PRSPs in terms of their ability to reduce poverty and stimulate 
viable development trajectories. An assessment is subsequently made of the 
Tanzanian PRSP, drawing on key background events and issues that 
contextualize the current engagement of NGOs and trade unions in the 
process. Fieldwork findings, based on interviews with NGO and trade union 
officials (as well as the Registrar of Trade Unions at the Ministry of Labour), 
are then discussed. The analysis focuses in detail on the processes and 
ideologies through which a small number of NGOs have come to occupy 
cardinal positions within the PRSP matrix, while trade unions have been 
largely excluded. Obtaining positions of strategic significance in 
superstructure institutions is vital to winning the war of position (Gramsci, 
2011b). Institutions of strategic importance can be used as a fountain-head by 
civil society organizations from which to present ideologies as representing 
the universal societal good. This is why gaining control of key institutions and 
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policy instruments is, for oppositional civil society groups, more important in 
winning the war of position than the quality or detail of the ideology they 
promulgate (Gramsci, 2011b). It is only by exercising intellectual and moral 
leadership (see chapter 1) as part of a historic bloc that oppositional groups 
can win the war of position and become capable of establishing a new 
ideological settlement.  Thus, the Tanzanian PRSP, as a key policy instrument 
for the state and the donors, was selected as a case study regarding the ways in 
which civil society groups contest strategic policy spaces. Concerning the 
former, Tanzania became one of the first countries to complete the requisite 
steps under the PRSP process enabling the country to obtain substantive debt 
relief and a further tranche of official development assistance. 151 Regarding 
the latter, the PRSP process has become the touchstone for the harmonization 
of aid to the extent that by 2003 it provided the ‘policy framework for all 
donors’ (DAC, 2003: 7).  The PRSP receives more financial as well as other 
forms of support from external donors than any other national policy 
instrument in Tanzania. 152 A fast-track PRSP for Tanzania was endorsed by 
the IFIs in 2000 with a second generation initiative, known by its Swahili 
acronym, MKUKUTA, put into operation in 2005. 153 Currently (2011), 
Tanzania’s third generation PRSP (URT, 2010b) is being rolled out. Thus, in 
the short to medium term, the initiative is likely to remain a key driver of 
                                                           
151
  See chapter 3. 
152
  See chapter 3. 
153
  The first PRSP (1999-2004) was called PRSP I. The second PRSP (2005-2010) was given the Swahili 
name - Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini- and is most commonly known by the acronym 
MKUKUTA. It is translated into English as National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty 
(NSGRP).  The third PRSP (2010-2015) is called MKUKUTA II or NSGRP II.  State documents in English 
sometimes use MKUKUTA and on other occasions NSGRP. MKUZA is the Swahili acronym for the PRSP 
on Zanzibar - Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kupunguza Umaskini Zanzibar. 
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economic and social policies at national level.  The fieldwork findings 
revealed that NGOs have not used their position of dominance as civil society 
representatives within the PRSP process to formulate counter-hegemonic 
discourses. Their views are disseminated largely within a framework created 
and controlled by the core elements of the integral state in alliance with the 
donors. Regarding trade unions, the IFIs at first ignored them and then 
carefully managed their mode of participation in the PRSP process, in general. 
The state mirrored this strategy concerning the way trade unions have taken 
part in the Tanzanian PRSP process. However, agency has been a significant 
factor regarding trade union participation, in that a small number of officials 
from the labour movement have made articulate and forceful contributions to 
debates concerning PRSP issues. These contributions were not part of a 
formulated trade union strategy and have been managed by the state and the 
donors in ways that minimize the opportunities for them to be developed into 
counter-hegemonic discourses. Given the substantive amount of control 
exercised over the PRSP process by the state and the donors, it is unlikely that 
NGOs or trade unions could use positions of strategic importance within its 
structures to formulate a sustainable counter-hegemonic discourse.           
 
6.2 Overview of the Role of Civil Society in the PRSP Process 
Since their origin in 1999, the key development actors driving the 
liberalization process in Tanzania (the World Bank, the IMF and major 
bilateral donors) have acknowledged PRSPs as the requisite policy framework 
within which to deliver assistance and to deal with recipient states. 154  PRSPs 
replaced Policy Framework Papers (PFPs) as the required statement of 
                                                           
154
  Recipient states have been renamed as ‘partners’ in the PRSP process. 
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recipient state objectives for purposes of adjustment lending by the IMF and 
concessional credits from the World Bank. Moreover, bilateral donors have 
increasingly set up or rearranged Country Programmes with reference to 
PRSPs. DFID (2003: 3), for example, tries to ‘align its own country 
programmes with PRS[P]s and to influence other donors to do the same.’ Civil 
society organizations have also paid significant attention to PRSPs, producing 
summaries (Bretton Woods Project, 2003), critiques (Oxfam, 2004, Rowden 
and Irama (ActionAid), 2004, O’Malley, (Save the Children) 2004, Malaluan 
and Guttal, (Focus on the Global South), 2003) and websites, such as ‘PRSP-
Watch’ (VENRO). 
  
 According to the IFIs, PRSPs should be country-driven to promote national 
ownership and comprehensive in terms of analysing poverty. They also need 
to be based on partnerships formed through coordinated mass participation of 
stakeholders (which entails a substantive role for civil society), results-
oriented and long-term in their approach to poverty reduction (IMF, 2010: 1).  
The World Bank (2010d) states that there is no blueprint for a PRSP and the 
individual circumstances of each country must be recognised. However, IFI 
prescription is apparent through the listing, by the World Bank, of four key 
steps to be taken in the process of drawing up a PRSP.  First, there should be a 
full description of the participatory process used. Second, an outline of the 
ways in which poverty has been diagnosed, recognising the multidimensional 
nature of the concept, should be set out. Third, clearly presented and costed 
priorities for macroeconomic, structural and social policies are necessary, so 
that ‘wish lists’ are avoided. Finally, it is important to create appropriate 
targets, indicators and systems for monitoring and evaluating progress (Booth, 
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2005, Booth and Lucas, 2002). Thus, PRSPs (which according to the World 
Bank (2010d) should be drawn up every three to five years) require recipient 
states to follow certain procedural steps rather than accepting specific policies. 
This aims to create a greater commitment to poverty reduction than was the 
case with previous forms of conditional lending. In sum, PRSPs represent a 
move from ‘policy conditionality’ to ‘process conditionality’ (Morrissey, 2005, 
Killick, 2004, Booth, 2003a).  
 
The move from SAPs 155 to PRSPs reflects the broader shift from the policies 
of the Washington Consensus to those of the Post-Washington Consensus in 
the latter half of the 1990s (see chapter 1). 156 This raises the question of the 
extent to which the PRSP process commits participating states to new and/or 
different methods of governance, as is claimed by the IFIs. Much has been 
written on what PRSPs are supposed to achieve with regard to poverty 
reduction and national development and about the way civil society 
organizations should be included in the process (in general and technicist 
terms) from the point of view of the donors (IMF, 2010, 2004, World Bank, 
2010a, 2010b, 2005b, 2004b). Such views put a stress on the core concepts of 
the donor discourse – partnership, ownership, participation, capacity building, 
dialogue and good governance.  For example, with regard to its relationships 
with civil society, the World Bank (2005a: 51) concentrates on increasing 
dialogue and consultations with the trade union movement, ‘including 
technical level meetings on policy issues of mutual interest, such as … 
                                                           
155
  See chapters 3, 4 and 5 for an analysis of the effects of SAPs on Tanzania, economically, politically and 
socially. 
156
  See, inter alia, Serra, Spiegel and Stiglitz, 2008, Stiglitz 2008, Williamson, 2008, Fine, 2006, van 
Waeyenberge, 2006 for examinations of key aspects of the shift from the Washington Consensus to the Post-
Washington Consensus. 
 260 
 
PRSPs.’ Critiques have tended to focus on wide conceptualizations of the 
process (Craig and Porter, 2006, 2003, Zack-Williams and Mohan, 2005, 
Booth, 2003a, Stewart and Wang, 2003) and structural and systemic obstacles 
to effective participation and ownership on the part of civil society, such as 
donor refusal to allow debate on macroeconomic policies and shortage of time 
to engage meaningfully with the main issues (Dewachter, 2007, Oxfam, 2004, 
Whaites, 2000). These broad-based conceptions of the mechanisms of the 
PRSP process have led to well-argued perspectives emerging on the inclusion 
of associational groups. (Gould, 2005, for example shows how civil society 
has been instrumentalized).  However, in depth studies of what is happening in 
particular countries with regard to the inclusion and exclusion in the PRSP 
process of certain types of civil society organizations, focusing on their 
perspectives, are lacking (Fraser, 2005).   
 
Much of the debate on PRSPs centres on what effects the linking of 
participation and ownership are having on economic, political and social 
policies in recipient countries, since the focus on these two concepts is cited 
by the IFIs as evidence of an advancement on the one-size-fits-all neo-liberal 
policies which characterized the preceding period of SAPs (World Bank, 
2010d, IMF, 2010, Wilks and Lefrancois, 2002). The way participation and 
ownership are connected in the PRSP process with regard to the involvement 
of civil society is pertinent, since:   
 
‘the importance attached to country ownership and civil society 
participation, and the attention given to the voices of the poor, have all 
been met with enthusiasm as important steps in improving the design 
and implementation of policies needed to accelerate development and 
reduce poverty’ (UNCTAD, 2002: 57).  
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Since participation and ownership are the core concepts behind the donor 
vision for the PRSP process, the initiative is an important testing ground, 
within which their limits, as imposed by external donors (as drivers) and states 
(as owners), can be analysed. Whether or not the stress on country ownership 
and mass participation of stakeholders in PRSP processes can be regarded as 
indicating a long-term change in policy orientation on the part of the IMF and 
the World Bank, and a willingness to accept policy heterodoxy from recipient 
countries, has become a matter of contention (Harrison, 2010a, Dewachter, 
2007, Craig and Porter, 2006, 2003, Gould, 2005, Fraser, 2005, Zack-Williams 
and Mohan, 2005, Gottschalk, 2004, Booth, 2003a, Stewart and Wang, 2003, 
Whaites, 2000). An examination of the reasons for the implementation of 
PRSPs sheds some light on this debate. First, the PRSP initiative emerged out 
of the need for new instruments to justify the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) initiative, aimed at debt reduction. To qualify for HIPC, recipient 
countries must draw up a PRSP, outlining how they intend to fight poverty, as 
well as the goals, priorities and instruments involved. Second, evidence 
pointed to poor poverty-reduction outcomes in many aid-dependent countries 
prior to 1999. Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pederson (2003: 285) state 
that even ‘the most convinced advocates of foreign aid have had to 
acknowledge that the results have often been disappointing and have not at all 
lived up to expectations.’ Aid dependency had become institutionalised 
through high volumes, with Tanzania being a case in point (See the analysis in 
chapter 3 and Engel, Erdmann and Mehler eds, 2006). 157 Aid had also led to 
the loss of public planning and implementation capacity because of the 
                                                           
157
 A number of writers have outlined how the institutionalization of aid dependency is a major cause of the 
ineffectiveness of aid in Africa. See, for example, Gumede, 2009, Glennie, 2008. 
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dominance of a project-based model (which failed) as it diverted attention 
away from the processes of development management in the recipient country 
and incentives for officials to spend time on reforming strategic thinking at the 
centre were undermined (White and Dijkstra, 2003). Moreover, the dominance 
of project aid fitted easily into the prevailing system of patron-client relations 
and helped to fuel it institutionally (Moyo, 2010, Easterly, 2006, Bauer, 1976). 
The recognition of these factors led to greater analysis during the 1990s of 
how to make the national policy context conducive to aid effectiveness (De 
Renzio and Krafchik, 2008, Brautigam and Knack, 2004, Van de Walle, Ball 
and Ramachandran (eds), 2003). Research in this area influenced donor moves 
toward sector-wide approaches (Brown et al, 2001, Foster, 2000) and 
‘partnership general budgetary support’ (PGBS) during the late 1990s, where a 
relationship based on cooperation between donors and recipients can be 
‘contrasted with the imposed conditionality of the structural adjustment era’ 
(Dom, 2007: 1). Third, PRSPs were created in response to the increasing 
amount of evidence that emerged during the 1990s showing the limits of 
conventional conditionalities, particularly those associated with SAPs, in 
levering positive change (Stein, 2008, Killick, 2002, Leandro et al., 1999, 
Mohan, Brown, Millward and Zack-Williams, 1999, Hussain and Faruqee 
(eds), 1994, Mahjoub (ed.), 1990). Stein (2008: 4) outlined how the 
consequences of SAPs in Africa were ‘terrible’ in both economic and social 
terms, evidenced by an increase in absolute and relative poverty and a decline 
in average life expectancy from fifty to forty-six between 1980 and 2003.  
Influenced by such trenchant criticisms of SAPs, ‘poverty reduction’ per se 
became an increasing part of the World Bank agenda during the 1990s and led 
to a focus, in particular, on the ‘social dimensions of adjustment’ (Jayarajah, 
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Brown and Sen, 1996, Hutchful, 1994, World Bank, 1993). Fourth, PRSPs 
came into being in part through recognition of the weaknesses involved in the 
common practice prior to 1999 of regarding poverty reduction as a special 
activity, which was added to existing programmes, requiring particular 
structures and activities. The resulting focus of poverty reduction policies was 
on project funding rather than processes of public resource allocation through 
the national exchequer. Thus, there was no connection to the macro-economic 
framework and a lack of an institutional link with the budget or overall 
management of public expenditure (Booth, 2003a).  
 
6.3 Conceptualizing Civil Society Participation in the PRSP Process 
Booth (2003a) sets out a typology of PRSPs 158 with supporters, such as the 
IFIs, at one end of a spectrum (who downplay the structural obstacles to 
improvement possibilities in Africa via domestic politics) and radical sceptics 
at the other extreme, who regard PRSPs as SAPs with superficial changes 
(Standing, 2000, for example). The radical sceptics include Craig and Porter 
(2003: 57), who contend that ‘much of PRSP seems little more than re-
labelling, often performed somewhat cynically.’ Forms of participation can be 
regarded as technologies of control since they mystify power relations, 
depoliticize negotiations and therefore secure IFI control of outcomes (see 
                                                           
158
  See also Fraser (2005), who delineates four main perspectives on PRSPs. First, that they are a sham and a 
public relations exercise. Second, they are leading to substantive possibilities for policy change. However, the 
limited alterations to PRSP policies compared to those previously adopted show states have learned that 
international economic realities offer few choices other than to embrace liberal democracy and free market 
reforms. Third, PRSP participation offers possibilities to transform relations between donors and recipients, 
so the focus should be on the processes of participation. Fourth, participation in PRSP processes does not 
result in gradual empowerment, because of the underlying principles of the concept itself, rather than through 
any processes of implementation. 
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also Gould and Ojanen, 2005 on this point). 159  Booth (2003a) himself adopts 
a third position, regarding PRSPs as a ‘non-trivial’ change informing the 
delivery of poverty support. 160 They proffer an opportunity to address critical 
problems and in particular provide a chance to stop aid conditionalities 
creating a situation where recipient states are undermined.  
 
In respect of the role of civil society, PRSP supporters, such as the IFIs, see 
this in de Tocquevillian terms (see chapter 2). That is, the PRSP process 
allows a variety of forms of associational life to participate freely, through 
stimulating and amicable debates, which lead to the views of the wider 
citizenry being recognized and incorporated into national policies by a 
responsive state. Radical sceptics dismiss this perspective as having little basis 
in reality. For them, a small number of NGOs dominate civil society input to 
the PRSP process. These are elite, urban-based organizations, which are 
unrepresentative of the views of the majority of associational groups (See, for 
example, Craig and Porter, 2006). According to the third way position adopted 
by Booth (2003), civil society actors have the opportunity to use PRSPs as a 
vehicle to move away from a situation where there is a generalized and 
internationalized responsibility for fighting poverty to a position where there 
is a more specific and local accountability, opening up the possibilities for 
these agents to play a substantive role in contesting policy spaces.     
 
                                                           
159
  In a variation of the radical sceptic view, Stewart and Wang (2003) set out a moral hazard position 
regarding PRSPs, whereby if recipients ’own’ poverty reduction strategies and there is little progress in 
alleviating poverty, they, including the indigenous civil society organizations which took part in the process, 
can be blamed and donors largely absolved. 
160
  Booth’s position is supported by other contributors to Booth, D (2003a) (ed.) Fighting Poverty In Africa: 
Are PRSPs Making a Difference?   
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6.4 Measuring Civil Society Participation in, and Ownership of, the 
PRSP Process 
 
Measuring Civil Society Participation 
There is a stress on outcomes with regard to measuring civil society 
participation in PRSPs. ‘In planning a participatory process, it is important to 
keep in mind that the outcome-based approaches that are initiated and the 
institutional arrangements that support them can have an enduring influence 
over policymaking and implementation’ (World Bank, 2004b: 237). The type 
of outcomes that emerge from civil society input is an important part of the 
debate about the strengths and weaknesses of participatory approaches in the 
context of the PRSP process. McGee (2002) regards PRSPs as the acid test for 
southern states’ commitment to participation and ownership. A key aspect of 
this test is whether civil society organizations regard the forms and levels of 
participation afforded them as providing an opportunity to promulgate a 
counter-hegemonic discourse to that of neo-liberalism. 
 
The key donor documents for assessing levels of participation in the PRSP 
process are the Joint Staff Assessments (JSAs) of the World Bank and the 
IMF. They ‘act as a signalling device for the Executive Boards of the IMF and 
World Bank that the strategy produced by the state provides a sound basis for 
providing concessional assistance’ (ODI, 2005: 3). The way participation is 
evaluated in the JSAs has been much criticised. Independent reviews by the 
IMF (IEO, 2004) and the World Bank (OED, 2004) did not find any 
procedures for assessing levels of participation set out in advance and stated 
that it was unclear as to whether different PRSPs were being assessed using 
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the same criteria. JSAs were also critiqued for being essentially ‘insider 
documents’, despite the fact that one of their stated objectives is to inform 
stakeholders in the PRSP process and the general public. Finally, the JSAs are 
attacked for portraying participation in PRSPs in an overly favourable light, 
using broad terms of praise. This is the case with regard to JSAs of the 
Tanzanian PRSP. The IEO, (2004) and OED (2004) reports ranked levels of 
‘Ownership and Participation’ the least transparent and accountable sphere of 
assessment in the JSAs. The World Bank provides ‘guidelines’ for analysing 
participation. These are based on answering four questions, outlined in Figure 
6.1 below. 
 
Figure 6.1 JSA Guidelines for Assessing Participation in the PRSP 
Does the PRSP describe the participatory processes that the state conducted to design and 
to build ownership for the strategy? 
Does the PRSP summarize major issues raised during the participatory process and the 
impacts of the process on the content of the strategy? How has the participatory process 
evolved over time? 
How closely is the PRSP related to any other current state document that set forth national 
or sectoral development plans and/or budgets? 
What are the plans for public dissemination of the PRSP? 
Source: IMF and World Bank (2001: 20) 
 
With regard to qualitative aspects of the participatory process, JSAs rank this 
from 1-5, with 1 being ‘poor’, 3 ‘moderate’ and 5 ‘good’. Moreover, a yes-no 
answer is required to the question, ‘was participation mentioned as one of the 
strong points of the PRSP process?’ 
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As Thomas (2004), points out, a problem with the JSA Guidelines is that there 
is a built-in prejudice towards approval. The questions focus on the quality of 
the description of participatory processes involved in formulating a PRSP, not 
on an assessment of the processes themselves. If the quality of participatory 
approaches were examined it would be harder to get approval from the 
Executive Boards of the IFIs than simply requiring an adequate description of 
the processes.   
 
Furthermore, Dewatcher (2005: 30) found that the criteria used in compiling 
different JSAs were not clear, comparable or verifiable. These inconsistencies 
‘contribute to the fuzziness and possible euphemisms that are instrumental in 
rating all PRSPs as acceptable.’ 
 
The typology for assessing civil society participation in the PRSP process 
provided by Tikare et al. (2004) in the World Bank’s ‘PRSP Sourcebook’ is 
also open to criticism for being vague. Only three ‘Country Types’ are set out 
with regard to the status of participation and the descriptions are so broad as to 
provide little explanatory power. 
 
Figure 6.2 Assessing the Current Status of Participation: A Typology 
 Country Type A Country Type B Country Type C 
Civil society Organized civil society and 
local state structures exist 
and participate in state 
processes and 
implementation. 
Some organized civil 
society groups exist, 
and participation in 
state processes is 
limited. 
Limited civil 
society 
organization. 
Source: Tikare et al. (2004: 249) 
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In sum, civil society participation in PRSP processes is not measured robustly 
or consistently. The ways in which civil society participation are assessed both 
in the World Bank’s participation sourcebook and in the JSAs are marked by a 
lack of analytical rigour and transparency. Since participation is inextricably 
linked to ownership in the PRSP process, there have also been various 
attempts to measure levels of the latter concept (World Bank, 2004b, Killick, 
1997, Johnson and Wasty 1993). However, as Entwistle and Cavassini (2005) 
point out, since the operationalization of ownership as a concept is difficult, 
the level of participation on the part of stakeholders in the PRSP process is 
often used as a proxy.  
 
Measuring Civil Society Ownership  
As Weeks et al. (2002: 72) point out, ‘no single policy was more associated 
with transferring ownership to aid recipients than the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers.’ The dynamic nature of ownership means that levels and 
types of ownership are constantly changing in countries taking part in the 
PRSP process. However, it is unlikely that countries receiving aid will be 
allowed to assume ownership of national policies if these run counter to the 
agenda of donors.161 Donors need to show domestic constituencies that they 
are using assistance effectively. This is a problem if donors and recipients 
have different views on policies and their capacity for implementation. 
Hayman (2003: 53), focusing on Eritrea, provides support for this analysis, 
arguing that ‘the donor community is ruled by its own agenda and is clearly 
not ready to concede the necessary control to allow real recipient ownership.’ 
                                                           
161
  See chapter 1 (section 1.4, in particular), for a general overview of arguments relating to donor influence 
on the conceptualization and operationalizing of the concept of ownership. 
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Moreover, in a wider study, Nkombo (2008: 6) concluded that ‘ownership in 
most African countries is still very poor.’  
 
With regard to practical ways to measure ownership, Weeks et al. (2002) take 
a matrix approach, which they use to measure ownership qualitatively. The 
matrix has three dimensions; the range of owners, the stages of the project 
cycle and the type of aid instrument or modality used. The matrix (see table 
6.1) is used to summarise the activity assessment of the stakeholders 
(including those in the civil society sphere) during the various stages of the 
project cycle. The summaries can be updated as the process moves on, which 
takes account of its dynamic nature.  No numeric values are used. 
 
Table 6.1 Basic Ownership Matrix 
 Stages of Project Cycle 
Owners Identification Selection Formulation Implementation Evaluation 
Partner state      
NGOs      
Beneficiaries      
Other groups….      
Source: Weeks et al. (2002) 
 
Lerche, Pincus and Weeks (2003) also adopt a qualitative approach in 
assessing whether the PRSP process adds value to existing poverty reduction 
strategies, which is set out in table 6.2, using India as a case study. 
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Table 6.2 Did the PRSP Process Add Value to Poverty Reduction Strategies? 
 Necessary 
Condition 
Sufficient Conditions 
Country A more poverty 
focused policy 
framework? 
Nationally-
owned and 
country-driven, 
including 
participation 
and awareness? 
Integrated 
into the 
national 
planning 
framework? 
Consistent 
with 
capacity to 
implement? 
Overall 
conclusion 
India No – long-
standing 
experience in 
poverty-reduction 
strategies 
Yes and Yes – 
long-standing 
practice of state 
Yes – 
national plan 
and PRSP 
are the same. 
The latter 
derivative of 
the former 
Yes – 
much 
stronger at 
national 
than state 
level 
No value 
added 
Source: Lerche, Pincus and Weeks (2003) 
 
Providing summary answers to key questions in matrix form, (Lerche, Pincus 
and Weeks, 2003, Weeks et al., 2002) may be worthwhile in assessing levels 
of ownership and could be triangulated with measurement of independent 
variables as formulated by Johnson and Wasty (1993), developed further by 
Killick (1997) and then the World Bank (2004b). 162 However, since the 
formal inception of PRSPs in September 1999, the IFIs have not used the 
classification scheme devised by Johnson and Wasty to measure levels of 
ownership. Instead they measure the concept by employing broad rankings 
(from 1-5), assessing participation as a proxy for ownership, based on 
methods that lack rigour and transparency. Furthermore, in utilizing this 
method, the IFIs fail to take into account the fact that the trajectories of socio-
economic and political processes over time are context-specific and, 
consequently, the way participation and ownership play out in particular 
                                                           
162
  See chapter 1 (section 1.4), for an analysis of the work of Johnson and Wasty on ownership. 
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countries is likely to be very different. Thus, the assigning of broad numeric 
values in assessing levels of civil society participation in (and, consequently, 
ownership of) PRSP processes, is virtually meaningless.  
 
6.5 The Tanzanian PRSP Process 
Tanzania is one of thirty-four sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries (out of a 
total of forty-seven) that have PRSPs, leaving less than that number (thirty 
three) in operation throughout the rest of the world (World Bank, 2010a). A 
major aspect of the Tanzanian PRSP at its inception in 1999, in line with the 
initiative across SSA, was the attempt to instil the institutions, procedures and 
norms of multiparty liberal democracy, as part of the World Bank’s good 
governance agenda, which included a substantive role for civil society 
organizations 163 (Harrison, 2010a, 2004a, 2004b, Zack-Williams and 
Harrison, 2009, Girdwood, 2007, Fukuda-Parr and Ponzio, 2002, Nelson, 
2000). Civil society in Tanzania was characterized as weak because of state 
intolerance towards oversight and criticism of its policies on the part of 
associational groups (see chapter 3). Thus, a key aspect of the PRSP process in 
Tanzania was the attempt to open up the policy-making process to the mass 
participation of citizens in the institutionalised context of civil society 
organizations, leading to increased accountability on the part of the state. The 
Tanzanian PRSP has been regarded as a success by the IFIs and a number of 
independent analysts. For example, Holtom (2007: 245) argues that the PRSP 
process has led to Tanzania securing aid and debt-relief and has engendered a 
stronger state-donor partnership than existed during the 1990s, which is to be 
                                                           
163  See chapter 1 for an analysis s of the origins of the good governance agenda in the general context of a 
shift from the policies of the Washington Consensus to those of the Post-Washington Consensus.  
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‘celebrated’, as it has led to macroeconomic stability and economic growth. 
However, such analyses fail to encompass in any detail the way the 
participation of civil society in the initiative has occurred and do not assess the 
way the processes were viewed from the perspectives of civil society 
organizations, such as NGOs and trade unions, themselves.  The fieldwork, 
thus, focused on these two areas.  
 
6.6 NGO Engagement in the PRSP Process 
The PRSP I process (1999 to 2004) for NGOs, involved the managed 
participation of a small number of organizations, which were invited to take 
part in ‘zonal workshops’ where consultations took place with state officials.  
With regard to Cluster 1 (Growth and Reduction of Poverty), little civil 
society input was allowed on key issues (notably macroeconomic policy 
fundamentals), which were set by the state and beyond substantive discussion. 
NGO input was thus concentrated on Clusters 2 and 3 (Quality of Life and 
Social Well Being and Governance and Accountability, respectively). 
 
The President’s Office produced the first budget guidelines for the PRSP, but 
costing was not done for the implementation phase. 164  REPOA (an 
organization with a track record as a specialist research organization on 
poverty issues) was given the position of secretariat for civil society input, 
while also contributing ideas as an individual NGO as to what should be 
included in the PRSP.  Moreover a small number of umbrella NGOs were 
commissioned and funded by the Vice President’s Office (VPO), which is the 
                                                           
164
  Officials from ESRF (one of two major think tank NGOs in Tanzania, along with REPOA) was selected 
by the state to do the costing post facto. 
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state department responsible for co-ordinating the PRSP process, to canvass 
the views of their member organizations. At the start of the PRSP I process, 
the Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development (TCDD) was championed 
by Oxfam, as the lead association for NGO input. As Oxfam moved to a focus 
on how to get its own programmes put into practice on the ground, the 
organization became less interested in the PRSP process and provided a 
reduced amount of support for TCDD, which, consequently, lost its 
importance as a coordinating body. This is an indication of the need, on the 
part of Tanzanian NGOs, for financing and support from foreign donors if they 
are to have the capacity to take part in national policy-making processes 
effectively. It also indicates the weakness of the de Tocquevillian vision, 
which informs the perspective of the donors, regarding civil society. Contrary 
to this vision, which is based on a wide variety of civil society organizations 
taking part freely in debates, Tanzanian associational groups lack the capacity 
to engage in an important and influential national policy instrument, such as 
the PRSP, without the patronage of foreign donors. Other international donors 
then moved to set up a Tanzanian apex organization, the Policy Forum, to 
oversee NGO input to the PRSP process, which became operational in 
November 2001. The interviews showed that a considerable amount of finance 
was used, and effort expended, by donors (Care International, in particular) to 
create the Policy Forum (now often called PF), as an umbrella organization 
that could coordinate the ideas and policies of all Tanzanian NGOs.  
 
The Policy Forum worked alongside other NGO umbrella organizations - 
Tanzania Council for Social Development (TACOSDE), Tanzania Association 
of NGOs (TANGO) and Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP) - 
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in coordinating the NGO input (Policy Forum, 2002a). The state and the 
donors used the documents provided through the co-ordinating work of the 
umbrella NGOs to claim that civil society input to the PRSP I process was 
extensive. The Policy Forum and TGNP set out policies and programmes in 
formal written submissions to the VPO, many of which were incorporated 
verbatim into the PRSP document sent to the IFIs in Washington for approval. 
However, in interviews, officials from the NGOs concerned outlined how this 
meant little, since strategies for the implementation of the proposed policies 
and programmes were not created.  Officials from the NGOs that made the 
submissions felt that the state used them primarily to gain credibility with the 
IFIs concerning the ‘participatory nature’ of the PRSP process. 165 In reality, 
the lack of time allowed for NGO input and the failure to provide any 
institutionalised means for NGOs to take part in the implementation stage 
meant that the PRSP I process was far from participatory. The entire 
participatory process was completed in just six months.  A key feature of this 
process were the discussions between NGOs and state officials at zonal 
workshops, which lasted one month (May 2000) with only around fifty NGOs 
participating. Moreover, little time was available to follow up on the work 
started as a result of issues raised at those meetings. Thus, NGO input was 
made in constrained circumstances, which did not allow well-researched and 
clearly thought out positions to be formulated.  Nevertheless, a full PRSP was 
approved by the IFIs in December 2000, leading to debt relief and a new 
tranche of loans being granted as part of HIPC. Clearly these two factors were 
the state’s highest priority in regard to desired outcomes from the PRSP I 
process.  
                                                           
165
  Sources: Interviews with a number of NGO officials in 2005 and 2006. 
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At the end of the PRSP I process a large-scale evaluation took place.  This was 
led by the VPO and took one year.  The review featured pre-designed 
questionnaires in newspapers for people to comment on what they wanted to 
be improved in Tanzania.  An NGO was commissioned to analyse the replies 
to the 30,000 questionnaires. Summaries of the replies were put into a booklet, 
which is available free from the VPO. However, the feedback from these 
questionnaires was not incorporated into the PRSP I process, as it was only 
analysed after the documents had been finalized. This is evident from the fact 
that the key PRSP I documents remained completely unaltered from the first 
draft to the final version and, therefore, could not have incorporated any of the 
findings from the survey. 166 Several interviewees provided documents which 
showed that much of the content of Clusters 2 and 3 of PRSP I had been taken 
directly from the Policy Forum submissions, which made the document ‘seem 
more like a wish list’ than an actionable strategic plan.  According to an 
interviewee from Policy Forum, NGO input, in the form of written 
submissions, was significant in Clusters 2 and 3, but only from the few 
organizations with good connections to the drafters. This reveals that the 
Policy Forum itself was well aware that it was unable to fulfil the mandate of 
the state by canvassing the views of a large number of grassroots associational 
groups, given the time and resources at its disposal. For another interviewee, 
who was the executive director of a well-funded organization, there `was little 
to get excited about, as macroeconomic policy was dictated from the top’ and 
civil society influence on this key area (Cluster 1) relating to poverty 
reduction was, consequently ‘negligible.’  The majority of interviewees 
pointed out that NGOs were frustrated at being regarded primarily as service 
                                                           
166
  Sources: Interviews with a number of NGO officials in 2005 and 2006. 
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delivery gap fillers in the social sector by the state and the donors. This was 
manifest from their exclusion from any debates of fundamental importance to 
the development of the country, notably those regarding macroeconomic 
policies. The state’s refusal to allow civil society organizations to debate 
macroeconomic policy within the setting of the PRSP process was an effective 
strategy as part of the war of position. Through this strategy, the state was able 
to substantially limit a challenge to its hegemony. 
 
A small number of interviewees argued that the PRSP I process merely 
provided a framework to ‘manage the donors.’ That is, the Tanzanian state 
adopted it and played along with it as a way of guaranteeing funds from 
donors, while, in reality, it was not committed to implementation and, 
therefore, did not take civil society participation seriously. In short, the state 
just ticked the boxes required by the donors to meet the minimum standards of 
civil society participation within the hegemonic neo-liberal discourse. This 
finding provides a challenge in some respects to the arguments of Holtom 
(2007), Harrison (2005) and Gould and Ojanen (2003) 167 that governance 
reforms have been accepted and internalized by powerful state officials, 
particularly within the Ministry of Finance. Whether Tanzanian state officials 
in positions of policy-making power are ‘true believers’ in the new policy 
agenda or simply ‘managing the donors,’ has significance. If they are true 
believers, the reforms are likely to remain in place for some time, whatever 
the policy outcomes. However, if the ‘managing the donors’ perspective put 
forward by some NGO officials in this research has validity, the reforms may 
be amended substantively or abandoned rapidly in the face of negative results.  
                                                           
167
  See chapter 3. 
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Overall, the interviews showed that all NGOs regarded participation in PRSP I 
as rushed and heavily managed by the state, in order to get the document 
accepted by the IFIs and, hence, obtain a debt relief package under HIPC as 
quickly as possible.  All the NGO officials interviewed pointed out that the 
limited timelines for civil society participation set by the state and the lack of 
an effective and concerted vision on the part of NGOs meant that (even in Dar 
es Salaam and Arusha) only a few large organizations could take part in the 
process in ways overwhelmingly dictated by the state.  A few interviewees 
argued that the majority of NGO officials participating were content that they 
had been included at all and even felt flattered at being asked to play a role in 
discussing the formation of national policies. They were not concerned to look 
deeply at whether their mode of participation was meaningful in terms of 
getting the needs of their members or constituencies addressed. Thus, the 
NGO sector was successfully co-opted by the state through its use of a low-
intensity ‘participation-as-consultation’ model (see chapter 1 for an analysis of 
different models of participation). It was clear to the vast majority of 
interviewees that the state wanted the NGO participation to focus on the social 
sector and, in particular, on non-income variables in the areas of health, 
education and water. Where NGOs were involved in income-based sectors 
affecting the poor, this was ‘not substantive’ through weak capacity and 
vision, in the words of one NGO official interviewed, who played an active 
role in the process. That is, NGOs did not present well-researched papers 
outlining a counter-hegemonic discourse. They lacked both information on 
income-based sectors and a collaborative vision, which could have been used 
as the basis from which to formulate alternatives to the neo-liberal discourse. 
However, there was a division between the views of Big International NGOs 
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(BINGOs) and local organizations regarding this issue, as illustrated by the 
claim of interviewees from Oxfam that the officials from local NGOs ‘did not 
know how to participate, so we recruited in-house experts to show them how 
to engage in policy dialogue.’ From this example, it can be seen that Oxfam 
uncritically regarded the donor-set modus operandi of the PRSP process as 
completely appropriate and believed that Tanzanian NGOs which were 
unfamiliar with this mode were lacking. This revealed the BINGOs, as well as 
the state and donors, work within a dominant discourse, which also entails an 
accepted method of operating. Organizations unfamiliar with this orthodoxy, 
thus, require ‘training.’ 
 
The majority of the interviewees felt that the second PRSP (MKUKUTA), 
which was rolled out from 2005, had involved more state consultation with 
NGOs. Therefore, the quantity of NGO participation increased. However, 
many interviewees pointed out that who exactly participates in development 
processes, and in what ways, are key factors in terms of influencing outcomes, 
rather than the overall number of civil society organizations which are 
engaged. In this regard, most interviewees argued that while MKUKUTA was 
based on a more participatory process than PRSP I, since there was a greater 
amount of civil society involvement, qualification is needed, as NGOs 
remained relatively disorganized and did not engage effectively. Few NGOs 
interviewed had analysed the type and level of NGO participation in the PRSP 
process in depth and worked out a strategy for their own organization, or one 
based on systematic collaboration with other NGOs or other forms of civil 
society, regarding how to participate and with what objectives.  
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Moreover, many interviewees pointed out that the majority of NGO officials 
involved in MKUKUTA do not know the issues facing the mass of people at 
the grassroots anyway, irrespective of their lack of ability to formulate 
effective strategies per se. Given this lack of coherence and cohesion in the 
NGO sector, it was impossible for them to formulate a sustainable counter-
hegemonic discourse and there was no substantive move towards the 
formation of a historic bloc of oppositional groups, which could challenge the 
rule of the state. 
 
An example of the need for the Tanzanian NGO sector to review participation 
strategies was provided by an interviewee from TANGO. Representatives of 
NGOs went to the capital city, Dodoma to discuss with parliamentarians how 
to participate more effectively in the PRSP process. They were told by MPs 
that they would be better off back in Dar es Salaam spending time with the 
technocrats who draw up budgets for the civil society sector, as they have 
significant power and it would thus be more productive for NGOs to enter 
discussions with them than to be in Dodoma with ordinary MPs, who have 
little influence on matters relating to NGOs.  For the interviewee, this typified 
the fact that NGOs tend to participate in the PRSP process without researching 
and planning how to maximize their effectiveness. A considerable amount of 
time and money was spent on the Dodoma meeting. For this interviewee, 
NGOs need a concerted strategy to be effective. The failure to target Dar es 
Salaam-based state technocrats and instead to wrongly focus on Dodoma 
parliamentarians was an example of the inadequate strategies that typify NGO 
participation in MKUKUTA. What participation in the PRSP process means 
for NGOs (and the state) remain uncertain. For this interviewee, the key 
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challenge for NGOs is how to make participation effective. For many NGOs 
in Tanzania, having been invited to meetings means they have ‘participated’ 
and it is disappointing to see that this is the limit of NGO expectations.  NGOs 
have no clear perspective regarding what participation should and should not 
mean. A lot of the NGO arguments are based on blaming the state for creating 
a lack of serious participation on the part of CSOs.  There is a need for NGOs 
themselves to understand issues relating to participation at a deeper level than 
is the case at present. It is also necessary to go beyond complaining about 
donor and state constraints on NGO participation in the MKUKUTA process 
and to develop a vision and strategy for the sector, rather than waiting for an 
agenda to be set and then adjusted ‘from above,’ as happens at present.  
 
This interviewee was the only one who formally outlined the need for 
Tanzanian NGOs to formulate a clear and sustainable counter-hegemonic 
discourse. Moreover, this perspective recognizes the importance of Gramsci’s 
(2011b) argument that to be successful, oppositional groups must exercise 
intellectual and moral leadership (see chapter 1), since, without these two 
elements, the achievement of hegemony is impossible. It is not enough for 
such a group merely to criticize the key tenets of state hegemony. A historic 
bloc of civil society groups needs to present its aims as representing the 
universal good of the society in question if it is to successfully challenge state 
hegemony. This involves using a variety of means, including publications, 
demonstrations, meetings and the media to persuade other classes and groups 
to accept their moral, social and political values. At present, NGO taking part 
in MKUKUTA do not use these methods but are overwhelmingly reactive, 
rather than proactive, to the way the state has constituted the process and the 
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ensuing strategies, targets and policies. A number of interviewees made the 
point that this situation has occurred to some extent as a result of MKUKUTA 
being externally imposed and put into practice with the intention of obtaining 
short-term results. Consequently, it was argued that NGOs are not reflecting 
on their participation in the MKUKUTA process and their focus is too much 
on piecemeal criticisms of the state. Therefore, NGOs need to collaborate in 
creating and sustaining a counter-hegemonic vision. In this regard, a number 
of interviewees made the point that the state itself does not know how to use 
MKUKUTA mechanisms and channels concerning participation on the part of 
civil society organizations, to a large extent as a result of the initiative being 
externally imposed. Thus, NGOs had an opportunity to take advantage of this 
uncertainty on the part of the state about the nature of participation, by putting 
forward a coherent and cohesive counter-hegemonic discourse. The fact that 
they have not done so is, consequently, a missed opportunity.  
 
Another interviewee outlined a different issue concerning the lack of 
coherence in the NGO position on participation, by arguing that there was a 
big question as to where the focus of the concept lay; with the people, as 
intended beneficiaries, or with the NGOs themselves. For this interviewee, the 
PRSP process must allow continuous engagement on the part of NGOs, which 
requires multi-channels that are open, non-bureaucratic and can involve 
informal discussions with power-holders as issues arise.  This would be better 
than always having a formal meeting framework where the same people attend 
every meeting in a ritualized manner.  A significant problem remains how to 
provide effective feedback mechanisms concerning MKUKUTA processes so 
that NGOs and their constituents can then act on key issues and present their 
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own arguments and strategies. 
 
A crucial aspect relating to the provision of effective feedback mechanism 
concerns language. Interviewees pointed out that in the rural areas people do 
not speak English well enough to understand the issues involved in the PRSP 
process.  Thus, having PRSP documents and meetings in Swahili is very 
important, but the problem remains that many materials are not translated well 
from English into Swahili so there is little reach of the documents, and the 
process itself, up country. This, for a considerable number of interviewees, is a 
deliberate state strategy, which is used in order to win the war of position. A 
related point, outlined by several interviewees, was that much work has been 
done on participation in MKUKUTA but remains on shelves and is never used 
to stimulate discussions or inform practice. As a result, state hegemony is 
maintained partly by narrowing down the number who can access materials 
related to MKUKUTA and by restricting the distribution of documents based 
on debates with this relatively small group of people, who have been able to 
read them. 
 
A number of interviewees made the point that the preponderance of umbrella 
groups makes the structure of the NGO sector unwieldy.  TANGO (2010: 1) 
(which is the largest umbrella group) argued that despite the existence of a 
number of umbrella groups in the NGO sector ‘not much has been done in 
terms of fostering ethical conduct and adherence to the principles of good 
governance among CSO.’ Since 2003, the work of the influential Foundation 
for Civil Society (FCS) has added to the complex and unwieldy structure of 
CSOs in Tanzania. FCS operates as a support organization aiming to 
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‘empower citizens through the provision of grants, facilitating linkages and 
enabling a culture of ongoing learning to civil society’ (FCS, 2008). The work 
of FCS is explicitly aligned with the PRSP process, in focusing on the 
provision of intermediary support mechanisms for CSOs to enable them to 
reduce poverty effectively as set out in the MKUKUTA and Vision 2025. A 
final important point outlined by several interviewees regarding participation 
is the arcane and lengthy funding application processes to bilateral donors and 
the Foundation for Civil Society, which means that few people can understand 
them fully. This undermines the ability of many civil society organizations to 
participate in the PRSP process and militates against perceptions of ownership 
of processes and policies. 
 
Most NGO officials argued that processes involved in participating in the 
PRSP are complicated and limit the effectiveness of their contributions. The 
majority of NGO officials were concerned with processes more than questions 
of policy substance.  For a minority of interviewees it is vital that NGOs 
taking part in the PRSP process change their focus from processes to 
substantive policy-making issues if their participation is to be meaningful. 
This is difficult, as it requires NGOs to formulate both individual strategies 
and coordinated input on policy-making across all members of the Macro 
Group. The umbrella groups also have the added difficulty of trying to put 
forward the views of their memberships, which are spread across the entire 
country.  
 
MKUKUTA has been characterized by the rise of a small group of NGOs, 
which have a significant influence on civil society input but also by an 
 284 
 
increase in the organization and presentation of counter-hegemonic discourses 
by a number of NGOs. The amount of lobbying and advocacy activities 
engaged in by elite Tanzanian NGOs has increased appreciably since the 
inception of MKUKUTA (see chapter 5 for details of the rise of advocacy and 
lobbying among Tanzanian NGOs, in general). For example, two large NGOs, 
TGNP and Hakikazi Catalyst, reviewed the national budget for 2005/2006, 
producing critiques and suggested alternatives after convening a series of 
seminars with the public and involving the media (Mbilinyi and Rusimbi, 
2005).  
 
As PRSP II was rolled out, a small group of NGOs consolidated their 
powerful position within the civil society sector. At the same time other 
associational groups were marginalized, to a large extent because they do not 
have ‘forms amenable to development contracting’ (Green, Mercer and 
Mesaki, 2010: 40), which is the preferred modus operandi of the donors. 
Furthermore, rural-based NGOs continue to have little input into PRSP 
processes. The level of access to basic social services, notably education and 
health, at the district level remains ‘poor’ (Semkwiji, 2009: 8). However, the 
participation of associations from rural areas at the 2010 Civil Society 
Organizations’ National Consultative Meeting on the PRSP was ‘weak’ 
(Policy Forum, 2010: 13). Thus, there is a lack of activity on the part of NGOs 
precisely where facilities and services are most ineffective in the country. 
Nevertheless, the donors involved in the PRSP process continue to concentrate 
their funding on a small number of urban-based associational groups. 
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Overall, PRSP II was characterized by the intensification of donor efforts to 
move Tanzania from a Gemeinschaft (Community) to a Gesellschaft 
(Association) type of society, where the former is ‘characterized by the social 
will as concord, folkways, mores and religion’ and the latter by the social will 
as ‘convention, legislation and public opinion’ (Tonnies, 1955: 270). The 
extent to which this aim is being realized is examined in the Fieldwork 
Findings section. In the Tanzanian PRSP process, NGOs provide a challenge 
to the state in such a way, as they have access to finance and power, through 
the patronage of foreign donors. They also have control of an important 
institutional apparatus, through their dominance of the Civil Society sector, 
which directs input to the PRSP process from associational groups in 
Tanzania. This control of the institutional apparatus within which civil society 
organizations take part in the PRSP process in Tanzania and the patronage of 
the external donors (which drive the process) allows NGOs to present their 
views on poverty reduction as representing the universal interests of citizens 
in Tanzania.  
  
NGOs regarded the level and type of their participation in MKUKUTA as 
quantitatively and qualitatively better in comparison to PRSP I. For the PF, 
which became the leading NGO player in the MKUKUTA process, ‘the state, 
and the VPO in particular, was much more open than during PRSP I.’ 
However, the interviews show that donor and state management of the process 
remained substantial. The first MKUKUTA meeting to review the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (PRS) was set up by the state and the donors. The PF sent 
three uninvited delegates to this meeting, who were allowed to contribute and 
argued that civil society should be allowed to organise its input to MKUKUTA 
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independently of the state. This was agreed between the state and the donors. 
 
Civil society organizations were involved in the Participatory Poverty 
Assessment (PPA) process and had input into the PRS Technical Working 
Group, subsequently producing its own review document of the process. 
However, the PRSP was published before this civil society document was 
finished.  Thus, as with the PRSP I, inputs from civil society and the public 
were rendered largely irrelevant and were not taken into account at all. 
 
The PF managed to get two people onto the MKUKUTA drafting group and 
were disappointed with the way the process operated, since in their view the 
team created the ideas first and then tried to find evidence to support these 
perspectives. When the first draft of MKUKUTA came out it was in English 
only. The PF offered to translate the document into Swahili and to simplify the 
content, as it was couched in very technical terms.  After doing the translation, 
the PF succeeded in having the document inserted into four Kiswahili 
language newspapers and one English language newspaper as a way of 
increasing the transparency of the process by bringing MKUKUTA issues to 
the attention of the (literate) public. 
 
The PF pressured the state to publish the second draft of the document in 
Swahili, but claimed the state reneged on this, after initially agreeing, and 
published the second draft of the document on the web in English only. The 
state then said they would conduct consultations outside Dar es Salaam, but 
the PF dissuaded them, as they felt it would be disastrous because the 
document used a lot of technical English, which was difficult to understand.  
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In the end, the PF did a straight translation of the second draft into Swahili 
with no simplification. 
 
Interviewees stated that another reason for the top-down nature of the PRSP 
process in Tanzania is concentration of power with the Executive. Many rank-
and-file parliamentarians cannot read English well. They get a one page 
Swahili summary of every law, while full drafts are published only in English. 
Thus, many parliamentarians cannot and/or do not read them and the debate 
on legislation, including laws related to poverty reduction, is consequently 
narrowly based. This is, for the majority of interviewees, another important 
reason why both national and state ownership of MKUKUTA is lacking.  ‘A 
small band of key actors and authors within the state write the documents,’ 
was the summary of one interviewee on this point. 
 
The PF’s own contribution to the first draft of MKUKUTA was a formal 
paper, which was included as one of the key documents in the process. PF 
officials felt that their recommendations were taken on board, particularly 
concerning the income versus non-income poverty debate and in the areas of 
governance and indicators.  Partly as a result of the PF document, governance 
was elevated to become a separate pillar in MKUKUTA and thus required 
outcomes and measurements of progress. This is exactly in line with the donor 
agenda. For the donors the inadequacy of governance in Tanzania has been 
identified as a fundamental cause of lack of ‘development.’ 168 Thus, having 
                                                           
168
  It was less than twenty years ago (in 1994) when the main donors suspended aid to Tanzania, citing 
governance failure as the core reason. See chapter 3. 
 288 
 
‘governance’ as a separate pillar in the PRSP 169 allows donors to focus on 
whether targets and benchmarks in this sphere have been met and to relate any 
failures to bring about poverty reduction directly to ‘poor governance’ rather 
than macroeconomic policy. 
 
The fact that the PF’s formal submission, along with others from major NGOs 
involved in the process, have been included in full, means that the document is 
unwieldy. The PF, therefore, has been pushing for prioritisation and 
simplification of points and indicators in order to make it actionable. 
However, the state’s position is that civil society has been consulted and that 
part of the process is finished. Thus, one of the core principles of PRSPs - that 
there should be tightly formulated and costed poverty reduction plans, rather 
than ‘wish lists’ - is almost completely ignored in practice, through state desire 
to show the donors that there is an acceptable level and type of civil society 
participation in MKUKUTA. 
 
Many interviewees stressed the confusion they felt over ownership in the 
MKUKUTA process.  It was pointed out that the poverty reduction procedure 
is supposed to be owned by the country with the state acting as ‘caretaker,’ by 
implementing what has been agreed by the stakeholders.  Thus, MKUKUTA 
should be owned by the stakeholders but it is the state that puts MKUKUTA 
into practice. For most interviewees, therefore, the state is the real ‘owner’ of 
the process and the document and the views of NGOs have little impact in 
terms of influencing policy formation.   
 
                                                           
169
  See chapter 3.  
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For NGO officials interviewed it is difficult to separate out these different 
aspects of ownership. Interviewees argued that the criteria used by the state in 
accepting or rejecting what is put forward by NGOs and other stakeholders as 
part of the PRSP process is not clear and this leads to participation and 
ownership being nebulous and largely meaningless concepts. One interviewee 
gave an example of the general concerns of NGO officials regarding this point 
in stating that ideas are important only if the people with them are convinced 
of their worth and have the will and the power to promote them.  If NGOs 
state that they want the infrastructure to be improved in order to boost the 
economy then there should be clearly stated processes involved through which 
the state has to respond to this ‘participation.’ However, for the interviewee, it 
is clear that the state will act only if they are convinced by the idea themselves 
and believe that they will meet the approval of the external donors. There are 
no formal institutional means in the PRSP process to challenge state rejection 
of ideas put forward by civil society organizations and, thus, participation and 
ownership mean little to them.   
 
For a considerable number of interviewees, the main point of the PRSP 
process is that the state should be open to ideas from Tanzanian individuals 
and groups and will act on them.  However, interviewees argued that in reality, 
ownership is a very political concept and donors play a controlling role. It was 
pointed out, in this regard, that FONGOs in the country run some good 
projects with grassroots groups, which benefit poor and marginalized peoples, 
but there is no national ‘ownership,’ since the state has no say in where the 
funds go and how they are utilized.  FONGOs are unlikely to transfer 
‘ownership’ of finance for such projects, since they are not convinced that 
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state accountability is better than it has been in the past. The state is unlikely 
to challenge the way they operate, as they play a valuable service delivery role 
and are well connected to powerful donors. 
 
For most of the interviewees, creating greater levels of trust between the state 
and NGOs, will take a long time and involve the creation of robust public-
management systems, capacity building and political will. Increasing the 
partnership aspect of the PRSP process will therefore take time. Though this is 
obvious to all participants, the donors want relations between major 
stakeholders to be changed and rebuilt overnight.  The long-term aspect, of 
change in political processes and relationships between different agents of 
development, is not accommodated by the donors. They require quick results, 
based on superficial ‘participation’ from NGOs in order to satisfy tick-box 
procedures. This perception reveals that most NGO officials taking part in the 
PRSP process argue within the conventional liberal discourse; the 
concentration is on temporal and spatial issues (lack of ability for NGOs 
outside urban centres to participate), while substantive policy alternatives are 
not proposed. 
 
In overall terms, MKUKUTA is regarded as involving quantitatively and 
qualitatively better participation on the part of NGOs than PRSP I.  However, 
the majority of NGO officials interviewed argue that participation remains a 
vague concept and it is not clear to any of the stakeholders taking part in the 
PRSP process how it should occur and with what outcomes. Moreover, the 
other core concepts of the PRSP process, ‘partnership’ and ‘ownership’ are 
also unclearly conceptualized and require long-term changes, which the 
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donors fail to appreciate in their desire to bring about quick results, in order to 
show that Post-Washington Consensus policies are effective.  In addition, the 
ability of state officials to comprehend the new discourse, systems and 
policies, which have been adopted as part of the PRSP process, continues to be 
weak, according to most interviewees. Consequently, MKUKUTA is 
characterized by a lack of coherence and cohesion, as was the case with PRSP 
I.   
 
6.7    Trade Union Engagement in the PRSP Process 
Since the World Bank and the IMF were founded in 1944, their relationship 
with trade unions has been largely non-existent for much of the time. The 
work of trade unions has only become of concern to the IFIs since the 
imposition of SAPs during the early 1980s, when conditions ‘were perceived 
by many developing country trade unions to negatively affect employment and 
conditions of work in formal labour markets’ (World Bank, 2007: 1 emphasis 
added). Since the 1990s, dialogue between the IFIs and the global labour 
movement has increased but trade unions remain suspicious of the IFIs 
following the consequences of SAPs. The 1995 World Development Report - 
‘Workers in an Integrating World’ - has a chapter on the work of trade unions, 
which outlines opposition to structural adjustment programmes as a ‘negative 
effect’ of their work, ‘despite the apparent success of many of these initiatives 
since 1991’ (World Bank, 1995: 81). No analysis is provided of why unions 
have opposed SAPs and no evidence is set out to show how the ‘success’ of 
structural adjustment has been measured. Moreover, the use of the qualifier 
‘apparent’ is a further indication of a less than convincing argument. 
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The IFIs state (World Bank, 2007) that they have increased interactions with 
trade unions, through meetings with global federations because they 
recognized their representative mandate and because they were experienced in 
debating economic issues. This can be seen as disingenuous at best, since if 
these are the real reasons, why were they not recognized many years before by 
staff at the IFIs? Other reasons for not engaging trade unions in dialogue 
before the 1990s are alluded to later in the document, where it is stated that, 
for the IFIs ‘trade union confederations were overly critical of their economic 
policies and failed to recognize many instances where sound economic 
policies led to sustained economic growth, sustained job creation and poverty 
reduction’ (World Bank, 2007: 1 emphasis added). Therefore, engagement did 
not occur because the World Bank regarded the stance of trade unions towards 
their policies as overly confrontational. It is also argued in the same document 
that, states in developing countries, have deflected trade union criticisms of 
‘the impact of IFI-sponsored structural reforms’ (ibid) by claiming that they 
had no control over the conditionalities attached to them, when in fact they do 
have responsibility for decisions taken on economic matters.  
 
Thus, the IFIs are arguing that many of their policies produce excellent 
economic results in developing countries (though no empirical examples are 
cited) and unions are wrongly critical of them. Furthermore, when policies do 
produce negative results for the labour market it is due to the way they have 
been implemented at national level, therefore union criticisms should be 
directed toward their own states. This does not sit easily with the title of such 
World Bank documents as ‘Essential Action: Structural Adjustment and 
Labour – Tanzania’ (World Bank, 2000 emphasis added), which includes a 
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series of references to the Tanzanian state’s adoption of privatization 
programmes ‘in consultation’ with the World Bank and asserts that the state 
‘has agreed to’ privatize the Dar es Salaam container terminal, rather than ‘has 
decided to.’  
 
By the end of the 1990s meetings between the IFIs and global labour 
federations had become regular and in 2002 a formal protocol was adopted for 
biennial meetings with ‘enhanced dialogue’ (World Bank, 2007: 2) and 
follow-up mechanisms to ensure that commitments were being honoured. The 
biennial meetings have continued since their inception and at the 2009 
meeting the shift of the IFIs (from the hard line neo-liberal policies that 
characterized the original Washington Consensus) 170 is apparent in the 
discussion when their officials state, ‘smart subsidies’ that are ‘well-targeted, 
time-bound and had a low fiscal cost were acceptable’ as a means to help the 
poor who were most affected by the economic crisis (World Bank, 2009a: 4). 
Union representatives at the discussion concluded by stating that through 
interacting ‘better’ and in a more ‘informed way’ with the IFIs, they could go 
on to ‘make a difference’ which was their yardstick for participation (World 
Bank, 2009a: 14). 
 
The difficulties involved in ‘making a difference’ are highlighted by the 
response of the World Bank when pressed by union representatives to make 
the inclusion of a labour clause in public procurement a mandatory 
requirement. The reply was that this would be very unlikely, as it required the 
approval of the Executive Directorate in order to amend World Bank policy, 
which would be hard to obtain (World Bank, 2009a).   
                                                           
170  See chapter 3 for an analysis relating to Tanzania 
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The international trade unions bodies were positive about the PRSP initiative 
when it was formally instigated in September 1999, arguing that despite its 
limitations, unions should get involved as much as their capacity allowed, 
since ignoring the process could lead to a ‘PRSP that undermines workers 
rights’ (ICFTU, 2001: 8). The World Confederation of Labour (WCL, 2002: 3) 
‘welcomed the intention of the IMF and the World Bank to focus on poverty 
reduction and participation.’ However, they became increasingly critical of the 
IFIs failures to bring about the participation of labour movements in PRSP 
processes after 2001 (GURN, 2011, ICFTU, 2001).  
 
These criticisms provided the impetus for a ten-month study from January to 
October 2003 by the IFIs and the global unions on the nature and extent of 
trade union participation (Egulu, 2004a, Egulu, 2004b). For the Global Union 
Research Network (GURN), this study was of significance, since independent 
trade union research on the PRSPs is vital in order to put ‘in place policy 
alternatives to those that are advanced by the Washington-based institutions.’ 
(GURN, 2011: 1). The study was also timely, as many PRSPs were moving 
into their second phase with new documents in train, which had the potential 
to provide findings capable of informing the way processes might be amended 
to include more effective labour movement participation than had been the 
case with the first phase of PRSPs. This study took the form of a ten-point 
questionnaire administered by the World Bank, the ICFTU and the WCL, 
which was used as the basis for a scorecard on trade union participation in the 
PRSP process, centred on three main themes (Egulu, 2004a). First, the ‘State 
of Social Dialogue’ assessed the enabling environment for consultations. 
Second, trade union ‘Participation’ was analysed, focusing on the level of 
 295 
 
consultation involved. Third, the ‘Labour Content’ of the PRSP was examined, 
centring on the way labour market issues were covered  
(Egulu, 2003). 171 
 
Several key findings emerged from the survey. First, trade unions remain 
sceptical of an initiative instigated by the IFIs. Second, lack of capacity within 
unions limits the effectiveness of their participation. Third, shallow and ill-
prepared consultation deters effective union engagement. Fourth, trade unions 
are grouped in the ‘CSOs Stakeholder Group’ in the World Bank’s PRSP 
Sourcebook but lack ties and identification with other civil society groups. 
Fifth, labour market interventions are not covered centrally in the PRSP 
process. Key concerns for unions, such as ways in which high levels of 
unemployment lead to poverty and the policy implications of this, are often 
inadequately covered or absent from the PRSP process (Egulu, 2004a and 
2004b).   
 
The heightened interest in trade unions on the part of the IFIs can also be seen 
from the way the World Bank has increased the content of its documentation 
on trade union participation in the PRSP process, which used to be minimal. 
The Bank now states that trade unions ‘are encouraged’ to participate in the 
PRSP process and regards them as ‘key organizations’ in the public and 
private sector, as well as members of civil society (World Bank, 2010b: 1). 
Trade unions are also recognized as ‘economic as well as political actors that 
                                                           
171  The particular issues covered by the three core themes relating to trade union participation in the PRSP 
process  
(the State of Social Dialogue, the level of Trade Union Participation and the Labour Content of the PRSP) are 
set out in appendices 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6, respectively. 
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can change power relationships in the way by which wealth is both created 
and shared’ (World Bank, 2010a: 2). These views contrast markedly with the 
neglect of trade unions in very important IFI-documents relating to the PRSP 
process, such as the PRSP Sourcebook (World Bank, 2004b). 
 
Some of the bilateral donors have also produced work on the subject of trade 
unions but these contain questionable arguments. The UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID), for example, published ‘How to work with 
Trade Unions’ in 2005 (revised in 2009). Some of its claims are misleading. It 
is stated for example, that in contrast to ‘many other civil society 
organizations in DFID’s partner countries, free trade unions are democratically 
accountable and financially self-reliant’ (DFID, 2009: 1). While the former 
point is briefly qualified, the latter claim is left to stand. Findings from this 
research in the context of Tanzania, as well as evidence from wider surveys 
(Egulu, 2004a, 2004b), reveal that weak financial capacity is one of the key 
problems facing trade unions in developing countries. DFID’s failure to 
discuss fully the financial state of trade unions in developing countries reveals 
their fundamental lack of understanding of a key issue and is an illustration of 
the failure on the part of most major bilateral donors involved in the PRSP 
process to pay more than lip service to the work of labour organizations. 
 
Trade unions were not invited to take part in PRSP I when it was introduced in 
October 1999 and played no role in the zonal workshops, where consultation 
with CSOs took place, Moreover, they were not asked to take part in PRSP 
reviews. For the General Secretary of TUCTA, this was the start of what has 
been continual hesitation about including the labour movement in the PRSP 
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process and also indicates that to become involved unions ‘have got to kick at 
their [the Tanzanian state] door every time.’ This view tallies with the 
perspectives of all the trade unions officials interviewed for this research. In 
this regard, the arguments of trade union officials interviewed run sharply 
counter to those expressed in the JSAs and reports by bilateral donors, which 
claim high levels of civil society participation in, and national ownership of, 
the Tanzanian PRSP process. Interviews with World Bank and NGO officials 
conducted as part of this research revealed an indifference or opposition to 
trade union participation within the PRSP process in Tanzania.  This contrasts 
strongly with the new World Bank rhetoric of inclusion in regard to trade 
union participation in the PRSP process. The disparity between World Bank 
rhetoric and practice was a major finding of the fieldwork and ran through the 
arguments of the vast majority of interviewees from the trade union 
movement.     
 
After a case for trade union participation in the PRSP process had been 
formally set out in the work of Egulu (2004a, 2004b, 2003), the World Bank 
moved to capture the terms and conditions of that inclusion. The World Bank 
has set the agenda in terms of issues that trade unions should be raising in 
relation to the PRSP process, which precludes discussion on what, for trade 
unions, is the most important aspect of the PRSP; the fundamentals of macro-
economic policies. In the case of Tanzania, the state also limited trade union 
effectiveness by determining the manner of their participation. Most 
importantly, this has involved trade unions placed within a catch-all ‘CSO 
Stakeholders’ group, dominated by NGOs. Consequently, the possibilities for 
labour associations to adapt and subvert the dominant discourse are limited, as 
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many issues are raised in the forum by NGOs that are not a priority for trade 
unions. and require a clear vision, a considerable amount of financial and 
technical capacity and a concerted will on the part of the trade union 
movement if counter-hegemonic views are to be put forward effectively. This 
example highlights how the war of position for trade unions in Tanzania 
involves a struggle with the state, powerful transnational actors and, to some 
extent other civil society organizations, making autonomous actions on their 
part very difficult to mount. Moreover, this case shows that the de 
Tocquevillian perspective regarding civil society, which informs the modus 
operandi of the donors, possesses little explanatory power (see chapters 4 and 
5 for other examples where this is the case). Trade unions clearly do not 
participate in the PRSP process in the consensual and independent way de 
Tocqueville saw associational groups engaging with the state in the US during 
the nineteenth century. The Gramscian view of civil society, based on the 
argument that associational groups struggle with the state in a constantly 
shifting war of position, explains the position of trade unions in the PRSP 
process more accurately. This perspective recognizes that the level and type of 
participation of civil society groups in national policy-making processes 
depends on the amount of power and resources both they, and the state, 
possess. The lack of capacity and the political will to form a collective vision 
on the part of the labour movement, therefore, are substantive obstacles to the 
formation of a counter-hegemonic discourse.  However, the war of position is 
always fluid (Gramsci, 2011b). Consequently, the Gramscian approach allows 
for new actors, from the labour movement, and strategies to emerge from 
praxis (see chapter 5), which can substantially influence the war of position. 
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The disrespect shown to labour organizations by the state is summed up for 
many unionists by the statements made by the permanent secretary for finance 
(who is also chair of the steering committee for the PRSP) to TUCTA officials 
when questioned about the absence of a formal invitation to trade unions. The 
permanent secretary claimed that trade unions had taken part, since some state 
employees who had played a role in drawing up and/or processing documents 
relating to the PRSP were members of the Tanzanian Union of State and 
Health Employees (TUGHE). The permanent secretary also informed trade 
union officials that ‘if you are not involved we expect you to gatecrash’; a 
statement which has been a source of much annoyance to trade unionists. In 
interviews, the comment was raised by a number of TUCTA officials at head 
office and by officials at individual trade unions. In response to their lack of 
involvement in the PRSP, TUCTA asked the ILO for assistance, which reacted 
by using Tanzania as a pilot country for its Project on Capacity Building for 
Effective Social Dialogue in the PRSP. This was based on emphasising social 
dialogue as a way to put into practice the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda (DWA) 
as a key part of the PRSP and as a means of stimulating representatives of 
both labour and capital to participate in the formulation of social and 
economic policies. Between September and December 2001 the ILO ran 
programmes for TUCTA, as well as the state and the Association of Tanzanian 
Employers (ATE), encouraging the three groups to set up a tripartite forum, 
which would formulate its own dialogue with other PRSP stakeholders (Egulu, 
2004a). 
 
However, the ILO (2001: 15) pointed out that although key employment and 
decent work issues were contained in the Interim-PRSP, they had ‘largely 
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disappeared from the final version of the PRSP.’ Overall, ‘labor issues do not 
feature prominently in the 53-page PRSP’ (Egulu, 2004a; 73). The state 
responded in 2001 by providing add-ons in an attempt to create employment. 
First, it set up supplementary programmes to create jobs and to address the 
problem of child labour. Second, (in line with donor-driven economic policies) 
it launched a micro-finance initiative in February 2002. This was aimed at 
providing start-up capital for the poor as a way of generating employment in 
the private sector in rural areas (Wangwe, 2004, Yaron, 2004). Third, the state 
instigated a review of its National Employment Policy (URT, 2000b).  
Few tangible benefits occurred as a result of these initiatives from the point of 
view of the unions. The state’s Second Progress Report on the PRSP 
(2001/2002), does not refer to trade unions at all. The report limits itself to 
stating the need for the ‘mainstreaming’ of civil society participation in the 
PRSP process and capacity building of CSOs in general (URT, 2003b: 76). 
 
Research and analysis by the state (URT, 2004a) and NGOs (Hakikazi 
Catalyst, 2002a) highlights issues regarding poverty reduction, which are 
integral to the work of trade unions, such as the need to focus on improving 
the terms and conditions of employment for the workforce. Despite the 
publication of this research, possible roles for trade unions in poverty 
reduction strategies are not discussed. This situation spurred the trade union 
movement into doing its own research and in September 2004 TUCTA 
published 'Trade Unions Input into the PRSP Process’ (TUCTA, 2004a). The 
publication of this document marked a watershed in the state-trade union 
relations in post-liberalization Tanzania. Key arguments put forward in the 
paper clearly showed that the trade union movement was willing to engage in 
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a war of position with the state. It argued that the PRSP has been ‘super-
imposed’ on Tanzania by the IFIs (TUCTA, 2004a: viii), and castigated the 
World Bank for concentrating on economic growth ‘without looking at who 
gets what or produce [sic] what’ (ibid). It also pointed out that ‘workers were 
not involved in contributing towards documentation of PRS I’ (ibid). The 
report concluded that the PRSP process has ‘made more people poorer and 
poorer’ (TUCTA, 2004a: ix) and failed to create employment. However, no 
counter-hegemonic discourse from the labour movement was put forward in 
the document and no follow-up research was done by trade unionists to this 
end. The state ignored the document and the failure of the trade unions to 
build on their claims with further research and publications meant that no 
subsequent discussion of the main arguments ensued.  
 
This shows the importance of Gramsci’s (2011b) argument that to win the war 
of position, civil society must engage in a protracted struggle, which entails 
continually building on actions, such as the publication of documents.  The 
trade union movement lacked both the capacity and the vision to follow-up on 
the publication of the document by outlining a counter-hegemonic discourse 
of its own. These limitations on the part of the labour movement 
notwithstanding, agency has been a significant factor in the war of position 
between trade unions and the state. That is, a small number of dynamic trade 
unionists have confronted the hegemonic discourse of neo-liberalism, as put 
forward in the PRSP process, forcing a response from the state and the donors. 
The strategic interventions by these actors have met by confrontation and 
attempts at co-option by the state. For example, one senior TUCTA official 
was outspoken in criticisms of the way the first PRSP was drawn up, arguing 
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that it was a World Bank-led document and copied from the Voices of the Poor 
initiative in its language and ideas. The official also argued that the state and 
the World Bank were manipulating figures used in the PRSP. The figures used 
as baselines, from which targets for improvements were set in various sections 
of the PRSP, were largely taken from the 1988 census. However, the state, 
with tacit World Bank approval, claimed they were from the 2001 census. 
Thus, the baseline figures had lower values than was the reality in 2001, 
making improvements seem to be greater achievements than was actually the 
case.   As a result of his interventions, the official was at first confronted by 
state and World Bank officials and formally reprimanded for participating 
‘inappropriately’ in the PRSP process. When the official refused to retract his 
claims and continued to attend PRSP meetings at his own behest, the state 
moved to a strategy of co-option by inviting him to serve on PRSP committees 
and the World Bank financed his travel to Zambia for a meeting. However, the 
official was informed that his formal inclusion in the PRSP process was on an 
individual basis and that he was not an official representative of the trade 
union movement.  Consequently, when the official is unable to attend 
meetings, nobody from the trade union movement is allowed to deputise. For 
the official, this shows that the participation of stakeholders in the PRSP 
process lacks transparency and accountability. ‘Who gets to be a 
representative on MKUKUTA committees is not dependent on the importance 
of the organization they represent but how they are regarded by those in power 
and how committed they are to trying to become a representative,’ was how 
this official summarized participation.   
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MKUKUTA objectives and policies have been amended in the light of the 
experience of PRSP I. However, as with PRSP I, labour am included in 
MKUKUTA as a cross-cutting, rather than a core, issue, which remains a 
major source of contention between the trade unions and the state. Moreover, 
trade union participation remains subsumed within the ‘Civil Society 
Stakeholders’ group, dominated by NGOs. In addition, macroeconomic issues, 
which have vital consequences for the workforce, are still not amenable to 
substantive discussion concerning possible reforms. Thus, as all the interviews 
revealed, trade unions are marginalized and frustrated participants in 
MKUKUTA. 
 
For trade unions the gap between the stated policies of MKUKUTA and 
practice is a fundamental problem. In interviews with trade unions officials, 
both at the TUCTA head office and individual unions, a common theme was 
the ‘reasonable’ rhetoric concerning policies set out in MKUKUTA but 
significant disquiet at the lack of action by the state regarding implementation.  
For example, although trade unions are designated, on its Poverty Monitoring 
website, as one of the six specific types of non-state actors with which the 
state works, in practice, no initiatives with labour associations have been 
implemented. Thus, TUCTA (2004a: xi) argues that the PRSP is ‘an academic 
manual to be used as a reference and not a strategy to mitigate poverty.’   
 
Subsequent research by the state and civil society organizations shows the 
claim made by TUCTA in their 2004 report, that the incidence of poverty is 
increasing in Tanzania, has some credence. According to state statistics the 
absolute number of people in poverty rose from 11.5 million to 12.8 million 
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from 2001 to 2007 (Policy Forum, 2008a). Furthermore, the poorest 10% of 
the population were worse off in 2007 than in 2001; their consumption levels 
fell by over 5% (Policy Forum, 2008a). Income inequality worsened in Dar es 
Salaam from 1991 to 2007 and (with regard to figures for 2007) ‘the 
economy’s significant growth since 2000/01 has not translated into income 
poverty reduction’ (URT, 2009b: 13).  Agriculture is the mainstay of the 
economy, yet for TUCTA (2004: ix), the strategies endorsed by the PRSP in 
this sector ‘do not favour the poor, rather constraints [sic] the development of 
small producers.’  Statistical evidence supports this view. For example, the 
state’s PHDR 2009 states that ‘a drop in the share of agriculture in total GDP 
in Tanzania seems to be largely the result of poor sectoral performance rather 
than productivity growth’ (URT, 2009b: 6).  Furthermore, when the population 
growth rate (2.9%) is taken into consideration, the number of rural poor 
increased between 2001 and 2007, despite a small decline in the incidence of 
poverty (TEDG, 2009). 
 
The fact that labour is treated as a cross-cutting, rather than core, issue in 
MKUKUTA was cited by many TUCTA officials as a key point. Officials 
argued that the Ministry of Labour should be assigned ‘core’ status in the 
process, rather than a ‘cross-cutting’ position. This is the basis for the 
arguments on the part of unions that they do not participate fairly in the PRSP 
process and are wrongly assigned to the catch-all ‘civil society stakeholders’ 
category, where their views are marginalized by the dominance of NGO 
perspectives. As a result of this marginalization, trade union ownership of the 
PRSP is lacking.  TUCTA officials contended that the World Bank has ensured 
that labour is only classed as a cross-cutting issue, as part of a deliberate 
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strategy aimed at winning the war of position. This is because the organization 
does not want to plan for and include labour systematically in the PRSP 
process but instead would like to see it dealt with piecemeal. A TUCTA 
official argued that the PRSP ‘only talks about labour as something to be 
exploited and used to raise productivity. No other aspects of labour are 
discussed in MKUKUTA.’ 
 
For officials of TUCTA-affiliated trade unions 172 two major problems stand 
out concerning trade union participation in MKUKUTA. The fact that trade 
union input is left out of the final document is of most concern, followed by 
the perception of MKUKUTA as a top-down state-controlled process. Thus, 
trade unions have to continually wait for, and rely on, reports from the state, 
which therefore dominates the process. These points are similar to criticisms 
made by NGO officials (see chapter 4). The major disparity in the views of 
NGOs and trade union officials in this regard relates to the claim of the latter 
that the labour movement is always excluded from state initiatives (the PRSP 
process being merely one more example) while NGOs are invariably included 
in policy debates with the state but do not contest the parameters set around 
the mode of their participation.  
  
A counterpoint was made by an official at TPAWU, who argued that it was 
TUCTA’s decision to represent the trade union movement collectively in the 
MKUKUTA process, collating the views of individual unions. This limits 
                                                           
172
   MKUKUTA is not of central concern to officials from non –TUCTA trade unions, as they have little or 
no chance to take part in the process, since trade union participation is coordinated through the TUCTA Head 
Office. This issue was raised by all the interviewees. 
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trade union involvement and can be contrasted unfavourably with the 
approach taken by NGOs, which apply to sit on MKUKUTA Committees 
individually, and, thus, get more overall representation than trade unions. This 
argument was supported by an officer of the Tanzania Seamen’s Union 
(TASU), who stated that TASU has not been able to put forward the particular 
concerns of seamen regarding poverty reduction, as trade union input to 
MKUKUTA is decided on and represented centrally by TUCTA. Moreover, an 
official at the Tanzania Local Government Workers Union (TALGWU) stated 
that the union has not been involved with MKUKUTA at all and that 
‘TALGWU only hears about MKUKUTA from the speeches of the state’. 
These answers reveal that TUCTA’s failure to garner the views of individual 
trade unions on issues relating to MKUKUTA has contributed to a lack of 
cohesion in the labour movement, which has hindered its ability both to form 
an effective historic bloc of oppositional groups and to create a sustainable 
counter-hegemonic discourse. 
 
Officials from the Tanzania Media Workers Union (TMW), made the point 
that members of their union, as media personnel, must be included in 
MKUKUTA, since they are vital in disseminating knowledge and ideas to the 
public. However, neither the TMW nor the Tanzania Union of Journalists 
(TUJ) have the capacity to raise member-awareness of poverty reduction 
strategies effectively, and knowledge of MKUKUTA is low in general 
amongst journalists. There are no concerted media campaigns on MKUKUTA. 
The use of English in PRSP documents was cited by trade union officials as a 
barrier to many of the members participating in the process, as they are not 
proficient in the language. As all the senior trade union officials can speak the 
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language fluently, they did not regard dealing with trade union matters in 
English at TUCTA Head Office as a problem. Moreover, since CBAs are 
negotiated through TUCTA’s Head Office there are no drawbacks in dealing 
with employers over this issue. One of the new guard TUCTA officials made 
the point that trade unionists find it taxing to write funding proposals in 
English which require ‘knowledge of precise and technical language, and is 
difficult’. Capacity building is thus needed in this area as ‘most of us [trade 
unions] are failing to get funds.’ For sixty per cent of TUCTA-affiliated trade 
unions, using English is a significant problem, mainly at branch level. It is 
particularly onerous when dealing with new investors, as their management 
teams do not usually speak Swahili and can be dismissive of people who are 
not fluent in English. For one trade union officer, the lack of proficiency in 
English by trade union officials ‘is a very big obstacle’ to helping workers in 
the plantation and agricultural sectors, as most of the new investors will only 
negotiate in English. Thus, trade union representatives ‘fear meetings with 
management of newly privatized industries.’ The ‘vicious circle’ problem is 
relevant here. Falling union membership, means less funding is available to 
send union officials on courses to learn English and thus capacity is weakened, 
which in turn makes it harder to recruit members. Use of English rather than 
Swahili in conducting union business reduces participation in the PRSP 
process and, thus, is a significant contributory factor in the lack of trade union 
ownership of the PRSP.  
 
6.8 Summary 
The attempt in the PRSP process to incorporate the views of civil society 
organizations through a participatory approach to policy creation, which will 
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in turn inculcate national ownership, is part of changing modalities of 
intervention in political processes, aimed in particular at controlling groups 
with low levels of allegiance to the state. Institution building and governance 
are at the heart of the Post-Washington Consensus and this plays out through 
the PRSP process in the form of conflict being eradicated from governing 
institutions and competing ideas being restricted to an arena within the 
consensus framework on macroeconomic fundamentals. Thus, the PRSP 
process has become a major vehicle to build consensus, pace de Tocqueville, 
through participation and ownership based on the World Bank’s vision of a 
depoliticised and bureaucratic developmental state. PRSPs are based on the 
recognition by the World Bank that external support for change and 
development can achieve little if the domestic will to reform is missing. 
External support from the World Bank comes in the form of technical advice 
and financial assistance. Domestically political leaders must build consensus 
and ownership through participatory processes, which inevitably means 
compensating, neutralizing or marginalizing groups that lose out in the 
process. Therefore, the attempt in the PRSP process to incorporate the views 
of civil society organizations through a participatory approach to policy 
creation can be regarded as part of the move to minimise opposition from 
dissenting groups. Underlying causes of political struggles and resistance to 
change are not addressed.  
 
Practically, this means the Tanzanian state has to ensure that at the micro-level 
of policy and strategy implementation, the PRSP process is run in a way 
acceptable to the influential multilateral donors, thus, guaranteeing that the 
final document will be approved at the Joint Staff Assessment (JSA) of the 
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IFIs in Washington and receive the support of the major bilateral donors, 
which remain a vital source of finance for the country. The fact that Tanzania 
remains an aid-dependent country (ODA makes up 65.8% of Tanzania’s gross 
capital formation) is very important in shaping relations between the donors 
and the state. As a result, civil society organizations regarded as disruptive to 
the process, such as trade unions, are marginalized. There is no reference to 
trade unions in any of the JSAs or Poverty and Human Development Reports 
(URT, 2009c, 2007e, 2005b, 2003a) produced by the state.  
 
The donors increasingly regard the Tanzanian state as a reliable partner and 
the country as one where they can disburse large amount of aid quickly and 
effectively. This causes the Tanzanian state to have ‘ever-increasing influence 
with its donors’ (Harrison, Mulley and Holtom, 2009: 295). Consequently, for 
the state, relations with external donors, as well as the new investors in the 
economy, carry a lot more weight than connections with civil society 
organizations. However, CSOs are of instrumental importance to the state, as 
their participation in the formation of the PRSP must occur in a way that 
satisfies the donors before funds will be disbursed. The publication of its third 
phase (MKUKUTA II, covering the period from 2010 to 2015) indicates that 
the PRSP will continue to be the dominant national development plan in 
Tanzania in the short to medium term, at least. The state has firmly linked 
MKUKUTA to previous national initiatives, stating that it ‘is a continuation of 
the long standing national commitments to fighting poverty initiated at 
independence in 1961’ (URT, 2010b: 1). Gramsci (2011b) made the point that, 
for oppositional civil society groups, a war of position is inevitably drawn out. 
Civil society organizations in Tanzania have now been operating within the 
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PRSP framework for over ten years and a number are starting to apply praxis 
(Gramsci, 2011b), by analysing why certain strategies have not worked 
effectively in the war of position and subsequently altering them in an attempt 
to increase their impact. Consequently, the longer the PRSP process continues 
in Tanzania, the greater the opportunities are for associational groups to use 
strategies effectively within the limited policy space opened up via the PRSP 
process to provide a counter-hegemonic discourse. This could threaten the 
donor-driven agenda and stretch the limits of IFI tolerance for participation on 
the part of civil society organizations. Therefore, while at present, civil society 
institutions are participating in debates as part of the PRSP process within 
narrowly construed donor-driven confines, they have an opportunity to use the 
new spaces where policies can be contested to open up new fronts in the war 
of position.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusions 
 
7.1    The Position of Civil Society Organizations in Post-liberalization  
 Tanzania    
In this chapter a summary is made of the main research outcomes of this work, 
followed by an analysis of policy implications arising from the findings. This 
book has examined, through a Gramscian lens, the reconfiguration of civil 
society in post-liberalization Tanzania, centring on the rationale for the 
marginalization of trade unions. This focus required an analysis of four related 
research questions. First, whether Tanzanian trade unions in the post-
liberalization period have been confined to representing a minority of wage 
labourers in the formal sector, which, therefore, constitute a labour aristocracy. 
Second, the extent to which the labour movement has created alliances with 
other forms of civil society (thereby embracing social movement unionism) 
with the potential to form a historic bloc of oppositional groups, which is able 
to provide a substantive challenge to neoliberal hegemony in the post-
liberalization era. Third, the reasons why NGOs have come to dominate civil 
society input to national policy-making processes in post-liberalization 
Tanzania. Fourth, how trade unions and NGOs have engaged in the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers process (the national policy-making instrument 
which has most support from external donors) and with what consequences. 
First, the main findings from the analysis of the central research question are 
discussed, followed by a critical assessment in turn of the major outcomes 
from the examination of the four related issues. A key conclusion arising from 
the analysis of all the research questions is that a Gramscian approach has 
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considerably more explanatory power regarding the role of civil society in 
post-liberalization Tanzania than the dominant liberal conception, which 
draws to a large extent on a misconception of the de Tocquevillian 
perspective. 
 
It is clear from this research that civil society in post-liberalization Tanzania is 
being reconstructed as an independent variable, largely through the influence 
of multilateral and bilateral donors. These external donors are promulgating a 
de Tocquevillian view of civil society in Tanzania, based on a vision of a wide 
variety of freely-formed organizations taking part in national policy-making 
processes in a consensual way, to indicate their views and needs to the state. 
This requires the state to accept and accommodate a plurality of ideas, thereby, 
avoiding dominance by a small number of well-organized groups of citizens.  
In reality, however, the donors have managed a situation where civil society 
input to national policy-making processes comes overwhelmingly from a few, 
largely Dar es Salaam-based, NGOs, which are externally funded and 
composed of well-educated professionals, who are versed in the hegemonic 
discourse (which revolves around the concepts of partnership, participation 
and ownership) in the post-liberalization period.   Apex associations (notably 
Policy Forum, TANGO and TGNP) have been tasked with drawing into 
national policy-making processes the participation of grassroots forms of 
associational life, which has proved impossible, through their lack of financial 
and technical capacity, as well as the poor communications infrastructure in 
Tanzania. Thus, the donors have engaged in social engineering, through 
shaping and controlling which elements of civic life can (and which cannot) 
participate in debates concerning national policy formulation and development 
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in post-liberalization Tanzania. Therefore, a civil society based around the 
extensive engagement of associational groups in national policy-making 
processes, is not emerging. This is exemplified by the marginalization of trade 
unions, which reflects the power of external donors to influence the state, 
concerning which groups it includes (and which it marginalizes) within the 
sphere of civil society, as it has been reconstituted in post-liberalization 
Tanzania.  
 
7.2     The Marginalization of Trade Unions in Post-liberalization  
Tanzania 
With regard to the rationale for the marginalization of trade unions in post-
liberalization Tanzania (the main research question), this study showed that a 
historically-grounded analysis is necessary if the reasons for this situation are 
to be understood in a nuanced way (see chapter 5). Trade unions developed a 
culture under colonialism that fostered solidarity and led to sustained conflict 
with state officials and representatives of capital. Therefore, they have 
experience of struggle on behalf of their members and historically have 
proved capable of effective organization and action. However, the legitimacy 
of trade unions as representatives of labour was eroded after independence. 
The legacy of more than thirty years of one-party rule, involving tight control 
over the labour movement, leading to trade unions being regarded as branches 
of the state, has proved difficult to overcome in the post-liberalization era.  It 
is, therefore, evident that civil society in Tanzania has long been germane to 
debates regarding participation and citizenship, since key elements of 
associational life, were used as a tool of organization and discipline by both 
the colonial administration and the one-party state, which emerged after 
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independence. Consequently, the legacy of colonialism must be the basis of 
any analysis of civil society in Tanzania. However, this is not the case with 
regard to the donors, which have much influence over national policy-making 
processes in the post-liberalization period (see chapter 3). They have, from the 
1990s, eschewed a historically-informed strategy and instead tried to build a 
‘new’ civil society in the country. This approach has failed to take into account 
how the development of Tanzanian civil society from the colonial period has 
affected the current composition and ideologies of various important 
associational groups, as well as their interrelationships and levels of capacity 
and legitimacy. Thus, participation in national policy-making processes is 
focused on the new, and carefully managed, NGO sector, while other forms of 
civil society are marginalized.  
 
Regarding the position of labour, the ascendancy of market forces that 
gathered pace under SAPs in the 1980s left many Tanzanian workers 
vulnerable, particularly after liberalization and privatization of the economy 
during the 1990s led to large numbers of redundancies (see chapter 3).  Trade 
unions have protested against the negative effects of these changes on workers 
and organized a small number of mass actions (notably the short-lived general 
strike in 1994 and the aborted general strike in 2010). These actions had little 
substantive effect on the position of the Tanzanian workforce. However, they 
were, in Gramscian terms (Gramsci, 2011b), important in terms of praxis. That 
is, such processes increased the organizational ability of the trade union 
movement and heightened levels of reflection about the effectiveness of their 
actions among officials and workers, thereby enhancing the possibility of them 
forming a counter-hegemonic discourse.  Furthermore, to some extent trade 
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unions in the post-liberalization period have become champions of greater 
state regulation of the economy in the national (rather than the international) 
interest and of the provision of public goods, in the face of opposition from 
the state and the external donors, which seek to maintain neo-liberal 
hegemony. For example, senior TUCTA officials were shocked at the strength 
of the World Bank’s opposition to the creation of a minimum wage in 
Tanzania during negotiations. TUCTA contested the World Bank’s rejection of 
a proposed minimum wage, pointing out to their officials that unless there 
were some agreements on basic costs of living and the wages required to meet 
them, there would be difficulty in finding a starting position when 
representatives of the state, employers and unions convened to negotiate.  A 
national minimum wage was introduced, partly as a result of union pressure, 
though World Bank officials argued that its imposition was an unwarranted 
interference in the workings of the free market and a potential deterrent to 
inward FDI.  
 
Such arguments on the part of the Tanzanian trade union movement in the 
post-liberalization era, as well as the actions they organized, have been a 
significant cause of their marginalization. That is, these arguments and actions 
led the major external donors (the World Bank, in particular) and the state to 
regard trade unions as a threat to neo-liberal hegemony in Tanzania. A neo-
liberal hegemony that is based on attracting inward FDI and giving domestic 
entrepreneurs the maximum opportunity to operate in an economic climate 
free from ‘inefficiencies’ created by demands for market distorting policies, 
such as regulated labour markets. Thus, the Gramscian argument, that 
oppositional civil society groups inevitably have to engage in a war of position 
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with the state if a sustainable counter-hegemonic discourse is to be formed, is 
persuasive with regard to trade union engagement in national policy-making 
processes in post-liberalization Tanzania. In addition, the situation has 
required trade unions to expand their war of position in order to encompass an 
ideological struggle with transnational actors (notably the World Bank), which 
are influential promoters of neo-liberal hegemony at a global level and drive 
the entrenching of a market-driven model in Tanzania (see chapter 3). In 
contrast, the de Tocquevillian view of the relationship between civil society 
and the state, drawing overwhelmingly on his observations of the US during 
the nineteenth century, has minimal explanatory power in the case of post-
liberalization Tanzania. The integral state in Tanzania has used moral and 
intellectual leadership and coercive legal-bureaucratic means, both of which, 
Gramsci argued, were necessary if the state was to become hegemonic 
(Gramsci, 2011b). Concerning the former, trade unions have been constantly 
attacked verbally by the state, representatives of capital (the ATE 173and the 
CTI 174, in particular) and, to some extent, by the external donors in the post-
liberalization period for their ‘irresponsible’ and ‘unnecessary’ calls for pay 
rises and industrial actions. In 2010, President Kikwete ‘lambasted’ the trade 
union leaders for demanding pay rises, which were beyond the budget of the 
state. 175 With regard to the latter element of the integral state, trade unions 
were threatened with coercive legal-bureaucratic measures when mounting 
actions. Senior state officials, including the president, declared the proposed 
general strike in 2010 illegal, and threatened to take TUCTA officials to court 
if they continued to press for the action (see chapter 5). Moreover, trade 
                                                           
173
  See for example, ‘ATE: TUCTA will pay for strike losses’ in This Day, 6 April, 2010  
174
  See for example, ‘Call of the strike, CTI urges TUCTA’ in This Day, 9 April, 2010 
175
  See ‘TUCTA in new strike ultimatum’ in This Day, 6 June 2010. 
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unions were declared ineligible to apply for state funding sources earmarked 
for ‘civil society’ and marginalized in all national policy instruments, 
including the PRSP, which receives the most funding and other forms of 
support from external donors. Thus, civil society in post-liberalization 
Tanzania is clearly not a level playing-field, since the donors and the state 
have made it impossible for trade unions to take part in national policy-
making processes in an autonomous and consensual manner (pace de 
Tocqueville).   
 
In responding to their marginalization in the post-liberalization period by the 
integral state and transnational actors, this research showed that Tanzanian 
labour movement faces two major issues; an ideological vacuum concerning 
perceptions of their role within the sphere of civil society and structural 
constraints caused by lack of finance, falling membership and poor facilities.  
 
7.3 Tanzanian Trade Unions and the Labour Aristocracy Debate 
The first issue related to the main research question examined in this work 
concerned the extent to which trade unions in post-liberalization Tanzania can 
be regarded as representing a labour aristocracy. This research demonstrated 
that the attitudes, behaviour and actions of unions show a heterogeneity that 
casts much doubt on the validity of the labour aristocracy thesis. The labour 
aristocracy thesis in the case of Tanzanian trade unions can be criticized in 
terms of both structural and agency-related factors. Concerning the former, a 
considerable number of trade unionists work in jobs with relatively poor terms 
and conditions of employment, such as plantation workers, represented by the 
Tanzanian Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union (TPAWU). In respect of 
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the latter, perceptions of many professions with a high degree of unionization 
by other groups in Tanzania are negative. For example, teachers, represented 
by the largest labour organization in the country, the Tanzania Teachers Union 
(TTU), work in a profession regarded as a last resort because of low salaries 
and status.   
 
Furthermore, even in fairly well paid sectors of the economy, such as mining, 
labour relations are confrontational and workers face constant struggles with 
representatives of capital, who are assertively anti-union. The research showed 
that the Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union (TAMICO) has been 
involved in continual disputes with mine managers and owners, as well as 
state officials, over the treatment of its members. Conflicts centre on the high 
level of surplus extraction that characterizes work in the mining sector. This 
creates feelings of solidarity between miners and much less well-paid workers, 
including those in the informal and rural sectors. Moreover, research 
undertaken by the labour movement revealed that many Tanzanian trade 
unionists provide much support for family and friends in the informal and 
rural sectors and have experience of work in both these spheres themselves 
(see chapter 5). As a result, the interests of relatively well-paid trade unionists 
and marginalized members of the workforce are intertwined to a considerable 
degree. In arguing, therefore, that workers in the formal sector of the economy 
are invariably an elite minority, distanced from the majority of the casualized 
and rural workforce (see chapter 5), the labour aristocracy thesis lacks nuance 
in the case of post-liberalization Tanzania. Moreover, the contention of 
advocates of the labour aristocracy thesis that highly paid sectors of the 
workforce are inevitably conservative and unwilling to formulate, or engage 
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with, a counter-hegemonic discourse was shown to be overly determinist in 
the case of trade unionists in post-liberalization Tanzania. Overall, this 
research found that trade unions and trade unionists in Tanzania have drawn 
on heterogeneous ideologies, livelihoods and actions in the post-liberalization 
period, which cannot be accommodated within the framework of the labour 
aristocracy thesis. 
 
7.4 Tanzanian Trade Unions and Social Movement Unionism 
Regarding the second issue related to the main research question, labour 
organizations in post-liberalization Tanzania have formed few alliances with 
other civil society groups in post-liberalization Tanzania and, therefore, social 
movement unionism has not been adopted (see chapter 5). The research found 
that a few tentative moves on the part of trade unions towards forming 
alliances with marginalized groups in the workforce have occurred. These 
have predominantly taken the form of some individual unions paying greater 
attention to the organization of women and youth members, while, at the 
centre, TUCTA has created a permanent space for a delegate from the youth 
wing of the movement on its executive. Moreover, a few unions (notably 
TUICO) have attempted to ally themselves with workers in the informal sector 
(see chapter 5). However, no enduring coalitions between trade unions and 
other civil society groups have been formed in the post-liberalization period. 
For example, trade unions did not work closely with other civil society 
organizations when engaging in actions, such as the proposed general strike in 
2010.There is, consequently, little chance at present of trade unions 
collaborating to form a historic bloc of oppositional groups, capable of 
challenging state hegemony.  
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The research revealed that the dominant form of civil society in post-
liberalization Tanzania, NGOs, (see section 7.5 below) are indifferent (and in 
some cases opposed) to trade union participation in national policy-making 
processes in Tanzania (see chapter 4). To a large extent, such views are caused 
by the perception that trade union structures and perspectives remain rooted in 
the past, when they were subsumed within the apparatus of the state.  
Moreover, many trade unionists themselves remain suspicious of NGOs, 
regarding them as too closely allied to the post-liberalization state and to 
external donors. The research also showed that trade unionists tend to regard 
NGOs as corrupt and aggressive, as well as lacking roots in Tanzanian society 
and accountability to their constituencies.  Thus, trade unions in post-
liberalization Tanzania lack a sense of unity with NGOs, as well as other 
forms of civil society, which makes the adoption of social movement unionism 
problematic in the short to medium-term. Since revolutionary unionism was 
unanimously rejected as a viable trajectory by all labour movement officials 
interviewed as part of this research, trade unions in Tanzania are left with the 
probability of adopting a business unionism approach by default. If this is to 
be avoided, the leadership needs to show clarity of vision in formulating an 
ideology and strategies for the labour movement that have hitherto been 
lacking in the post-liberalization period.  
 
7.5   The NGO Dominance of Civil Society in Post-liberalization Tanzania 
Regarding the third issue related to the main research question examined in 
this work, NGOs have been nurtured by the donors following liberalization in 
Tanzania, as their preferred type of civil society organization. A small number 
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of large, urban-based NGOs have received a substantive amount of financial 
and technical support from external donors (see chapter 4). The multilateral 
and bilateral donors are ostensibly fostering a model of liberal pluralism, 
based on cultivating a large and diverse number of individual civil society 
organizations in Tanzania. However, they have de facto played a substantive 
role (through being the driving force behind the formation of an NGO apex 
organization, when others already existed and the funding of a few elite Dar es 
Salaam-based organizations) in creating elements of a corporatist civil society 
model (see chapter 4). As a result of this funding and support, a small number 
of influential NGOs nominally represent the views of the many grassroots 
groups operating outside the urban centres, which do not have the capacity to 
make their perspectives known to the state. These umbrella groups have little 
contact with grassroots groups, which lack the necessary means (such as, 
email and mobile telephones) to communicate effectively. As a result, the 
mode of participation of civil society organizations in national policy-making 
processes belies the de Tocquevillian vision on which it is based, since a 
diversity of views from citizens’ groups is lacking and civil society input to 
national policy-making processes is dominated by a small number of well-
organized and resourced NGOs. Alternative sorts of associational life in 
Tanzania, which have developed roots as by-products of economic, political, 
social and cultural forces, and, thus, do not need to be created by donors, are 
marginalized.  These types of civil society (often in the form of twilight 
associations) are important to many Tanzanians, in providing financial 
support, employment opportunities and social solidarity (see chapter 2). The 
fact that they have been almost entirely ignored in national policy-making 
processes shows that the external donors are intent on creating a version of 
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civil society in Tanzania in their own image, dominated by actors who come 
from within the hegemonic discourse. 
 
NGOs have not provided a serious and sustained challenge to hegemony of 
neo-liberalism in Tanzania during the post-liberalization period, for several 
significant reasons. First, a number of the elite NGOs accept the de 
Tocquevillian perspective that civil society organizations assist in forming 
policies which represent hegemonic universalism, through discussions with 
state representatives, which take place in a trusting, tolerant and transparent 
political environment. That is, these organizations regard themselves as 
partners of the state in contributing to the formation of national policies. Thus, 
they have accepted the de Tocquevillian discourse, based on the belief that all 
civil society organizations take part in debates with the state concerning 
national policy formation in a free and equal way. Second, while not actively 
embracing the de Tocquevillian perspective on civil society participation in 
national policy-making processes, in post-liberalization Tanzania, the majority 
of NGOs have not considered ways to form a concerted counter-hegemonic 
discourse. The interviews revealed that most NGOs concentrate 
overwhelmingly on day-to-day service delivery activities and, while most 
have recently created advocacy departments, these have achieved little in 
terms of setting up and sustaining a collective NGO vision capable of 
countering neo-liberal hegemony. Third, many NGOs are reluctant to confront 
neo-liberal hegemony, through their concerns about the state’s reaction to 
criticism (as evidenced by its attacks on, and suppression of, Hakielimu and 
Youth Partnership Countrywide, analysed as case studies in chapter 4). Such 
fears on the part of NGOs have led to them self-censoring the way they 
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participate in national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania.  
A few strategies and actions on the part of NGOs have confronted the 
hegemony of neo-liberalism. The Open Sheraton meetings (TGNP) and press 
campaigns (Hakielimu) are examples in this regard (see chapter 4). However, 
such strategies and actions do not constitute a coherent and sustained counter-
hegemonic discourse. As with the case of trade unions, a Gramscian analysis 
provides useful insights into the ways in which NGOs have participated in 
national policy-making processes in post-liberalization Tanzania, which are 
not possible through the application of a de Tocquevillian lens. The de 
Tocquevillian perspective, based on the characterization of consensual civil 
society-state relations in the formation of national policies, which results in a 
win-win situation, is unable to explain the confrontational reaction of the state 
to TGNP’s Open Sheraton meetings, including the threat of the use of coercive 
legal-bureaucratic measures, based on the claim that the provision of a free 
drink at these events was an illegal inducement to attend. Furthermore, the de 
Tocquevillian approach cannot accommodate the aggressive reaction of the 
state to the publications of Hakielimu, the platform put forward by Baraza la 
Wanawake and the meetings held by Youth Partnership Countrywide (see 
chapter 4). In contrast, a Gramscian perspective, based on oppositional civil 
society groups engaging in a fluid war of position, is able to provide valid 
explanations as to why the strategies and actions of TGNP, Hakielimu, Baraza 
la Wanawake and Youth Partnership Countrywide drew a response from the 
integral state encompassing both ‘moral and intellectual leadership’ (Gramsci, 
2011b) and coercive legal-bureaucratic means (Gramsci, 2011b), as was the 
case with its response to trade union strategies and actions (see section 7.2). 
The use of moral and intellectual leadership took the form of arguments, on 
 324 
 
the part of the state, that its vision and strategies were informed by evidence-
based research and represented the universal good for Tanzanian society, while 
dissenting civil society voices were based on uniformed contentions, driven 
largely by the interests of their foreign funding agencies. The employment by 
the integral state of coercive legal-bureaucratic measures was manifested in 
the de-registration of Youth Partnership Countrywide and Baraza la 
Wanawake, so they could no longer function as civil society organizations, 
and the banning of all Hakielimu materials from Tanzanian educational 
establishments. 
 
7.6 Trade Unions and NGOs in the Tanzanian PRSP process 
The fourth issue related to the main research question examined in this book, 
focused on how trade unions and NGOs have participated in the PRSP process 
in Tanzania. The Tanzanian PRSP process is premised on the participation of a 
mass of citizens, resulting in widespread national ownership of the policy 
outcomes. 
  
Regarding participation, TUCTA officials argued that the Tanzanian state 
formed a Civil Society Stakeholders (CSS) group within the PRSP process to 
present a single view, which weakens trade union arguments, as they are 
filtered through one large and undifferentiated civil society voice. The state 
created the CSS group despite the fact that officially it defines civil society as 
consisting of four separate sections; the private sector, NGOs, community 
based organizations and trade unions. Consequently, conflicting civil society 
perspectives are lost in the PRSP process, where outcomes are presented as 
being based on ‘consensus’ and ‘win-win scenarios.’ For TUCTA officials, 
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trade unions should be included in the PRSP process (as well as all national 
policy-making processes) in a separate section, as their work is vital to 
poverty reduction since, ‘we represent labour, which is the most crucial aspect 
of productivity,’ in the words of one interviewee.  However, the PRSP process 
is based on the designation by the donors and the state of the ‘poor’ as 
‘objects’ who can be ‘known’ and  ‘acted upon’ (Wignaraja 2006, 1992).  They 
are not conceived of as ‘subjects’ who ‘know themselves’ and ‘can act for 
themselves.’ The donors and the state believe that, having identified these 
objects, they can then act on their behalf to bring them development through 
national policies, which have been derived from listening to their perceived 
needs expressed in the institutionalized context of civil society organizations.  
Leaders of the Tanzanian trade union movement argue that they are legitimate 
representatives of many poor trade unionists. However, they are unable to 
adequately represent their needs, since input from trade unions has to be 
filtered through the CSS group, which is dominated by NGOs. Thus, labour 
issues, central to poverty reduction, such as enforcement of minimum wage 
legislation, do not receive a platform.   
 
While the structured way in which the labour movement is forced to take part 
in the PRSP process has limited their opportunities to formulate a counter-
hegemonic discourse, certain individual trade unionists (both from TUCTA’s 
head office and from individual trade unions, such as TPAWU) have inserted 
themselves, uninvited, into the PRSP process and driven discussions in a more 
politicized direction than was originally the case in Tanzania (see chapter 6). 
The state used various strategies in its war of position to marginalize the 
influence of these actors, including refusing permission for the most dynamic 
 326 
 
of these individuals to formally claim affiliation to the trade union movement 
during participation in PRSP processes.  
 
The donors driving the PRSP process, and the state (as its owner) have made 
no efforts to draw on participatory models and methods which have a history 
in Tanzania, such as the self-help movement in the 1960s (which drew the 
rural population into negotiating their developmental needs with state officials 
on a large scale) and clauses from Mwongozo (dating back to 1971) relating to 
the need for managers to lead by example, for ostentation to be eschewed and 
for personal behaviour to be ethical. These clauses are close in form to 
positions put forward as part of ‘third generation’ participatory development 
concerns, stressing the need for ethical behaviour by officials involved in 
development processes (see chapter 1). Workers’ committees were also 
institutionalized in many workplaces following independence. Whilst regarded 
as too close to management in a lot of cases, they did create an indigenous 
participatory culture of sorts, parts of which could be drawn on in debates 
about poverty reduction and economic growth. Instead of looking for ways to 
draw on such relevant examples from the past in Tanzania, the donors prefer 
to use a small group of westernised NGOs as a vanguard to put forward the 
views of Tanzanian citizens. 
 
Regarding ownership, this research revealed that the concept is flawed on two 
levels. First, requiring the Tanzanian state to show national ownership of 
policies is an imposition by external donors, which acts as an over-arching 
conditionality. The state is unable to reject ownership of policies as a 
condition, on the grounds that it is inappropriate in the particular socio-
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economic and political circumstances pertaining in Tanzania, if the country 
wants to receive aid and debt relief. Second, even if the merits of ownership 
are accepted as beneficial to Tanzania, its conceptualization and measurement 
within the Tanzanian PRSP process are questionable. Analytical frameworks 
to measure levels of ownership have been developed by the World Bank 
(World Bank, 2004b, Johnson and Wasty, 1993). However, measurement of 
levels of ownership in the Joint Staff Assessments relies on assigning 
numerical values from 1-5 with no detailed descriptors for the different 
rankings being provided. The assessments thus lack both rigour and 
transparency (see chapter 6). Overall, the narrow base of civil society 
participation results a lack of widespread ownership of the Tanzanian PRSP 
process. Furthermore, the positive numerical scores awarded within the 
category of ‘civil society participation’ in the Joint Staff Assessments of the 
IFIs, are meaningless.  
 
7.7 Policy Implications 
The research has centred on the rationale for the marginalization of trade 
unions in post-liberalization Tanzania. In order to play a more meaningful role 
in civil society, the labour movement could adopt various policies. 
 
First, trade unions could use the limited amount of impetus that actions, such 
as the proposed general strike in 2010, has generated, to concentrate on 
forming a coherent and sustainable vision for the labour movement in post-
liberalization Tanzania, which is currently lacking. In this regard, a focus on 
re-framing industrial relations within a tripartite system, involving trade 
unions, representatives of capital (in the form of employers associations) and 
the state, might have utility. Key issues, such as employment and livelihoods 
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creation would then be based around the arguments and interests of domestic 
agents, rather than those of external donors, intent on establishing the global 
hegemony of neo-liberalism. An obstacle to the realization of such a policy is 
the continuing aid dependency of the Tanzanian state (see chapter 3). This 
gives the donors substantive leverage over national policies and it is possible 
that they would put pressure on the state to reduce the influence of trade 
unions in debates concerning the labour market. The opposition of the World 
Bank to trade union arguments in favour of the introduction of a minimum 
wage in Tanzania provides an illustration, in this regard. This example shows 
the difficulty for trade unions in winning the war of position, since they are 
facing not just the Tanzanian state, but, also the allied power of transnational 
actors, intent on fostering the hegemony of neo-liberalism at a global level. 
 
Second, the Tanzanian trade union movement could attempt to increase its 
currently weak financial capacity through a concerted attempt to raise funds 
from external sources, particularly the international trade union movement. 
Such forms of support were denied the trade union movement by the state 
following independence, on the grounds that it would lead to the undue 
influence of alien ideas. For such a strategy to succeed, it would necessitate, 
first, building the technical capacity of trade union officials, particularly in 
terms of training in the area of writing funding proposals. This research 
showed that trade union leaders are becoming increasingly aware of how 
difficult it is to complete complex funding proposals and, in particular, the 
problems involved in using the current key terminology and concepts from the 
‘dominant development discourse in ways which will meet with the approval 
of the donors, who are its gatekeepers.  
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The World Bank and the ILO 176 currently do not provide funds for the 
Tanzanian labour movement and the bilateral donors (with the notable 
exception of DANIDA) remain indifferent to the trade unions, preferring to 
focus on NGOs as civil society partners. For example, although DFID has 
produced ‘How to work with Trade Unions’ (DFID, 2009), they have no 
contacts with the Tanzanian labour movement. The same is true for USAID 
and JICA.  Overall, trade union leaders would be in a stronger position to 
submit effective funding proposals to major external donors if they had 
training in how to focus the content and, in particular, how to use the key 
discourse terms of the post-liberalization period; partnership, participation and 
ownership. 
 
Third, Tanzanian trade unions in the main have been losing members in 
considerable number since liberalization, with the exception of the Tanzania 
Teachers Union  (see chapter 5). Campaigns to attract new members could 
revitalize the movement. Such an initiative could involve the systematic 
targeting of workers in the informal sector, women and youth, which would 
enhance the ability of trade unions to refute the claim that currently they 
represent a labour aristocracy. Evidence from this research revealed that trade 
unions do not represent a labour aristocracy. Nevertheless, the claim that trade 
unions represent a relatively privileged minority of wage labourers in the 
formal sector has been used by the state as a strategy in its war of position 
since the colonial period. It was employed with particular effectiveness by the 
one-party state in post-independence Tanzania to divide and rule the 
                                                           
176
  The ILO has funded projects to assist Tanzanian trade unions in the post-liberalization period (see chapter 
3 for    details).  
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workforce (see chapter 5). Thus, initiatives aimed at working with 
marginalized groups, may enhance the legitimacy of trade unions as 
representatives of the Tanzanian workforce and counter the views of citizens 
(derived residually from arguments put forward by senior officials, including 
Nyerere, during the period of one-party rule) that the labour movement 
represents an elite minority of formal sector workers. Moreover, increasing the 
membership base would raise income, thus, increasing the capacity of trade 
unions. 
 
Fourth, in addition to working more closely with marginalized sectors of the 
workforce, trade unions could also make attempts to increase cohesion and 
mutual support within the labour movement, as well as collaboration with 
other forms of civil society, particularly NGOs, as part of a move to embrace 
social movement unionism. Regarding the former, a considerable number of 
the individual trade unions are small and lack the capacity to provide services. 
Of the twenty one trade unions registered with the Office of the Registrar, 
more than half have less than three thousand members and five have fewer 
than three hundred.  For the members of some of these small unions the 
situation is worse than it was when trade unions were part of a monolithic 
structure in Tanzania.  Polarization has occurred; a few trade unions are doing 
reasonably well under the new system while others are doing worse than when 
trade unions were part of a state-controlled structure, as they have to fight for 
funding and recognition on their own and are not apportioned resources from 
the centre in the way they were under the one-party system. There is a danger 
that small unions will struggle on with little finance and few resources and 
that this will fragment and weaken the trade union movement in Tanzania as a 
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whole. The same argument applies to the formation of trade union federations. 
Multiple federations can be formed under the provision of the 1998 Trade 
Union Act and the possibility of having several centres of power could make 
the trade union movement less coherent and cohesive and lead to solidarity 
breaking down. Consequently, there is a case for TUCTA to make a concerted 
effort to increase contacts between unions and to formulate an overall vision 
for the movement, which could assist in uniting individual organizations. This 
would require a considerable amount of financial and technical capacity, as 
well as political will, making it important for TUCTA leaders to find effective 
ways to raise funds (see point two above in this section for details). 
Concerning the latter, given the mutual misgivings between officials of trade 
unions and NGOs in Tanzania (as outlined in section 7.4) increasing 
collaborative work between them requires concerted will and imagination on 
both sides, which is presently lacking.  
 
The focus of this research has been on two types of civil society organizations 
and accordingly the final words should go to their officials. The pressing need 
for both NGOs and trade unions to clarify their positions within the political 
economy of Tanzania was made apparent during interviews and participant 
observation. A similar point made by a senior official from an NGO and from 
a trade union in different contexts is significant for the future of both of these 
types of civil society organizations in post-liberalization Tanzania. For the 
former, far too much time is taken up by the NGO sector complaining about 
the role of the state in national policy-making processes. The focus of NGOs 
must shift from this ‘negativity’ to an emphasis on forming their own 
strategies and effective participation techniques. It is vital for NGOs ‘to reflect 
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on their work seriously and to form an overall strategic plan. This is not 
happening currently.’  According to the latter, trade unions over-concentrate on 
the point that they are marginalized by the state through coercive legal-
bureaucratic measures, aggressive verbal attacks by senior government 
officials when defending the interests of the workforce and by being subsumed 
within an undifferentiated mass of civil society organizations, when taking 
part in national policy-making processes, such as the PRSP. These are all state 
strategies (as part of its war of position, Gramscian terms) aimed at 
marginalizing the labour movement. Trade unions should respond less with 
angry statements about how it is treated unfairly and instead should ‘come up 
with a very strong and clear position as to how they stand within the civil 
society sector in Tanzania’ and ‘why their vision and views merit their 
separation from the rest of the civil society stakeholders’ when taking part in 
national policy-making processes.  
 
The need for strategic action based on a clear vision of their roles is vital to 
the future of NGOs and trade unions in Tanzania, and by extension, the whole 
civil society sector. The importance of this is evidenced by the reply of a 
senior trade union official at TUCTA when asked about the current level of 
surplus extraction on the part of the foreign ‘new investors’ and the position of 
the external donors and the state regarding this issue. His reply was that all of 
them are concerned only with creating ‘a profit-driven society, which is 
draining the blood from Tanzanian workers.’ This view, notwithstanding, 
Tanzanian trade unions have more possibilities to form a sustainable counter-
hegemonic discourse than at any previous time during the post-liberalization 
period. This could be built around a nationalist discourse, focusing on the high 
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level of surplus extraction by foreign new investors in lucrative sectors of the 
economy, notably mining. Hitherto, the post-colonial state in Tanzania has 
appropriated the discourse of national liberation. It has argued forcefully, since 
1961, that all classes and groups, including trade unions, must subordinate 
their narrow, sectional interests to the greater good: building a strong and 
independent nation, following years of colonial exploitation and repression. In 
doing so, the state has exercised moral and intellectual leadership (in 
Gramscian terms) to create hegemony. However, the state’s lack of 
transparency and accountability regarding its stance towards the mining 
industry has been used by the labour movement to claim that it is colluding 
with foreign capital in the appropriation of valuable Tanzanian assets, such as 
gold and diamonds, which belong to the people. This is being done through 
the exploitation of Tanzanian labour, which endures oppressive terms and 
conditions of labour in these mines, including suppression of trade union 
activities. Whether these claims stand up to close scrutiny is debatable (see 
chapter 5). Nevertheless, they have provided some leverage for the trade union 
movement in its war of position with the state and could lead to the formation 
of a wider counter-hegemonic discourse. As Gramsci pointed out, the war of 
position is always fluid and the state is clearly uncomfortable in dealing with 
the nationalist rhetoric of the trade union movement, when it focuses on the 
appropriation of lucrative Tanzanian minerals.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 334 
 
Bibliography 
Abugre C. (2000) Still Sapping the Poor: A Critique of IMF Poverty 
Reduction Strategies London: World Development Movement 
 
ActionAid (2004) Rethinking Participation: Questions for Civil Society about 
the Limits of Participation in PRSPs Washington, DC: ActionAid 
 
African Rural Energy Enterprise Development (AREED) (2010) The Energy 
Sector in Tanzania New York: UN 
 
Agrawal N. et al (1993) Structural Adjustment, Economic Performance, and 
Aid Dependency in Tanzania, Washington, DC: World Bank Working Paper 
No. 93/66 
 
Alegi P. (2004) Laduma! Soccer, Politics and Society in South Africa 
Scottsville: University of Kwazulu-Natal Press 
 
Alloo F. (2000) ‘Tanzanian Networks and the Vulnerable’ in Waheeda S. and 
A. Albee (eds) (2001) Selected Studies of Civil Society in Tanzania: Policy, 
Social Capital and Networks of the Vulnerable Dar es Salaam: DFID 
 
Alonso R. and R. Utz (2004) Fiscal Aspects of PRSP Implementation in 
Tanzania Washington DC: World Bank 
 
Amin S. (1990) Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World London: Zed 
 
Ananaba W. (1979) The Trade Union Movement in Africa London: Hurst 
 
Anello E. (2003) ‘My Pathway to Work on Participation in Local Governance’ 
in Cornwall A. and G. Pratt (eds) (2003) Pathways to Participation: 
Reflections on PRA London: ITDG 
 
Anheier, H, Glasius M and M. Kaldor (eds) (2009) Global Civil Society 
Yearbook 2009 London: Sage 
 
Anwar Q. (2003) ‘Six Experiences with PRA’ in Cornwall A. and G. Pratt 
(eds) (2003) Pathways to Participation: Reflections on PRA London: ITDG 
 
 335 
 
Armstrong D. et al (eds) (2010) Civil Society and International Governance: 
The Role of Non-State Actors in the EU, Africa, Asia and the Middle East 
London: Routledge 
Armstrong G. and Giulianotti R. (eds) (2004) Football in Africa: Conflict, 
Conciliation and Community Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Arrighi G. and J. Saul (1973) Essays on the Political Economy of Africa 
London: Monthly Review Press 
 
Athumani R. (2009) ‘MKUKUTA Gets 230bn/- Shot In The Arm From UK’ in 
Daily News (Tanzania), 11 August, 2009 
 
Banerji A. et al (2010) Stepping Up Skills for More Jobs and Higher 
Productivity Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
Bank of Tanzania (2011) Monthly Economic Review: February 2011 Dar es 
Salaam: Bank of Tanzania 
 
Baran P. and P. Sweezy (1966) Monopoly Capital London: Monthly review 
Press 
 
Barker C. et al (1986) African Industrialization: Technology and Change in 
Tanzania Aldershot: Gower 
 
Barrow O. and M. Jennings (eds) (2001) The Charitable Impulse: NGOs and 
Development in East and North-East Africa Oxford: James Currey 
 
Baskin J. (2000) ‘Labour in South Africa’s Transition to Democracy: 
Concertation in a Third World Setting’ in Adler G. and E. Webster (eds) (2000) 
Trade Unions and Democratization in South Africa, 1985-1997 London: 
Macmillan 
  
Basu K. (2006) ‘East Asian Crisis’ in Clark D. (ed.) The Elgar Companion to 
Development Studies Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
 
Bates R. (2005) Markets and States in Tropical Africa London: University of 
California. Original published in 1981 - 2005 edition contains new Preface.  
 
 336 
 
Bauer P. (1976) Dissent on Development London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 
 
Baylies C. and M. Power (2001) ‘Civil Society, Kleptocracy and Donor 
Agendas: What Future for Africa?’ in Review of African Political Economy, 
No. 87 
 
Bayliss K. (Forthcoming) Water Governance and Informal Providers: 
Evidence from Dar es Salaam New York: UNDP 
Bebbington A. (2005) ‘Theorizing Participation and Institutional Change: 
Ethnography and Political Economy’ in Hickey S. and G. Mohan (eds) 
Participation - From Tyranny to Transformation? Exploring New Approaches 
to Participation in Development London: Zed 
 
Bebbington A., Hickey S. and S. Mitlin (eds) (2008) Can NGOs Make a 
Difference? The Challenge Of Development Alternatives London: Zed 
 
Bebbington A., Hickey S. and S. Mitlin (2008) ‘Introduction: Can NGOs 
Make a Difference? The Challenge of Development Alternatives’ in 
Bebbington A., Hickey S. and S. Mitlin (eds) (2008) Can NGOs Make a 
Difference?: The Challenge Of Development Alternatives London: Zed 
 
Becker G. (1975) Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with 
Special Reference to Education New York: National Bureau of Economic 
Research 
 
Becker K. (2004) The Informal Economy Stockhom: SIDA 
 
Bennell P. (1996) ‘Rates of Return to Education: Does the Conventional 
Pattern Prevail in Sub-Saharan Africa?’ in World Development, Vol.24, No. 1 
 
Berg E. and J. Butler (1964) ‘Trade Unions’ in Coleman J. and C. Rosberg 
(eds) (1964) Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa 
Berkeley: University of California Press 
 
Bernstein H. (2004) 'Considering Africa’s Agrarian Questions’ in Historical 
Materialism, Vol. 12, No. 4 
 
 
 337 
 
Bezuidenhout A. (2002) ‘Towards Global Social Movement Unionism? Trade 
Union Responses to Globalization in South Africa.’ In Jose A. (ed.) (2002) 
Organized Labour in the 21st Century Geneva: Institute for Labour Studies  
Bhagwati J. (1982) ‘Directly Unproductive, Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities’ 
in Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 90, No. 5. 
 
Bienefeld M. (1972) A General Theory of Trade Union Development: Some 
Lessons from Tanzania Dar es Salaam: Economic Research Bureau, 
University of Dar es Salaam 
 
Bienefeld M. (1977) Trade Unions and Peripheral Capitalism: the Case of 
Tanzania Brighton: Institute of Development Studies Discussion Paper 112 
 
Bienefeld M. (1979) ‘Trade Unions, the Labour Process, and the Tanzanian 
State’ in The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 17, Issue 4 
 
Bigsten A. et al (2001) ‘Tanzania’ in Shantayana D. et al (eds) (2001) Aid and 
Reform in Africa: Lessons from Ten Case Studies Washington, DC: World 
Bank 
 
Blair H. (1997) ‘Donors, Democratization and Civil Society: Relating Theory 
to Practice’ in Hulme, D and M. Edwards (eds) (1997) NGOs, States and 
Donors: Too Close for Comfort? Basingstoke: Macmillan   
 
Blommaert J. (2005) ‘Situating Language Rights: English and Swahili in 
Tanzania Revisited’ in Journal of Sociolinguistics, Vol.9, No. 3 
 
Boesen J. et al (eds) (1986) Tanzania: Crisis and Struggle for Survival 
Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet 
 
Bolton D. (1978) ‘Unionization and Employer Strategy: The Tanganyikan 
Sisal Industry, 1958-1964’ in Gutkind P., Cohen R. and J. Copans (eds) (1978) 
African Labor History London: Sage 
 
Booth D. (ed.) (2003a) Fighting Poverty In Africa: Are PRSPs Making a 
Difference? London: Overseas Development Institute 
 
 338 
 
Booth D. (2003b) ‘Introduction and Overview’ in Development Policy 
Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 
 
Booth D. (2005) Poverty Monitoring Systems: An Analysis of Institutional 
Arrangements in Tanzania London: Overseas Development Institute, Working 
Paper 247 
 
Booth D. and H. Lucas (2002) Good Practice in the Development of PRSP 
Indicators and Monitoring Systems London: Overseas Development Institute, 
Working Paper 172 
 
Bottomore T. (ed.) (1971) Karl Marx: Early Writings London: Watts 
 
Bourdieu P. (1990) Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture London: 
Sage 
Bourdieu P. (1986) ‘The Forms of Capital’ in Richardson J. (ed.) (1986) 
Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education New York: 
Greenwood 
 
Bratton M. (1989) ‘The Politics of Government-NGO Relations in Africa’ in 
World Development, Vol. 17, No. 4 
 
Bratton M. and N. van de Walle (1998) Democratic Experiments in Africa: 
Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective Cambridge: CUP 
 
Brautigam D. and S. Knack (2004) ‘Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance 
in Sub-Saharan Africa’ in Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 
52, No. 2 
 
Bretton Woods Project (2003) Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs): A 
Rough Guide London: Bretton Woods Project 
 
Brode H. (1977) British and German East Africa New York: Arno Press 
 
Brown M. and E. Uslaner (2002) Inequality, Trust, and Political Engagement 
Maryland: Maryland University 
 
 
 339 
 
Brown A. et al (2001) The Status of Sector-Wide Approaches London: 
Overseas Development Institute, Working Paper No. 142 
 
Bryceson D. (2010) ‘Agrarian Fundamentalism or Foresight? Revisiting 
Nyerere’s Vision for Rural Tanzania’ in Havnevik K. and A. Ishinika (eds) 
Tanzania in Transition: From Nyerere to Mkapa Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na 
Nyota Publishers 
 
Bukuku E (1993) The Tanzanian Economy: Income Distribution and 
Economic Growth London: Praeger 
 
Bulmer M. and D. Warwick (eds) (1983) Social Research in Developing 
Countries: Surveys and Censuses in the Third World Chichester: John Wiley 
 
Burawoy M. (1996) ‘The State and Economic Involution: Russia Through a 
China Lens’ in World Development, Vol. 24, No. 6 
 
Burki S. and Perry G. (1998) Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions 
Matter Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
Butler J., Laclau E. and S. Zizek (eds) (2000) Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left London: Verso 
 
Buyamba M. (2005) Implementation of WTO Policies in Tanzania regarding 
National Trade Policies and Performance: A Case Study of Public Institutions, 
Agencies and Business Operators Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam 
 
Campbell H. (1991) ’The Politics of Demobilisation in Tanzania: Beyond 
Nationalism’ in Campbell H. and H. Stein (eds) (1991) in The IMF and 
Tanzania Harare: SAPES 
 
Campbell H. and H. Stein (1991) ’Introduction: The Liberalisation in 
Tanzania’ in Campbell H. and H. Stein (eds) (1991) in The IMF and Tanzania 
Harare: SAPES 
 
Campbell H. and H. Stein (eds) (1991) The IMF and Tanzania Harare: SAPE 
 
 
 340 
 
Cameron G. (2001) ‘Taking Stock of Pastoralist NGOs in Tanzania’ in Review 
of African Political Economy, No.87 
 
Carvalho F. (2001) ‘On the Ownership of Reform Proposals: How Social 
Policies found their way into IMF Adjustment Programs’ in Economica, Vol. 
3, No. 1 
 
Chachage C. and M. Mbilinyi (eds) (2003) Against Neo-Liberalism: Gender, 
Democracy and Development Dar es Salaam: E and D 
 
Chambers R. (2007) From PRA to PLA and Pluralism: Practice and Theory 
Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, IDS Working Paper 286 
 
Chambers R. (2005) Ideas For Development London: Earthscan 
 
Chambers R. (1992a) Rural Appraisal: Rapid, Relaxed and Participatory   
Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, IDS Discussion Paper 311    
 
Chambers R. (1999) Rural Development: Putting the Last First Harlow: 
Longman 
 
Chambers R. (1992b) ‘Spreading and Self-Improving: A Strategy for Scaling-
Up’ in Edwards M. and D. Hulme (eds) (1992) Making a Difference: NGOs 
and Development in a Changing World London: Earthscan 
 
Chambers R. (1997) Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last London: 
ITDG  
Chambua S. (2002a) Democratic Participation in Tanzania: The Voices of 
Workers Representatives Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam 
 
Chambua S. (2002b) Review and Modernization of the Curriculum of the 
TUCTA Trade Union College in Mbeya Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es 
Salaam 
 
Chambua S. (1997) ‘Tanzania: A People in Distress’ in Kester G. and O. 
Sidibe (eds) (1997) Trade Unions and Sustainable Democracy in Africa  
Aldershot: Ashgate 
 
 341 
 
Chan S. (2002) Composing Africa: Civil Society and Its Discontents Tampere: 
TAPRI 
 
Chandhoke N. (2003) the Conceits of Civil Society New Delhi: OUP 
 
Chang H. (2002) Kicking Away The Ladder: Development Strategy In 
Historical Perspective London: Anthem Press 
 
Chang H. (2005) The East Asian Development Experience: The Miracle, The 
Crisis and The Future London: Zed 
 
Chang H. and I. Grabel (2004) Reclaiming Development: An Alternative 
Economic Policy Manual London: Zed 
 
Chase R. and M. Woolcock (2005) Social Capital and the Micro-Institutional 
Foundations of CDD Approaches in East Asia: Evidence, Theory, and Policy 
Implications Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
Cheema V. and G. Popovski (eds) (2010) Engaging Civil Society: Emerging 
Trends in Democratic Governance Tokyo: United Nations University 
 
Chege S. (1999) ‘Donors Shift More Aid to NGOs’ in Africa Recovery, Vol. 
13, No. 1 
 
CIA (2010) World Fact book Tanzania 
Available at –  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tz.html 
Accessed: 13 July 2010 
Clark D. (ed.) (2006) The Elgar Companion to Development Studies 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
 
Clark J. (2002) ‘NGOs and the State’ in Desai V. and Potter R. (eds) (2002) 
The Companion to Development Studies London: Arnold 
 
Clark J. (1997) ‘The State, Popular Participation and the Voluntary Sector’ in 
Hulme D. and M. Edwards (eds) (1997) NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close 
for Comfort? London: Macmillan 
 342 
 
Clarke G. (1998)’Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Politics in the 
Developing World’ in Political Studies, Vol. 46, Issue 1 
 
Clarke G. and M. Jennings (eds) (2008) Development, Civil Society and 
Faith-Based Organizations: Bridging the Sacred and the Secular Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Clayton A. (ed.) (1993) Governance, Democracy and Conditionality: What 
Role for NGOs? Oxford: INTRAC  
 
Clemente R. (2003) ‘From Participatory Appraisal to Participation on 
Governance in the Philippines’ in Cornwall A. and G. Pratt (eds) (2003) 
Pathways to Participation: Reflections on PRA London: ITDG 
 
Cohen R., Copans J. and P. Gutkind (1978) ‘Introduction’ in Gutkind P., 
Cohen R. and J. Copans (eds) (1978) African Labor History London: Sage 
 
Cohen D. and B. Laporte (2004) the Evolution of the Knowledge Bank 
Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
Coleman J. (1988) ‘Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital’ in 
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 94 
 
Coleman J. and C. Rosberg (eds) (1970) Political Parties and National 
Integration in Tropical Africa London: University of California Press 
 
Comstock-Gay S. and J. Goldman (2008) ‘More than the Vote’ in The 
American Prospect, 12 December, 2008 
 
 
Cooke B. and U. Kothari (2002) ‘The Case for Participation as Tyranny’ in 
Cooke B. and U. Kothari (eds) (2002) Participation: the New Tyranny?  
London: Zed 
 
Cooke B. and U. Kothari (eds) (2002) Participation: the New Tyranny?  
London: Zed 
 
 
 343 
 
Cooksey B. (2011a) Public Goods and Rents in Tanzania London: ODI, 
African Power and Politics Programme (APPP) 
 
Cooksey B. (2011b) The Investment and Business Environment for Gold 
Exploration and Mining in Tanzania London: ODI, African Power and Politics 
Programme (APPP) 
 
Cooksey B. (2010) ‘Trends in Corruption During the Mkapa Era – who wants 
to Know?’ in Havnevik K. and A. Ishinika (eds) Tanzania in Transition: From 
Nyerere to Mkapa Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers 
 
Cooksey B. and T. Kelsall (2011) The Political Economy of the Investment 
Climate in Tanzania London: ODI, African Power and Politics Programme 
(APPP) 
 
Cooper F. (1996) Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in 
French and British Africa Cambridge: CUP 
 
Cornwall A. (2003) ‘Winding Paths, Broken Journeys: Travels with PRA’ in 
Cornwall A. and G. Pratt (eds) (2003) Pathways to Participation: Reflections 
on PRA London: ITDG 
 
Cornwall A. and J. Gaventa (2001) From Users and Choosers to Makers and 
Shapers: Repositioning Participation in Social Policy 
Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, IDS Working Paper 127  
 
Cornwall A. and C. Nyamu-Musembi (2004) ‘Putting the ‘Rights-based 
Approach’ to Development into Perspective’ in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 
25, No. 8 
 
Cornwall A. and G. Pratt (2003) ‘Introduction’ in Cornwall A. and G. Pratt 
(eds) (2003) Pathways to Participation: Reflections on PRA London: ITDG  
 
Cornwall A. and G. Pratt (eds) (2003) Pathways to Participation: Reflections 
on PRA London: ITDG  
 
Coulson A. (1985) Tanzania: A Political Economy Oxford: OUP 
 
 344 
 
Cox R. (1983) ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in 
Method’ in Millennium, Vol. 12, No. 2 
 
Craig D. and D. Porter (2006) Development Beyond Neoliberalism? 
Governance, Poverty Reduction and Political Economy London: Routledge 
 
Craig D. and D. Porter (2003) ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A New 
Convergence’ in World Development, Vol. 31, No. 1 
 
Cramer C. (2002) Own Up! Does Anyone Out There have A Decent Theory 
Of Ownership? London: SOAS, Centre for Development Policy and Research 
 
Cramer C., Stein H. and J. Weeks (2006) ‘Ownership and Donorship: 
Analytical Issues and a Tanzanian Case Study’ in Journal of Contemporary 
African Studies Vol. 24, No. 3 
 
DAC (2003) DAC Peer Review: Tanzania Paris: OECD 
 
Damachi U., Deibel H. and L. Trachtman (eds) (1979) Industrial Relations in 
Africa New York: St. Martins Press 
 
Dangor Z. and D. Nadison (2000) ‘Strategies to Enhance Civil Society 
Engagement in Public Policy in Tanzania’ in Waheeda S. and A. Albee (eds) 
(2001) Selected Studies of Civil Society in Tanzania: Policy, Social Capital 
and Networks of the Vulnerable Dar es Salaam: DFID 
 
DANIDA (2002) Evaluation: Business Sector Support Programme Tanzania 
Copenhagen: DANIDA 
 
Datta C. (2003) ‘Participation of the People’ in Cornwall A. and G. Pratt (eds) 
(2003) Pathways to Participation: Reflections on PRA London: ITDG 
 
Davidson B. (1987) Africa In Modern History: The Search for a New Society 
Harmondsworth: Penguin 
 
De Renzio P. and W. Krafchik (2008) ‘Budgeting for the Poor: Implications 
for Policy and Practice’ in Robinson M. (ed.) (2008) Budgeting for the Poor 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
 345 
 
De Soto H. (2001) The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the 
West and fails Everywhere Else London: Black Swan 
 
De Tocqueville A. (1845a) Democracy In America: Volume 1 New York: 
Vintage 
 
De Tocqueville A. (1845b) Democracy In America: Volume 2 New York: 
Vintage 
 
De Waal A. (1997) Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in 
Africa Oxford: James Currey 
 
Degnbol-Martinussen J. and P. Engberg-Pederson (2003) Aid: Understanding 
International Development Cooperation London: Zed  
 
Dercon S. et al (2008) Collective Action and Vulnerability: Burial Societies in 
Rural Ethiopia Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI), CAPRi Working Paper, No. 83 
 
Desai V. (2002) ‘Role of Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs)’ in Desai 
V. and R. Potter (eds) (2002) The Companion to Development Studies 
London: Arnold 
 
Dewachter S. (2007) Civil Society Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Processes: Who is Getting a Seat at the Pro-poor Table?  Antwerp: IDPM 
 
Dewachter S. (2005) The Participation Conditionality Under Poverty 
reduction Strategy Papers: The Joint Staff Assessment Experience Antwerp: 
IDPM 
 
DFID (2009) How to Work with Trade Unions London: DFID  
 
DFID (2003) The PRSP Process and DFID Engagement: Survey of Progress 
London: DFID  
 
Dom C. (2007) Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support 1994-2004: What 
are the Effects of General Budget Support? East Kilbride: DFID 
 
 346 
 
Dowden R. (2009) Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles London: 
Portobello 
 
Drazen A. (2002) Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political 
Economy Approach Washington, DC: IMF 
 
Drazen A. and P. Isard (2004) Can Public Discussion Enhance Program 
“Ownership”? Washington, DC: IMF 
 
Drinkwater M. (2003) ‘Reflections on Participation and Empowerment’ in 
Cornwall A. and G. Pratt G. (eds) 2003) Pathways to Participation: Reflections 
on PRA London: ITDG  
 
Driscoll R. and A. Evans (2005) ‘Second-Generation Poverty Reduction 
Strategies: New opportunities and Emerging Issues’ in Development Policy 
Review, Vol. 32, No. 1 
 
Due J. (1980) Costs, Returns and Repayment Experience of Ujamaa Villages 
in Tanzania, 1973-1976 Washington, DC: University Press of America 
 
Duma F. (1990) The Role of JUWATA in the Defence of Economic Interests of 
Workers: The Case of Three Institutions Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es 
Salaam 
 
Dunn J. (2003) ‘The Contemporary Political significance of John Locke’s 
Conception of Civil Society’ in Kaviraj S. and S. Khilnani (eds) (2003) Civil 
Society: History and Possibilities Cambridge: CUP 
 
Eade D. (ed.) (2002) Development, NGOs and Civil Society: Selected Essays 
from Development in Practice Oxford: Oxfam 
 
Eade, D. and A. Leather (eds) (2005) Development NGOs and Labor Unions: 
Terms of Engagement Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press 
 
Eade D. and E. Ligteringen (eds) (2006) Debating Development: NGOs and 
the Future Oxford: Oxfam 
 
 
 347 
 
East African (2010) Tanzania: Anne Makinda In Control of Nation’s Bunge 
Available at - - http://allafrica.com/stories/201012201456.html 
Accessed – 3 May, 2011 
 
Easterly W. (2002) The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures 
and Misadventures in the Tropics London: MIT Press 
 
Easterly W. (2006) The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid 
the Rest have done so Much Ill and so Little Good Oxford: OUP 
Edwards M. (2006) NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations 
London: Earthscan 
 
Edwards M. (2004) Civil Society Oxford: Polity 
 
Edwards M. (1998) Nailing Jelly to the Wall: NGOs, Civil Society and 
International Development London: Edwards Associates 
 
Edwards M. (1989) ‘The Irrelevance of Development Studies’ in Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 1 
 
Edwards B., Foley M and M. Diani (eds) (2001) Beyond Tocqueville: Civil 
Society and the Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective London: 
University Press of New England 
 
Edwards M. and A. Fowler (2003) ‘Introduction: Changing Challenges for 
NGDO Management’ in Edwards M. and A. Fowler (eds) (2003) NGO 
Management London: Earthscan 
 
Edwards M. and A. Fowler (eds) (2003) NGO Management London: 
Earthscan 
 
Edwards M. and D. Hulme (eds) (1996) Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO 
Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World West Hartford, 
Conn.: Kumarian. 
 
Edwards M. and D. Hulme (eds) (1992) Making a Difference: NGOs and 
Development in a Changing World London: Earthscan 
 
 348 
 
Edwards M. and D. Hulme (1992a) ‘Making a Difference: Scaling-up the 
Developmental Impact of NGOs – Concepts and Experiences’ in Edwards M. 
and D. Hulme (eds) (1992) Making a Difference: NGOs and Development in a 
Changing World London: Earthscan 
 
Edwards M. and D. Hulme (1996) ‘Too Close for Comfort? The Impact of 
Official Aid on Nongovernmental Oranizations’ in World Development, Vol. 
24, No. 6 
 
Egulu L. (2004a) Trade Union Participation in the PRSP Process 
Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
 
Egulu L. (2004b) ‘Unions and PRSPs - An Analysis of the World Bank’s 
View’ in International Labour Organization (ed.) (2004) Trade Unions and 
Poverty Reduction Strategies Geneva: ILO 
 
Egulu L. (2003) Decent Work, Poverty Reduction and PRSPs; The Role of 
Social Dialogue and Advocacy in PRSP Processes Washington, DC: World 
Bank  
 
Engel U., Erdmann G. and A. Mehler (eds) (2006) Tanzania Revisited: 
Political Stability, Aid Dependency, and Development Constraints Hamburg: 
Institute of African Affairs 
 
Engels F. (1999) The Condition of the Working Class in England Oxford: 
OUP Originally published in 1885 
 
Elbaum M. and R. Seltzer (2004) The Labor Aristocracy: The Main Basis For 
Opportunism in the Labor Movement Chippendale, NSW: Resistance Books 
 
Entwistle J. and F. Cavassini (2005) An Operational Approach for Assessing 
Country Ownership of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: Volume 1 – 
Analysis and Implications Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
ESRF (2011) Governance and Capacity Building 
http://www.esrftz.org/capacity.asp 
Accessed 25 April 2011 
 349 
 
Evans P. (1996a) ‘Government Action, Social Capital and Development: 
Reviewing the Evidence on Synergy’ in World Development, Vol. 24, No. 6 
 
Evans P. (1996b) ‘Introduction: Development Strategies across the Public-
Private Divide’ in World Development, Vol. 24, No. 6 
 
Evans A. and E. Ngalewa (2003) ‘Tanzania’ in Booth D. (ed.) (2003) Fighting 
Poverty In Africa: Are PRSPs Making a Difference? London: ODI 
 
Ewald J. (2010) ‘Challenges to the Democratisation Process in Tanzania’ in 
Havnevik K. and A. Ishinika (eds) Tanzania in Transition: From Nyerere to 
Mkapa Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers 
 
Femia J. (2001) ‘Civil Society and the Marxist Tradition’ in Kaviraj S. and S. 
Khilnani (eds) (2003) Civil Society: History and Possibilities Cambridge: 
CUP 
Ferguson J. (1998)’ “Transnational Topographies of Power: Beyond ‘the State’ 
and ‘Civil Society’ in the study of African Politics” Draft Mimeo – Irvine: 
University of California in Lewis D. (2002a) ‘Civil Society in African 
Contexts: Reflections on the Usefulness of a Concept’ in Development and 
Change, Vol. 33, No. 4 
 
Ferguson J. (1994) The Anti-politics Machine Minneapolis: University of 
Minneapolis Press 
 
Fine B. (2002) ‘It Ain’t Social, It Ain’t Capital and It Ain’t Africa’ in Studia 
Africana, No. 13 
 
Fine B. (2001) ‘Neither the Washington nor the Post-Washington Consensus; 
An Introduction’ in Fine B., Lapavitsas C. and J. Pincus (eds) Development 
Policy in the Twenty-first Century; Beyond the Post-Washington Consensus 
London: Routledge 
 
Fine B. (2006) ‘The Developmental State and the Political Economy of 
Development’ in Jomo K. S. and B. Fine (eds) (2006) The New Development 
Economics: After the Washington Consensus London: Zed 
 
 
 350 
 
Fine B. (2010) Theories of Social Capital: Researchers Behaving Badly 
London: Pluto 
 
Fine B., Lapavitsas C. and J. Pincus (eds) (2001) Development Policy in the 
Twenty-first Century; Beyond the Post-Washington Consensus London: 
Routledge 
 
Fine B. and P. Rose (2001) ‘Education and the Post-Washington Consensus’ in 
Fine B., Lapavitsas C. and J. Pincus (eds) (2001) Development Policy in the 
Twenty-first Century; Beyond the Post-Washington Consensus London: 
Routledge 
 
Fischer G. (2011) ‘Power Repertoires and the Transformation of Tanzanian 
Trade Unions’ in Global Labour Journal, Vol. 2, Issue 2 
 
Fisher J. (1998) Nongovernments: NGOs and the Political Development of the 
Third World West Hartford, Conn: Kumarian Press 
 
Fjeld T. (2000) ‘Soccer Rites’ in Nuttall S. and C-A Michael (eds) (2000) 
Senses of Culture: South African Culture Studies Oxford: OUP 
 
 
Fjeldstad O-H (2003)’Fighting Fiscal Corruption: Lessons from the Tanzania 
Revenue Authority’ in Public Administration and Development, Vol. 23, No. 2 
 
Foley M., Edwards B. and M. Diani (2001) ‘Social Capital Reconsidered’ in 
Edwards B., Foley M. and M. Diani (eds) (2001) Beyond Tocqueville: Civil 
Society and the Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective Hanover: 
University Press of New England 
 
Foley M. and B. Edwards (1996) ‘The Paradox of Civil Society’ in Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 3 
 
Foster M. (2000) New Approaches to Development Cooperation: What can we 
Learn with Experience from Implementing Sector-Wide Approaches London: 
Overseas Development Institute, Working Paper 140 
 
 
 351 
 
Foundation for Civil Society (2008) Strategic Plan 2005-2008: Investing for 
Impact Dar es Salaam: Foundation for Civil Society 
 
Fowler A. (2002) ‘NGDO-Donor Relationships: The Use and Abuse of Power’ 
in Desai V. and Potter R. (eds) (2002) The Companion to Development 
Studies London: Arnold 
 
Fowler A. (2000) The Virtuous Spiral: A Guide to Sustainability for NGOs in 
International Development London: Earthscan 
 
Fowler A. (1997) Striking a Balance: A Guide to Enhancing the Effectiveness 
of NGOs in International Development London: Earthscan. 
 
Fox J. (1996) ‘How Does Civil Society Thicken? The Political Construction of 
Social Capital in Rural Mexico’ in World Development, Vol. 24, No. 6 
 
Fraser A. (2005) ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: Now Who Calls The 
Shots?’ in Review of African Political Economy, Nos. 104/105 
 
Friedland W. (1969) Vuta Kamba: The Development of Trade Unions in 
Tanganyika Stanford: Hoover Institution Press 
Friedman M. (1968) ‘The Role of Monetary Policy’ in American Economic 
Review, 58 
Friedman M. and W. Heller (1969) Monetary vs Fiscal Policy New York: 
Norton 
 
Fukuda-Parr S. and R. Ponzio (2002) Governance Past, Present, Future: 
Setting the Governance Agenda for the Millennium Declaration New York: 
UNDP 
 
Fukuyama F. (1996) Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity 
New York: Simon and Schuster 
 
Galarraga R. and A. Gogue (1997) ‘Africa in a Period of Adjustment’ in  
Kester G. and O. Sidibe (eds) (1997) Trade Unions and Sustainable 
Democracy in Africa Aldershot: Ashgate 
 
 352 
 
Gary I. (1996) ‘Confrontation, Co-operation or Co-optation: NGOs and the 
Ghanaian State During Structural Adjustment’ in Review of African Political 
Economy, No. 68 
 
Gibbon P. (2001a) ‘Civil Society, Locality and Globalization in Rural 
Tanzania: A Forty-Year Perspective’ in Development and Change, Vol. 32, No. 
5 
 
Gibbon P. (2001b) ‘Cooperative Cotton Marketing, Liberalisation and “Civil 
Society” in Tanzania’ in Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol. 1, Issue 3 
 
Gibbon P. (1999) Privatization and Foreign Direct Investment in Mainland 
Tanzania, 1992-1998 Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research, 
Working Paper, No. iv.99.1 
 
Gibbon P. (ed.) (1993) Social Change and Economic Reform in Africa 
Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet 
 
Girdwood J. (2007) ‘Reforming the World Bank’: From Social-liberalism to 
Neo-liberalism’ in Comparative Education, Vol. 43, No.3 
 
Glennie J. (2008) The Trouble with Aid: Why Less Could Mean More for 
Africa London: Zed 
 
Global Finance (2011) Tanzania Country Report 
http://www.gfmag.com/gdp-data-country-reports/164-tanzania-gdp-country-
report.html#axzz1aURAL4oE 
 
Gonza M. (2008) Assessing Labour and Environmental Standards in South 
African Multinational Companies in the Mining Industry in Africa: The Case 
of the Geita Gold Mining Company Ltd. Dar es Salaam: African Labour 
Research Network (ALRN) 
 
Goodhand J. (2006) Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in Armed Conflict 
Rugby: ITDG 
 
Goodhart M. (2005) ‘Civil Society and the Problem of Global Democracy’ in 
Democratization, Vol. 12, No. 1 
 353 
 
Gottschalk R. (2004) The Macroeconomic Policy Content of the PRSPs: How 
Much Pro-Growth, How Much Pro=Poor? Brighton, Institute of Development 
Studies, University of Sussex 
 
Gould J. (ed.) (2005) The New Conditionality: The Politics of Poverty 
Reduction Strategies London: Zed 
 
Gould J. and J. Ojanen (2005) ‘Tanzania: Merging in the Circle’ in Gould J. 
(ed.) (2005) The New Conditionality: The Politics of Poverty Reduction 
Strategies London: Zed 
 
Gould J. and J. Ojanen (2003) Merging the Circle: The Politics of Tanzania’s 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Helsinki: University of Helsinki, Institute of 
Development Studies  
 
Gramsci A. (1994) Letters from Prison: Volume II New York: Columbia 
University Press 
 
Gramsci A. (2011a) Prison Notebooks: Volume II (Edited by Buttigieg J.) New 
York: Columbia University Press 
 
Gramsci A. (2011b) Prison Notebooks: Volume III (Edited by Buttigieg J.) 
New York: Columbia University Press 
 
Gramsci A. (1977) Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci 
(Edited and translated by Hoare Q. and G. Smith) London: Lawrence and 
Wishart 
 
Gramsci A. (1919) ‘Workers’ Democracy’ in L’Ordine Nouvo 21 June 1919 
Available at - http://www.marxists.org/archive/gramsci/1919/06/workers-
democracy.htm 
Accessed – 12 November, 2011 
 
Gray H. and M. Khan (2010) ‘Good Governance and Growth in Africa: What 
can we Learn from Tanzania?’ in Padayachee V. (ed.) (2010) The Political 
Economy of Africa London: Routledge 
 
 
 354 
 
Greeley A. (2001) ‘Coleman Revisited’ in Edwards B., Foley M and M. Diani 
(eds) (2001) Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and the Social Capital Debate 
in Comparative Perspective London: University Press of New England 
 
Green M., Mercer C. and S. Mesaki (2010) The Development Activities, 
Values and Performance of Non-governmental and Faith-based Organizations 
in Magu and Newala Districts, Tanzania London: DFID, UK Aid, Religions 
and Development Research Programme, Working Paper 49-2010 
 
Grootaert C. (1998) Social Capital: The Missing Link? Washington, DC: 
World Bank, Social Capital Working Paper Series 
 
Guibernau M. (1996) Nationalism: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the 
Twentieth Century Oxford: Polity Press 
 
Gumede W. (2009) The Democracy Gap: Africa’s Wasted Years London: Zed 
 
Gupta R. (2006) NGOs and the State New Delhi: Mahaveer 
 
GURN (2011) Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
Available from - 
http://www.gurn.info/en/topics/poverty-reduction-strategy-papers-prsps-and-
international-financial-institutions-ifis 
Accessed: 2 February 2011 
 
Gutkind P., Cohen R. and J. Copans (eds) (1978) African Labor History 
London: Sage 
 
Hakielimu (2005a) Sera Poa… Lakini Utekelezaji? (Great Policies… but 
Implementation?) Dar es Salaam: Hakielimu 
Hakielimu (2005b) Three Years of PEDP Implementation: Key Findings from 
Government Reviews Dar es Salaam: Hakielimu 
 
Hakielimu, Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) and Research on Poverty 
Alleviation (REPOA) (2005)) Access to Information in Tanzania: Still a 
Problem Dar-es-Salaam: Hakielimu, LHRC and REPOA 
 
 355 
 
Hakielimu and DSA-TWG of the Poverty Monitoring System (2005) Growing 
Out of Poverty: A Plain Language Guide to Tanzania’s National Strategy for 
Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP) Dar es Salaam: Hakielimu and 
DSA-TWG 
 
Hakikazi Catalyst (2002a) Bouncing Back: Some Grassroots Responses To 
The PRSP Arusha: Hakikazi Research Series 001 
 
Hakikazi Catalyst (2002b) Influencing Tanzania’s Poverty Reduction Strategy 
– PRSP, PRS And The PMMP Arusha: Hakikazi Catalyst 
 
Hakikazi Catalyst (2010) Plain Language Guides  
Available from - 
http://www.hakikazi.org/plain_language.htm 
Accessed: 21 November 2010 
 
Hakikazi Catalyst (2002c) Tanzania NGO Policy Forum: Towards A Protocol 
For Engagement In The Policy Process Arusha: Hakikazi Catalyst 
 
Hakikazi Catalyst (2002d) The NGO Policy Group: Towards Formalisation? 
Arusha: Hakikazi Catalyst 
 
Hansen H. (2008a) Paper for TUCTA Secretariat Retreat, September 2008: 
Mini-evaluation of Progress since Last Planning Retreat 
Dar es Salaam: TUCTA 
 
Hansen H. (2008b) BSPS III Has Started Dar-es-Salaam: TUCTA 
 
Hardt and Negri (2000) Empire London: Harvard University Press 
 
Harrison G. (2001) ‘Post-Conditionality Politics and Administrative Reform: 
Reflections on the Cases of Uganda and Tanzania’ in Development and 
Change, Vol. 32, No. 4 
 
Harrison G. (2004a) ‘HIPC and the Architecture of Governance’ in Review of 
African Political Economy, No.99 
 
 
 356 
 
Harrison G. (2010a) Neoliberal Africa: The Impact of Social Engineering 
London: Zed 
 
Harrison G. (2010b) ‘Post-Neoliberalism?’ in Review of African Political 
Economy, Vol.37, No.123 
 
Harrison G. (2004b) The World Bank and Africa: The Creation of Governance 
States London: Routledge 
 
Harrison G. (2005) ‘The World Bank, Governance and Theories of Political 
Action in Africa’ in British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 
7 
 
Harrison G., Mulley S. and D. Holtom (2009) ‘Tanzania: A Genuine Case of 
Recipient Leadership in the Aid System?’ in Whitfield L. (ed.) (2009) The 
Politics of Aid: African Strategies for dealing with Donors Oxford: OUP 
 
Harriss J. (2006) ‘Social Capital’ in Jomo K. S. and B. Fine (eds) (2006) The 
New Development Economics: After the Washington Consensus London: Zed 
 
Harrod J. and R. O’Brien (eds) (2002) Global Unions? Theory and Strategies 
of Organized Labour in the Global Political Economy London: Routledge 
 
Hashemi S. and M. Hassan (1999) ‘Building NGO Legitimacy in Bangladesh: 
The Contested Domain’ in Lewis D. (ed.) (1999) International Perspectives on 
Voluntary Action: Reshaping the Third Sector London: Earthscan 
 
Hausman R., Rodrik D. and A. Velasco (2005) Growth Diagnostics 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
 
Havnevik K. (2010) ‘A Historical Framework For Analysing Current 
Tanzanian Transitions: The Post-Independence Model, Nyerere’s Ideas and 
Some Interpretations’ in Havnevik K. and A. Ishinika (eds) Tanzania in 
Transition: From Nyerere to Mkapa Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota 
Publishers 
 
 
 
 357 
 
Havnevik K. (2010) ‘Postscript: Tanzania in Transition – Summary and 
Trends, 2005-2010’ in Havnevik K. and A. Ishinika (eds) Tanzania in 
Transition: From Nyerere to Mkapa Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota 
Publishers 
 
Havnevik K. and A. Ishinika (eds) (2010) Tanzania in Transition: From 
Nyerere to Mkapa Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers 
 
Hawkey I. (2010) Feet of the Chameleon: The Story of African Football 
London: Portico 
 
Hayami Y. (2003) From the Washington Consensus to the Post-Washington 
Consensus: Recent Changes in the Paradigm of International Development 
Assistance Tokyo: FASID 
 
Hayek F. (1988) The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism London: 
Routledge 
 
Hayman R. (2003) Reconciling Ownership of Development and external 
Assistance: Aid and Nation building in Eritrea Edinburgh: University of 
Edinburgh, Centre of African Studies, Occasional Paper, No. 95 
 
Hearn J. (2007) ‘African NGOs: The New Compradors?’ in Development and 
Change, Vol. 38, No. 6 
 
Hearn J. (2001) ‘The ‘Uses and Abuses’ of Civil Society in Africa’ in Review 
of African Political Economy, No. 87 
 
Hegel G. (2003) ‘Philosophy of Right’ in Hodgkinson V. and M. Foley (eds) 
(2003) The Civil Society Reader London: University Press of New England 
 
Helleiner G. et al (1995) Report of the Group of Independent Advisers on 
Development Cooperation Issues Between Tanzania and Its Aid Donors 
Copenhagen: Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
Heller P. (1996) ‘Social Capital as a Product of Class Mobilization and State 
Intervention: Industrial Workers in Kerala, India in World Development, Vol. 
24, No. 6 
 358 
 
Hickey S. and G. Mohan (2005a) ‘Relocating Participation Within a Radical 
Politics of Development’ in Development and Change, Vol. 36, No. 2 
 
Hickey S. and G. Mohan (2005b) ‘Towards Participation as Transformation: 
Critical Themes and Challenges’ in Hickey S. and G. Mohan (eds) (2005) 
Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation? Exploring New Approaches 
to Participation in Development London: Zed 
 
Hickey S. and G. Mohan (eds) (2005) Participation: From Tyranny to 
Transformation? Exploring New Approaches to Participation in Development 
London: Zed 
 
Hildyard N. et al (2002) ‘Pluralism, Participation and Power: Joint Forest 
Management in India’ in Cooke B. and U. Kothari (2002) Participation: the 
New Tyranny? London: Zed 
 
Hilhorst D. (2003) The Real World of NGOs: Discourses, Diversity and 
Development London: Zed 
 
Hobsbawn E. (1976) Labouring Men: Studies in the History of Labour 
London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 
 
Hodgson G. (2007) ‘Meanings of Methodological Individualism’ in Journal of 
Economic Methodology, Vol. 14, No.2 
 
Holtom D. (2005) ‘Reconsidering the Power of the IFIs: Tanzania and the 
World Bank, 1978-1985’in Review of African Political Economy, No. 106 
 
Holtom D. (2007) ‘The Challenge of Consensus Building: Tanzania’s PRSP 
1998-2001’ in Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2 
 
Howell J. and J. Lind (eds) (2010) Civil Society Under Strain: Counter-
Terrorism Policy, Civil Society and Aid Post 9/11 Sterling, VA: Kumarian 
 
Howell J. and J. Pearce (2002) Civil Society and Development: A Critical 
Exploration London: Lynne Rienner 
 
 
 359 
 
Hubbard J. (2011) The United States and the End of Colonial Rule in Africa, 
1941-1968 Jefferson, NC: McFarland  
 
Hudock A. (2001) NGOs and Civil Society: Democracy by Proxy?  
Cambridge: Polity 
 
Hulme D. (2008) ‘Reflections on NGOs and Development: The Elephant, the 
Dinosaur, Several Tigers but No Owl’ in Bebbington A., Hickey S. and D. 
Mitlin (eds) (2008) Can NGOs Make a Difference? The Challenge of 
Development Alternatives London: Zed 
 
Hulme, D and M. Edwards (1997) ‘NGO, States and Donors: An Overview’ in 
Hulme, D. and M. Edwards (eds) (1997) NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close 
for Comfort? Basingstoke: Macmillan   
 
Hulme, D and M. Edwards (eds) (1997) NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close 
for Comfort? Basingstoke: Macmillan   
 
Hussain I. and R Faruqee (eds) (1994) Adjustment in Africa: Lessons from 
Country Case Studies Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
Hutchful E. (1994) ‘Smoke and Mirrors: The World Bank’s Social Dimensions 
of Adjustment (SDA) Programme’ in Review of African Political Economy, 
No. 62 
 
Hyden G. (1980) Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California 
 
Hyden, G. and M. Bratton (eds) (1992) Governance and Politics in Africa 
London: Lynne Rienner 
 
Hyman R. (2001) Understanding European Trade Unionism: Between Market, 
Class and Society London: Sage 
 
Ibhawoh B. and J. Dibua (2003) ‘Deconstructing Ujamaa: The Legacy of 
Julius Nyerere in the Quest for Social and economic Development in Africa’ 
in African Journal of Political Science, Vol. 8, No. 1 
 
 360 
 
ICFTU (2001) Guide to Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers Washington DC: 
ICTFU 
 
ICFTU (2011) ‘Tanzania: Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights 
(2011)’ in Annual Survey 2011 of Violations of Trade Union Rights Brussels: 
ICFTU 
 
ICSID (2008) Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd., Claimant v. United Republic of 
Tanzania, Respondent Washington, DC: World Bank, ICSID 
 
IEO (2004) Report on the Evaluation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs) and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) Washington, 
DC: IMF 
 
IFC (2011) Doing Business: Measuring Business Regulations Washington, 
DC: IFC, World Bank 
 
IFC (1996) Doing Business: Pro-Business List – Top Ten Reformers 
Washington, DC: IFC, World Bank 
 
Igoe J. (2003) ‘Scaling Up Civil Society: Donor Money, NGOs and the 
Pastoralist Land Rights Movement in Tanzania’ in Development and Change, 
Vol. 34/5 
 
Ikiara G. (1988) The Role of Employee Organizations in Africa Lagos: Paper 
prepared for the first African Regional Congress in Industrial Relations 9-11th 
November 1988 
 
Iliffe J. (1989) A Modern History of Tanganyika Cambridge: CUP 
 
Iliffe J. (1969) Tanganyika Under German Rule: 1905 – 1912 Cambridge: 
CUP 
 
Iliffe J. (1975) ‘The Creation of Group Consciousness Among the 
Dockworkers of Dar-es-Salaam, 1929-50’ in Sandbrook R. and R. Cohen (eds) 
(1975) The Development of an African Working Class Toronto: University of 
Toronto 
 
 361 
 
ILO (2001) ILO Relations with Bretton Woods Institutions Geneva: ILO 
 
ILO (ed.) (2004) Trade Unions and Poverty Reduction Strategies Geneva: ILO 
 
IMF (2010) Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) Washington, DC: IMF 
 
IMF (2001) Strengthening Country Ownership of Fund-Supported 
Programmes Washington, DC: IMF 
 
IMF (2004) The Poverty Reduction Growth Facility: A Fact Sheet 
Washington, DC: IMF 
 
IMF and IDA (2007) Joint Staff Advisory Notes on the National Strategy for 
Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA) Annual Implementation 
Report 2006/07 Washington DC: IMF and IDA 
 
IMF and IDA (2002) Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 
Approach: Main Findings Washington DC: IMF and IDA 
 
IMF and IDA (2004) Tanzania: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – Progress 
Report – Joint Staff Assessment Washington DC: IMF and IDA 
 
IMF and IDA (2003) Tanzania: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – Progress 
Report – Joint Staff Assessment Washington DC: IMF and IDA 
 
IMF and IDA (2000) Tanzania: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – Joint Staff 
Assessment Washington DC: IMF and IDA 
 
IMF and World Bank (2001) Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers – Progress in 
Implementation Washington, DC: IMF and World Bank 
 
Japan Development Institute (2010) Tanzania Mini-Tiger Plan 2020 Tokyo: 
Japan Development Institute 
 
Jayarajah C., Brown W. and B. Sen (1996) Social Dimensions of Adjustment: 
World Bank Experience, 1980-1993 Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
Jeffries R. (1975) ‘Populist Tendencies in the Ghanaian Trade Union 
 362 
 
Movement’ in Sandbrook R. and R. Cohen (eds) (1975) The Development of 
an African Working Class Toronto: University of Toronto 
 
Jenei G. and E. Kuti (2008) ‘The Third Sector and Civil Society’ in Osborne 
S. (ed.) (2008) The Third Sector in Europe: Prospects and Challenges 
Abingdon: Routledge 
 
Jennings M. (2007) ‘ “A Very Real War”: Popular Participation in 
Development in Tanzania During the 1950s and 1960s’ in International 
Journal of African Historical Studies Vol. 40, No. 1 
 
Jennings M. (2001) ‘Development is Very Political in Tanzania: Oxfam and 
the Chunya Integrated Development Programme’ in Barrow O. and M. 
Jennings (eds) (2001) The Charitable Impulse: NGOs and Development in 
East and North-East Africa Oxford: James Currey 
 
Jennings M. (2008a) Surrogates of the State: NGOs, Development and 
Ujamaa in Tanzania Bloomfield: Kumarian 
 
 
Jennings M. (2008b) ‘The Spirit of Brotherhood: Christianity and Ujamaa in 
Tanzania’ in Clarke G. and M. Jennings (eds) (2008) Development, Civil 
Society and Faith-Based Organizations: Bridging the Sacred and the Secular 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Jennings M. (2003) ‘“We Must Run While Others Walk”: Popular 
Participation and Development Crisis in Tanzania 1961-9’ in Journal of 
Modern African Studies Vol. 41, No. 2 
 
Jennings M. and C. Mercer (2011) ‘Rehabilitating Nationalisms: Conviviality 
and National Consciousness in Postcolonial Tanzania’ Forthcoming in 
Politique Africaine, special issue on ‘Nationalism in Tanzania.’ 
 
Jerven M. (2010) ‘Random Growth in Africa? Lessons from an Evaluation of 
the Growth Evidence on Botswana, Kenya Tanzania and Zambia, 1965-1995’ 
in Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 46, No. 2 
 
 
 363 
 
Jobert, B. and B. Kohler-Koch (eds) (2008) Changing Images of Civil Society: 
From Protest to Government Abingdon: Routledge 
 
Johnson J. and S. Wasty (1993) ‘Borrower Ownership of Adjustment 
Programs and the Political Economy of Reform’ World Bank Discussion 
Paper, No. 199 Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
Jomo K. S. and B. Fine (eds) (2006) The New Development Economics: After 
the Washington Consensus London: Zed 
 
Jones S. (2006) Antonio Gramsci London: Routledge 
 
Jordan L. and P. Van Tuijl (2003) ‘Political Responsibility in Transnational 
NGO Advocacy’ in Edwards M. and A. Fowler (eds) (2003) NGO 
Management London: Earthscan 
 
Jose A. (2002) ‘Organized Labour in the 21st Century: Some Lessons for 
Developing Countries’ in Jose A. (ed.) (2002) Organized Labour in the 21st 
Century Geneva: Institute for Labour Studies 
 
Jose A. (ed.) (2002) ‘Organized Labour in the 21st Century: Some Lessons for 
Developing Countries’ in Jose A. (ed.) (2002) Organized Labour in the 21st 
Century Geneva: Institute for Labour Studies 
Kagia R. (ed.) (2005) Balancing the Development Agenda: The 
Transformation of the World Bank under James D. Wolfensohn, 1995-2005 
Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
Kajege C. (2002) Civil Society Participation in PRSP: Tanzania Experience 
Dar es Salaam: TCDD 
 
Kamat S. (2004) ‘The Privatization of Public Interest: Theorizing NGO 
Discourse in a Neoliberal Era’ in Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 1, 
No. 1 
 
Kanbur R. (1999) The Strange Case of The Washington Consensus Mimeo. 
Ithaca: Cornell University  
 
Kaniki M. (ed.) (1980) Tanzania Under Colonial Rule London: Longman 
 364 
 
Kapinga W. (1986) ‘State Control of the Working Class Through Labor 
Legislation’ in Shivji I. (ed.) (1986) The State and the Working People in 
Tanzania Dakar: Codesria 
 
Kapur D. (2006) The “Knowledge” Bank Washington, DC: Center for Global 
Development 
 
Karcher S. (2001) IMF, World Bank and Democracy Bonn: University of 
Bonn (Institute for Political Science), Seminar Paper 
 
Karume S. (ed.) (2004) Dilemmas of Political Transition: Towards 
Institutionalisation of Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania Johannesburg: EISA 
 
Katz E. (1976) A Trade Union Aristocracy Johannesburg: University of the 
Witswatersrand 
 
Kaviraj S. and S. Khilnani (2003) ‘Introduction: Ideas of Civil Society’ in 
Kaviraj S. and S. Khilnani (eds) (2003) Civil Society: History and Possibilities 
Cambridge: CUP 
 
Kelsall T. (2001) ‘Donors, NGOs and the State’ in Barrow O. and M. Jennings 
(eds) (2001) The Charitable Impulse: NGOs and Development in East and 
North-East Africa Oxford: James Currey 
 
 
Kelsall, T. (2002) ‘Shop Windows and Smoke-filled Rooms: Governance and 
the Re-politicisation of Tanzania’ in Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 
40, No. 4 
 
Kelsall, T. (2000) Subjectivity, Collective Action, and the Governance Agenda 
in Tanzania, London: Thesis, University of London 
 
Kelsall T. and Mercer C. (2003) ‘Empowering People? World Vision and 
“Transformatory Development” in Tanzania’ in Review of African Political 
Economy, No.96 
 
Kester G. (2007) Trade Unions and Workplace Democracy in Africa 
Aldershot: Ashgate 
 365 
 
Kester G. and O. Sidibe (1997) ‘Trade Unions, It’s Your Turn!’ in Kester G. 
and O. Sidibe (eds) (1997) Trade Unions and Sustainable Democracy in Africa 
Aldershot: Ashgate 
 
Kester G. and O. Sidibe (eds) (1997) Trade Unions and Sustainable 
Democracy in Africa Aldershot: Ashgate 
 
Khan M. (2002) State Failure in Developing Countries and Strategies of 
Institutional Reform, Conference Paper, Oslo, 24-26 June 2002 
 
Khan M. (2004) Strategies For State-Led Social Transformation: Rent 
Management, Technology Acquisition and Long-Term Growth 
Hanoi: Asian Development Bank, Workshop on Making Markets Work Better 
for the Poor, Hanoi, 12-15th April, 2004 
 
Khan M. and H. Gray (2006) State Weakness in Developing Countries and 
Strategies of Institutional Reform: Operational Implications for Anti-
Corruption Policy and A Case Study of Tanzania London: Paper prepared for 
DFID 
 
Kikula I. et al (2005) Researching Poverty in Tanzania: Problems, Policies and 
Perspectives Dar es Salaam: REPOA 
 
Killick T. (2002) ‘Aid Conditionality’ in Desai V. and R. Potter (eds) (2002) 
The Companion to Development Studies London: Arnold 
 
 
Killick T. (2004) Did Conditionality Streamlining Succeed? Washington, DC: 
World Bank 
 
Killick T. (1997) ‘Principals, Agents and the Failings of Conditionality’ in 
Journal of International Development, Vol. 9, No.4 
 
Killick T. (1998) Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change London: 
Routledge 
 
 
 
 366 
 
Kiondo A. (1993) ‘Structural Adjustment and Non-Governmental 
Organizations in Tanzania: A Case Study’ in Gibbon P. (ed.) (1993) Social 
Change and Economic Reform in Africa Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet 
 
Kiondo A. (1992) Structural Adjustment, Political Pluralism and Participatory 
Politics in Tanzania: The Central Role of NGOs Dar es Salaam: TAAMULII 
 
Kitindi O. (1999) State Control Over Trade Unions Through Law from the 
1990s: A Critical Overview Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam 
 
Kitine H. (1976) The Growth of the Labour Movement in Tanzania Dar es 
Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam 
 
Kohl B. (2002) ‘Stabilizing Neoliberalism in Bolivia: Popular Participation 
and Privatization’ in Political Geography No. 21 
 
Koo L. (2008) National Development Strategy of Tanzania In View To 
Korea’s Development Experience Dar es Salaam: President’s Office 
 
Koponen J. (1995) Development for Exploitation: German Colonial Policies 
in Mainland Tanzania, 1994 – 1914 Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society 
Korr C. and M. Close (2010) More Than Just a Game: Football v Apartheid 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Korten D. (1990) Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global 
Agenda West Hartford: Kumarian Press. 
 
Kothari U. (ed.) (2005) A Radical History of Development Studies: 
Individuals, Institutions and Ideologies London: Zed 
 
Kothari U. and M. Minogue (eds) (2002) Development Theory and Practice: 
Critical Perspectives Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan  
 
Kraus J. (2007a) ‘Conclusion: Trade Unions and Democratization in Africa’ in 
Kraus J. (ed.) (2007) Trade Unions and the Coming of Democracy in Africa 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
 
 367 
 
Kraus J. (2007b) ‘Trade Unions in Africa’s Democratic Renewal and 
Transitions: An Introduction’ in Kraus J. (ed.) (2007) Trade Unions and the 
Coming of Democracy in Africa Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Kraus J. (ed.) (2007) Trade Unions and the Coming of Democracy in Africa 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
Krueger A. (1974) ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society’ in 
American Economic Review, Vol.64, No. 3. 
 
Kuczynski P-P and J. Williamson (eds) (2003) After the Washington 
Consensus Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics 
 
Laclau E. (2000) ‘Identity and Hegemony: The Rise of Universality in the 
Constitution of Political Logics’ in Butler J., Laclau E. and S. Zizek (eds) 
(2000) Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the 
Left London: Verso 
 
Lal D. (1997) The Poverty of Development Economics London: The Institute 
of Economic Affairs 
 
Lam W. (1996) ‘Institutional Design of Public Agencies and Coproduction: A 
Study of Irrigation Associations in Taiwan’ in World Development, Vol. 24, 
No. 6 
 
Lambert (2002) ‘Labour Movement Renewal in the Era of Globalisation: 
Union Responses in the South’ in Harrod J. and R. O’Brien (eds) (2002) 
Global Unions? London: Routledge 
 
Lapides K. (ed.) (1987) Marx and Engels on the Trade Unions London: 
Praeger 
 
Lata M. (2007) Changing Roles of NGOs in the 21st Century New Delhi: 
Mahaveer 
 
 
Lauer K. (2008) Transforming NGO MFIs: Critical Ownership Issues to 
Consider, Washington, DC: CGAP Occasional Paper, No 13.  
 368 
 
Lawyers Environmental Action Team (2010) Repackaging Authoritarianism: 
Freedom of Association and Expression and the Right to Organize Under the 
Proposed NGO Policy for Tanzania Dar es Salaam: LEAT 
 
Leal P. (2007) ‘Participation: The Ascendancy of a Buzzword in the Neo-
liberal Era’ in Development in Practice, 17: 4-5 
 
Leandro J. et al (1999) ‘Towards a More Effective Conditionality: An 
Operational framework’ World Development, Vol. 27, No. 2 
 
Leather A. (2005) ‘Labor Union and NGO Relations in Development and 
Social Justice’ in Eade, D. and A. Leather (eds) (2005) Development NGOs 
and Labor Unions: Terms of Engagement Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press 
 
Leftwich A. (2008) Developmental States, Effective States and Pverty 
Reduction: The Primacy of Politics Geneva: UNRISD 
 
Lenin V. (1996) Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism London: Junius 
 
Lerche J., Pincus J. and J. Weeks (2003) PRSPs and National Development 
Strategies: A report to DFID London: SOAS, Centre for development Policy 
and Research 
 
Lewis D. (2002a) ‘Civil Society in African Contexts: Reflections on the 
Usefulness of a Concept’ in Development and Change, Vol. 33, No. 4 
 
Lewis D. (2002b) ‘Development NGOs and the Challenge of Partnership: 
Changing Relations Between North and South’ in Social Policy and 
Administration, Vol. 32, No. 5 
 
Lewis D. (ed.) (1999) International Perspectives on Voluntary Action: 
Reshaping the Third Sector London: Earthscan 
 
Lewis D. (2002c) ‘Non-governmental Organization: Questions of 
Performance and Accountability’ in Desai V. and R. Potter (eds) (2002) The 
Companion to Development Studies London: Arnold 
 
 
 369 
 
Lewis D. (2001) The Management of Non-Governmental Organizations: An 
Introduction London: Routledge 
 
LHRC (2002) Labour and Employment Issues Dar es Salaam: LHRC 
 
LHRC (2004) Legal and Human Rights (LHRC): Annual Report 2004 Dar es 
Salaam: LHRC 
 
LHRC (2008) Tanzania Human Rights Report 2008: Progress Through Human 
Rights Dar es Salaam: LHRC 
 
Lipili P. (2005) ‘Mkapa Adds Weight To Hakielimu Ban’ in The Observer 
(Tanzania), 10 September, 2005 
Little I. (1982) Economic Development: Theory, Policy, and International 
Relations New York: Basic Books 
 
Lively J. (1961) The Social and Political Thought of Alexis De Tocqueville 
Oxford: Clarendon 
 
Locke J. (1986) The Second Treatise on Civil Government Amherst, New 
York: Prometheus 
 
Lucas R. (2006) ‘Migration and Economic Development in Africa: A Review 
of Evidence’ in Journal of African Economies, Vol. 15, Supplement 1 
 
Ludwig, F. (1999) Church and State in Tanzania: Aspects of a Changing 
Relationship Leiden: Brill 
 
Lugalla J. (1993) ‘Structural Adjustment Policies and Education in Tanzania’ 
in Gibbon P. (ed.) (1993) Social Change and Economic Reform in Africa 
Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet 
 
Lund C. (2006) ‘Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in 
Africa’ in Development and Change, Vol. 37, No. 4 
 
 
 
 370 
 
Maghimbi S. (1990) ‘Cooperatives in Agricultural Development’ in O’Neill N. 
and K. Mustafa (1990) (eds) Capitalism, Socialism and the Development 
Crisis in Tanzania Aldershot: Avebury 
 
Maghimbi S. (2010) Cooperatives in Tanzania Mainland: Revival and Growth 
Dar es Salaam: Coop Africa, Working Paper, No. 14 
 
Mahjoub A. (ed.) (1990) Adjustment or Delinking? The African Experience 
London: Zed 
 
Maina W. (1998) ‘Kenya: The State, Donors and the Politics of 
Democratization’ in Van Rooy A. (ed.) (1998) Civil Society and the Aid 
Industry London: Earthscan 
 
Malaluan J. and S. Guttal (2003) Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A Poor 
Package for Poverty Reduction Bangkok: Focus on the Global South 
 
Malik (2003) ‘Sharing my Dilemmas: Mixed Messages on PRA and 
Participation’ in Cornwall A. and G. Pratt (eds) (2003) Pathways to 
Participation: Reflections on PRA London: ITDG  
 
Mallaby S. (2005) The World’s Banker: a Story of Failed States, Financial 
Crises, and the Wealth and Poverty of Nations London: Yale University Press 
 
Mallya E. (2000) A Critical Look at Tanzania’s Development Vision 2025 
New York: UNPAN 
 
Mallya E. (2001) Development Of Women NGOs: Case Studies Of Land And 
Sexual Harassment Legislation Dar es Salaam: Research And Education For 
Democracy In Tanzania (REDET) 
 
Mamdani M. (1996) Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the 
Legacy of Late Colonialism Princeton: Princeton University Press 
 
Mamdani M. (1992) ‘Conceptualising State and Civil Society Relations: 
Towards a Methodological Critique of Contemporary Africanism’ in Auroi C. 
(ed.) (1992) The Role of the State in Development Processes London: Frank 
Cass 
 371 
 
 
Manji F. and C. O’Coill (2002) ‘The Missionary Position: NGOs and the State 
in Africa’ in International Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 3 
 
Manzo K. (2007) ‘Learning to Kick: African Soccer Schools as Carriers of 
Development’ in IMPULMELELO, Vol. 2, No. 7 
 
Mapetla, M. et al (2007) Hunger Vulnerability: Burial Societies as Social 
Protection Mechanism in Lesotho Maseru: ISAS, National University of 
Lesotho 
 
Mapunda O. and G. Mpangara (1969) The Maji Maji War in Ungoni Dar es 
Salaam: East African Publishing House 
 
Marx K. (1970a) A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy 
Moscow: Progress Publishers 
 
Marx K. (1970b) Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right Cambridge: CUP 
(Originally published in 1843) 
 
Marx K. (1971) ‘On The Jewish Question’ in Bottomore T. (ed.) (1971) Karl 
Marx: Early Writings London: Watts (Originally published in 1844) 
 
Matiko J. (1968) The Tanganyika Mine Workers Union: Mwadui Branch Dar 
es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam 
 
Matlosa K. (2004) ‘Civil Society and Democratization in Tanzania’ in Karume 
S. (ed.) (2004) Dilemmas of Political Transition: Towards Institutionalisation 
of Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania Johannesburg: EISA 
 
Matobo T. (1998) ‘The Socio-Economic Role of Burial Societies and Money 
Lending Christmas Clubs in the Informal Sector in Lesotho’ in Lesotho Social 
Sciences Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 
 
May T. (2001) Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process Buckingham: 
OUP 
 
 
 372 
 
Mbembe A. (2001) On the Postcolony Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press 
 
Mbilinyi M. et al (eds) (2003) Activist Voices: Feminist Struggles for an 
Alternative World Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Gender Networking Programme 
 
Mbilinyi M. and M. Rusimbi (2005) ‘Tanzania: Is This A Pro-poor Gender-
Sensitive Budget?’ Review of African Political Economy, Nos. 104/105 
 
McGee R. (2002) 'Participating in Development’ in Kothari U. and M. 
Minogue (eds) Development Theory and Practice: Critical Perspectives 
Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Mchomvu A. et al (1998) ‘Social Policy and Research Practice in Tanzania’ in 
Journal of Social Development in Africa, Vol. 13, No.2 
 
McKeon N. (2009) The United Nations and Civil Society: Legitimating 
Global Governance – Whose Voice? London: Zed 
 
McNeil M. (2002) ‘Engaging the Poor’ in Development Outreach, Vol. 4 
 
McQuinn M. (2011) ‘The Position of Trade Unions within the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) Process in Tanzania’ Presentation: 
International Conference on Making Development Inclusive: The MDGs and 
Beyond Bradford: University of Bradford 
 
McQuinn M. (2009) ‘Trade Union Ideologies and Poverty Reduction: Should 
Tanzanian Trade Unions move towards ‘Social Movement Unionism’ in Order 
to Become more Effective Players in the PRSP?’Presentation: The Norwegian 
Association for Development Research (NFU): Annual Conference 
Kristiansand: University of Agder 
Meier G. (ed.) (1987) Pioneers in Development New York: OUP 
 
Mercer C. (2004) ‘Engineering Civil Society: ICT in Tanzania’ in Review of 
African Political Economy, No.99 
 
Mercer C. (2002a) ‘NGOs, Civil Society and Democratization: A Critical 
Review of the Literature’ in Progress in Development Studies, Vol.2, No.1 
 373 
 
Mercer C. (2003) ‘Performing Partnership: Civil Society and the Illusion of 
Good Governance in Tanzania’ in Political Geography, Vol. 22, No.7 
 
Mercer C. (1999) ‘Reconceptualizing State-society Relations in Tanzania: are 
NGOs ‘Making a Difference’?’ in Area, Vol.31, No.3 
 
Mercer C. (2005) ‘Telecentres and Transformations: Modernizing Tanzania 
Through The Internet’’ in African Affairs, 105/419 
 
Mercer C. (2002b) ‘The Discourse of Maendeleo and the Politics of Women’s 
Participation on Mount Kilimanjaro’ in Development and Change, Vol. 33 
 
 
Michael F. (2001) Factors Affecting the Effectiveness of Tanzanian Trade Dar 
es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam 
 
Michael S. (2004) Undermining Development: The Absence of Power Among 
Local NGOs in Africa Oxford: James Currey 
 
MIGA (2007) Snapshot Africa – Tanzania: Benchmarking FDI 
Competitiveness Washington, DC: MIGA, World Bank 
 
Mihyo P. (1979) ‘Industrial Relations in Tanzania’ in Damachi U., Deibel H. 
and L. Trachtman (eds) (1979) Industrial Relations in Africa New York: St. 
Martins Press 
 
Mihyo P. (1975) ‘The Struggle for Workers’ Control in Tanzania’ in Review of 
African Political Economy, Vol. 2, Issue 4 
 
Minogue M. (2002) ‘Power to the People? Good Governance and the 
Reshaping of the State’ in Kothari U. and M. Minogue (eds) (2002) 
Development Theory and Practice: Critical Perspectives Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan  
 
Mirowski P. and D. Plehwe (eds) (2009) The Road from Mount Pelerin: The 
Making of the Neoliberal thought Collective Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press 
 
 374 
 
Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2010) Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance 
http://www.moibrahIMFoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-index 
Accessed: 21 October 2010 
 
Mohan G. (2002a) ‘Beyond Participation: Strategies for Deeper 
Empowerment’ in Cooke B. and U. Kothari (2002) Participation: the New 
Tyranny? London: Zed 
 
Mohan G. (2002b) ‘Participatory Development’ in Desai V. and R. Potter (eds) 
(2002) The Companion to Development Studies London: Arnold 
 
Mohan G., Brown E., Millward B. and A. Zack-Williams (eds) (1999) 
Structural Adjustment Theory, Practice and Impacts London: Routledge 
 
Morrissey O. (2005) ‘Alternatives to Conditionality in Policy-based Lending’ 
in Koeberle S. et al (eds) (2005) Conditionality Revisited: Concepts, 
Experiences and Lessons Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
Morton A. (2007) Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in 
the Global Economy London: Pluto 
 
Mosse D. (2002) ‘People’s Knowledge,’ Participation and Patronage: 
Operations and Representations in Rural Development’ in Cooke B. and U. 
Kothari (2002) Participation: the New Tyranny? London: Zed 
 
Moyo D. (2010) Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and How there is a Better 
Way for Africa London: Penguin 
 
Mshana R. (2003) ‘The Impact of Economic, Social and Political Reforms in 
Tanzania’ in Chachage C. and M. Mbilinyi (2003) Against Neoliberalism: 
Gender, Democracy and Development Dar es Salaam: TGNP 
 
Msuku N. Z. (1976) The Role of NUTA in Collective Bargaining in Tanzania: 
The Case of Kioo Ltd. Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam 
 
Mukandala R. (1999) Trade Unionism In Tanzania: The Case Of The Tanzania 
Federation Of Trade Unions (TFTU) And Government Dar es Salaam: 
University of Dar es Salaam 
 375 
 
Muller M. (2005) The Political Dynamics of the Informal Sector in Tanzania 
Roskilde: IDS, Roskilde University 
 
Mushi A. (Forthcoming) The Need for a Vision and Strategy on the Part of 
Tanzanian NGOs Birmingham: University of Birmingham, PhD. Research 
 
Musoke I. (1978) Imperialism, Social Structure and Class Struggles in 
Tanzania: An Analysis of Labor Processes in a Dependent Economy 
Michigan: Ann Arbor Press 
 
Mwakyembe H. (1986) ‘The Parliament and the Electoral Process’ in Shivji I. 
(ed.) (1986) The State and the Working People in Tanzania Dakar: Codesria 
Mwapachu J. (1998) ‘Preface’ in Tibaijuka A. (ed.) (1998) The Social Services 
Crisis of the 1990’s: Strategies for Sustainable Systems in Tanzania Aldershot: 
Ashgate 
Myint H. (1987) ‘The Neo-classical Resurgence in Development Economics: 
its Strengths and Limitations’ in Meier G. (ed.) (1987) Pioneers in 
Development New York: OUP 
Nahala R. (1997) The Freedom of Association in Tanzania: Implications for 
Civil Society and Sustainable Development Dar es Salaam: LEAT 
 
Narayan D. (1999) Bonds and Bridges: Social Capital and Poverty 
Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
Narayan D. et al (2000) Voices of the Poor:  Crying Out for Change 
Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
Naud W. (2010) (2010) ‘The Determinants of Migration from Sub-Saharan 
African Countries’ in Journal of African Economies, Vol. 15, No. 3 
 
Ndee H. (2007) ‘Sport as a Political Tool: Tanzania and the Liberation of 
Africa’ in Majumder B. and F. Hong (eds) (2007) Modern Sport – The Global 
Obsession: Politics, Religion, Class, Gender London: Routledge 
 
Ndegwa S. (1996) The Two Faces of Civil Society: NGOs and the Politics in 
Africa West Hartford: Kumarian 
 376 
 
Ndomo A. (2005) ‘PRSP Rhetoric: Sugar-coated Structural Adjustment 
Reality’? in IIED (2005) Civil Society and Poverty Reduction IIED, 
Participatory Learning and Action, No. 51 
  
Ndulu B. (1987) Stabilization and Adjustment Policies and Programmes: 
Country Study – Tanzania Helsinki: WIDER 
 
NEC (2011) 2010 Presidential Election Results 
http://www.nec.go.tz/index.php?modules=election_results_2010&sub=&etype
=1&region=&button=Search 
Accessed – 3 May, 2011 
 
Nelson P. (2002) ‘The World Bank and NGOs’ in Desai V. and R. Potter (eds) 
The Companion to Development Studies London: Arnold 
 
Nelson N. and S. Wright (1995) 'Participation and Power’ in Nelson N. and S. 
Wright (eds) Power and Participatory Development: Theory and Practice 
London: ITDG 
 
Nelson N. and S. Wright (eds) (1995) Power and Participatory Development: 
Theory and Practice London: ITDG 
 
Ngowi H. (2002) ‘Foreign Direct Investment Entry Modes in Tanzania: Types, 
Driving Forces and Implications’ in Tanzanet Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1 
 
Nkombo N. (2008) Development Aid and National Ownership: A review of 
Critical Experiences from Africa Accra: Promoting Ownership and Reforming 
Conditionality: Workshop Presentation 
 
Nord R. et al (2009) Tanzania: The Story of an African Transition Washington, 
DC: IMF 
 
Norwegian Council for Africa (2009) Ethiopia: New Law is Strangling NGOs 
and Criticism  
Available at - http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/17883.html 
Accessed – 11 January 2011 
 
 
 377 
 
Nugent P. (2004) Africa Since Independence Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan 
 
Nuttall S. and C-A Michael (eds) (2000) Senses of Culture: South African 
Culture Studies Oxford: OUP 
 
Nyerere J. (1976) Freedom and Socialism (Uhuru Na Ujamaa) London: OUP  
 
Nyerere J. (1967) Freedom and Unity (Uhuru Na Umoja) London: OUP  
 
Nyerere J. (1968) Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism London: OUP 
 
ODI (2005) PRSP Annual Progress Reports and Joint Staff Assessments – A 
Review of Progress London: ODI 
 
OECD (2010a) Aid Statistics: Donor Aid Charts Paris: OECD – Development 
Co-operation Directorate 
 
OECD (2010b) Aid Statistics: Recipient Aid Charts Paris: OECD – 
Development Co-operation Directorate 
 
OECD (2001) Evaluation Feedback for Effective Learning and Accountability 
Paris: OECD 
 
OED (2004) The Poverty Reduction Strategy Initiative: An Independent 
Evaluation of the World Bank’s Support Through 2003 Washington, DC: 
OED 
 
Olaleye W. (2004) ‘Political Parties - The State of Tanzania’s Political 
Landscape’ in Wangwe S. (ed.) (2004) Dilemmas of Political Transitional: 
Towards Institutionalisation of Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania 
Johannesburg: EISA  
 
Oliver R. and A. Atmore (1994) Africa Since 1800 Cambridge: CUP 
 
Oloka-Onyango J. and J. Barya (1997) ‘Civil Society and the Political 
Economy of Foreign Aid in Uganda’ Democratization Vol. 4, No. 2 
 
 378 
 
O’Malley K. (2004) Children and Young People Participating in PRSP 
Processes: Lessons from Save the Children’s Experiences London: Save the 
Children 
 
O’Neill N. and K. Mustafa (1990) (eds) Capitalism, Socialism and the 
Development Crisis in Tanzania Aldershot: Avebury 
 
Osborne S. (ed.) (2008) The Third Sector in Europe: Prospects and Challenges 
Abingdon: Routledge 
 
Osborne S. et al (2005) ‘Government/non-Profit Partnerships, Public services 
Delivery, and Civil Society in the Transitional Nations of Eastern Europe: 
Lessons from the Hungarian Experience’ in International Journal of Public 
Administration, Vol. 28 
 
OSSREA (2009) Good Governance and Civil Society Participation in Africa 
Addis Ababa: OSSREA 
 
Ostrom E. (1996) ‘Crossing the Great Divide: Coproduction, Synergy, and 
Development in World Development, Vol. 24, No. 6 
 
Oxfam (2004) From ‘Donorship’ to Ownership: Moving Towards PRSP 
Round Two Oxford: Oxfam Briefing Paper, No. 5 
PACT (2006a) Legislative Roadmap: A Guide for Civil Society Organizations 
in Tanzania. Part One: Policy, Law and Governance Dar es Salaam: Pact 
Tanzania 
 
PACT (2006b) Legislative Roadmap: A Guide for Civil Society Organizations 
in Tanzania. Part Two: Civil Society and the Law Making Process Dar es 
Salaam: Pact Tanzania 
 
PACT (2006c) What is TAPP? Dar es Salaam: Pact Tanzania 
Padayachee V. (ed.) (2010) The Political Economy of Africa London: 
Routledge 
 
Pallotti A. (2008) ‘Tanzania: Decentralising Power or Spreading Poverty?’ in 
Review of African Political Economy, No. 116 
 379 
 
Pannenborg A. (2008) How to Win a Football Match in Cameroon: An 
Anthropological Study of Africa’s Most Popular Sport Leiden: African Studies 
Centre 
Parkison M. (2001) Building Capacity for Public Participation: A Democracy 
Network Program in Romania, Battleboro, VT: SIT Occasional Paper Series, 
No. 2 
 
Parpart J. (1982) The “Labour Aristocracy” Thesis Considered Once Again: 
The Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt 1926–1986 Boston: Boston University, 
African Studies Center, Working Paper, No. 56 
 
Peace A. (1975) ‘The Lagos Proletariat: Labor Aristocrats or Populist 
Militants’ in Sandbrook R. and R. Cohen (eds) (1975) The Development of an 
African Working Class Toronto: University of Toronto 
 
Pearce J. (1997) ‘Between Co-option and Irrelevance? Latin American NGOs 
in the 1990s’ in Hulme, D and M. Edwards (eds) (1997) NGOs, States and 
Donors: Too Close for Comfort? Basingstoke: Macmillan   
 
Pearce J. (2002) ‘Development, NGOs, and Civil Society: The Debate and its 
Future’ in Eade D. (ed.) (2002) Development NGOs and Civil Society: 
Selected Essays from Development in Practice Oxford: Oxfam 
 
Pender J. (2007) ‘Country Ownership: The Evasion of Donor Responsibility’ 
in Bickerton C., Cunliffe P., and A Gourevitch (eds) (2007) Politics Without 
Sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary International Relations London: 
UCL Press 
 
Pender J. (2005) Less Interests, More Influence: The Paradox of Poverty 
Reduction and the Redefinition of Development Dar es Salaam: SAID 
Workshop 
Petras J. (2003) The New Development Politics: The Age of Empire Building 
and New Social Movements Aldershot: Ashgate 
 
Petras J. and H. Veltmeyer (2001) Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in 
the 21st Century New York: Zed 
 
 380 
 
Pimbert M. (2003) ‘Learning to Live the Politics of Participation’ in Cornwall 
A. and G. Pratt (eds) (2003) Pathways to Participation: Reflections on PRA 
London: ITDG 
 
Pincus J. and J. Winters (eds) (2002) Reinventing the World Bank London: 
Cornell University Press 
 
Pinkney R. (2009) NGOs. Africa and the Global Order Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan 
 
Plastow J. (2005) Pastoralism and Advocacy: Lessons from the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Process in Tanzania 
 
Policy Forum (2010) CSOs National Consultation Meeting On MKUKUTA 
Assessment Findings, 18-19 January 2010: Setting The Ground For Planning 
Dar es Salaam: Policy Forum 
 
Policy Forum (2008a) Growth in Tanzania: Is It Reducing Poverty? Dar es 
Salaam: Policy Forum 
 
Policy Forum (2002a) NGO Statements Consultative Group Meeting, Dar es 
Salaam, December 2-5, 2002 Dar es Salaam: Policy Forum 
 
Policy Forum (2002b) Towards a Protocol for Engagement in the Policy 
Process Dar es Salaam: Policy Forum 
 
Policy Forum (2008b) Transparency And Accountability Within Civil Society: 
An Opportunity For Self-Reflection Dar es Salaam: Policy Forum 
 
Poole M. (1981) Theories of Trade Unionism London: Routledge 
 
Post C. (2006) Explaining Working Class Conservatism: The Myth of the 
‘Labor Aristocracy’ Montreal: American Sociological Association, Annual 
Meetings  
 
Pratt C. (1999) ‘Julius Nyerere: Reflections on the Legacy of His Socialism’ in 
Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1 
 
 381 
 
Pratt C. (1978) The Critical Phase in Tanzania: Nyerere and the Emergence of 
a Socialist Strategy Cambridge: CUP 
 
Pretty J. (1995) Regenerating Agriculture: Policies and Practice for 
Sustainability and Self-Reliance Washington DC: Joseph Henry 
 
Putnam R. (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community London: Simon and Schuster 
 
Putnam R. (2003) ‘Making Democracy Work’ in Hodgkinson V. and M. Foley 
(eds) (2003) The Civil Society Reader London: University Press of New 
England 
 
Putnam R. (1993a) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions In Modern 
Italy New Jersey: Princeton University Press 
 
Putnam R. (1993b) ‘The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public 
Life’ in Prospect, Vol. 4, Issue 13 
 
Qorro (1991) Self-Help Organizations in the Sub-District of Karatu (Arusha, 
Tanzania) Arusha: Conference Presentation – NGOs, Civil Society and the 
State, Institute of Development Studies, Dar es Salaam 
Ramphele M. (2006) ‘NGOs and Civil Society’ in Clark D. (ed.) (2006) The 
Elgar Companion to Development Studies Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
 
REBA (2007) ‘Burial Societies, Lesotho’ in REBA Case Study Brief, No. 13 
 
REPOA (2011) REPOA’s Straetgic Plan for 2010 – 2014 Dar es Salaam: 
REPOA 
 
Ricci F. (2008) Elephants, Lions and Eagles: A Journey Through African 
Football London: WSC Books 
 
Rice X. (2008) ‘The Water Margin’ in The Guardian (UK) Tuesday 16 August, 
2007 
 
 
 382 
 
Rice X. (2007) ‘Water: Campaigners Cheer Defeat of Biwater’s £10m 
Tanzanian Claim’ in The Guardian (UK) Tuesday 29 July, 2008 
 
Riddell R. (2007) Does Foreign Aid Really Work? Oxford: OUP 
 
Rist G. (2005) The History of Development London: Zed 
 
Rizzo M. (2002) ‘Being Taken for a Ride: Privatization of the Dar es Salaam 
Transport System 1983 – 1998’ in Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 
40, No. 1  
 
Rizzo M. (2006) ‘What was Left of the Groundnut Scheme? Development 
Disaster and Labour Market in Southern Tanganyika, 1946-1952’ in Journal 
of Agrarian Change, Vol. 6, Issue 2  
 
Robinson M. (1993) ‘Governance, Democracy and Conditionality: NGOs and 
the New Policy Agenda’ in Clayton A. (ed.) (1993) Governance, Democracy 
and Conditionality: What Role for NGOs? Oxford: INTRAC  
 
Robinson M. (1992) ‘NGOs and Rural Poverty Alleviation: Implications for 
Scaling-up’ in Edwards M. and D, Hulme (eds) (1992) Making a Difference: 
NGOs and Development in a Changing World London: Earthscan   
 
Robinson M. (1997) ‘Privatising the Voluntary Sector: NGOs as Public 
Service Contractors?’ in Hulme, D and M. Edwards (eds) (1997) NGOs, States 
and Donors: Too Close for Comfort? Basingstoke: Macmillan   
 
Rodney W. (1972) How Europe Underdeveloped Africa London: Bogle-
L’Ouverture 
 
Rodney W. (1980) ‘The Political Economy of Colonial Tanganyika, 1890 – 
1930’ in Kaniki M. (ed.) (1980) Tanzania Under Colonial Rule London: 
Longman 
 
Rodrik (2006) Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington 
Confusion? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Working Paper, January 
2006 
 
 383 
 
Rodrik (2004) Rethinking Growth Policies In The Developing World 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Working Paper, October 2004 
 
Roe Goddard C., Passe-Smith J. and J. Conklin (eds) (2003) International 
Political Economy: Readings on State-Market Relations in the Changing 
Global Order Basingstoke: Palgrave 
 
Rose P. (2003) 'From the Washington to the Post-Washington Consensus: The 
Influence of International Agendas on Education Policy and Practice in 
Malawi' in Globalization, Societies and Education, Vol. 1, No. 1  
 
Rose P. (2006) ‘From Washington to Post-Washington Consensus: The 
Triumph of Human Capital’ in Jomo K. S. and Fine B. (eds) (2006) The New 
Development Economics: After the Washington Consensus London: Zed 
 
Rowden R. and J. Irama (2004) Rethinking Participation: Questions for Civil 
Society about the Limits of Participation in PRSPs Washington, DC and 
Kampala: ActionAid, USA and ActionAid, Uganda 
 
Roy-Campbell Z. (1999) Empowerment Through Language: The African 
Experience in Tanzania and Beyond Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press 
 
Rugendyke B. (ed.) (2007) NGOs as Advocates for Development in a 
Globalising World London: Routledge 
 
Rugumamu S. (1997) Lethal Aid: The Illusion of Socialism and Self-reliance 
in Tanzania Asmara: Africa World Press 
 
Rupiya M., Lwehabura N. and L. Le Roux (2006) Civil-Security Relations in 
Tanzania: Investigating the Relationship between the State, Security Services 
and Civil Society Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies 
 
Rusimbi M. (2003) ‘SAP For Whom? Grassroots Perspectives’ in Chachage C. 
and M. Mbilinyi (2003) Against Neoliberalism: Gender, Democracy and 
Development Dar es Salaam: TGNP 
 
Rwechungura G. (1976) Workers Participation in Tanzania Dar es Salaam: 
University of Dar es Salaam 
 384 
 
Salamon L. (1994) ‘The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector’ in Foreign Affairs, 
July/August, 1994 
 
Sandbrook R. and R. Cohen (eds) (1975) The Development of an African 
Working Class Toronto: University of Toronto 
 
Satola D. (1997) Legal and Regulatory Implications of Implementing WTO 
Telecommunications Commitments in Developing Markets Washington DC: 
World Bank 
 
Saul J. (1975) ‘The “Labour Aristocracy” Thesis Reconsidered’ in Sandbrook 
R. and R. Cohen (eds) (1975) The Development of an African Working Class 
Toronto: University of Toronto 
 
Schattschneider E. (1960) The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of 
Democracy in America Chicago: Holt, Rinehart and Winston  
 
Schneider D. (2008) Burial Societies in South Africa: Prevalence and 
Importance Princeton: Princeton University 
 
Schuurman F. (2003) ‘Social Capital: the Politico-Emancipatory Potential of a 
Disputed Concept’ in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 24 
 
Semkwiji D. (2009) Challenges And Opportunities Towards Social Integration 
And Inclusion: The Tanzania Experience Dar es Salaam: ESRF 
 
Sender J. and S. Smith (1986) The Development of Capitalism in Africa 
London: Methuen  
 
Seppala P. (2008) ‘The Politics of Economic Diversification: 
Reconceptualising the Rural Informal Sector in South-east Tanzania’ in 
Development and Change, Vol. 27, No. 3 
 
Serra N., Spiegel S. and J. Stiglitz (2008) ‘Introduction: From the Washington 
Consensus towards a New Global Governance’ in Serra N. and J. Stiglitz (eds) 
(2008) The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global 
Governance Oxford: OUP 
 
 385 
 
Serra N. and J. Stiglitz (eds) (2008) The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: 
Towards a New Global Governance Oxford: OUP 
 
Shantayana D. et al (eds) (2001) Aid and Reform in Africa: Lessons from Ten 
Case Studies Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
Shigetomi S. (ed.) (2002) The State and NGOs: Perspectives from Asia 
Singapore: ISEAS 
 
Shillington K. (1995) History of Africa New York: St Martin’s Press 
 
Shivji I. (1986) ‘Introduction: The Transformation of the State and the 
Working People’ in Shivji I. (ed.) (1986) The State and the Working People in 
Tanzania Dakar: Codesria 
 
Shivji I. (2006) Let the People Speak: Tanzania Down the Road to  
Neo-liberalism Dakar: Codesria 
 
Shivji I. (2004) ‘Reflections on NGOs in Tanzania: What we are, what we are 
not, and what we ought to be’ in Development in Practice Vol.14, No. 5 
 
Shivji I. (2007) Silences in NGO Discourse: The Role and Future of NGOs in 
Africa Oxford: Fahamu 
 
Shivji I. (1991) ‘The Democracy Debate in Africa: Tanzania’ in Review of 
African Political Economy, No. 50 
 
Shivji I. (ed.) (1986) The State and the Working People in Tanzania Dakar: 
Codesria 
 
Silliman G. and L. Noble (1998) Organizing for Democracy: NGOs, Civil 
Society and the Philippine State Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 
 
Smillie I. (2001) Patronage or Partnership? Local Capacity Building in 
Humanitarian Crises Bloomfield Conn.: Kumarian 
 
Sogge D. (ed.) (1996) Compassion and Calculation: The Business of Private 
Foreign Aid London: Pluto Press 
 386 
 
 
Speller I. (2007) ‘An African Cuba? Britain and the Zanzibar Revolution, 
1964’ in The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 35, No. 2 
 
Spooner D. (2004) ‘Trade Unions and NGOs: The Need for Cooperation’ in 
Development in Practice, Vol. 14, 1/2 
 
Standing G. (2000) ‘Brave New Words? A Critique of Stiglitz’s World Bank 
Rethink’, in Development and Change, Vol. 31, No. 4 
 
Steffek J. et al (2010) .Assessing the Democratic Legitimacy of Transnational 
CSOs: Five Criteria’ in Steffek J. and K. Hahn (eds) (2010) Evaluating 
Transnational NGOs: Legitimacy, Accountability, Representation 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Steffek J. and K. Hahn (eds) (2010) Evaluating transnational NGOs: 
legitimacy, Accountability, representation Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Stein H. (2008) Africa and the Making of Adjustment: How Economists 
Hijacked the Bank’s Agenda London: Bretton Woods Project 
 
Stephens D. (2009) Qualitative Research In International Settings: A Practical 
Guide Abingdon: Routledge 
 
Stewart S. (1997) ‘Happy Ever After in the Marketplace: Non-governmental 
Organizations and Uncivil Society’ in Review of African Political Economy, 
Vol. 24, No. 71 
 
Stewart F. and Wang M. (2003) Do PRSPs Empower Poor Countries and 
Disempower the World Bank, Or Is It The Other Way Round?’ Oxford: Queen 
Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, QEH Working Paper No. 108  
 
Stiglitz J. (2010) Freefall: Free Markets and the Sinking of the Global 
Economy London: Allen Lane 
 
Stiglitz J. (2002) Globalization and its Discontents London: Penguin 
 
Stiglitz J. (1999) More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving toward the 
 387 
 
Post-Washington Consensus Helsinki: United Nations University/WIDER 
Research      
 
Stiglitz J. (2000) ‘The Contributions of the Economics of Information to 
Twentieth Century Economics’ in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 
115, No. 4 
 
Sum N. (2003) From ‘Integral State’ to ‘Integral World Economic Order’: 
Towards a Neo-Gramscian Cultural International Political Economy 
Lancaster: University of Lancaster, Cultural Political economy Working Paper 
Series, No. 7 
 
Sumra S. (2004) The Living and Working Conditions of Teachers in Tanzania 
Dar es Salaam: Hakielimu 
 
Sundar P. (2010) Foreign Aid for Indian NGOs: Problem or Solution? London: 
Routledge 
 
Sundet G. (2008) Getting to Grips with Reality: Is it Possible to Realign 
MKURABITA to Empower the Poor? Oslo: Norwegian People’s Aid 
 
Svendsen K. (1986) ‘The Creation of Macroeconomic Imbalances and a 
Structural Crisis’ in Boesen J. et al (eds) (1986) Tanzania: Crisis and Struggle 
for Survival Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet 
 
Swantz M-L. (2003) ‘My Road to Participatory Action Research’ in Cornwall 
A. and G. Pratt (eds) (2003) Pathways to Participation: Reflections on PRA 
London: ITDG  
 
TADREG (1994) Structural Adjustment in Socio-Political Context: Some 
Findings from Iringa Region Dar es Salaam: TADREG Research Report III  
Tandon Y. (1996) ‘An African Perspective’ in Sogge D. (ed.) (1996) 
Compassion and Calculation: The Business of Private Foreign Aid London: 
Pluto Press 
 
 
 
 
 388 
 
TANGO (2010) More Coordination Needed 
Available at - 
http://www.tango.or.tz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=54:
more-coordination-needed&catid=1:latest-news 
Accessed: 2 May 2011 
 
Tarimo C. M. (1977) Management and Worker Relations in Mount Carmel 
Rubber Factory Dar es Salaam: University of Dar-es-Salaam 
 
Tarp F. (ed.) (2000) Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learnt and 
Directions for the Future London: Routledge  
TEDG (2009) Report of Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) on National 
Strategy for Growth and reduction Of Poverty (NSGRP) Implementation Gaps 
Dar es Salaam: TEDG 
 
The Citizen (2006) ‘Pay your Staff Better, Kikwete tells Employers’ in The 
Citizen (Tanzania) 5 August 2006 
 
This Day (2010) ‘ATE: TUCTA will Pay for Strike Losses’ 6 April 2010 
 
This Day (2010) ‘Call off the Strike CTI Urges TUCTA’ 9 April 2010 
 
This Day (2010) ‘TUCTA in New Strike Ultimatum’ 6 June 2010 
 
Thomas B. (1987) ‘Development through Harambee: Who Wins and Who 
Loses? Rural Self-Help Projects in Kenya’ in World Development, Vol. 15, 
Issue 4 
 
Thomas M. (2004) ‘Can the World Bank Enforce its Own Conditions? In 
Development and Change, Vol. 35, No. 3 
 
Thomas H. (1995a) ‘Challenges Facing Trade Unions’ in Thomas H. (ed.) 
(1995) Globalization and Third World Trade Unions: The Challenge of Rapid 
Economic Change London: Zed  
 
Thomas H. (1995b) ‘The Erosion of Trade Unions’ in Thomas H. (ed.) (1995) 
Globalization and Third World Trade Unions: The Challenge of Rapid 
Economic Change London: Zed  
 389 
 
Thomas H. (ed.) (1995) Globalization and Third World Trade Unions: The 
Challenge of Rapid Economic Change London: Zed 
Tibaijuka A. (ed.) (1998) The Social Services Crisis of the 1990’s: Strategies 
for Sustainable Systems in Tanzania Aldershot: Ashgate 
 
Tikare S. et al (2004) ‘Participation’ in World Bank (2004) PRSP Sourcebook 
Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
Toepler S. and L. Salamon (2003) ‘NGO Development in Central and Eastern 
Europe: An Empirical Overview’ in East European Quarterly, Vol. 37 
 
 
Tonnies F. (1955) Community and Association (Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft) London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
 
Townsend M. (1998) Political Economy Issues in Tanzania New York: Edwin 
Mellen  
 
Townsend J. et al (2002) ‘Challenges for NGOs’ in Desai V. and R. Potter 
(eds) The Companion to Development Studies London: Arnold 
 
Towse P. et al (2002) ‘Non-graduate Teacher Recruitment and Retention: 
Some Factors Affecting Teacher Effectiveness in Tanzania’ in Teaching and 
Teacher Education, Vol. 18, Issue 6 
 
Tripp A. (1992) ‘Local Organizations, Participation and the State in Urban 
Tanzania’ in Hyden, G. and M. Bratton (eds) (1992) Governance and Politics 
in Africa London: Lynne Rienner 
 
Tripp A. (2000) ‘Political Reform in Tanzania: The Struggle for Associational 
Autonomy’ in Comparative Politics, Vol. 32, No. 2 
 
TUCTA (2004a) Trade Union Input into the PRSP Process Dar es Salaam: 
TUCTA 
 
TUCTA (2004b) Trade Union Membership Profile in Tanzania Dar es Salaam: 
TUCTA 
 390 
 
Tumbo N. (1969) Towards the Search for Permanent Unity of Tanganyika’s 
Trade Union Movement Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam 
 
Ubels J. et al (eds) (2010) Capacity Development in Practice London: 
Earthscan 
 
UNCTAD (2002) Economic Development in Africa, From Adjustment to 
Poverty Reduction: What Is New? New York: United Nations 
 
UNCTAD (2007) Rethinking Industrial Policy (Discussion Paper 183) New 
York: United Nations 
 
UNCTAD (2007) The Least Developed Countries Report 2007 New York: 
United Nations 
 
 
UNDP (2000) Human Development Report 2000: Human Rights and Human 
Development New York: United Nations 
 
UNDP (2009) Human Development Report 2009 – Overcoming Barriers: 
Human Mobility and Development New York: United Nations 
 
UNDP (2010) UNDP Engagement with Civil Society New York: UNDP 
 
UNICEF (2010) Tanzania, United Republic of: Statistics 
Available at – 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/tanzania_statistics.html 
Accessed: 2 May, 2011 
 
URT (2004a) An Analysis of Respondents’ Questionnaires For PRS Review 
Dar es Salaam: Vice President’s Office 
 
URT (1995) Directory of Non-Governmental Organizations in Tanzania by 
31st December 1994 Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer 
 
URT (2004b) Employment and Labour Relations Act No. 6 of 2004 Dar es 
Salaam: Ministry of Labour 
 
 391 
 
URT (2007a) Integrated Labour Force Survey Dar es Salaam: Ministry of 
Planning, Economy and Empowerment 
 
URT (2000a) Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP) Dar es Salaam: 
Government Printer 
 
URT (2002a) Measuring Poverty Reduction: Understanding Tanzania’s 
Poverty Monitoring System Dar es Salaam: Vice President’s Office 
 
URT (2009b) MKUKUTA and MKUZA Review Dar-es-Salaam: Ministry Of 
Finance And Economic Affairs 
 
URT (2008) MKUKUTA Annual Implementation Report 2007/08 Dar-es-
Salaam: Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment 
 
URT (2008) MKUKUTA Annual Implementation Report 2007/08 Dar-es-
Salaam: Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment 
 
URT (2007b) MKUKUTA Annual Implementation Report 2006/07 Dar-es-
Salaam: Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment 
 
URT (2007c) MKUKUTA Monitoring Highlights: Issue 7 Dar-es-Salaam: 
Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment 
 
URT (2007d) MKUKUTA Monitoring Highlights: Issue 6 Dar-es-Salaam: 
Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment 
 
URT (2006) MKUKUTA Monitoring Master Plan Dar es Salaam: 
PER/MKUKUTA Consultative Meeting 
 
URT (2007e) MKURABITA: Property and Business Formalisation 
Programme Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer 
 
URT (2010a) NACONGO Dar-es-Salaam: The President’s Office 
 
URT (2000b) National Employment Policy Dar es Salaam: Government 
Printer 
 
 392 
 
URT (1997) National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES) Dar es Salaam: 
Government Printer 
 
URT (2010b) National Strategy For Growth And Reduction Of Poverty 
(NSGRP II) Dar-es-Salaam: Ministry Of Finance And Economic Affairs 
 
URT (2005a) National Strategy For Growth And Reduction Of Poverty 
(NSGRP) Dar es Salaam: Vice President’s Office 
 
URT (2011) Parliament of Tanzania Dar es Salaam: The President’s Office 
 
URT (2009c) Poverty and Human Development Report 2009 Dar es Salaam: 
Mkuki na Nyota 
 
URT (2007e) Poverty and Human Development Report 2007 Dar es Salaam: 
Mkuki na Nyota 
 
URT (2005b) Poverty and Human Development Report 2005 Dar es Salaam: 
Mkuki na Nyota 
 
 
URT (2003a) Poverty and Human Development Report 2003 Dar es Salaam: 
Mkuki na Nyota 
 
URT (2003b) Poverty Reduction Strategy: The Second Progress Report 
2001/02 Dar es Salaam: Government Printer 
 
URT (2010c) Procedures For Registration Of Non Governmental 
Organizations Under The Non Governmental Organizations Act No. 24/20002 
Dar es Salaam: Vice President’s Office 
 
URT (2000c) Tanzania Assistance Strategy Dar es Salaam: Government 
Printer 
 
URT (2001) The National Policy on Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) Dar es Salaam: Vice President’s Office 
 
 
 393 
 
URT (2002b) The Non-Governmental Organizations Act (No. 24) Dar es 
Salaam: Government Printer 
 
URT (1954) The Societies Act (Principal Legislation) Dar es Salaam: 
Government Printer 
 
URT (1999) The Tanzania Development Vision 2025 Dar es Salaam: Vice 
President’s Office 
URT (1998) Trade Unions Act, 1998 Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Labour 
 
URT (2010d) United Republic of Tanzania in Key Statistics Dar es Salaam: 
National Bureau of Statistics 
 
URT (2007f) Views Of The People 2007 Dar es Salaam: REPOA 
 
Uphoff N. (1996) ‘Why NGOs are not a Third Sector: A Sectoral Analysis 
with some Thoughts on Accountability, Sustainability and Evaluation’ in 
Edwards M. and D. Hulme (eds) (1996) Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO 
Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World West Hartford, 
Conn: Kumarian 
 
USAID (2005) US Action Plan on Harmonization Aid Harmonization and 
Alignment 
Available at – 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/26/30094584.pdf 
Accessed: 21 November 2010  
 
USAID (2003) USAID’s Approach to Poverty Reduction: Synthesis of Studies 
in Honduras, Mali, Romania and Uganda Washington, DC: USAID Evaluation 
Brief, Number 9 
 
Uvin P. et al (2000) Scaling Up NGO Programs in India: Strategies and 
Debates Boston, Mass: IDR Reports, Vol. 16, No. 6 
 
Uvin P. and D. Miller (1994) Scaling Up: Thinking Through The Issues 
Providence, Rhode Island: The World Hunger Program, Brown University 
 
 
 394 
 
Van de Walle, N., Ball N. and V. Ramachandran (eds) (2003) Beyond 
Structural Adjustment: The Institutional Context of African Development 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Van Rooy (2004) The Global Legitimacy Game: Civil Society, Globalization 
and Protest Basingstoke: Palgrave MacmIllan 
 
Van Waeyenberge (2006)’From Washington to Post-Washington Consensus: 
Illusions of Development’ in Jomo K. S. and B. Fine (eds) (2006) The New 
Development Economics: After the Washington Consensus London: Zed 
 
Vener J. (2000) ‘Prompting Democratic Transitions from Abroad: 
International Donors and Multi-Partyism in Tanzania’ in Democratization, Vol. 
7, Issue 4 
 
Vener J. (1996) The Onset of Regime Transition from Single to Multiparty 
Politics: a Case Study of Tanzania Columbus, Ohio: Thesis Ohio State 
University 
 
VENRO PRSP-Watch 
http://www.prsp-watch.de/index.php?page=english/english.php 
 
Von Holdt (2003) Transition from Below: Forging Trade Union and 
Workplace Change in South Africa Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press 
 
Wade R. (1998) 'The Asian Crisis and the Global Economy: Causes, 
Consequences and Cure' in Current History, November 1998 
 
Waheeda S. and A. Albee (eds) (2001) Selected Studies of Civil Society in 
Tanzania: Policy, Social Capital and Networks of the Vulnerable Dar es 
Salaam: DFID 
 
Walzer M. (2003) ‘The Concept of Civil Society’ in Walzer M. (ed.) Toward a 
Global Civil Society Providence; Berghahn 
 
Walzer M. (ed.) (2003) Toward a Global Civil Society Providence; Berghahn 
 
 
 395 
 
Wanderi P. (2009) ‘External Aid System and Sports in Kenya’s National 
Development’ Presentation – The Norwegian Association for Development 
Research (NFU): Annual Conference Kristiansand: University of Agder 
 
Wangwe, S. (2002) Aid Reform in Africa: The Conceptual Framework Dar es 
Salaam: ESRF 
 
Wangwe S. (2004) Innovation in Rural Finance in Tanzania Arusha: Paper 
presented at the Third Annual Conference on Microfinance 
 
Wangwe S. (ed.) (2004) Dilemmas of Political Transitional: Towards 
Institutionalisation of Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania Johannesburg: EISA  
 
Wangwe, S. and B. Van Arkadie (2000) Overcoming Constraints on Tanzanian 
Growth: Policy Challenges Facing the Third Phase Government, Dar es 
Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota 
 
War on Want (2006) Focus for Change: Informal Economy Organizations in 
Africa London: War On Want 
 
Waters T. (2006) ‘Markets and Morality: American Relations with Tanzania’ 
in African Studies Quarterly, Vol. 8, Issue 3 
 
WCL (2002) New Names, New Policies: Two Years of Poverty Reduction 
Strategies in IMF and World Bank – Recommendations from African Trade 
Unions Brussels: WCL 
 
WDM (2005) One Size for All: A Study of IMF and World Bank Poverty 
Reduction Strategies London: WDM 
 
Webster E., Lambert R. and A. Bezuidenhout (2008) Grounding Globalization: 
Labour in the Age of Insecurity Oxford: Blackwell 
 
Weeks J. et al (2002) Supporting Ownership: Swedish Development 
Cooperation with Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda Stockholm: SIDA Evaluation 
02/33                          
 
 
 396 
 
Whaites A. (2000) PRSPs: Good News for the Poor? Milton Keynes: World 
Vision 
 
White H. and G. Dijkstra (2003) Programme Aid and Development: Beyond 
Conditionality London: Routledge 
 
Whitfield L. (ed.) (2009) The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for dealing 
with Donors Oxford: OUP 
 
Wiarda H. (2003) Civil Society: The American Model and Third World 
Development Cambridge, MA: Westview 
 
Widner J. (1992) The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya: From “Harambee!” to 
“Nyayo!” Oxford: University of California Press  
 
Wignaraja P. (2006) ‘Globalization and New Social Movements: Lessons 
From South Asia’ in Dasgupta S. and R. Kiely (eds) (2006) Globalization and 
After Thousand Oaks: Sage 
 
Wignarja P. (1992) New Social Movement in the South: Empowering the 
People London: Zed 
 
Wilks A. and F. Lefrancois (2002) Blinding with Science or Encouraging 
debate? How World Bank Analysis Determines PRSP Policies London: 
Bretton Woods Project 
 
Williamson J. (2008) ‘A Short History of the Washington Consensus’ in Serra 
N. and J. Stiglitz (eds) (2008) The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: 
Towards a New Global Governance Oxford: OUP 
 
Williamson J. (2000) ‘What should the World Bank think about the 
Washington Consensus’ in The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 15, No. 2  
 
Willis J. (1993) ‘The Administration of Bonde, 1920 – 1960: A Study of the 
Implementation of Indirect Rule of Tanganyika’ in African Affairs, Vol. 92, 
Issue 366 
 
 
 397 
 
Wils F. (1992) ‘Scaling-up, Mainstreaming and Accountability: The Challenge 
for NGOs’ in Edwards M. and D. Hulme D. (eds) (1992) Making a Difference: 
NGOs and Development in a Changing World London: Earthscan 
 
Wolfensohn J. (2005) Voice for the World’s Poor: Selected Speeches and 
Writings of World Bank President, James D. Wolfensohn, 1995-2005 
Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
Wolfowitz P. (2006) Emerging Hope in Africa Washington DC: CARE 
National Advocacy Conference 
 
Wolfowitz P. (2005) World Bank President’s Contacts with CSOs Washington 
DC: World Bank 
 
Woodhouse P. (1998) ‘People as Informants’ in Thomas A., Chataway J. and 
M. Wuyts (eds) (1998) Finding Out Fast: Investigative Tools for Policy and 
Development London: Sage 
 
Woodhouse P. and A. Chimhowu (2005) ‘Development Studies, Nature and 
Natural Resources: Changing Narratives and Discursive Practices’ in Kothari 
U. (ed.) (2005) A Radical History of Development Studies: Individuals, 
Institutions and Ideologies London: Zed 
 
World Bank (1981) Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An 
Agenda for Action Washington, DC: World Bank 
World Bank (2010a) Civil Society: Overview Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
World Bank (2005a) Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade 
of Reform Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
World Bank (2000) Essential Action: Structural Adjustment and Labor - 
Tanzania Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
World Bank (2004a) Guidelines for Joint Staff Assessment of Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
World Bank (2010b) Guidelines for Trade Union Consultation Washington, 
DC: World Bank 
 398 
 
World Bank (2005b) Issues and Options for Improving Engagement Between 
the World Bank and Civil Society Organizations Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
World Bank (2007) Joint Background Paper: Review of Five Years of 
Structural Dialogue Between the International Trade Union Movement and the 
International Financial Institutions Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
World Bank (2009a) Joint Report on Meetings Between The International 
Trade Union Movement (ITUC/Global Unions) and the IMF and World Bank 
Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
World Bank (2003a) Kenya – The State of Social Dialogue: Trade Union 
Participation in the PRSP Process Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
World Bank (2010c) Key Issues in Education Washington DC: World Bank 
 
World Bank (2003b) Malawi – The State of Social Dialogue: Trade Union 
Participation in the PRSP Process Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
World Bank (2010d) Projects and Lending 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTSITETOOLS/0,,content
MDK:20264002~menuPK:534379~pagePK:98400~piPK:98424~theSitePK:9
5474,00.html 
Accessed: 21 November 2010 
 
World Bank (2002) PRSP Good Practices Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
World Bank (2004b) PRSP Sourcebook Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
World Bank (1989) Sub-Saharan Africa: from Crisis to Sustainable Growth 
Washington DC: World Bank 
 
World Bank (2010e) Tanzania: Country Brief Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
World Bank (2003c) Tanzania: The State of Social Dialogue Washington, DC: 
World Bank 
 
 
 399 
 
World Bank (1999) Tanzania: Social Sector Review Washington, DC: World 
Bank 
 
World Bank (1994) The World Bank and Participation Sourcebook 
Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
World Bank (2010f) What are PRSPs? 
Available at - 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/E
XTPRS/0,,contentMDK:22283891~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK
:384201,00.html 
Accessed: 21 November 2010 
 
World Bank (2010g: 1) What is Social Capital? Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
World Bank (1995a) World Bank Participation Sourcebook Washington, DC: 
World Bank 
 
World Bank (2005c) World Bank-Civil Society Engagement Washington DC: 
World Bank 
 
World Bank (2006) World Bank-Civil Society Engagement: A Review of 
Years 2005 and 2006 Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
World Bank (2009b) World Bank-Civil Society Engagement: Review of Years 
2007 to 2009 Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
World Bank (1997) World Development Report: The State in a Changing 
World Washington, DC: OUP 
 
World Bank (1995b) World Development Report: Workers in an Integrating 
World Washington, DC: OUP 
 
World Bank (2009b) World Development Indicators Washington, DC: World 
Bank 
 
World Bank – Social Capital Website http://worldbank.org/poverty/scapital 
 
 400 
 
Wuyts M. (2001) 'Informal Economy, Wage Goods and Accumulation Under 
Structural Adjustment: Theoretical Reflections Based on the Tanzanian 
Experience' in Cambridge Journal of Economics, 25 
 
Yaron J. (2004) Rural Microfinance: The Challenges and Best Practices Dar es 
Salaam: Bank of Tanzania 
 
Yunus Z. (2005) ‘Hakielimu: Mungai Hits Back At Critics’ in The Citizen, 
Wednesday, 23rd November 2005 
Zack-Williams A. and G. Harrison (2009) ‘Africa’s Future is up to Africans: 
Really?’ in Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 36, No. 121 
 
Zack-Williams A. and G. Mohan (2005) ‘Africa from SAPs to PRSP: Plus Ca 
Change Plus C’est la Meme Chose’ in Review of African Political Economy, 
Vol. 32, No. 106 
 
Unpublished Sources 
 
Kallaghe P. (2010) Address by the High Commissioner of the United Republic 
of Tanzania to the Annual General Meeting of the Britain-Tanzania Society 
London Voluntary Sector Resource Centre, 16 October, 2010 
 
Office of the Registrar of Trade Unions, URT - various documents relating to 
membership figures and other information about Tanzanian trade unions 
Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Labour, Office of the Registrar of Trade Unions 
TUCTA (1996) Research on Number of Dependents Supported by Trade 
Union Members in Tanzania Dar es Salaam: TUCTA 
 
URT (2006) Agreed Wage Rates in the Fishing Industry, 2006 Dar es Salaam: 
Ministry of Labour 
 
World Bank – Tanzania (2005) Coffee Mornings with the Press and Civil 
Society Dar es Salaam: World Bank 
 
 
 
 401 
 
Appendices 
Appendices 1.1 to 1.7 - Sources of Information for the Research 
Appendix 1.1: Overview of NGO-related Respondents (Purposive 
Samples) 
 
 
Interviews, respondents and institutions visited during 10 months of 
Fieldwork in 3 sessions 
 
1-5 interviews with –  
 
NGO Officials from Members of the Civil Society Stakeholders 
‘Macro Group’ 
Policy Forum  (PF) 
Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP)  
Tanzania Council for Social Development (TACOSODE) 
Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) 
Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) 
Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) 
Hakielimu  
Save the Children Tanzania 
ActionAid Tanzania 
 
NGO Officials from Non-Members of the Civil Society Stakeholders 
‘Macro Group’ but taking part in PRSP process 
Tanzania Education Network (TEN/MET)  
Pact Tanzania 
Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO) 
Oxfam Tanzania 
 
Official from NGO not taking part in the PRSP process 
Youth Partnership Countrywide (YPC) 
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Appendix 1.2: Overview of Trade Union-related Respondents (Purposive 
Samples) 
 
1-5 interviews with -  
 
Trade Union Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA) 
General Secretary  
Deputy General Secretary (x2) - the post-holder changed between the second 
and third fieldwork periods 
Director of Economics and Research 
Director of Education 
Director of Gender and Youth Issues 
Adviser on Gender Issues 
Director of Occupational Health and Safety, Environment and HIV/AIDS 
Senior Adviser DANIDA (seconded to TUCTA on fixed-term contract) 
 
TUCTA-Affiliated Trade Unions 
Conservation, Hotels, Domestic and Allied Workers Union  
Communication and Transport Workers Union of Tanzania   
Dock Workers Union of Tanzania 
Researchers Academicians and Allied Workers Union 
Tanzania Local Government Workers Union 
Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union 
Tanzania Seamen’s Union 
Telecommunication Workers Union of Tanzania 
Tanzania Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union  
Tanzania Railway Workers Union   
Tanzania Teachers Union 
Tanzania Union of Industrial and Commercial Workers 
Tanzania Union of Journalists  
Tanzania Union of Government and Health Workers  
 
Non TUCTA-Affiliated Trade Unions 
Tanzania Union of Private Security Employees  
Industrial and General Workers Union of Tanzania   
Tanzania Social Services Industry Workers Union 
Tanzania Media Workers Union 
Tanzania Fishing Crew and Allied Workers Union 
Tanzania Pilots Union 
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Appendix 1.3: Overview of Other Respondents 
 
 
1-5 interviews with -  
 
Ministry of Labour Officials 
Registrar of Trade Unions 
Deputy Registrar of Trade Unions 
 
Academics 
Professor at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam 
– specialist in labour market issues and work on trade unions 
Senior Lecturer at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es 
Salaam – specialist in civil society, poverty and gender issues 
Professor of Education - University of Dar es Salaam – working on civil 
society issues 
 
Donors 
Public Information Officer – World Bank 
Education Policy Officer – World Bank 
Senior Adviser – World Bank (seconded from DANIDA) 
Team Leader – Pro-poor Policy and Poverty Monitoring Unit - UNDP 
HIV/AIDS Policy Specialist - UNDP 
Poverty Monitoring Adviser - JICA 
Education Adviser – JICA 
 
Others 
Interviews were conducted with officials from Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
Tanzania 
Media Council of Tanzania (MCT), Mkombozi, Aga Khan University, 
Independent Development Consultant (former Country  
Programme Director, Oxfam Tanzania). 
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Appendix 1.4: Full List of Respondents  
 
Officials from ‘Macro Group’ NGOs Purposively Sampled 
1. Patrick Ngowi - Commonwealth Education Fund (CEF) Tanzania 
Programme Coordinator, Save the Children (SCF) 
2. Mrs Theofrida Kapinga - Executive Secretary, Tanzania Council for 
Social Development (TACOSODE)  
3. Andrew Mushi - Policy and Advocacy Programme Officer,  
Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO) 
4. Professor Haidari Amani - Executive Director, Economic and Social 
Research Foundation Council (ESRF)  
5. Dr Oswald Mashindano - Senior Research Fellow, Economic and Social 
Research Foundation (ESRF) 
6. Mary Rusimbi - Executive Director, Tanzania Gender Networking 
Programme (TGNP) 
7. Gemma Akilimali - Senior Programme Officer - Activism, Lobbying 
and Advocacy, Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP) 
8. Gertrude Mugizi - Executive Director, Policy Forum 
9. Rakesh Rajani - Executive Director, Hakielimu 
10. Donald Mmari - Consultancy Coordinator, Researcher, Research on 
Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) 
11. Luca Katera – Researcher, Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) 
12. Ms Rose Mushi - Country Programme Director, ActionAid 
13. Mrs Helen Kijo-Bisimba - Executive Director, Legal and Human Rights 
Centre (LHRC) 
14. Daniel Mvella - Programme Manager, Legal and Human Rights Centre 
(LHRC) 
 
Officials from ‘Non-Macro Group’ NGOs Purposively Sampled 
1. Fred Kwame - Country Programme Manager, Oxfam 
2. Silas Likasi – Deputy Country Programme Manager, Oxfam 
3. Nora Pendaeli-Mhina – Program Manager, Pact Tanzania 
4. Theo Macha - Program Officer, Pact Tanzania 
5. Dr Joseph Kisanji – Coordinator, Tanzania Education Network 
(TEN/MET) 
6. Israel Ilunde - Executive Director, Youth Partnership Countrywide 
(YPC) 
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Officials from the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA) – Head 
Office 
1. Mr Nestory Ngulla - General Secretary (x2) 
2. Mr Hassan Raha – ex-Deputy General Secretary 
3. Mr Nicholas Ernest Mgaya - Deputy General Secretary 
4. Mr John Gonza - Director of Economics and Research (x2) 
5. Mrs Margaret Mandago - Director of Education (x4) 
6. Mrs Sihan Ahmed - Director of Gender and Youth Issues (x3) 
7. Dr Kassim Meja Kapalata - Director Occupational Health and Safety, 
Environment and HIV/AIDS 
8. Dr Chande - Adviser on Gender Issues 
9. Mr Holger Hansen - Senior Adviser – DANIDA (Trade Union 
Component – seconded to TUCTA) 
 
Officials from Trade Unions Affiliated to the Trade Unions Congress of 
Tanzania 
1. Mr Said S. Wamba - General Secretary, Conservation, Hotels, Domestic 
and Allied Workers Union (CHODWAU) 
2. Mr C. M. Samang’ombe - General Secretary, Communication and 
Transport Workers Union of Tanzania (COTWU(T)) 
3. Mrs Debora Lutwaza - Head of Public Relations, Education and 
Training, Dock Workers Union of Tanzania (DOWUTA) 
4. Mr Godwin Ndonde - Legal and Administrative Officer, Dock Workers 
Union of Tanzania (DOWUTA) 
5. Mrs Mgaya - General Secretary, Researchers Academicians and Allied 
Workers Union (RAAWU)  
6. Mr Hezron Julius Kaaya - Deputy General Secretary, Researchers 
Academicians and Allied Workers Union (RAAWU) 
7. Mr J. S. Makongwa - General Secretary, Tanzania Local Government 
Workers Union (TALGWU) 
8. Mr Hassan Khamis Ameir - General Secretary, Tanzania Mines and 
Construction Workers Union (TAMICO) 
9. Mr Makwaya Musu Pingu – ex-General Secretary, Tanzania Mines and 
Construction Workers Union (TAMICO) 
10. Mr Mbao J. S. Saad – ex-Deputy General Secretary, Tanzania Mines 
and Construction Workers Union (TAMICO) 
11. Accountant - Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union 
(TAMICO). The respondent did not want to be named.  
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12. Mr Mchafu Ahmed Chakoma - General Secretary, Tanzania Seamen’s 
Union (TASU) 
13. Mr W Kashanda - Head of Research, Loans and Economy, 
Telecommunication Workers Un ion of Tanzania (TEWUTA) 
14. Mr Yahaya Msangi - Head of Research, Planning and Credit, Tanzania 
Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union (TPAWU)  
 
15. Mrs Helen Katala - Head of Education and Gender, Tanzania Railway 
Workers Union (TRAWU) (x2) 
16. Mr Y. B. K. Msulwa - General Secretary, Tanzania Teachers Union 
Abbreviation of Organization (TTU) 
17. Mr Anthony Mtavangu - Head of Education and Training, Tanzania 
Teachers Union (TTU) (x2) 
18. Mr Boniface Y. Nkakatisi - General Secretary, Tanzania Union of 
Industrial and Commercial Workers (TUICO) 
19. Mr Godfrey Kambenga - General Secretary, Tanzania Union of 
Journalists (TUJ) (x2) 
 
Officials from Trade Unions Not Affiliated to the Trade Union Congress 
of Tanzania 
1. Mr Eugene Aloyse Kazoka - General Secretary, Tanzania Union of 
Private Security Employees (TUPSE)  
2. Mr S. S. Marenda - General Secretary, Industrial and General Workers 
Union of Tanzania (IGWUTA) 
3. Mr Michael Kashemba - Deputy General Secretary, Industrial and 
General Workers Union of Tanzania (IGWUTA) 
4. Mr C. N. Nakuhwa - General Secretary, Tanzania Social Services 
Industry Workers Union (TASIWU) 
5. Mr Juvenalis Lesia - General Secretary, Tanzania Media Workers Union 
(TMW) 
6. Mr Songoro Mynonge - National Chairperson, Tanzania Media Workers 
Union (TMW) 
7. Mr Hamid Yassin - National Treasurer, Tanzania Media Workers Union 
(TMW) 
8. Mr Joseph Maseke - General Secretary, Tanzania Fishing Crew and 
Allied Workers Union (WAMEUTA) 
9. Captain Joseph Ibanda - General Secretary, Tanzania Pilots Union 
(TPU) 
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Government Officials 
1. Mrs Dorothy Uiso - Registrar of Trade Unions, Office of the Registrar 
of Trade Unions, Ministry of Labour (x3) 
2. Mr Gabriel Murumbe – Deputy Registrar of Trade Unions 
Office of the Registrar of Trade Unions, Ministry of Labour (x3) 
 
Officials from Other NGOs 
1. Mrs Pili Mtambalike - Programme Officer. Media Council of Tanzania 
2. Ms Claire Lwehabura - Project Officer, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
3. Ms Elsie Downham - Official, Mkombozi (Liberator) 
 
Officials from Supranational Organizations 
1. Catriona Byrne - HIV/AIDS Specialist, United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) 
2. Rosalie Ferrao - Public Information Officer, Public Information Office, 
World Bank 
3. Rest Lasway - Education Specialist, World Bank 
4. Astrid Ruge - Special Assistant to the World Bank Country Programme 
Manager (Seconded from DANIDA) 
5. Amon Manyama - Team Leader - Pro-Poor Policy and Poverty 
Monitoring, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
 
Officials from Bilateral Donors 
1. Tamahi Yamauchi - Poverty Monitoring Adviser, Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
2. Kazuyo Igarashi - Education Adviser, Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA) 
 
Academics 
1. Professor Samuel Chambua - Acting Head of Department, Institute of 
Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam (x2) 
2. Professor Issa Mcholo Omari - Professor of Educational Research and 
Private Consultant, University of Dar es Salaam 
3. Dr M. K. Ngaiza - Senior Lecturer in Poverty, Gender and 
Development, Institute of Development Studies (IDS), University of 
Dar es Salaam 
4. Dr Euan Davidson – Lecturer, Aga Khan University, Dar es Salaam 
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Others 
1. Mark Waite - Development Consultant (Former Country Programme 
Director of Oxfam) 
2. Mr Omar Faruk Osman - Secretary General - Eastern Africa Journalists 
Association 177 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
177  The recording of the titles of interviewees reflects the way they were given during interviews. 
All interviewees were post-holders at the time of interviews. Where the job title has ‘ex’ as a prefix, this 
reflects the fact that at the time of subsequent interviews, the post-holder had changed. 
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Appendix 1.5: Questions to NGO Officials 
1. What are the main issues facing NGOs in Tanzania? 
2.  What are the main issues concerning the PRSP process from the point 
of view of NGOs in Tanzania? 
3.  What are the main issues concerning the relationship between NGOs 
and the trade union movement in Tanzania? 
4.  What are your views concerning use of English when dealing with 
NGO issues in Tanzania? 
5.  What are your views on the relationship between NGOs and the 
government in Tanzania? 
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Appendix 1.6: Questions to TUCTA Officials, TUCTA-Affiliated Trade 
Union Officials and Non TUCTA-Affiliated Trade Union Officials 
 
1. What are the main issues facing the trade union movement in 
Tanzania? 
2.  What are the main issues concerning the PRSP process from the 
point of view of the trade union movement in Tanzania? 
3.  What are the main issues concerning the relationship between the 
trade union movement and NGOs in Tanzania? 
4.  What are the main issues concerning the relationship between ‘new 
investors’ and the trade union movement in Tanzania? 
5.  What are your views on mergers between trade unions  
           in Tanzania? 
6. What are your views concerning the use of English when dealing 
with trade union issues in Tanzania? 
7.  What are your views on the relationship between the trade union 
movement and the government in Tanzania? 
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Appendix 1.7  Key Government and Civil Society Documents used 
 
PRSP-related  
MKUKUTA and MKUZA Review (2009) 
MKUKUTA Annual Implementation Report 2007/08  
MKUKUTA Annual Implementation Report 2006/07  
MKUKUTA Monitoring Highlights: Issue 7 (2007) 
MKUKUTA Monitoring Highlights: Issue 6 (2007) 
National Strategy For Growth And Reduction Of Poverty (NSGRP II) (2010) 
National Strategy For Growth And Reduction Of Poverty (NSGRP) (2005) 
Poverty Reduction Strategy: The Second Progress Report 2001/02 
Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP) (2000) 
Government - Poverty and Human Development Reports (biannual) 
Poverty and Human Development Report 2009  
Poverty and Human Development Report 2007 
Poverty and Human Development Report 2005 
Poverty and Human Development Report 2003 
Government - Other 
Employment and Labour Relations Act No. 6 (2004b) 
Integrated Labour Force Survey (2007) 
NACONGO (2010) 
Procedures For Registration Of Non Governmental Organizations Under The Non 
Governmental Organizations Act No. 24/20002 
The Tanzania Development Vision 2025 (1999) 
Trade Unions Act, 1998  
Views Of The People 2007 
Civil Society 
Hakielimu - Sera Poa… Lakini Utekelezaji? Great Policies… but Implementation? (2005) 
Hakielimu - Three Years of PEDP Implementation: Key Findings from Government Reviews 
(2005) 
Hakielimu, Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) and Research on Poverty Alleviation 
(REPOA) - Access to Information in Tanzania: Still a Problem (2005) 
Hakielimu and DSA-TWG - Growing Out of Poverty: A Plain Language Guide to Tanzania’s 
NSGRP (2005) 
Hakikazi Catalyst - Bouncing Back: Some Grassroots Responses To The PRSP (2002) 
Hakikazi Catalyst - Influencing Poverty Reduction Strategy: PRSP, PRS And The PMMP 
(2002) 
Hakikazi Catalyst - Plain Language Guides (2010)  
Hakikazi Catalyst - Tanzania NGO Policy Forum: Towards A Protocol For Engagement In 
The Policy Process (2002) 
Hakikazi Catalyst – The NGO Policy Group: Towards Formalisation? (2002) 
Legal and Human Rights Centre - Labour and Employment Issues (2002) 
Legal and Human Rights Centre Annual Report (2004) 
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Appendix 4.1 Overview of NGOs Interviewed 178 
Name  Macro 
Group   
Type of 
NGO 
Focus of Work Base Website Publications 
NGO Policy 
Forum (NPF) 
Founded – 2001 
Yes Umbrella Advocacy 
1.Participation – 
Active Citizens’ 
Voices  
2. Public money 
3. Local 
governance 
DSM  Yes Yes – own 
research-based 
papers and 
Annual 
Reports 
Tanzania 
Gender 
Networking 
Programme 
(TGNP)  
Founded – 1993 
Yes Umbrella Advocacy and 
Training 
1. Gender  
2. Social 
transformation to 
enhance equity 
DSM Yes Yes – books, 
journal articles 
and own 
papers  
Tanzania 
Education 
Network 
(TEN/MET) 
Founded – 1999 
No Umbrella Advocacy  
1. Education – 
furtherance of 
quality basic 
education for all 
DSM Yes Yes – Reports 
and 
newsletters 
Tanzania 
Council for 
Social 
Development 
(TACOSODE) 
Founded – 1987 
179
 
Yes Umbrella Advocacy and 
Training 
1. Capacity 
building to achieve 
social Justice 
DSM Yes Yes – 
newsletters 
Economic and 
Social Research 
Foundation 
(ESRF) 
Founded – 1994 
Yes Unitary Research and 
Policy Analysis 
1. Capacity 
building - policy 
analysis and 
development 
management 
DSM Yes Yes – own 
research-based 
papers  
Research on 
Poverty 
Alleviation 
(REPOA) 
Founded – 1995 
Yes Unitary Research, Training 
and Policy Dev. 
1. Pro-poor growth 
2. Poverty 
reduction 
DSM Yes Yes – own 
research-based 
papers  
Legal and 
Human Rights 
Centre (LHRC) 
Founded – 1995 
Yes Unitary Research, Training 
and Policy Dev. 
1. Legal/Human 
Rights issues 
DSM Yes Yes – own 
research-based 
papers  
                                                           
178  As the appendix relates to the work of NGOs in Tanzania and is linked closely to issues analysed in 
chapter 4  
(The NGO Sector in Tanzania) it starts with 4.  
179
 TACOSODE has existed since 1965 under another name as a joint government- voluntary sector 
organization. 
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Oxfam 
Tanzania 
Active since 
early 1970s. 
Current 
strategic plan- 
2007 – 2017 
No 
 
Branch of 
BINGO 
Advocacy and 
Service-delivery 
1.Quality of 
education 
2. Smallholder 
agriculture 
3.Accountable 
governance 
DSM Yes Yes – own 
research-based 
papers  
Hakielimu 
Founded – 2001 
Yes Unitary Advocacy 
1.Provision of 
quality basic 
education 
2. Democratization 
of governance 
DSM Yes Yes, books, 
booklets, 
articles, own 
research-based 
papers 
Save the 
Children 
Tanzania 
Founded – 2001 
Yes Branch of 
BINGO 
Advocacy and 
service-delivery 
1. Education, health 
care and   shelter 
for vulnerable 
children 
DSM Yes Yes, own 
research-based 
papers 
ActionAid 
Tanzania 
Founded – 1998 
Yes Branch of 
BINGO 
Advocacy and 
service-delivery 
1.Education – 
formal/non-formal 
2.Advocacy – 
economic policies 
DSM Yes Yes, own 
research-based 
papers 
Pact Tanzania 
Founded – 2002 
No Branch of 
BINGO 
Advocacy – 
Training 
Mentoring, 
Technical 
Assistance 
1.Capacity 
building: areas – 
HIV/AIDS, OVC 
180
 Governance 
DSM Yes Yes, own 
research-based 
papers  
Youth 
Partnership 
Countrywide 
(YPC) 
Founded – 2002 
No Unitary Advocacy 
Building local 
democracy – 
accountability of 
local govt. 
authorities 
Kibaha No Yes – booklets 
and reports 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
180
  OVC = Orphans and Vulnerable Children. 
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Appendices 5.1 to 5.6 – Information and Issues Concerning Trade Unions 181 
 
Appendix 5.1 Tanzanian Unions Registered with the Office of the Registrar of Trade Unions  
Name of Trade Union TUCTA Membership 
Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU) Yes 
Tanzania Local Government Workers Union 
(TALGWU)  
Yes  
Tanzania Union of Industrial and Commercial 
Workers (TUICO) 
Yes  
Tanzania Union of Government and Health 
Employees (TUGHE) 
Yes  
Tanzania Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union 
(TPAWU) 
Yes  
Conservation, Hotels, Domestic and Allied Workers 
Union (CHODAWU) 
Yes 
Researchers, Academicians and Allied Workers 
Union (RAAWU) 
Yes 
Communication and Transport Workers Union 
(Tanzania) (COTWU–T) 
Yes 
Tanzania Railway Workers Union (TRAWU) Yes 
Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union 
(TAMICO) 
Yes 
Dock Workers Union of Tanzania (DOWUTA) Yes 
Tanzania Social Services Industry Workers Union 
(TASIWU)  
No 
Tanzania Fishing Crew and Allied Workers Union 
(TAFICAWU) 
No 
Telecommunications Workers Union of Tanzania 
(TEWUTA) 
Yes 
Industrial and General Workers union of Tanzania  
(IGWUTA) 
No 
Tanzania Union of Private Security Employees 
(TUPSE) 
No 
Tanzania Seamen’s Union (TASU) Yes 
Tanzania Union of Journalists TUJ) Yes 
Tanzania Media Workers Union (TMW) No 
Tanzania Pilots Union TPU) No 
Tanzania Agroforestry Workers Union (TAWU) No 
   Source: McQuinn (2011)  
 
                                                           
181  All appendices containing information and issues relating to trade unions start with 5, as they are linked 
closely to issues analysed in chapter 5. 
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Appendix 5.2 Tanzanian Trade Unions – Resources 
  
Trade Union Education/ 
Training 
Department 
Research/ 
Economics 
Department 
Gender  
Department 
or Officer 
Website Journal or 
Newsletter 
Email 
TTU  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
TALGWU No No No No No Yes 
TUICO Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
TUGHE No No No No No Yes 
TPAWU No No No No No Yes 
CHODAWU No No No No No Yes 
RRAAWU No No No No No Yes 
COTWU–T No No No No No Yes 
TRAWU No No Yes No No Yes 
TAMICO No No Yes No’ No Yes 
DOWUTA Yes No No No No Yes 
TASIWU No No No No No Yes 
TAFICAWU No No No No No Yes 
TEWUTA No Yes No No No Yes 
IGWUTA No No No No No Yes 
TUPSE No No No No No Yes 
TASU No No No No No Yes 
TTUJ No No No No No Yes 
TMW No No No No No Yes 
TPU No No No No No No 
TAWU No No No No No No 
Source: McQuinn, (2011, 2009).   
 
 
For purposes of identification, full names of trade unions with their abbreviations in brackets are provided in 
appendix 5.3. 
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Appendix 5.3  Tanzanian Trade Unions – Membership Figures   
Name of Trade Union Number of Members 
Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU) 157,000  
Tanzania Local Government Workers Union 
(TALGWU) 
37,493 
Tanzania Union of Industrial and Commercial 
Workers (TUICO) 
37,022 
Tanzania Union of Government and Health 
Employees (TUGHE) 
35,868 
Tanzania Plantation and Agricultural Workers 
Union (TPAWU) 
26,461 
Conservation, Hotels, Domestic and Allied 
Workers Union (CHODAWU) 
15,183 
Researchers, Academicians and Allied Workers 
Union (RAAWU) 
9,830 
Communication and Transport Workers Union 
(Tanzania) (COTWU–T) 
9,612 
Tanzania Railway Workers Union (TRAWU) 7,063 
Tanzania Mines and Construction Workers Union 
(TAMICO) 
6,456 
Dock Workers Union of Tanzania (DOWUTA) 2,700 
Tanzania Social Services Industry Workers Union 
(TASIWU) 
2,147 
Tanzania Fishing Crew and Allied Workers Union 
(TAFICAWU) 
2,000 
Telecommunications Workers Union of Tanzania 
(TEWUTA) 
1,478 
Industrial and General Workers union of Tanzania  
(IGWUTA) 
1,000 
Tanzania Union of Private Security Employees 
(TUPSE) 
600 
Tanzania Seamen’s Union (TASU) 270 
Tanzania Union of Journalists TUJ) 153 
Tanzania Media Workers Union (TMW) 51 
Tanzania Pilots Union TPU) 50 
Tanzania Agroforestry Workers Union (TAWU) 21 
Source – McQuinn (2011) 
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Appendix 5.4 
 
Scorecard on Trade Union Participation in the PRSP (1) 
 
The State of Social Dialogue: looks at the enabling environment for 
consultations in a particular country, focusing on:  
 
- The trade union situation 
- Violations of trade union rights 
- Constitutional provisions 
- Labour legislation 
- Ratification of ILO core conventions 
 
Source: Egulu, (2003)  
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Appendix 5.5 
 
Scorecard on Trade Union Participation in the PRSP (2) 
 
Trade Union Participation in the PRSP process: looks at the level of 
consultations with trade unions, focusing on: 
 
- At what stage were trade unions invited – at the very start, mid-point or 
not at all? 
- Did trade unions make ‘noise’ before being invited? 
- Did the labour ministry help? 
- If not invited at all, what steps did trade unions take? With what results? 
- Participation/chairing of thematic groups? 
- What views were espoused? Written document? 
- Does the PRSP contain trade union views? 
- If not, what have trade unions done? 
- Alliances with civil society organizations? 
- Alliances with employer federations/ 
- Involvement of the ILO? 
 
Source: Egulu, (2003)  
 
 
 
 
 419 
 
Appendix 5.6 
 
Scorecard on TU Participation in the PRSP (3) 
 
Labour Content of the PRSP: centres on the labour market issues covered in 
the PRSPs:  
 
- Employment 
- Pensions reforms 
- Social security measures 
- Wage policies 
- Human resource development 
- Technical, entrepreneurial vocational education and training (TEVET) 
- Labour code changes 
- Informal sector politics 
- Core labour standards 
- Anti-child labour policies 
- Micro finance 
- Occupational health and safety for workers 
 
Source: Egulu, (2003)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
